The Republicans’ defeat in the midterm elections was a serious blow to Donald Trump. The Democrats have gained more leverage in Congress, but that does not mean the White House will suddenly change its course on Ukraine. U.S. foreign policy remains in the hands of the president and his inner circle, which still shows a commitment to agreements with the Kremlin.
In an exclusive interview with 24 Channel, Scott Lucas, a professor of international politics at the Clinton Institute at University College Dublin, explained what to expect from the new balance of power in Congress, why attempts to implement Trump and Putin’s “diesel deal” have run into obstacles, whether there is any hope for the talks in Abu Dhabi, and why J.D. Vance is already effectively preparing for the 2028 presidential election.
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How the Republicans’ defeat could affect U.S. policy toward Ukraine
Let’s discuss the events in the United States and this humiliating blow to the Republican Party and U.S. President Donald Trump. How might this affect U.S. foreign policy toward Ukraine, security assistance to Ukraine, and the “diesel deal” between Trump and Putin?
Undoubtedly, the Democrats now have a clear majority in both chambers of Congress, with at least 54 of the 100 seats in the Senate. There are two more races they could win: in Alaska and Mississippi. That would bring the total to 56. The projected majority in the House of Representatives is 87 seats.
This is quite significant, considering that we considered these races to be very close, with an unpredictable majority outcome, at least a few weeks ago. But I believe we should be cautious about what this means for U.S. support for Ukraine or the resumption of that support.
First, the new Congress does not begin its work until January 3. So we have nearly two months until then. Second, foreign policy in the U.S. is now, quite clearly, in the hands of the executive branch – the White House.
And, of course, Trump’s inner circle has been very hostile toward Ukraine in recent weeks through his envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, particularly because of the tens of billions of dollars in business deals being offered by the Kremlin.
So, at the moment, there is no prospect that the Trump camp will suddenly say: “We have suffered this major defeat. We need to suspend discussions of these deals with the Russians. We need to take a tougher stance against Moscow to secure a ceasefire along the current front line.”
Full interview with Scott Lucas: watch the video
Instead, I think the first indication of what the Trump team will do will be that next week they’ll hold these talks – possibly in Abu Dhabi in the UAE – with representatives from Ukraine and Russia. At that point, we may get a signal after the talks as to whether Witkoff and Kushner are more receptive to the idea of a ceasefire along the current front line, but so far there are no signs of that.
So, for example, President Zelenskyy reported that he spoke with spoke with Witkoff and Kushnerfor 90 minutes. He said, as I understand it – and I quote – “a very substantive discussion” – but no details were provided. He was unable to offer anything that would indicate a change in the Americans’ position.
If there is a broader sign here – if not of hope, then of possibility – it is that Congress is more inclined to support Ukraine than Trump’s inner circle. We saw this with the sanctions bill – or, more precisely, the tariff bill – which would have imposed 500% tariffs on Russia and 100% tariffs on each of its five major customers.
But, of course, when this bill – known as the Graham Act, named after the late Senator Lindsey Graham – was passed in September, Donald Trump signed it but refused to enforce it.
Will the new Congress push back against this and say, “No, you have to do this. It’s the law. You have to push back against this”? Will the new Congress say that purchasing diesel fuel from Russia is not allowed? In fact, they are illegal, since there is a 2022 law that prohibits any import of Russian energy resources – oil or gas – into the United States.
Will we see pressure not only on Trump, but also, say, on his Secretary of Defense, Pete Hagset? So that they can explain why Starshield, the early warning intelligence system, was shut down, and why they are blocking the transfer of equipment and weapons – including Patriot air defense systems – from NATO allies.
I think the only thing we can point to as a somewhat encouraging sign at the moment is that, in part because the Trump camp has weakened, other parts of the U.S. administration – and, in fact, the U.S. political and business communities as a whole – are taking a tougher stance toward Russia.
And I think a sign of this today is the fact that Russia was unable to deliver the diesel fuel that Donald Trump had agreed to purchase. Two of the four tankers aren’t even heading for the United States right now. They’re going in a different direction. And the third, it seems, is on hold, trying to figure out if it will be able to reach the United States.
Why Trump and Putin’s “diesel deal” ran into trouble
You just mentioned the Financial Times report about tankers deviating from their planned routes, likely out of fear of punishment from Congress, sanctions, and legal problems. Does this mean that global companies and corporations, as well as insurers, are simply afraid to carry out this agreement between Trump and Putin because they know that next year a new Congress will take office, which may pass a law banning the import of Russian diesel into the U.S., and might even impose penalties, given that there have been reports that members of Congress have sent letters to port authorities and U.S. banks regarding a possible future investigation?
I think you’re absolutely right, without even going any further. The point isn’t that Democrats might pass a law banning these shipments Russian diesel fuel. The law already exists. Importing Russian energy resources into the United States is already illegal.
That is why Trump’s approval of these purchases is so brazen – not only in relation to Congress but also from a legal standpoint.
Unless, of course, he can prove that there is an exception – that there should be a waiver of the law – and he certainly hasn’t requested one at this point. There is a serious question as to whether he will be able to avoid liability for this. And at the very least, there are enough questions as to why these tankers turned around or stopped, waiting to see what to do next.
Even more striking is that both tankers that turned away from the United States were under sanctions. One belonged to Hong Kong, the other to Russia. So the question of why the U.S. is dealing with sanctioned tankers at all is obvious.
And yes, I think that insurers, shipowners, and financial firms that may be involved in these operations all understand that there is a significant risk here: that a court could rule this an illegal operation, and therefore the cargo could be confiscated, and you could lose your money. At least, I hope that’s where we’ll end up.
It’s interesting that in recent days there has been very little discussion from the administration regarding the procurement of Russian diesel fuel. Returning to the idea that this is absolutely necessary, returning to the idea that they consider it legal.
So I’m quite hopeful. I’m quite hopeful that at least this specific Trump initiative to purchase Russian diesel fuel – which does almost nothing to help the diesel market in the United States but gives Russia billions of dollars – will not be implemented right now.
What to Expect from the Abu Dhabi Talks
What about the peace talks? We currently have the next meeting scheduled in Abu Dhabi for November 10–11 with representatives from the United States, Trump’s special envoy, the Ukrainian delegation, and, most likely, a Russian delegation will also join. What are your expectations right now? Do you think Trump will continue to be just as active in these peace efforts, or should we expect that we’re perhaps seeing the last roundtable discussions with this team?
There are so many questions regarding this meetings next week in Abu Dhabi. I think the first one is: What is the agenda here? Is this just a preliminary discussion? “Okay, we’re going to sit down at the negotiating table again, for the first time in nearly nine months.”
Or will this be a meeting with a real agenda and specific issues up for discussion? And if so, what are those issues?
We know that in early September, Donald Trump’s envoy, real estate developer Steve Witkoff, and his son-in-law Jared Kushner were pushing the idea of a partial ceasefire – specifically, an energy truce. But, of course, we also know that the problem with that energy truce was that it was simply “oil refinery for oil refinery.”
And Russia has many oil refineries. Ukraine has only one, which isn’t actually operating at full capacity. So it was an unbalanced proposal.
Now, will they return to the negotiating table with a genuine energy ceasefire that calls for a halt to attacks on all energy facilities – not just oil refineries, but also facilities vital to the power grid, such as thermal power plants and hydroelectric power plants? Will a ceasefire – a proposal for a ceasefire – be on their agenda? Will it be based on the current front line, or will it allow the Russians to seize even more Ukrainian territory?
So we really have no idea what the content will be, what the essence of these talks will be. And this brings us back to the fundamental reason why we are not making progress on the political track of the negotiations.
There is progress on the military front, but not on the political front, because the Russians do not want a ceasefire along the current front line. They are sticking to their maximalist demands, namely: give us the rest of Donbas, the Donetsk region, or else we will not stop our attacks.
And if the Russians say that this is a so-called “special military operation,” that they have certain demands, that they must receive more territory, you tell the Russians: “No, we didn’t tell you that. We asked: ‘Will you agree to a ceasefire along the current front lines?’” That is exactly how it should happen.
I think, at this stage, we should view these negotiations only as preliminary, and then we’ll see if there’s a way to move them forward.
Why is the Kremlin using the Oleshky issue and the meeting with Melania Trump?
The disaster in Oleshky revealed the true face of the so-called “Russian World.” What role does Melania Trump play in this process?
Yes, this is indeed an important question that should be analyzed on several levels. The first is to discuss the reality of politics and political theater.
The reality of politics here is that the Russians were effectively using these civilians as human shields, as a means of deterring Ukrainian attacks. Nearly 2,000 residents of Oleshky remained there. For months, they suffered from severe deprivation, a lack of food, medicine, and other supplies, because the Russians confiscated the aid that Ukrainian forces had airdropped to them this fall.
So, as far as I understand from people familiar with the situation, what helped break the deadlock – that is, force the Russians to allow the evacuation of civilians – was the intervention of the Pope, Pope Leo XIV. It was precisely after his intervention that negotiations took place, which, let’s say, revitalized the dialogue between Mr. Lubinets, the Verkhovna Rada’s Commissioner for Human Rights, and his Russian counterpart.
And we have an agreement. And I am very glad that we reached it, because several hundred – we don’t know the exact number – Neither Ukraine nor Russia has provided that figure. Melania Trump says that nearly 800 civilians were able to leave Oleshky, and many of them have returned to free Ukraine.
They had to travel through Russia and Belarus and then return to free Ukraine. And now they can get something to eat. Now they can, at least as much as is possible amid nightly Russian attacks, feel at least a little bit of safety. That is the reality of the political situation that has unfolded.
The theatrical side of politics is that, regardless of what Melania Trump said – and I’m sure she cares about the fate of these civilians – she did not play a central role in the negotiations.
But in the theater of politics, if you want to secure the support of the Trump administration – or at least prevent it from switching sides – you say: Melania Trump is wonderful. And Melania Trump – she deserves to be honored for what she’s done. Indeed, yesterday President Zelenskyy presented an award to Melania Trump presented her with a high Ukrainian honor for her actions. That’s the theater of politics.
I understand why this was done. And the Russians will say the same thing. Melania Trump is wonderful. She’s a peacemaker. She’s wonderful because they want her husband to be “in Vladimir Putin’s pocket.”
Now let me move on to what I think is very interesting in order to take this conversation further. Both the Ukrainian Ombudsman, Mr. Lubinets, and the Russians traveled to Washington for what I suspect was a ceremony honoring Melania Trump.
Kirill Dmitriev, Vladimir Putin’s chief financial adviser, was there.
Kirill Dmitriev had absolutely nothing to do with the negotiations regarding the Oleshky. He was not involved in the negotiations to organize the evacuation. So why is Kirill Dmitriev traveling to the U.S.? Has he suddenly become a great humanitarian? And the answer, of course, is no.
Kirill Dmitriev is likely in Washington to speak with other people, such as Donald Trump’s envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.
Kirill Dmitriev is there to push through Russian deals worth tens of billions of dollars that Moscow offered to Kushner and Witkoff in early September. And they’re using a meeting with Melania Trump as a cover to advance their real agenda.
The story now is how the Kremlin is trying to maneuver this and go beyond Oleshky to bring the negotiations back to its terms, namely: we give you business deals, you give us what we want inside Ukraine, and you keep the rest of the country weak.
How J.D. Vance Has Already Launched His Presidential Campaign
Let’s also highlight U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s reaction to this humiliating defeat in the midterm elections. He placed all the blame for this situation on the war with Iran and, presumably, on President Trump. Do you consider this his first statement, the start of his presidential campaign?
Yes. This is no subtle hint. J.D. Vance wants to become president in the 2028 election. As, incidentally, does Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
However, J.D. Vance’s political stance differs from the rest of the Trump camp: he opposed the war in Iran from the very beginning. He didn’t stop it. He didn’t try to stop it, but He was against her.
Now that the midterm election results are in – and it’s such a crushing defeat – J.D. Vance doesn’t want this defeat to derail his 2028 presidential campaign. So instead, he’s looking at how he can use this to secure a unique position, a special place for that campaign.
And that means saying, “I’m the one who opposed this war, and everyone else involved in this – including Marco Rubio – they’ve dragged you into this mess that’s happened. They’ve dragged the Republican Party into this mess; they’ve dragged the country into this mess. I’m the one you can count on.”
Now, also keep in mind that last week, just a few days before the election, J.D. Vance sent a message to Tehran through intermediaries stating that the U.S. wants to resume negotiations that might potentially end the war.
And now Vance will be hoping that Iran accepts this proposal, and that Vance can be the one to lead the negotiations and claim that he was the one who helped resolve this war, which has caused so much damage.
This, of course, puts him at odds with Donald Trump. And although Donald Trump has stated that he to some extent agrees with Vance’s assessment that the war in Iran has led to rising gas prices, he has also made it very clear that he does not support Vance’s candidacy in the upcoming election.
He even said, “I don’t know if he’s running.” Well, I know he’s running, and I think Trump knows it too, but he doesn’t want to commit himself.
This means – and we’re back to where we started – that the Trump camp is becoming even more unbalanced due to the internal political processes taking place.
We must clearly understand that J.D. Vance is an enemy of Ukraine’s security. He is an enemy of Europe’s security. He clearly articulated this position in February 2025, when he said that Europe must take care of itself, and that this has nothing to do with the United States. I don’t think Vance will change this position. So, we have a situation where Donald Trump acts on his own terms, but he is unreliable, at least when it comes to Ukraine’s security. Vance also acts on his own terms. He, too, is unreliable when it comes to Ukraine’s security.
Next, we should watch to see if Marco Rubio will step down as Secretary of State, since Rubio cannot run for president while remaining in that position. And what does this mean? First, we’ll see whether Rubio, as a candidate, will support Ukraine’s security, as well as who will replace him.
It has already become known today that someone not particularly qualified in matters of diplomacy or geopolitics – I’m referring to Sergio Gora, who has long been one of Donald Trump’s “fixers” – may become the next Secretary of State.
And it’s not just his lack of qualifications that’s significant. He is the person who promoted the false narrative that the 2014 Revolution of Dignity was a sham because it was allegedly “inspired by the West.”
So, no matter how you look at it, I’m afraid that, given the inner circle of the Trump administration, there’s no good news to be expected. What’s happening is that everyone is pursuing their own interests first and foremost, rather than Ukraine’s interests. And you, as before, will have to rely as much as possible on the relevant agencies to continue addressing Ukraine’s security. Career officials are becoming even more important now.
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