"Another year and a half – and the Russian oil industry might be gone": Svitan on the strikes against oil refineries

Ukraine is stepping up its strikes on Russian oil refineries, and the latest attacks have targeted facilities that supply fuel to Moscow and the Moscow region. At the same time, the Republicans’ defeat in the U.S. congressional elections could change Washington’s approach to military aid for Ukraine and open up new opportunities for arms deliveries.

Military expert, flight instructor, and Ukrainian Armed Forces Reserve Colonel Roman Svitan explained on 24 Channel why Donald Trump’s weakened position could benefit Ukraine and how relations with the U.S. should be built moving forward. He also assessed the consequences of strikes on the Russian oil industry, estimated the possible timeframe for its potential collapse, and explained why even a powerful electronic warfare shield would not provide complete protection for Ukrainian cities.

Trump’s defeat opens up new opportunities for Ukraine

The Republicans suffered a defeat in the U.S. midterm congressional elections, while the Democrats strengthened their positions. At the same time, discussions are already underway in Washington regarding the potential accountability of Pentagon leadership. Could this become a window of opportunity for Ukraine and potentially lead to a shift in U.S. military support?

I was intrigued by Donald Trump’s explanations regarding the war with Iran. He claims that the emergence of nuclear weapons in that country could not be allowed. But why, then, doesn’t the United States take the same approach toward North Korea, which already possesses a nuclear arsenal?

There is also Pakistan, which possesses nuclear weapons. And despite the complex situation in the region, that country is aware of its responsibility for the possible consequences of using them.

Therefore, Trump’s arguments regarding Iran seem unconvincing to me. In my opinion, the U.S. administration misjudged the threat and then began to justify its decisions by citing the need to counter Iran’s nuclear program.

I believe that the war in the Middle East was primarily driven by economic interests and the desire to drive up global oil prices. American, Israeli, and Russian oil and gas companies stood to benefit from this.

Instead, they tried to shift the political blame for the price hikes first onto Iran, and later even onto Ukraine. We heard accusations that our strikes against the Russian oil industry allegedly caused diesel prices to rise in the U.S.

But we cannot ignore the role of the parties to the conflict in the Middle East themselves. It was their decisions, in my opinion, that created the conditions for this turn of events.

The situation on the oil market is now beginning to change. Following a period of high prices, supply is gradually increasing, and I expect oil prices to continue to fall.

For Ukraine, the results of the U.S. election create a more favorable political situation. Trump has lost the ability to rely entirely on the Republican majority in Congress, so his influence on legislative decisions will be limited.

Congress is the legislative branch of the United States. And now we can hope that it will more actively adopt decisions that align with democratic principles and the interests of America’s allies.

This also applies to sanctions against Russia. The new political balance could complicate situations where sanctions are used as a bargaining chip with the countries or companies against which they are intended.

The most important thing for us is to make the right use of these changes in the military sphere. Diplomatic and geopolitical issues should be resolved by politicians, but a concrete opportunity is opening up in terms of supplying the Ukrainian army.

We need to work actively with Congress and explain to American lawmakers exactly what weapons Ukraine needs.

One option that, in my opinion, is worth revisiting is the Lend-Lease program.

I believe the U.S. has obligations to Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum. Therefore, the U.S. must help us restore the defense capabilities that Ukraine lost after giving up its nuclear arsenal.

It will take the new Congress about a month or two to begin full-scale work. Therefore, starting in January, we need to engage in substantive discussions regarding the supply of American weapons under Lend-Lease.

I propose a model under which Ukraine would receive weapons now, and payment for them could be made in the future using Russian reparations following our victory.

To achieve this, we do not necessarily have to wait for the U.S. administration to propose a new aid package on its own. Ukraine must approach Congress with specific needs and possible mechanisms for meeting them.

Why Trump’s Promises Failed to Deliver Results

Trump repeatedly promised to end Russia’s war against Ukraine and spoke of a possible ceasefire and negotiations. However, we never saw any real agreements. Why did he make these statements, and what did the election results reveal about his policy?

It was typical campaign rhetoric. He said what his political strategists believed would appeal to American voters.

If a certain phrase could boost his support by even three-tenths of a percent, he used it. But these statements were not backed by concrete actions.

This became particularly noticeable during the last month before the election. Trump began flitting from one topic to another, looking for any opportunity to improve his poll numbers.

I saw panic in his behavior. He understood that the situation was unfolding unfavorably for the Republicans, and he tried to at least partially shift voter sentiment.

But the result turned out to be exactly what he feared. The Republican Party suffered a heavy defeat.

Therefore, we shouldn’t have expected that all of his pre-election statements regarding Ukraine would necessarily translate into real decisions. I’ve said this before.

Now, more than ever, we shouldn’t base our own policy on every statement Trump makes. He may announce new initiatives or propose meetings and negotiations, but we need to evaluate his actual actions.

I would generally advise against getting drawn into public disputes with him. There’s no need to respond to every provocation or try to convince him through the media.

Especially since new developments may already be underway within the Republican Party. J.D. Vance is gradually forming his own political positions and, in my opinion, will try to distance himself from Trump.

Therefore, Ukraine should think not only about the current U.S. president but also about the politicians who will shape American policy after him.

There is also one important positive outcome of Trump’s presidency. Over the past two years, Europe has taken its own security much more seriously.

European nations have realized that they cannot rely indefinitely on American guarantees. They have begun to increase defense spending, develop their military industries, and seek their own means of defense.

This is very important for Ukraine, because Europe has now effectively become our rear, while we are defending it against Russian aggression.

It is precisely these relationships that I consider to be of paramount importance to us.

Cooperation with European institutions, financial circles, and military structures must be our top priority. The United States remains an important partner, but it should no longer be the sole foundation of our security.

If the Americans are willing to help, that’s great. We can negotiate Lend-Lease agreements and the supply of weapons from their stockpiles.

However, what is most important for Ukraine right now is its connection with Europe. Our European partners secure our rear, while Ukraine holds back Russian troops that pose a threat to the entire continent.

Why Does Putin Need a Meeting with Trump and Xi Jinping?

Politico reported on a possible meeting between Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin. Why does the Kremlin need such a format, and can the leaders of the U.S. and China agree on anything that would affect the war against Ukraine?

And why would Xi Jinping want to negotiate with Trump, whose political leverage has already been significantly reduced?

The U.S. president has two years left in his term. During this time, his influence may weaken even further, and a new Congress will make it more difficult to implement controversial agreements.

That’s why I’m not at all sure that such a trilateral meeting will take place.

Putin certainly needs it. He wants to stand alongside the two most influential world leaders and show that Russia remains a power with which everyone is forced to negotiate.

But his actual position, in my opinion, is significantly weaker.

In this situation, Trump and Xi Jinping resemble two sharks, although one of them has already had its fins cut off. And Putin, caught between them, is just an ordinary herring trying to pass himself off as an equal partner in the negotiations.

Following the Republicans’ defeat, Xi Jinping has even fewer reasons to rush into such a meeting. The Chinese leadership thinks in much longer time frames.

For Beijing, two years is not a long enough period to warrant entering into important strategic agreements with a president who is gradually losing influence.

I do not rule out that China will prefer to wait for a different U.S. administration. This could be J.D. Vance or the politician who wins the next presidential election.

As for Russia, I believe that its current situation is increasingly pushing the country toward a major internal crisis.

China has significant economic interests on Russian territory. This primarily concerns natural resources and regions located near the Chinese border.

In my assessment, Xi Jinping understands that Russia’s continued depletion could open up additional opportunities for Beijing.

We are already seeing how the war against Ukraine is weakening Russia’s economy and military capabilities. And I suspect that China is counting on taking advantage of potential changes in Russia.

Even if we imagine that Trump and Xi Jinping could discuss the future of Russian resources, the U.S. president today does not have a strong enough political position to secure a major long-term agreement.

Therefore, I doubt that the planned format will be implemented at all. And even if the meeting does take place, it is unlikely to directly change the situation in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Ukraine is striking at three fuel supply routes to Moscow

Following a Ukrainian attack in Ryazan, a Rosneft oil refinery caught fire, and a fire was also reported at a Wildberries warehouse. What is the significance of these strikes, and how do they affect the Russian oil industry?

Almost every day over the past week, we’ve seen another Russian oil and gas facility hit. And this is precisely the strategy whose importance I’ve been emphasizing for several years.

The systematic destruction of the oil industry could deprive Russia of the economic capacity to continue the war.

But the key here is not just the number of attacks, but their continuity.

We cannot afford to pause for a week or two. The Russians have repair crews, equipment, and certain capabilities to restore damaged facilities.

According to my information, during a roughly two-week hiatus in strikes on Russian oil refining facilities, they were able to resume operations at the Omsk and Syzran refineries. The Kirishinaftorgsintez facility has also resumed oil refining.

That is why we cannot stop. While a damaged plant is being repaired, it must remain under the threat of a new strike.

The latest attacks are particularly noteworthy because they targeted several large enterprises at once that supply Moscow and the Moscow region with motor fuel.

The supply of petroleum products to Russia’s capital region is carried out via several main logistical routes.

The Kstovo Oil Refinery in the Nizhny Novgorod region serves the eastern route.

The Yaroslavl “Slavneft-YANOS” refinery serves the northern route. And the Ryazan Oil Refinery serves the southern route.

And the Ukrainian military struck all three.

In my assessment, these attacks have caused very serious disruptions to production processes. This involves a significant reduction in the capacity to refine crude oil and produce motor fuel.

Such operations could be particularly significant for ensuring fuel supplies to Moscow and the Moscow region. If large enterprises simultaneously lose the ability to operate at full capacity, it becomes much more difficult to compensate for the shortfall in production.

Therefore, I consider these strikes to be a highly successful operation by the Ukrainian military.

As for the fire at the Wildberries warehouse, that needs to be examined separately.

I do not rule out the possibility that such logistics facilities may be used to transport not only ordinary goods but also components used in the production of drones. Specifically, I am referring to components of Chinese origin.

This is one possible reason why such facilities may have been targeted. However, the specific contents of the struck warehouse still need to be determined.

Earlier reports also mentioned a fire at the Ozon facility. I believe that large logistics networks also deserve attention if their infrastructure is being used to support the Russian military-industrial complex.

The oil and gas industry is of immense importance to the Russian economy, but there are other major sectors whose disruption could create additional problems.

By my estimates, logistics and trading hubs of this scale also account for a significant share of economic activity.

That is why I view strikes against various components of the Russian economic system as interconnected. The more key sectors that experience disruptions, the harder it will be for the Kremlin to finance the war.

What Does the Strike on the Plant in Orel Mean?

A fire broke out at an oil refinery in Orel, Russia, following an attack. Why might this facility have been targeted, and what does the strike reveal about the capabilities of Ukrainian weapons?

First and foremost, it shows that we are already capable of striking targets deep within Russian territory.

The Oryol region is located farther from the Ukrainian border than the Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, and Rostov regions, which make up the first border zone.

We are, in fact, moving on to operations in the next belt of Russian territory.

This is already the enemy’s operational rear. The corresponding zone can extend up to approximately 500 kilometers.

Our operational-level weapons are capable of carrying out missions at such distances, although specific capabilities depend on the type of weaponry.

In particular, the use of repeaters allows us to extend the range of communication with drones. Under certain conditions, we can operate at distances of approximately 300–400 kilometers.

Therefore, strikes on targets in the Oryol region no longer seem unusual to me.

The Ukrainian military is expanding the geographic scope of its weapons’ deployment. And I believe that operations against Russian logistical rear areas will continue.

The primary purpose of such attacks is to gradually limit the enemy’s ability to use industrial facilities and logistical infrastructure to sustain the war.

How much time does the Russian oil industry have left?

According to the Main Intelligence Directorate, as a result of Ukrainian attacks, 15 of 38 strategic Russian oil refineries have been taken out of operation, and another 12 have reduced their production of petroleum products. How serious are these losses, and how long must the strikes continue to inflict critical damage on the Russian economy?

This confirms what I’ve been saying for several years now. If we continuously strike the Russian oil industry with sufficient intensity, we can gradually cripple it.

By my estimates, achieving this result may require about three to four years of systematic effort.

But we’ve already come a long way.

In about a year and a half of regular attacks, we’ve managed to seriously damage nearly half of Russia’s oil refining capacity.

Therefore, I believe that if we maintain the current intensity for another year and a half or so, we can inflict such heavy losses on the industry that it will effectively cease to function normally.

This is my forecast, which depends on whether we can maintain the regularity of the attacks and how quickly the Russians will be able to restore the damaged facilities.

But even the current statistics show that this approach is working.

Fifteen of the 38 strategic refineries that, according to intelligence reports, have been taken out of operation account for a very significant portion of Russia’s oil refining capacity.

In addition, another 12 facilities are operating at reduced production levels.

It is important to understand that this is not about the permanent physical destruction of every plant. The Russians are repairing equipment, restoring individual processing units, and trying to get the facilities back up and running.

That is precisely why a continuous series of strikes is necessary.

If we attack a refinery and then give it a few weeks to carry out repairs undisturbed, part of the result will be lost.

We need to create a situation where the Russians are constantly spending resources on restoring damaged facilities but are unable to bring them back to full operation in time.

I believe that the Russian oil and gas industry is so closely intertwined with other sectors of the economy that a large-scale shutdown would have consequences far beyond fuel production.

Hence my prediction of a possible collapse of the Russian economy. But whether this comes to pass will depend on the intensity of further strikes and other economic factors.

If we can double the number of strikes, results could materialize much sooner.

This requires additional long-range drones, as well as missiles capable of striking Russian operational and strategic rear areas.

I hope that Ukraine will be able to obtain a significant number of ATACMS from its partners. They could help strike targets at long ranges and strengthen our capabilities.

Among the key facilities that Ukraine is already capable of targeting – or could expand its capabilities to target – are the Volgograd, Saratov, Syzran, and Ryazan oil refineries.

However, there are also targets located much farther away. In particular, the Omsk Oil Refinery and infrastructure in Yamal.

To effectively target such facilities, we need weapons with even greater range.

If Ukraine can produce them on its own or obtain them from partners, the intensity of the attacks can be increased.

In that case, I do not rule out that a large-scale crisis in the Russian oil and gas industry could occur as early as the end of next year.

However, this depends not only on our capabilities but also on our partners’ decisions regarding arms supplies.

If the intensity remains roughly at current levels, it is important to at least maintain constant pressure on key facilities.

Even a single effective strike on a specific plant per month may be enough to complicate its recovery and force the Russians to spend resources on repairs once again.

We need to accumulate problems within the industry so that they reinforce one another. Then, even the restoration of individual production lines will not guarantee that the enterprises will return to normal operations.

Who Could Be Behind the Explosion on the Gas Pipeline in Siberia

A powerful explosion occurred on a major gas pipeline in Siberia, Russia. Could Ukrainian drones have traveled that far, and who, in your opinion, might have been involved in this incident?

I’m not sure that drones were actually involved there.

We cannot rule out the involvement of people who are directly on Russian territory and oppose the current government.

Millions of ethnic Ukrainians live in Russia. In addition, there are representatives of other ethnic groups who advocate for greater autonomy for their regions or even secession from the Russian Federation.

Therefore, I suspect that some damage to critical Russian infrastructure may be linked to the activities of local resistance movements.

However, the specific circumstances of the gas pipeline explosion must be determined separately.

I believe that for many peoples within Russia, the weakening of central authority in Moscow could create new political opportunities.

This applies to the Tatars, Bashkirs, Ingush, Buryats, Yakuts, and representatives of other peoples.

Some of these movements seek greater autonomy, while others advocate for the independence of their own states.

In this context, I also mentioned political initiatives related to the Ingush independence movement and its representatives in exile.

If the Russian economy suffers increasingly greater losses, it will become more difficult for the central government to control the situation in the regions.

I do not rule out that this will strengthen the aspirations of certain peoples for political self-determination.

The interests of such movements may partially coincide with those of Ukraine, as the weakening of the Russian state system will limit the Kremlin’s ability to continue the war.

But I emphasize once again: regarding the specific explosion in Siberia, I cannot say for certain who exactly caused it.

At the same time, Russian oil and gas facilities remain vulnerable not only to drone attacks. The vast extent of pipelines and other infrastructure makes it difficult to protect them across the entire territory of Russia.

Why an electronic warfare dome does not guarantee Kyiv’s protection

There have been reports about the creation of an electronic warfare dome over Kyiv. How effective can such protection be against “Shaheds,” and what needs to be done to secure Ukrainian cities from air attacks?

It is technically possible to cover Kyiv with an electronic warfare dome. And such systems can be deployed not only over the capital but also over other cities.

But this does not fully solve the problem.

The Russians are constantly changing the way they guide their drones. If we effectively jam their communication channels, they will switch to other technologies.

In particular, they may use machine vision, where a drone independently recognizes objects and navigates without constant communication with an operator.

In such a case, simply jamming the radio signal will no longer guarantee that the drone will be unable to reach its target.

Therefore, I believe that the physical destruction of aerial targets should remain the cornerstone of our defense.

Moreover, it is best to do this before Russian drones penetrate deep into Ukrainian territory.

This requires a dense air defense system along the front line.

For several years now, I have been speaking about the need to create a frontline barrier based on short-range anti-aircraft missile systems.

Such systems can intercept drones and other aerial targets at relatively short ranges.

Importantly, these systems are already beginning to arrive in Ukraine, and some of the equipment and ammunition are being produced by Ukrainian companies.

In particular, the production of cheaper interceptor missiles, which can be used against large numbers of aerial targets, is expanding.

According to my calculations, to create at least one continuous line of defense along approximately 2,000 kilometers of the front, about 200 systems with a range of approximately 10 kilometers are needed.

At the same time, their coverage areas must partially overlap so that no unprotected sections remain between them.

This is a complex task, but it is gradually being implemented.

Some Ukrainian corps have already established their own army air defense units, including regiments equipped with short-range surface-to-air missile systems.

Their experience can be used to further deploy such a system in other areas.

Once we have formed a sufficiently dense frontline barrier, a significant portion of Russian air targets will be destroyed before they even approach Ukrainian cities.

At that point, the importance of local electronic warfare (EW) domes will gradually diminish, although they may continue to serve as an additional layer of protection.

However, it is important to distinguish between drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.

Short-range air defense barriers can be effective against many aerodynamic targets. Ballistic missiles, on the other hand, require different countermeasures.

I believe that to deter Russian ballistic strikes, Ukraine needs to develop its own long-range missile capabilities.

In my view, the ability to launch retaliatory strikes against Russian territory is also an element of deterrence.

At the same time, the main task of air defense remains unchanged – to prevent Russian missiles and drones from reaching Ukrainian cities.

This requires a combination of various measures: short-range systems on the front lines, specialized missile defense in the rear, and electronic warfare as an additional layer of protection.

Roman Svitan on Trump’s defeat: watch the video

The interview is available on 24 Channel’s YouTube channel via the link to the source.