Reports have emerged in Western media about a possible agreement between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin that could simultaneously address the war in Ukraine and the standoff with Iran. At the same time, Washington is seeking new approaches to European security, and political changes in France could jeopardize continued support for Kyiv.
Israeli journalist Zvi Silber explained on 24 Channel why he does not believe such a global agreement is possible and what signs of a new U.S. military operation he sees in the Middle East. and what signs of a new U.S. military operation he sees in the Middle East. He also assessed the risks for Ukraine posed by the rise of the far right in Europe, the prospects for U.S. aid, and the political struggle to form a new Israeli government.
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The Trump-Putin Deal
The Telegraph writes about a possible “double deal” between Trump and Putin regarding Ukraine and Iran. According to these reports, the Kremlin could allegedly help restore shipping through the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for agreements on Ukraine. According to these reports, the Kremlin could allegedly help restore shipping through the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for agreements on Ukraine. How realistic is such a scenario, does Putin have influence over Tehran, and what is currently happening regarding Iran?
Let’s start with geopolitics. I see two very interesting parallels between the situation in the Middle East and in Europe.
In the Middle East, there are wealthy Sunni states and Shiite Iran, which is hostile to them. The United States has long sought to prevent these countries from engaging in direct military conflict. There is also Israel, which is in constant military confrontation with its adversaries and influences relations in the region.
We are now witnessing a particularly acute phase of the conflict. The U.S. administration has decided to intervene directly in this situation, although Washington had previously tended to act primarily through diplomatic and military-political mechanisms of deterrence.
In my opinion, there is a certain analogy in Europe as well. There is an economically powerful Europe, and there is a significantly poorer but well-armed Russia. Between them lies a massive confrontation, and the United States is trying to influence the balance of power.
In this situation, Ukraine resembles Israel to some extent, as it, too, is at war and is situated between major geopolitical centers.
But there is an important difference: the U.S. is not directly involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine. I think the main reason remains Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons. No one wants to allow a direct confrontation that could lead to nuclear war.
That is precisely why the attempt to link an end to the war in Ukraine with agreements on Iran strikes me as contrived. Such a framework looks good in newspaper headlines and geopolitical theories, but it is unclear how it could work in practice.
What can Putin offer Trump regarding Iran? Can he really force the Iranian regime to abandon its nuclear program? Or convince Tehran to comply with U.S. demands?
Suppose Putin promises to stop supplying weapons to Iran. But that doesn’t mean the Iranian leadership will agree to comply with Washington’s conditions.
For more than two decades, Putin has been trying to sell the West on his ability to negotiate with other authoritarian regimes. He has claimed that he can influence North Korea, Syria under Bashar al-Assad, Iran, and other states with which Western countries have struggled to find common ground.
However, I see no results that would confirm his claims to the role of an indispensable mediator.
These are all empty promises. Putin is trying to extract the maximum benefit from them, but ultimately the result is zero. And I think the West understands this perfectly well.
Now let’s look at the other side of a possible agreement. What can Trump offer Putin regarding Ukraine?
He might try again to restrict the sharing of intelligence or the operation of Starlink. But we’ve already seen similar situations and the reactions to them.
These decisions sparked strong discontent not only in Ukraine but also in the United States and other countries. Trump himself began to deny his involvement in the Starlink restrictions, and later, attempts were made to explain the problems as technical issues.
I don’t rule out that some of the difficulties may indeed have been technical. Any complex system sometimes experiences glitches. But the main point is that Trump tried to distance himself from this scandal as quickly as possible.
Therefore, I don’t see what exactly he can guarantee the Kremlin in exchange for Putin’s promises regarding Iran.
Neither Trump nor Putin can deliver what’s needed. If we’re talking about some kind of global peace agreement, there won’t be any global peace agreement.
Even the idea of a new “Yalta” involving Trump, Putin, and Xi Jinping cannot be realized. As far as I recall, Peskov has already spoken of significant differences between the parties, which make it pointless to hold such a meeting in the near future.
I, too, doubt that it will take place. Given the current political circumstances, a meeting with Putin could prove too toxic for Trump.
As for Iran, however, the situation is much more complicated. I wouldn’t read too much into the triumphant statements by Iranian officials, particularly Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi. The more difficult the regime’s situation becomes, the more actively its representatives talk about their own successes.
According to the information I have, Trump is pushing forward with the “Iron Gate” program. It calls for further tightening of the naval blockade of Iran and restrictions on land transportation routes.
This involves controlling border crossings, mountain passes, rail routes, and other routes through which Iran can import and export goods.
The goal of this policy is to maximize economic pressure on the Iranian regime, which is already in a difficult financial situation.
At the same time, oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz have not completely ceased. Transportation has become significantly more expensive due to rising ship insurance costs and crew wage demands, but oil continues to flow into the global market.
Iran cannot completely cut off this flow. At the same time, countering small vessels capable of operating in the strait remains a difficult task.
From Israel’s perspective, there are currently several signs of possible preparations for a new military operation.
Our military analysts have noted reports of the deployment of six U.S. Globemaster III military transport aircraft to the Middle East. Such aircraft are capable of transporting large quantities of military hardware, equipment, and personnel.
Similar movements were observed prior to previous phases of military operations against Iran.
In addition, reports have emerged regarding the U.S. aircraft carrier “Theodore Roosevelt.” It had been in Singapore but, according to this information, unexpectedly left the port and set course for the Middle East.
The movement of ships and aircraft alone does not necessarily mean that a decision on a new operation has been made. However, the combination of these reports compels me to closely monitor how the situation develops.
The Republicans’ defeat in the midterm elections has weakened Trump’s domestic political standing, but he retains significant presidential authority in the areas of foreign policy and military decisions.
Congress can restrict funding, pass legislation, and oversee the administration. At the same time, the president has the power to veto, so political confrontation between the White House and lawmakers will not necessarily halt his foreign policy initiatives.
There have also been changes within the administration itself.
J.D. Vance has consistently advocated for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict with Iran. He was one of the proponents of negotiations mediated by Pakistan and participated in related talks in Islamabad.
However, following the Republicans’ election defeat, his position may have been significantly weakened. Vance actively supported the party’s candidates, many of whom lost their races.
In addition, some Republicans hold him responsible for the fact that the administration spent too long trying to reach an agreement with Iran and failed to quickly end the military confrontation.
I am not claiming that Trump shares this assessment, but I do not rule out that dissatisfaction with the vice president’s position is also emerging within his inner circle.
If Vance’s influence wanes, it may become easier for advocates of tougher action against Iran to convince the president of the need for a new operation.
Trump himself said in a recent CBS interview that he currently has no plans to escalate the situation with Iran. But based on his statements, it’s very difficult to predict his next moves.
I have a feeling that something is going to happen in the near future – some kind of operation. I don’t know what form it will take, but no one wants to drag this out any longer.
This is my prediction, not information about a military decision that has already been made. However, the combination of U.S. troop movements, economic pressure on Iran, and political changes in Washington points to the possibility of a new escalation.
European Security and Risks for Ukraine
Consultations between NATO, the European Union, Ukraine, and the U.S. are scheduled ahead of the talks in Abu Dhabi. Why are Trump and Putin trying to discuss a new European security architecture even before a ceasefire in Ukraine?
We’ve already discussed how Donald Trump does not view European leaders the same way his predecessors did.
Most current European politicians are ideologically closer to American Democrats. Their views on social policy, international relations, and many domestic issues differ significantly from Trump’s position.
He has repeatedly clashed with them, criticized their policies, and demanded a review of trade and security agreements.
I think that Trump now views the European Union not only as a political partner but also as a serious economic competitor.
If the European Union were to break up into separate states, their positions in international trade would be significantly weakened. The euro would cease to be such a major competitor to the U.S. dollar, and it would be easier for Washington to negotiate with individual European countries.
Trump views Europeans today not as allies, but rather as competitors. And when we say “the West,” meaning the U.S. and Europe as a single entity, under Trump that is no longer the case at all.
Just look at the United States’ relationship with Canada. Trump is engaged in trade disputes with Canada and imposing tariffs, even though it is one of America’s closest allies.
Canadian leaders now hope that the change in the composition of Congress will help resolve at least some of these issues.
But none of this suggests that Trump is capable of imposing any new security system on European countries. I don’t think an agreement with Russia can be implemented over the heads of European leaders, especially without an end to the war in Ukraine.
Here, it’s worth recalling how Trump’s policy toward the Russia-Ukraine war began after his return to the White House.
He demanded that his partners present a concrete plan for ending the hostilities. He was interested in exactly how the war could end, since he did not want it to drag on indefinitely.
And the answer Trump found was quite simple: a deal must be reached with Russia.
He tried to apply the same principle in dealing with Iran. The U.S. president believes that diplomatic contacts can yield results even with regimes that have previously failed to honor similar agreements.
I do not share his optimism about the possibility of reaching an agreement with Putin. However, I understand why the White House continues to seek a diplomatic solution.
European countries say they are ready to support Ukraine for as long as necessary. But no one can say for sure how long the war will last or when Putin’s rule might end.
It could happen quickly, or it could drag on for many years. The Trump administration does not want to base its entire strategy on the expectation that the current Russian regime will collapse.
Therefore, it continues to seek a compromise that would at least bring an end to the fighting.
But there is another serious problem: Europe itself is gradually changing.
Look at how far-right and far-left movements are gaining strength. They often oppose large-scale government spending on military support for Ukraine, arguing that funds should instead be directed toward domestic needs.
Public opinion is also influenced by information campaigns on social media. I believe that Russian entities are actively using these platforms to exacerbate political divisions within European societies.
These processes are gradually reshaping the political landscape. And the longer the war lasts, the more significant the election results in leading European countries will become.
The European clock is ticking, too. I say this as an Israeli: Europe has betrayed Israel many times. That is why I cannot unconditionally rely on its political promises.
I am particularly concerned about France. It is one of the largest countries in the European Union and is of great importance for military and political support for Ukraine.
According to the polls I’ve seen, Marine Le Pen is polling at about 39%. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who represents the radical left wing of French politics, is polling at around 18–19%.
I wouldn’t call myself an expert on French domestic politics. But I’ve spoken with political scientists who specialize in this topic. They consider it possible that the second round of the presidential election could be between Le Pen and Mélenchon, with Le Pen emerging victorious.
I’m concerned that the French political center is losing popularity. A portion of voters is increasingly supporting radical forces – both on the right and on the left.
And this isn’t just a French problem. We’re seeing serious polarization in Israel and the United States. Social media is amplifying the influence of political movements that previously didn’t have such broad support.
The situation in France is further complicated by street protests and social conflicts. I am particularly concerned about the radicalization of part of the protest movement and the anti-Semitic incidents, which I associate with this political tension.
Marine Le Pen has tried to distance herself from the political legacy of her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and has removed him from the party. However, I cannot ignore the history of the far-right movement with which she is associated.
I do not like Emmanuel Macron’s policies, but compared to Le Pen, I consider him a much more moderate and pragmatic centrist.
The consequences of a potential change in power in France could be very serious, particularly for Ukraine.
Le Pen has already stated that she would support Ukraine, but under different financial terms. She proposes selling weapons rather than providing them for free.
If one of the European Union’s largest member states adopts such a position, it could significantly impact the overall system of European aid.
Therefore, I do not believe that Ukraine can indefinitely count on the current policies of European countries remaining unchanged. Much will depend on future elections, the economic situation, and the political center’s ability to curb the rise of radical forces.
Aid to Ukraine and Peace Talks
Following the U.S. elections, Democrats have begun discussing an effort to resume free military aid to Ukraine. The discussion centers on a potential $15 billion aid package. How realistic is it to restore such support?
We’ll see if the Democrats manage to pass the necessary legislation. With the shift in the political balance in Congress, they now have additional opportunities, but that doesn’t mean new aid will be automatically approved.
In this context, it’s also worth mentioning U.S. military support for Israel.
For many years, the United States has provided Israel with approximately $3 billion annually in the form of military aid. It is important to understand that these were not ordinary cash transfers to the Israeli budget.
Israel was given the opportunity to purchase weapons and military equipment from American manufacturers. In other words, these funds largely flowed back into the U.S. military-industrial complex itself.
But Trump fundamentally dislikes the idea of providing free aid to other countries.
Benjamin Netanyahu had previously spoken of a gradual phase-out of U.S. military funding by 2032. Israel has a sufficiently strong economy, so in the long run, it can cover a significantly larger portion of its defense expenditures on its own.
Following the U.S. midterm elections, according to the information I cited, Netanyahu has already begun discussing a much faster phase-out of such aid – by 2027.
For Israel’s defense budget, this amount is not so critical that its loss would make it impossible to fund the military. But politically, this is a very telling decision.
I do not rule out that the Trump administration will apply a similar approach to other partners as well. For example, Jordan receives approximately $1.65 billion in U.S. military aid annually.
I do not know whether these agreements will also be revised. However, the general trend in U.S. policy is quite clear.
As for Ukraine, let’s return to Trump’s main question: how to end this war?
He sees no other way out except through negotiations with Putin. And he will most likely continue to insist on a diplomatic settlement, even if previous attempts have failed.
Today, the so-called “Korean scenario” is often mentioned.
This involves a cessation of hostilities roughly along the current line of contact without a final political settlement of the territorial issue. The parties may not recognize each other’s positions, but the active phase of the war comes to an end.
This is not a full-fledged peace treaty. However, a cold standoff, in which people stop dying, is still better than a continuous hot war.
In my opinion, this is precisely the direction Trump is trying to move in.
But we must understand the most important thing: the United States cannot single-handedly determine the future of Ukrainian territories.
No one today can force Ukraine to give anything up. Ukraine is a fully sovereign democratic state. No one can force it to its knees and make it accept Putin’s terms.
Europe will be involved in the negotiations one way or another. I do not think that European states will remain on the sidelines of a process on which their own security directly depends.
For Europe, the issue of international recognition of the occupied territories is of fundamental importance. If we accept that one state can seize part of another by force and receive international approval for it, this will set an extremely dangerous precedent.
Europeans understand that the consequences of such a decision could affect other countries as well.
I see a historical parallel here with the 1938 Munich Agreement, when European states agreed to territorial concessions in favor of Nazi Germany.
At the time, many hoped that meeting Hitler’s demands would prevent a major war. But that did not happen. German aggression continued, Poland was eventually invaded, and World War II began.
I believe that European leaders remember this experience and do not want to repeat such a mistake.
Therefore, I do not think anyone is capable of forcing Ukraine to give up the Donbas, other territories, or agree to dismantle its own defense capabilities.
A ceasefire and surrender are two different things. Trump may seek a negotiating mechanism, but the final decisions regarding its future must be made by Ukraine itself.
The Struggle for Power in Israel
Israeli President Isaac Herzog has tasked Gadi Eizenkot with attempting to form a new government following elections that failed to give any political bloc a clear majority. Could Benjamin Netanyahu really lose his position as prime minister?
This is not just a theoretical threat, but a real political situation. But I wouldn’t rush to conclude that Netanyahu has already lost power.
Four years ago, Israel already had a so-called “government of change,” formed with the participation of the current opposition parties. It lasted a little over a year, after which early elections were held, and Netanyahu won again.
Now a similar problem has arisen: neither of the two main political blocs has enough seats to form a stable coalition on its own.
According to my calculations, Gadi Eizenkot’s bloc has five fewer seats than the forces that nominally support Netanyahu.
However, the 48 members of the opposition bloc were joined by the votes of 19 Arab Knesset members, who supported giving Eizenkot the first opportunity to form a government.
Thanks to this, he received the necessary support to begin negotiations.
But I very much doubt that he will be able to form a viable coalition that relies on Arab parties.
There are deep divisions among these political forces regarding the war, the Palestinian issue, and the future of Israel.
If Eisenkot attempts to form a minority government with the external support of Arab lawmakers, this, in my opinion, would be an extremely risky decision for him.
I suspect that such a government could quickly lose its stability. And the political consequences for Eisenkot himself and his allies could be very serious.
On the other hand, Netanyahu’s bloc also lacks a sufficient majority.
Therefore, I believe the best option for Israel is to form a broad government of national unity.
Netanyahu himself has already issued a video address calling for the formation of such a government headed by him. He argues that his Likud party holds the largest number of seats among the individual political parties.
I do not rule out that this very issue will be the focus of the most difficult negotiations at this time.
Under Israeli procedure, Eizenkot has been given 28 days to form a coalition. If he fails to secure the necessary support, the right to attempt to form a government may pass to another political leader.
In my opinion, it will be very difficult for Eisenkot to achieve a result within these four weeks.
Therefore, there are two main scenarios. The first is that Israel will once again face a political crisis and the need to hold another election.
But endless election campaigns could seriously weaken many of the current political leaders, especially those in the opposition.
The second scenario is that the parties will end their mutual boycotts, reach a compromise, and form a government that includes representatives from across the political spectrum.
I consider the second option to be far better.
I hope that common sense will prevail, that all these personal boycotts will end, and that politicians will finally reach an agreement. Israel needs a broad centrist government that can move the country forward and bring unfinished wars to a close.
Another important issue remains the establishment of a state commission to investigate the events of October 7. I think that for many potential participants in a broad coalition, this will be one of the main conditions for an agreement.
Israel continues to face a complex security situation. Therefore, a prolonged domestic political crisis or an unstable minority government could create additional problems.
I cannot say for certain that a compromise will definitely be reached. However, I hope that a government of national unity will ultimately be formed with the participation of both Netanyahu and Eisenkot.
In my opinion, this would allow them to break the political deadlock and focus on issues of security, domestic stability, and the country’s future.
Trump is looking for a way out of the war, and Europe may betray Ukraine: watch the video
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