"They wanted a 'shaking' – they got it": Kyrychevsky on the strikes against Russian military factories

Ukrainian long-range strikes are targeting Russian ports, oil refineries, and facilities involved in missile production. Meanwhile, Russia claims to have intercepted American Rusty Dagger missiles, while Poland is discussing a possible exchange of MiG-29 fighter jets for Ukrainian drone-countermeasure technology.

Military expert Ivan Kyrychevsky, speaking on 24 Channel, explained the significance of the strikes on Ust-Luga, the refinery in Kirishi, and the Morozov Plant, and assessed Russian claims regarding American missiles. He sharply criticized Poland’s position on the transfer of MiG-29s and explained why Ukraine will likely have to return to blackout measures and what risks this poses for Ukrainian aviation.

Ukraine is systematically striking Russian missile factories

Ukrainian long-range drones attacked targets in the Leningrad Oblast, including the port of Ust-Luga, the oil refinery in Kirishi, and the Morozov Plant, where solid-fuel charges for rockets are manufactured. Why is this region so important to Russia, and what is the significance of such strikes?

To begin with, I’d like to propose a conceptual framework. There is a provision of international humanitarian law regarding the occupying state’s responsibility for the situation in the occupied territory. I propose to expand on this idea somewhat creatively: the aggressor country itself must bear responsibility for the consequences of the war it started, including what happens on its own territory.

They wanted a “shaking” – they got their “shaking.” As for exactly where their territory burned down, what means were used to cause the fire, and which units were involved – that’s another matter.

As for Ust-Luga, for me this is, to some extent, a pleasant case of déjà vu. During the spring wave of attacks on Russian ports in 2026, according to information that could be made public, our “Raid” regiment was also involved in the relevant operations. Therefore, this area is already well known to the Ukrainian Defense Forces.

What makes Ust-Luga unique is that Russia developed this port in the 2010s as a key long-haul export route. And this wasn’t just about oil and petroleum products, but other cargo as well. In my opinion, the Russian leadership expected that even in the event of a major war against Ukraine, it would be able to use this infrastructure without hindrance.

When the port was being developed, Moscow could hardly have imagined that Ukraine would have long-range assets capable of independently covering the distance to the Leningrad Oblast. And now, drones launched from Ukrainian territory are reaching targets that the Russians considered sufficiently far from the combat zone.

When the Russians were building Ust-Luga, who could have imagined – even in their wildest dreams – that we would have long-range weapons capable of reaching the Leningrad region under their own power? Launched from Ukrainian territory – and it made it there.

But it’s not just strikes on ports or oil refineries that matter. The Morozov Plant is part of Russia’s missile production, and its destruction fits into a much broader trend. The Ukrainian Defense Forces are systematically targeting both “Iskander” and S-400 launchers, as well as the facilities that produce these weapons.

According to my observations, at least ten key factories linked to the Russian missile program have sustained damage this year. The “Oko Gora” monitoring group also reported that October set a record for the number of attacks on Russian military-industrial complex facilities, with 18 targets struck.

In other words, we are not seeing isolated, random attacks, but rather a sustained campaign against a critical segment of the Russian military-industrial complex. Ukraine is trying to limit the enemy’s ability not only to launch missiles but also to produce new ones.

We still consider it an original idea that we must not only shoot down the arrows but also hunt down the archers. But the hunt for the archers themselves and for the bow production cycle is already proceeding at such a pace that the Russians can’t keep up with it.

The public is getting used to the results of Ukraine’s long-range operations so quickly that it sometimes fails to notice their scale. Yet not long ago, strikes against facilities critical to the production of Russian ballistic missiles seemed like a much more difficult task. Now such attacks occur regularly, and the Morozov Plant is one of the facilities in that production chain.

What Is Known About the American Rusty Dagger Missiles

The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have intercepted four American Rusty Dagger cruise missiles, but later began deleting some of the posts. What kind of weaponry is this, could Ukraine have obtained it, and is Russia’s behavior linked to the U.S.-Russia talks in Abu Dhabi?

First and foremost, the question arises: does Ukraine even have these missiles? Last fall, there were optimistic reports about U.S. plans to transfer up to 3,000 of these weapons to us. But intentions and actual deliveries are two different things, so I wouldn’t rush to draw conclusions based on Russian statements.

The Rusty Dagger was developed as part of the U.S. ERAM program, which launched in 2024 and reached a certain stage of implementation in 2026. It is a small-sized cruise missile that, in terms of its class, falls somewhere between traditional cruise missiles and jet-powered strike drones. There is still no complete consensus worldwide even on the correct terminology for such weapons.

For comparison, one might mention the Russian “Banderol.” It has a warhead weighing approximately 130 kilograms, with a total takeoff weight of about 260 kilograms. This is a relatively compact weapon, and the Rusty Dagger falls into roughly the same conceptual category, although the specifications of specific models may vary.

As early as the 2010s, the Americans were exploring the possibility of developing cheaper missiles for the wars of the future. They understood that it is not always practical to use expensive systems like the Tomahawk or the AGM-158 JASSM if a given mission can be accomplished with a significantly cheaper weapon.

However, difficulties arose in the practical implementation of such ideas. As a result, it was Russia and Ukraine that began to widely deploy small-caliber jet-propelled strike weapons before the corresponding American programs could reach significant scale.

The Americans have understood since the 2010s that the wars of the future would require not only expensive missiles like the Tomahawk or JASSM, but also something cheaper. But for about ten years, they didn’t have much success with this. And it was the Russians and us who were the first to start using such small-caliber jet-propelled weapons.

Another important point is production volume. Even under the most optimistic plans, Rusty Dagger production was expected to reach approximately 50 units per month. Therefore, reports of a possible transfer of thousands of missiles should be viewed with an understanding of how much time their production may require.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has its own designs for similar purposes. Specifically, these are the “Palyanytsia” and the “Bars,” which is better known in the media. In my opinion, the likelihood of such Ukrainian weapons being used during attacks on Russian territory should not be underestimated. Furthermore, “Palyanytsia” and “Neptun” are linked by a single manufacturer that is working on the production of these systems.

Therefore, I see no reason to unconditionally believe Russian reports. Moscow regularly claims military successes that do not correspond to the actual situation. We even see Russian propaganda declaring territories in Donbas as captured, when in reality they remain under Ukrainian control.

If the Russians saw a “Rusty Dagger” – that’s their problem. As for what was actually flying there, that’s not for public disclosure at this time. I suggest approaching this story with a certain degree of skepticism.

I cannot say for certain whether the removal of Russian posts is linked to the presence of the American delegation at the talks in Abu Dhabi. But even the claims about the allegedly shot-down missiles are not sufficient proof that Ukraine received and deployed the Rusty Dagger.

MiG-29s in Exchange for Ukrainian Drone Technology

The Polish Ministry of Defense announced an agreement to transfer MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine in exchange for drone-countermeasure technology. What specific technologies might this involve, and why is Poland interested in Ukraine’s experience with intercepting drones?

You know, throughout all these years of full-scale war, I’ve tried to take a moderate stance toward Poland. I believed we shouldn’t escalate tensions with the Poles, since cooperation with them is extremely important. But when it came to discussing the transfer of one airworthy and one non-airworthy MiG-29, frankly speaking, my patience ran out.

Let me explain why this elicits such a reaction. Poland already has certain capabilities in the field of countering drones. For example, it uses American Mirops interceptor drones, which I consider quite effective. The Ukrainian military also works with such systems and is achieving good results.

The Poles are beginning to develop their own long-range drones, including models that, in concept, resemble the “Shahed” in a specific application segment. So it’s perfectly understandable that they’re interested in Ukrainian technologies, since our army has extensive practical experience fighting Russian drones.

But the question is what exactly Poland is prepared to offer in return. Last summer, a Polish journalist who wrote the book *Poland at War* suggested that, in exchange for its existing fleet of MiG-29s, Poland might be offered a batch of Fire Point long-range drones and related technological developments. This was merely a theory, not a confirmed agreement.

Now, however, it seems that the Poles want to receive significantly more than they are willing to give. And if we’re really talking about just one airworthy aircraft and another that can’t fly, then to me such a proposal seems disproportionate.

All these years, I’ve tried not to escalate disputes with the Poles, because cooperation with them is important. But when it comes to one airworthy MiG and one that isn’t, I’ve had enough. If they’ve decided to hand these over to us on the principle of “here, take what I don’t want,” then our response may be commensurate.

Of course, our technologies must also be fairly evaluated. Ukraine has indeed achieved significant results in the development of anti-aircraft drones, but that doesn’t mean they’re already perfect. Many of these systems require constant refinement – updating the electronics, fine-tuning the guidance systems, and improving other components.

I know this well from my work supporting the units for which we are raising funds to purchase anti-aircraft drones. Such systems require regular refinement, and this is entirely natural for technologies that are being developed right in the midst of war. Therefore, if our Polish partners seek to benefit from Ukraine’s experience, they must understand not only the advantages of our designs but also the amount of work that goes into refining them.

There is also a broader political issue. Some Polish analysts constantly complain that Poland is not sufficiently involved in negotiations regarding Ukraine’s future and European security. They would like to see their country among the key participants in the process, roughly on par with France or Germany.

But such a role requires not only political ambition but also a willingness to shoulder the corresponding costs and obligations. In my opinion, the Polish side does not always demonstrate a willingness to pay that price. If the country wants to play a more significant role in European security matters, it must back up its claims with concrete actions.

Polish analysts would like Poland to play a role in the negotiations nearly on par with that of France or Germany. But there’s a catch – they aren’t willing to pay for it. And if they aren’t willing, then they shouldn’t expect any special treatment.

This seems particularly strange given that, according to my information, Poland still has at least 12 MiG-29s on paper. Their technical condition may vary – some of the aircraft may have been decommissioned – but even those unfit for flight could be of interest to Ukraine.

Today, we’re already using F-16s, counting on further development of our air force, and discussing the prospects of acquiring Gripen aircraft. However, the combat use of Ukrainian MiG-29s continues, as does pilot training on these aircraft. Therefore, additional aircraft – even if they require repairs or can be used as a source of spare parts – remain relevant to us.

I believe that such assistance could be useful for another five years. The Polish side must understand that we are not talking about obsolete equipment that Ukraine no longer needs, but about aircraft that are still performing combat missions.

And if the Poles have decided to haggle over every single MiG, then Ukraine also has the right to determine the conditions under which it will transfer its own technology. I don’t think we should automatically agree to any proposals simply because Poland is our neighbor and partner.

We’ll give our Polish friends a soldering iron – let them figure out the microchips on their own. We could also provide instructions on how to solder them into an anti-aircraft drone. If they’re haggling with us over every rusty MiG, then let them evaluate our assistance accordingly.

We’re interested in cooperating with Poland, and I don’t deny its importance for Ukraine. But cooperation must be mutually beneficial. If the Polish side wants to receive our technological developments and claim a significant role in European security matters, it must demonstrate a corresponding level of readiness to help Ukraine.

Why Kyiv Region May Need Blackouts

The Kyiv Regional Defense Council has recommended tightening blackout measures for businesses, utility companies, and the residential sector. Can Russian drones use illuminated objects as landmarks, and how effective would such a measure be?

Unfortunately, it is currently difficult to say definitively how effective blackouts will be against all modern Russian drones. That is precisely why, in my opinion, we’ll have to err on the side of caution. Moreover, I don’t rule out that these recommendations may eventually extend not only to the Kyiv region but also to other regions of Ukraine.

In 2022, the situation was somewhat different. At that time, Russian aircraft were still flying directly over areas where combat operations were taking place, and Russian planes were using conventional bombs, which required them to fly close to the target to drop them. At that time, the current capabilities for using guided bombs from a distance of several dozen kilometers did not yet exist to the extent that we are seeing today.

Recall the battles for Kyiv. Russian aircraft flew as far as the outskirts of the capital. I also recall reports of an incident in which a Russian Ka-52 helicopter allegedly reached the Poltava region and struck a target near Pyriatyn. Under such conditions, blackout measures served a perfectly understandable purpose.

Once Russian aircraft could no longer operate freely behind the front lines, the need for such a strict blackout regime diminished. But now other threats are emerging, linked to the development of drone guidance systems.

The problem is that the capabilities of Russian drones cannot be reduced solely to communication capabilities. They can be equipped with optical cameras, and under certain conditions, the images from these cameras are transmitted in real time. In addition, the enemy is developing systems that help drones navigate using visual landmarks.

The Main Intelligence Directorate reported, in particular, on the Russians’ use of the “Susannin” system. To explain its principle in very simple terms, the onboard computer may have a pre-prepared image of the route, and the camera compares it with what it sees during flight.

The Russians use satellite imagery that allows them to distinguish terrain features, populated areas, and other landmarks. The corresponding image is loaded into the system, and the drone can use it to verify its own route. If necessary, the course is corrected using navigation tools.

Russian drones are equipped with optical cameras. The Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) frequently refers to the “Susannin” system, in which a route image is stored in the computer, and the camera verifies whether the drone is flying correctly. And during such guidance, visual landmarks can also be important.

For example, a well-lit settlement or a large infrastructure facility may be visible from the air and help with navigation. Therefore, recommendations regarding light masking have a certain logic to them, although I wouldn’t go so far as to say that implementing them will automatically make all Russian drones less effective.

There is another factor that must be taken into account. In areas where there is insufficient coverage by ground-based air defense systems, the Ukrainian Air Force is forced to intercept Russian drones. The Air Force has repeatedly spoken about this.

And Ukrainian pilots also need clear reference points. If lighting is completely turned off across large areas, this could make it harder to locate populated areas and affect the execution of missions in the air. In particular, it is important not to create additional risks when intercepting drones near residential areas.

In my opinion, this is precisely why decisions regarding blackout measures must be made with due consideration for the needs of both ground-based air defense and aviation. It may be necessary to apply flexible rules depending on the situation in specific areas.

I think that over time we will be forced to return to blackout measures, but perhaps with certain flexible provisions. We need to limit the Russians’ capabilities without, at the same time, limiting the capabilities of our own air force.

Therefore, I am currently considering tightening blackout measures as a precautionary step. Ukraine must take into account the development of Russian guidance systems, but at the same time, it is important to maintain the effectiveness of our own means of countering air threats.

Kyrychevsky on blackouts in the Kyiv region: watch the video