"The Kremlin Has No Intention of Negotiating": An Interview with Sahakyan on Putin's Plans, Trump's Concessions, and the Risks for Ukraine

The negotiations, which were supposed to bring the end of the war closer, increasingly resemble a political show, in which Russia gains time and new opportunities to put pressure on Ukraine. While Donald Trump tries to negotiate with the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin does not give up his maximalist demands and uses diplomacy as a continuation of the war by other means.

Political scientist Oleg Sahakyan, in an exclusive interview with Channel 24, explained why Russia is not really interested in peace agreements, how the Kremlin is trying to use the negotiation process to get closer to the United States, and why economic cooperation between Washington and Moscow is unlikely to have prospects. They also talked about the possible consequences of the midterm elections in the United States, potential meetings between Trump, Putin, and Zelensky, the future architecture of European security, and the risks for Ukraine if they try to end the war without real guarantees of protection. More in the material.

Why the Kremlin is faking negotiations

After a long pause, Putin agrees to resume negotiations. What has changed in his calculations? Did he see an opportunity to gain more from the negotiating track than on the battlefield, or was it something else?

No. Russia is resuming the negotiation process not as a process for agreements, but as a process of delay .

Here we need to take two steps back. Understand that there is a large militaristic component in the Russian diplomatic school. The Russians turn everything into a weapon. Sports in epaulettes, diplomacy the same, ballet, art the same. All this is jokingly described as "sticking out epaulettes" or "comrade" major. It doesn't matter whether he is in a pack with a conductor's instruction or, in this case, with a diplomatic case in his hands.

For Russians, diplomacy goes exclusively alongside the army. Its task is to create better conditions for the army to carry out its operations.

Question: Has Russia abandoned its own aggressive ambitions? No. Has Russia acknowledged that it cannot achieve results through military means? No. Is Russia perhaps so in trouble that it is asking for negotiations and is ready to offer something in return? No.

Okay, we can say that we don't have a definitive answer to these questions. We can only speculate. But then I offer one indicator: is Russia now making concessions in order for the negotiations to take place or not? Trump made concessions for absolutely nothing from Russia.

Therefore, for Russia, of course, such negotiations are currently beneficial because they allow us to improve the context on the front. They have no success. And to take and tie Ukraine's hands so that we do not attack the oil refinery, so that Ukraine then goes to some kind of disengagement where it is unprofitable for Ukraine, or the States put pressure, and Ukraine was forced to refuse this and, perhaps, they deprived us of something else. At least they did not increase pressure on Russia, did not increase military support for Ukraine.

Will this create additional problems in Europe with the United States, because it will conflict and contrast European security interests and the American desire to reach an agreement here and now?

The third point is what ties the hands in order to conduct economic cooperation with the States. Yes, in small forms, yes, in hidden forms, perhaps, but nevertheless it creates a space in which it is possible, under the guise of negotiations regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war and solely for the sake of ending the war with humanitarian goals, for example, to restore gas supplies. For example, to do something else, where now Russia and the States will sit at the valve together.

It seems to me that this is how the American and Russian teams imagine it. Therefore, Putin is not losing anything by entering into a simulated negotiation process. He is only gaining additional leverage for himself, with which he can either exert a strong influence or not so much. Maybe he will not be able to exert much influence at all, but at least he will burn time during which support for Ukraine could increase and pressure on Russia could increase.

So, going back to the direct answer to the question, today it's not about negotiations. Today it's about diplomatic maneuvers on the part of the Russians to secure better opportunities for themselves on the front.

And for Ukraine, this is a forced participation in this theater of the absurd in order to prevent the situation from worsening for us. Because no matter how much you feed Trump, he still looks at Moscow. He will gladly put any responsibility on Ukraine and at the same time until the last moment, and even after it, he will justify Putin. So that his beloved other half looks at each person the way Trump looks at Putin, and makes such concessions.
Interview with Oleg Sahakyan: watch the video

A few months ago, Putin, Lavrov, and the Russian leadership in general publicly demonstratively withdrew from the negotiation process. They then stated that they would be ready to resume the negotiation process only after the Ukrainian side withdraws its troops from Donbas, or even from Kherson and Zaporizhia. Why was this step taken then, to return now?

Americans have learned to play bad cop and good cop under the Trump administration. And the Russians are great at it.

There is a centaur, half-man, half-horse. The upper part is human, and the lower part is horse. Well, then there is Lavrov. He usually makes all sorts of terrible hawkish speeches. And then Dmitriev would come with another proposal, with another "zero in the check" that they could get if they helped Russia cooperate, etc. And there are some trillion-dollar projects: space exploration, building tunnels to Alaska, and a whole bunch of other things.

The classic game: there's a bad guy, and he raises the stakes, and then there's a good guy. Moreover, Dmitriev played the card several times in negotiations with Witkoff and Kushner that give me something, I need some kind of victory, which I'll come and put on the table for my boss Putin, because otherwise Lavrov will come, and Lavrov will already be blowing his ears that we need to wave the nuke again, that we need to attack.

I am sure that Lavrov is far from being as uncompromising and hawkish as the role he is currently assigned. And Dmitriev is far from being such a softie and a boy who advocates for peace and is simply ready to hang around between Russia and the States until his feet are full, just to end the war.

This game is classic, clear, very primitive and simple . About as primitive as Trump, which is why it works.

Why cooperation between the Kremlin and Washington has no prospects

How far can economic cooperation between Russia and the United States of America go?

Not far away. Cooperation between the United States and Russia has no serious prospects .

If we take the sectors, for example, gas, oil, which Trump really wanted. Surveys at the start of this whole story more than a year ago of American companies, conducted by their business associations, showed the result. None of the American companies are ready to enter Russia with hydrocarbon projects.

Why? Because the world is bursting at the seams. Because they will come in again with big investments and they will be abandoned again. The day after tomorrow there will be a big war. Everyone understands perfectly well that Russia will stagnate one way or another. It will take a year, two, five, but it will not take a decade or a century.

Accordingly, any long money will not enter Russia at the moment, if we are talking about hydrocarbons. Plus, the stagnant demand for hydrocarbons in the world, especially from Russia. Accordingly, why do this? To also become dependent later on China, which will buy or not buy it from you?

Because Europe is gradually giving up. In the future, after the launch of additional production by Turkey, Cyprus, on the Mediterranean shelf, plus Norway, which is also not reducing production, European consumption itself will fall. Therefore, there is no interest in this.

Okay, invest in construction. Very funny. Construction in Russia. Where? Where? What to build in a war economy, from which Russia will still be a long time coming out? I understand sensitively that no. Later, perhaps, yes. Very short-term with short money. When they started, they withdrew a year later.

Therefore, there are no queues in America of businesses ready to enter Russia, and there is no way around it. Not to mention the fact that some companies are beholden to Europe and, accordingly, would very much hate to be subject to sanctions, because it is not American sanctions that are the most terrible in terms of global impact, but European ones.

Today, this is the situation. And the European market is much larger, no one wants to lose it. And there are much fewer political risks here. Therefore, even with the presence of purely European sanctions and the lifting of American ones, we imagine a catastrophic situation, this will undoubtedly have an impact, but it will not have an absolute impact.

The third point about their cooperation. State cooperation. Congress, American public opinion. Which American politician would go against 90% of American society to cooperate with Russia in conditions where there is no peace, no positives, nothing happens? Now Trump wanted to play the game of allowing Russian diesel to enter the American market. The electoral result is catastrophic for him. The consequences are already being recorded by American sociology. That's it.

And what did Vance just say the other day? Oil prices are rising because of Iran. Wow, wow. The epiphany happened in just a week. Before that, it turns out because of Ukraine and the fact that Ukraine is bombing refineries. Ukraine is not bombing refineries. Ships are sailing to the United States with Russian diesel, and prices are renewing the historical maximum.

And we have to admit the reality, because the American voter, of course, likes to be told sweet things. But he comes to the gas station, and he sees the price tag there. And he sees the continuation of the Russian-Ukrainian war and understands the inadequacy of these statements. Therefore, there is no room for cooperation here either.

And not to mention, for example, some indirect projects a la the restoration of gas supplies to Europe with American participation. They directly dispersed and hit their heads against the wall in Europe to allow not only Russia, but the Russian-American connection to control their own energy security. To completely forget about their subjectivity.

We recall the words of Mr. Borrell, the former head of the EU foreign policy department, who led it at the beginning and throughout the Russian full-scale invasion. And not so long ago, literally a year ago, things changed. His standard speech at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the European Union, usually these are closed meetings, closed speeches, but this time it was published.

He said that the days when European prosperity was based on cheap energy from Russia, cheap goods and manufacturing from China, and the delegation of security to the United States were over. Such prosperity was too expensive for Europe.

How do you assess the potential deal factor regarding Lukoil?

This is an exclusively business, corrupt "internecine quarrel", where they decided to quickly "cheat" and bribe.

The Russians don't change their methods. Why change them if they work? This is classic bribery. It's not just through Arab funds that this can be done. You can also do it directly through company approvals. I don't think it will work. Really. It won't work.

What are the 2 possible scenarios after the US election?

If we talk about the election factor, or rather the election results. What happens in the negotiation track, in the relationship between Trump and Putin, if Democrats win both houses of Congress? And another scenario, if the upper house, the Senate, still has a Republican majority?

I think too much is being bet on the results of the third day, who will win. For Ukraine, of course, this is extremely important, but not as much as is being described.

The first important point, in my opinion, is that the transition of power generally takes place normally, that the election results are established, are recognized, and that the States are not sucked into a long political crisis, and, God forbid, a bloody one, because there are a lot of weapons in their hands, because the boiling point is high. And this scenario, in my opinion, is the first to be considered.

What for Ukraine? The main thing is that intelligence and weapons arrive in the same way that Starlink worked. That's all. This is the only thing we have from the States right now, and this is what is critically important for us.

That's a lot.

And we haven't received anything else for a long time. There is no financial support from the United States. Trump came, closed all programs for financing Ukraine, and accordingly, all this is now being done exclusively by Europeans and partners from other regions, such as Canada, Japan, Australia, etc.

Second. The weapons that were transferred to us from Pentagon warehouses or purchased under direct procurement programs for Ukraine are not being purchased. This is not happening. Three. Any increase in the quality of types of weapons, the transfer of newer aircraft to Ukraine – nothing like that is happening.

That is, absolutely everything is limited to the sale of weapons. Therefore, these things need to be preserved. Even in the event of a deep political crisis, I don't think anyone will seriously touch them. Especially now, when Trump tried to get away with it completely, both politically and economically, losing a whole series of contracts.

So I think the risks of this were there, but they were minimized by the fact that Trump played this card now, before the election.

Two. Okay, scenario: the transition happens more or less without going into extreme situations, and the Republicans keep the Senate, lose the House of Representatives. In this case, the restraining straitjacket on Trump is not very tight. Accordingly, he can still abuse his rights in relation to the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Simply put, he will still have certain opportunities to put pressure on Ukraine, which he will try to use as soon as a window of opportunity opens for him. So the situation is riskier for us.

Okay, the Democrats win both chambers. In that case, the straitjacket around Trump tightens. Accordingly, the risk of negatives for us is less.

But in both scenarios, I don't see a guaranteed or significant chance that Trump will suddenly come to his senses, he will have a catharsis, I don't know, some kind of revelation will come to him. And he will suddenly want to support Ukraine and smear Putin with a thin layer. I don't think so. And American parliamentarians don't have the mechanisms to seriously force Trump to do this.

Here everything will depend on what political barters will take place in American politics, what the internal electoral situation will be, what the situation will be in relations with China and other actors. Based on this, Trump's corridor, which will put pressure on him, will narrow.

But this is Trump. Trump periodically makes self-destructive steps. To take action now to stop the supply of intelligence data to Ukraine and restrict communications was as easy as taking action and jumping off a balcony onto the concrete of an electoral college.

And everyone understood that there would be no benefit from this. This is a step that is striking in its stupidity. And yet he did it. Now everyone is raking up the negatives. It brought absolutely nothing, except problems for the Republican Party and a worsening of the situation for Trump. But he did it.

So to say that there is anything guaranteed in American politics? No, it is broken. This machine works and will periodically fail. Accordingly, we can predict how it will work, but it can take and fail at any moment. Something like this.

So when the mechanism is broken, it's safe to say that if Democrats come, it will be like this, if Republicans come, it will be like this, no, it doesn't work. The political system is broken.

Who really benefits from the meeting of Russia, China and the USA?

I want to talk to you about two potential trilateral meetings. The first is Trump, Putin, and Zelensky. And the second is Trump, Putin, and Xi Jinping. What are your odds that such meetings can happen? And if they do, what might be decided at them?

I am skeptical about the possibility of a trilateral meeting between the United States, Russia, and China. Such a meeting may well take place, but with zero results. It will most likely not take place.

Whether it will happen or not will depend on what Putin is ready to offer China and the United States. The United States is okay, everything is clear here. But what to offer China?

If he gives away deep-sea ports, for example, in the Arctic, for this or gives an even bigger discount on gas or something, it should be very practical, very rational, then Xi Jinping can go for a three-way meeting, smile brightly at the camera, and wave his hand.

No high-level "Yalta 2.0". In this situation, I don't see any benefit for China. What are the global topics that China is really interested in right now, the States are interested in? This is the topic of artificial intelligence, the topic of nuclear weapons, the topic of Iran and trade.

On nuclear weapons. China is against a three-way meeting. They will not negotiate because China has a smaller nuclear potential than Russia and the United States. And they have refused many times.

They do not participate in negotiations on disarmament and deterrence, because they say: "Okay, you reduce yours to our potential, then we will talk. Or we will increase ours to yours, and then we will talk. And now we will not agree to slow us down when we are gaining strength, so that it will be easier for you." Therefore, they will not agree on this together.

Artificial intelligence - why is Russia in this process? How can we negotiate on artificial intelligence if there is no Japan, if there is no France, if there are no other countries that also already have their own sovereign systems, have their own large companies that are seriously represented on the international artificial intelligence market?

Without the European Union, which is today the key trendsetter in regulating artificial intelligence and the digital space in general, there is nothing to talk about. And Russia is a nanodwarf there.

The third point. Regarding Iran. China has failed. It has been unable to do anything about the Strait of Hormuz being blocked. Despite the fact that it has even sent ships closer there. The States have failed. They cannot do anything about Iran. They cannot.

The Russians play a minor role by supplying and buying, but they can neither unblock nor block, nor help nor save. Russian air defense over Iran failed miserably. Not a subject.

Iran is a monument to the inability of "great powers" to do anything. With Iran, it became clear that this unipolar, bipolar world has gone to the bottom.

So, returning to the topic of this meeting as a whole, well, which one, I'm sorry, Tehran or Yalta? When they can't accept some rules of the game that will be directive for others. Who will they tell them directively? India? That the States and China have agreed on how India should be in world politics now and where it belongs, and how to play.

Will they tell the European Union? Maybe they will tell Pakistan and Turkey and the Arabs of the New Union? There is no world in which this could be done.

And so it's interesting that before Anchorage, they had to negotiate with Trump, before Xi Jinping, their meeting with Putin was already a good ten during a full-scale war, and they are rushing to a potential meeting of the three at a time when the world in which it had great significance, where it was possible to sit down and redraw the world map, is no longer there .

It has remained in postmodernity. It does not exist socially, economically, digitally, politically, or even commercially. Without the European Union, if we talk about sanctions and big trade, which interests China, there is nothing to talk about.

Therefore, the Russian-Ukrainian war, with all due respect to us, is not an issue on which there is a consensus among the three of them and generally something on which there can be an agreement. And in this case, this meeting is necessary only for Putin. If Putin offers something very expensive, they will buy from him. Or rather, they will sell him this meeting. If Putin does not offer anything expensive, then there will be no meeting.

In any case, expect this meeting to bring some kind of breakthrough, that something will be agreed upon, some kind of big deal... Will Xi Jinping now make a big deal with Russia, whose backyard is in his pocket? It's about how you would discuss buying a new apartment with a parrot that sits on your windowsill, and agree with it which apartment you will move to.

Or with Trump, the "lame duck", where he is now looking at Trump through binoculars and thinking whether to take this duck or not. He has already hunted it. Why? I don't know where those who are now talking about big deals between big countries get their inspiration and imagination .

There are no more big agreements, no big countries, and the world is bursting at the seams. And in the near future, there will be no points of certainty from the nuclear superpowers anywhere near.

Why Zelenskyy shouldn't meet with Putin now

Second meeting. Do you believe that Trump, Zelensky, and Putin can meet?

I have even less faith in a meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin. Why would Putin meet with Zelensky? I'll even put it bluntly: why would Zelensky meet with Putin?

Zelensky simply needs to talk about his readiness for such a meeting in order to prevent this argument from being used against us. But Putin is not interested. Putin says that they are fighting a "big war". For him, Zelensky should not exist at all. As, in fact, for the States. Also, Ukrainian subjectivity interferes with it. And right now its name is Zelensky.

His personal qualities resonate with this quite brightly and beautifully. We are constant beneficiaries of Zelensky's strengths, and at the same time we are constant hostages of his weaknesses. And, unfortunately, in a situation of war, the role of a figure always gains additional weight, and in conditions of weak institutions, it gains almost absolute weight.

Therefore, we have no shock absorbers for Zelensky's personal weaknesses and flaws. Thank God, at least we have positives. And accordingly, he is annoying now.

What? Putin can meet only if Ukraine is ready to capitulate.

So we don't need the United States to capitulate at all. We were not going to, are not going to and will not do this. This is obvious from the dry numbers, this is obvious from the situation at the front, this is clear from the internal sociology, this is clear from the security situation in Europe in general. Therefore, such a trilateral meeting, it is only a subject of conversation and diplomatic revenge.

Well, it's just that now, when the scenery of the negotiation process has been unfolding again, I would call it, including Trump, and in general, such news has started to appear in the information space. That's actually why I asked you about this potential trilateral meeting.

Since Trump took office as president, negotiations have not taken place for a single day. The scenery is there. What is happening is theater, theater of the absurd, in which Trump sometimes sits in the hall and says: "I am a spectator," then runs out onto the stage: "I am the director, now I will tell you what goes where," then periodically tries to play the role of a prima and perform on stage himself, and then the audience applauds him and says: "Oh, how well I did!"

And all visits are at most consultations. What is their legal status? What is their normative-diplomatic status? None. What are the binding elements? None. What are the guarantee elements? None.

If we take the entire corpus of design of this so-called negotiation process, we can see that it is a shadow of negotiations. It lacks the basic elements that are necessary for anything to be called negotiations at all.

After all, we have already seen their successes in the Middle East in Israel, Iran, Palestine and the entire process around it from the Kushner clan. They played with that toy, broke it and started a new one in the Russian-Ukrainian war. And they are already breaking this one.

What is the dangerous scenario for the end of the war?

According to "Ukrainian Pravda", Kyiv wants to shift the focus of the negotiations from Donbas to the future architecture of European security. My question is: can such a change in the rules of the game destroy the Russian negotiating strategy? Well, that is, to stop these talks exclusively about Donbas and shift the focus of attention to the future architecture of European security.

Here again, we need to separate the "flies from the cutlets" a little. The issue of European security was undermined by Russia, because the security structure that was built on the romantic idea from the twentieth century, so revived from the pages of Dumas's "The Three Musketeers" - "One for all and all for one", the idea that lay at the heart of NATO, etc., crumbled.

Russia managed to de facto defeat the idea of transatlantic unity by attacking it where it did not exist, in Ukraine. They fight here, but capitulate there. But that's how the globalized world works. An idea can be killed not even where it is formally present. It can be killed where it is, even informally. And Ukraine remained the biggest romantic, Euro-Atlanticist in Europe. And the humiliation in Ukraine of the ideas on which NATO is based knocked the ground out from under its feet and actually made us disappointed in NATO's effectiveness even without direct verification.

And then Trump, who decided to completely collapse NATO... It was not Putin who killed him. NATO also killed transatlantic trust, which will now be restored by generations of voters. This will not change even during the next term, and perhaps even several more terms of office of politicians, the situation will not change. There will be no transatlantic trust.

In these conditions, we have a situation where the system that at least illusoryly ensured European security has collapsed. Something must come to replace it.

The Russians are trying to carry out this revision by joining this process, saying: "We will now, with Russian force and boots, determine the contours and outlines of the European collective security system. You will coordinate it with us."

Ukraine is holding back this process and preventing Russia from achieving success not only in seizing Ukraine, not only in provocations against others, but also in ensuring that Russia is the determining factor in what the architecture should be, who should expand, who should not expand, how many troops to have, not to have, where to go, where not to go, where the zones of influence are, etc.

These are all ideas that come from a deep and dense past, which Russia is trying to impose in the form of a world built on the right of force.

And that's why this dialogue is necessary. But it's not a dialogue with Russia. It's a dialogue in which Europe, more broadly than the European Union, must come to an agreement, and also play a role, in order to ensure this contour.

And geopolitical subjectivity is achieved only through how you interact with the external contour, because you can hallucinate anything you want inside. That is why this system needs Canada, Japan, Oceania, Africa, etc. The role of Europe in relation to them, the agenda that will unfold here, and Ukraine are an integral part of this architecture.

Therefore, this dialogue is necessary, because the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war cannot occur in isolation from the formation of a collective security system. Otherwise, any freeze, any incomplete completion of the Russian-Ukrainian war will lead to the fact that all of European security will limp, and this will happen at the expense of European security.

For us, for Ukraine, this means at the expense of our rear, and we will be waiting with our heads turned 180 degrees back all the time, waiting for something somewhere in Europe to rebel, break, and our flanks will open. On the other hand, this will mean that our war will also go into low intensity, any other, but it will not end, and it will definitely return with Russian revenge, because they will want to take revenge .

And we will have to live in a military camp mode all the time, expecting this revenge not tomorrow, but in a year, in five. As soon as there is another escalation on the Korean Peninsula, howitzers are immediately rolled out.

Because the barrage of fire that North Korea provides is aimed at Seoul. Seoul is located right on the border of the demarcation zone, that is, the disengagement zone. And there, with just cannon artillery, you can destroy all of Seoul. And we could find ourselves in such a situation if the issue of European security is not resolved.

Conversely, any agreement here will be a precedent for it and more broadly. But this is not about dialogue with Russia, this is not about dialogue with the States, this is not about dialogue with China.

But the formation of a European system of collective security and understanding the subjective positions of Europe is an opportunity to set an agenda from which it will then be possible to talk to China, talk to Russia, talk to the States. Well, to talk to Russia clearly, that is through Ukraine by force. This is the only available effective mechanism for Europe, and it should go hand in hand with classical diplomacy.

Now, representatives of the Scandinavian countries, The two leaders called and spoke with Putin , conveyed the European position in order to demonopolize the American channel. Very competently. They met with Ukraine nearby, strengthening us at the meeting with Witkoff. Thus, they legitimized their opportunity to be in the process and now they have spoken out in favor of Russia.

And thus, for Russia, there is not one player on that side, but at least three players: one with whom Russia does not want to talk, Ukraine; one with whom Russia wants to talk, the United States; two with whom Russia can talk, but there will be no good result for it.

And appealing to metaphors and analogies, Russians like to call themselves bears. How do they hunt bears? They drive them in with dogs. It is impossible to confront a bear head-on. A bear must be driven in.

And I suspect that what we are now observing may already be the beginning of a story about the Russians having to play on several chessboards at the same time. They like to turn over chessboards, they like to convert one into another. When on the other side there is one player sitting, and the chessboards are different. And it is necessary that there are 5-7 players sitting with a coordinated game opposite Russia so that they do not have time to moderate these boards, so that they accumulate problems on each of them.

Actually, this process is just beginning, so against this background, talking about European collective security is critically important for Ukraine, it is our existential interest. But this is not about negotiations with Russia about this, this is about negotiations with our partners in Europe in order to have a reliable rear, and to talk to Russia from a position of strength, and not from a position of persuading Russia to negotiate, as the United States does.

Why Trump Can't Give Putin What He Wants

The Economist writes that the Americans are offering Moscow sanctions relief, economic deals, and even the resumption of Nord Stream. My question is: don't we risk a situation where Putin starts to reap the dividends of peace even before he agrees to end the war?

In general, holding negotiations with Russia without a ceasefire is a major diplomatic failure that was committed by the collective West, no matter who considers themselves part of it or who is part of it.

The States made this big "sausage" for everyone, because without intercepting the escalation initiative from the aggressor, going to negotiations is either irresponsibly entertaining oneself with illusions, or betraying oneself and one's partners.

Why? Because if the aggressor continues to hold the escalation initiative, he decides how he shoots, how much he shoots, with what intensity he shoots, where he attacks, and where, on the contrary, he may not attack at this time.

So accordingly, you go to negotiations with a terrorist when he is holding hostages and shooting at you, and you are disarmed, and he is not surrounded, he can go anywhere. On the contrary, you can only go to negotiations with a terrorist when you have seized the escalation initiative.

He understands that he is being targeted. He understands that any step he takes will be even worse if he tries to escalate. Then negotiations are an alternative to a forceful solution, but they must be an alternative to a forceful solution. And for this, a forceful solution must exist.

And if negotiations begin by rejecting a forceful solution and leaving the forceful solution to the aggressor, who controls the escalation initiative, then it turns out that we are begging for negotiations, and the aggressor says: "Well, you are weak, you want negotiations."

In everyday life, it is impossible to fight off a rabid dog that attacks you by telling the dog: "Don't attack." You take a stick and hit it. And if you are afraid of hurting this dog and each time wave the stick somewhere nearby, saying: "Well, next time I'll hit it, I'll hit it," etc., then the next time it is not taken seriously, because the dog understands perfectly well: you will not hit it.

The Russians are crazy. They only understand the language of force. And the negotiations so far have been built on the premise that we refuse force but go "talk." That doesn't work.

And yet, if everything continues to develop under this structure, can Putin get all these "buns" that were listed by The Economist?

To answer directly to The Economist article, no, he won't get those bonuses. But Putin will win something else – he will win time .

Instead of the circle around him narrowing, it freezes, weakens a little, pulses a little again. And he can sell it as inside Russia, as something like, look, I told you they would break first. They will blink, not us. Like with Crimea: no one believed, but I did. You see, it will be the same here.

Now a civil war will start in the States, and we will take Ukraine with one left. It will not work. Then he will say: "Now, in the spring, by the summer, we will add Ukraine, because the elections in France, Le Pen will come in the elections, and now we will take Ukraine with one right." And so they have been living for several years.

And these "buns" that are being offered are impossible to implement. Trump has no way to implement Nord Stream, to unblock it. Will Trump decide this? Ridiculous. Tell that to Germany.

Maybe the far right will come, AFD, and do it in Germany. Trump and Musk will support them a couple more times, and their ratings will go even lower in Europe. This Jewish kiss from across the ocean is already well known in Europe. Orban can tell if anyone is interested.

Will they lift sanctions on Russian diesel, like they do now, oil, gas, everything else? They tried with diesel in this volume, for 60 days only with a postponement, etc. And it came to Trump's head from a direct feed.

Because what did some American parliamentarians say? We had a precedent this week. For the first time in Trump's term, parliament twisted his hands, and not just his hands, but all the causal places.

And the Republican Party parliamentarians very boldly and clearly hinted to Trump that they would not vote for any personnel decision unless support for Ukraine was restored. And Musk was reborn with this series of tweets, and Trump personally had to say that there were no problems with various data. Well, if there were, it has already been resolved. In any case, now there are definitely no problems.

Why? Because, apart from the fact that the elections are over, during this period of two months after them, the current composition of the chambers still functions, and the Trump team wants to drag out personnel decisions during this period, all possible seats that can only be filled by their people. And if their deputies refuse to vote during this period, then this plan is covered with a copper basin for them.

Accordingly, Trump had to undo all these decisions, because this is a very heavy blow. So what is he doing next? Does he want to lift sanctions on Russia? Of course, I could doubt Trump's intellectual abilities, but I think not in his instinct for self-preservation.

And if we talk about understanding this situation, then it is at the level of training. They climbed - they hit. I think that this should have reached everyone by now.

What does Putin expect from the American midterm elections?

Destabilization of the United States. And Russia will do its utmost to do so. I am sure that Russia will destabilize the United States, and in particular it can sell this to China, because in this way China can benefit from this situation without getting itself into trouble.

The Russians have much more mechanisms and tools to destabilize the situation in the States. One of them is a weapon of mass television destruction, Tucker Carlson, what is it worth. And there are still such people in Russia. And Russia has its hands free, because what else will they do to them? Everything has already happened, they say.

Why you shouldn't be fooled by illusions about security guarantees

When this specter of negotiations, the negotiation process, reappeared, they started talking about various security guarantees. Similar to the fifth article and so on. Do you believe at all at this stage in any real security guarantees signed on paper for Ukraine? And who is going to sign them?

I don't believe in any security guarantees. I only believe in guaranteeing Ukraine's ability to resist, to win, and to ensure its security.

Any security guarantees today are not guarantees to fight for us. I don't believe it. It will depend on the political situation in the country that gives such guarantees. The day after tomorrow it will change. So what, will a conditional Le Pen come to France and will she fulfill such guarantees? Or will she be imprisoned later for not fulfilling them? Let's not entertain ourselves with illusions.

Czechoslovakia was helped a lot by the guarantees it had from the Soviet Union and Britain. Nevertheless, Hitler came, took part of the Sudetenland, and everyone turned a blind eye to it and had the Munich Tea Party.

Therefore, in periods when the world order is cracking at the seams, it is a period of scattering stones, not gathering them. To talk about any guarantees is either to be stupid, or I don't even know how naive one has to be, that it would amount to stupidity. I don't believe in it.

This interview has been shortened, corrected, and edited for better understanding by the audience.