"It's better to go to prison than to join the Armed Forces of Ukraine": Romanenko explained the problem with mobilization in Ukraine

Russia is intensifying its attacks on Ukraine’s energy sector, even though its offensive campaign has not yielded the expected results on the front lines. Ukraine needs additional missiles for air defense, but strengthening its defense capabilities depends not only on Western aid but also on resolving internal problems.

Military expert Lieutenant General Ihor Romanenko explained on 24 Channel why Putin has changed his approach to waging war and under what conditions he might decide to carry out a new mobilization. The founder of the “Let’s Close Ukraine’s Skies” Foundation also assessed the risks following the ceasefire in Oleshky and explained why mobilization in Ukraine will not become more effective without changes to legislation and law enforcement accountability.

Russia Has Shifted to a War of Destruction

During his visit to Berlin, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that the Russians are not achieving their objectives on the battlefield but maintain air superiority. The enemy is attacking thermal power plants – specifically the Ladyzhyn plant – using cruise missiles and drones. Does this mark the beginning of a new wave of energy terrorism ahead of winter, and how do the current attacks differ from those of last year?

We are indeed seeing a shift in approach. A few months ago, Putin conceptually shifted from a war of attrition to a war of destruction. And, unfortunately, this involves the destruction of our homeland, primarily through airstrikes.

This is linked to the situation on the front lines. Russian troops continue to advance in certain areas, but have not achieved the decisive results they had hoped for during the 2026 offensive campaign.

Moreover, according to my assessment, this year the Ukrainian Defense Forces have liberated more territory than the enemy has been able to capture. We saw similar results in 2022, but this is a very important indicator for the current phase of the war.

The Russians are also suffering enormous losses. According to the data provided, they lost approximately 54,000 military personnel in October, with the highest daily toll reaching about 2,250 killed and wounded.

Putin is aware of these problems but has not yet decided how to address them. One option is a new partial mobilization in Russia. In my opinion, such plans are already being considered, but the Russian leader is hesitant to implement them due to fears of social upheaval.

That is why he is increasingly focusing on airstrikes. What is particularly dangerous is that Russia is trying to destroy our critical infrastructure right before winter.

This isn’t just about electricity. Strikes on these facilities could disrupt water supply, heating, and other systems on which people’s lives in cities depend.

We must strengthen our missile defense as much as possible. This is primarily a matter of securing the necessary equipment from our partners, as specialized systems are required to counter ballistic missiles.

But it is equally important to develop other components of air defense. Ukrainians are already demonstrating significant potential in creating new technologies and means to counter drones.

I believe we need to expand the capabilities of organized air defense groups, particularly to protect the places where people live and work. The government and our allies are working to provide the necessary equipment, but we must also leverage our domestic capabilities.

The training of future officers is of particular importance. For example, together with other charitable foundations, we are helping to provide cadets at the Kharkiv University of the Air Force with modern simulators.

No simulator can fully replace real combat conditions. But it allows training to closely mimic what officers will face during their service. And the effectiveness of units and the reduction of casualties will depend on their professionalism.

The main task now is to strengthen defenses against missiles and drones at all levels. In my opinion, the destruction of energy infrastructure has become one of Putin’s priorities following the setbacks of his ground forces.

The Ukrainian leadership is exploring various ways to obtain the necessary resources. In particular, Zelenskyy has proposed temporarily suspending strikes on Russian oil refineries for one month if the United States, in return, provides Ukraine with an adequate number of anti-ballistic missiles.

This is one possible option for an agreement that could help strengthen our defenses ahead of the most challenging winter period.

Where Ukraine Can Obtain Additional Missiles for the Patriot System

Germany and the United Kingdom are preparing a joint plan to strengthen Ukraine’s air defense, which they intend to present at the “Ramstein” meeting on November 17. At the same time, Boris Pistorius notes a lack of information from the U.S. regarding the delivery timeline for the Patriot system, and production of PAC-2 GEM-T missiles in Germany is only just beginning. Can Europeans transfer missiles from their stockpiles to Ukraine while we wait for the promised 500 American missiles?

Both the Europeans and the Americans can help. European countries have certain stockpiles of missiles, but this raises questions about their maintenance schedules and future use.

Some of the missiles are nearing the end of their designated service life. If they are to be stored further, they will require inspections, maintenance, or replacement with newer models.

Therefore, the Ukrainian leadership is asking its partners to transfer these missiles to us now, when they are urgently needed for defense. Later, their stockpiles can be replenished with future American deliveries.

This refers, in particular, to the 500 missiles planned for delivery at a later date. At the same time, the specific timing of their arrival remains a critical issue, as Ukraine needs protection now, not in a few years.

However, not all European countries are ready to quickly transfer their stockpiles. The reason lies not only in the number of missiles available but also in pressure from Russia.

Putin is effectively threatening Europeans with possible strikes if they continue to help Ukraine. And some countries fear that after transferring the missiles, they themselves will be left with insufficient resources for their own defense.

Therefore, we must seek options that will simultaneously strengthen Ukraine and guarantee our partners that their arsenals will be replenished in the future.

As for Donald Trump, in my opinion, we need to speak to him in his own language. He constantly emphasizes deals, so we, too, need to propose concrete agreements that can deliver results.

If he wants Ukraine to stop striking Russian oil refineries, then we need to have substantive discussions about what U.S. missile defense capabilities the U.S. can provide in return.

This logic of agreements can also be seen in other diplomatic initiatives related to the war. For example, we saw how the humanitarian operation in Oleshky was presented as a personal diplomatic achievement of Melania Trump.

But the practical implementation of such operations is carried out by the relevant agencies, particularly intelligence and military ones. The public presentation of an agreement and the actual work of rescuing people are not the same thing.

It is important that we were able to evacuate a significant portion of our citizens. But the humanitarian outcome should not prevent us from assessing the military implications of the agreements, especially if the Russians were able to exploit the ceasefire for their own purposes.

Russia used the ceasefire to strengthen its positions

After the ceasefire ended in the Oleshky area, the General Staff reported that Russian troops had used those few days to regroup, set up anti-drone nets, and replenish their ammunition. To what extent might this intensify attacks on Kherson? Are new attempts to cross the Dnipro River possible, and what threats should we now expect?

In fact, this was quite predictable. We’ve already discussed that the Russians might use the humanitarian pause for their own military purposes. And that, in my opinion, is exactly what they did.

There was no need to harbor any illusions about the behavior of the Russian command. It was given time that could be used to strengthen its positions, bring in necessary supplies, and prepare for further actions.

It’s also important to keep in mind the Kremlin’s broader goals. Russia illegally incorporated the Kherson region into its Constitution, along with three other Ukrainian regions. Therefore, its leadership has not abandoned its plans to establish control over the entire territory of the region.

The Russians have already carried out several test attacks in the Kherson direction. We recall their actions near the Antonivsky Bridge, on the islands of the Dnipro River, near Oleshky, and in adjacent areas.

Now they may use their reinforced positions to make new attempts to attack Ukrainian units. But this does not mean that Russia already has sufficient forces for a large-scale crossing of the Dnipro.

The Dnipro River itself remains a very significant natural barrier. It substantially complicates offensive operations, and the right bank has a height advantage in many places, which is important for defense.

At the same time, we must not underestimate the danger of isolated attacks. The Russian command may attempt to operate in small groups, use islands, and test the resilience of Ukrainian positions.

We must also take into account that over the past three days or so, the residents of Kherson have had a respite from constant attacks. This was extremely important for the people, but the military must assess what capabilities the enemy has gained during this time.

There is also a broader aspect to Russian plans. Information is emerging – particularly citing intelligence assessments – that the Kremlin is considering new offensive operations on several fronts.

These include the south, the Kharkiv region, and the Chernihiv region. Russian leadership also continues to push the idea of creating so-called “sanitary” or “buffer” zones near the Ukrainian border.

First and foremost, they are considering the Sumy and Kharkiv regions, but the Chernihiv region is also mentioned among the potential targets.

So far, in my assessment, Russia lacks the forces to carry out such large-scale plans simultaneously. That is precisely why the issue of additional mobilization is becoming increasingly urgent for Putin.

He may try to draw on new reserves to increase troop numbers in these areas. But this will require time, preparation, and adequate logistical support.

The 2026 offensive campaign effectively failed to deliver the results Russia had planned. Therefore, I do not rule out that the Russian command is already shifting some of its objectives to next year, possibly to the spring.

This is also linked to the intensification of air strikes. As long as the Russians cannot achieve decisive results on the front lines, they are trying to inflict maximum damage on Ukraine with missiles and drones.

What conclusions should be drawn from the events in Borshchahivka

The SBU reported that it had identified approximately one hundred individuals involved in the events in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka, while Kirill Budanov claimed there was external influence. At the same time, military officer Anton Kolumbet drew attention to the possible existence of covert schemes involving the smuggling out of newly mobilized personnel and soldiers who deserted their units. What conclusions should the state draw from this incident?

In my opinion, decisions need to be made in at least two areas. The military has been discussing these issues for a long time – in fact, since 2022 – but the necessary changes have not yet been fully implemented.

First, legislation must be amended to strengthen accountability for fulfilling national defense obligations. This applies to both military personnel and civilians.

Second, ensuring the actual enforcement of even those laws that already exist. This is because the problem lies not only in the wording of regulatory documents but also in how the relevant authorities respond to violations.

We know that there are groups operating in Ukraine that offer to help people who are having problems with mobilization or their service in military units. Such offers have been appearing online since 2023.

When a high-profile case arises, lawyers, medical professionals, and others quickly step in to get involved. But here we need to determine exactly who they are, on what grounds they are operating, and whether their actions constitute a violation of the law.

For example, following the events in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka, a woman who was presented as a healthcare worker attracted significant attention. Questions arose regarding the institution on whose behalf she was allegedly acting.

I believe that such circumstances should be investigated by the competent authorities. If illegal schemes exist, law enforcement agencies should uncover them earlier, not only after they generate public outcry.

It is important to remember that the law defines citizens’ obligations regarding military registration, completing the necessary procedures, and providing documents regarding their health, family circumstances, and other factors that affect their ability to serve.

If these requirements are violated, the authorized state agencies must respond.

And this is precisely where questions arise regarding the police and the State Bureau of Investigations. They are responsible for addressing potential violations, not shifting this burden onto military personnel.

We often see that law enforcement agencies only begin to take active action after a conflict has already arisen, when the problem has escalated and come to light.

But proactive measures are needed. If there are groups that may be organizing the illegal removal of military personnel or otherwise obstructing the performance of military duty, this must be investigated in advance.

And responsibility must be borne not only by the direct participants in such schemes, but also by officials who had the authority to prevent violations but failed to ensure proper oversight.

Therefore, following the events in Borshchahivka, it is not enough simply to identify those involved in a specific incident. We need to determine why the problem arose, which mechanisms failed, and who is responsible for ensuring they function properly.

Why Mobilization Requires Legislative Change

Serhiy Sternenko and Yuriy Butusov have once again raised the issue of mobilization reform, which had previously been actively discussed, but the public has yet to see any noticeable changes. Should we revisit this reform and better explain to people exactly what the government intends to change?

But what is there to communicate if the necessary decisions still haven’t been made? We talk a lot about reforming mobilization, but the fundamental approaches remain virtually unchanged.

Currently, a significant portion of the responsibility for this process has effectively been placed on the Army command. But I consider this fundamentally wrong.

Mobilization is the state’s responsibility, not that of a single branch of the Armed Forces. Responsibility for organizing the process must first and foremost lie with the government and the relevant civilian state agencies.

The Armed Forces must carry out their immediate tasks, train military personnel, and ensure national defense. And the state must create a mechanism that will allow for the lawful, organized, and effective recruitment of troops.

We see that the government has begun to address mobilization issues more actively. However, attention is once again focused primarily on those citizens who are already registered and working within the legal framework.

In particular, checks are being conducted on draft registrations to identify cases where they may have been processed with violations. Undoubtedly, this needs to be done, as there may also be opportunities for corruption within the registration system.

But with this approach, we are only covering those whom the state already knows about.

According to available estimates, there are over 200,000 people classified as evading their mobilization-related obligations. A separate issue involves military personnel who have left their units without authorization.

Here, we need to clearly define responsibility. If we’re talking about violations of the law, law enforcement agencies – primarily the police – must take action.

I do not deny the need to hold representatives of the Territorial Recruitment Centers accountable when they themselves violate the law. The law must apply equally to employees of the Territorial Recruitment Centers and to all other citizens.

But we cannot focus all our attention solely on possible violations by representatives of the Territorial Recruitment Centers while failing to adequately address other problems.

In my opinion, the police are aware of a significant number of cases of draft evasion and unauthorized desertion from military units. However, taking active measures in this area may be unpopular, and officials are not always willing to take responsibility for such decisions.

As a result, we continue to face a situation where the military is performing functions that should be carried out by other government agencies.

There is also the issue of balancing accountability for legal violations with military service. I believe that the current mechanisms do not provide sufficient motivation to fulfill one’s military duty.

Under current law, it’s better to go to prison than to join the Armed Forces. And until this changes, there will be no progress in mobilization.

I am talking about the need to review the consequences for failing to comply with legal requirements. The state must create a clear system in which everyone is held accountable for their actions, and violations are not left without proper legal consequences.

The second fundamental issue is who exactly should be working with citizens. Inspections and other measures provided for by law must be carried out by authorized law enforcement officers within the scope of their authority.

But when processes that fall under the jurisdiction of state agencies are effectively managed by the Army Command, the system continues to operate according to the old principles.

Without changing this approach, the reform will not yield the desired results.

There is also currently discussion about the possibility of reviewing approximately 5% of registrations to identify cases of improper registration. But this again concerns people who are already registered and known to government agencies.

Meanwhile, those who are not properly registered or who violate established requirements remain a problem that requires systematic action.

All responsible officials must fulfill their duties. The government must formulate public policy; law enforcement must respond to violations of the law; and military command must ensure the execution of combat missions and the training of personnel.

I fear that the necessary decisions may once again be postponed until the situation becomes significantly more complicated.

If Putin decides to carry out a partial mobilization and is able to call up, for example, an additional 300,000 people, Russia will attempt to use these forces for new offensive operations.

Then Ukraine will have to react to the change in the size of Russian forces rather than prepare for it in advance. And catching up with the enemy under such circumstances will be much more difficult.

Russia has shifted to a war of destruction: watch the video