Equipment worth billions is rusting, and Kyiv is not ready for winter: a candid interview with an energy expert

Ukraine is heading into winter amid Russian attacks on its energy sector, and problems with preparing critical infrastructure could make getting through the cold months more difficult. At the same time, even equipment provided by partners cannot always be connected quickly, and risks to water supply and heating remain a concern.

Adv

How have Ukraine and its cities been preparing for winter?

The Prime Minister reported that since mid-July, Russia has been attacking Ukraine’s energy sector daily, with over 2,000 such attacks having occurred in total. At the same time, he stated that Ukraine is now better prepared for winter than before. If it weren’t for these preparations, we might already be feeling the consequences in the form of power and water supply disruptions. Do you see the results of these preparations? Which cities are truly ready for winter, and which, unfortunately, haven’t had time to prepare properly?

Let’s start with the big picture of winter preparations. I must say that, once again, we’re starting to prepare too late. In my opinion, this work should have begun back in 2023, after the first difficult winter, when it had already become clear that the enemy would use the energy sector as a weapon and open an energy front against the civilian population of Ukraine.

Unfortunately, the government at the time did not heed the advice of experts when we emphasized that everything possible must be done to make Ukraine less dependent on large power generation facilities – thermal power plants, hydroelectric power plants, combined heat and power plants, etc.

Now let’s move on to the positive aspects. What lessons did we learn from previous winters, and what did we do in the run-up to this one?

First, we have built up a fairly substantial strategic reserve of energy equipment needed for repair work.

Second, we have accumulated significant volumes of gas in our storage facilities. Therefore, compared to previous periods, there should be fewer problems in this regard.

Third, we’ve streamlined the work of our energy workers. They already have experience and understand what needs to be done, when, where, and how.

At the same time, we must understand that the enemy has not only increased the number of attacks on energy facilities but has also begun to employ new tactics. The Russians are launching swarms of drones one after another, which complicates the work of our energy workers.

The level of danger has increased, and there is less time to carry out repairs. Whereas energy workers used to be able to operate under relatively safe conditions, such opportunities are now significantly more limited.

As for the preparedness of cities, the situation varies from place to place. There is no uniform level of preparedness – each region has its own achievements and challenges. Some cities, notably Vinnytsia, have made significant efforts to minimize their dependence on centralized power supply. Significant work in this area has also been done in Mykolaiv. There, local authorities realized that they need to rely on their own resources and create conditions for the development of decentralized electricity generation.

But when it comes to Kyiv, which is the source of the greatest concern, the situation there is disheartening, especially regarding water supply. Resilience plans for the capital were not actually begun until this spring – early summer of this year.

The resilience plan itself was approved at a National Security and Defense Council meeting in August, so there is little time left to implement it. To provide a facility as large as Kyivvodokanal with backup power, a series of tasks must be completed, and the necessary equipment must be purchased and configured. Implementation of this project will continue until next spring.

In other words, there are enormous problems with Kyiv’s preparations. And this is particularly unfortunate because, unlike many other cities and towns, Kyiv had – and still has – the financial resources to carry out such projects. The capital is not facing a budget shortfall – on the contrary, it has a budget surplus. However, the city was also counting on funding from the central government.

And here we again face the problem of delays on the part of the central government, which fails to pass the laws necessary to secure European funding in a timely manner. As a result, the flow of funds is also delayed. So the situation is truly complex.

There is another important point. Ukraine could reduce its dependence on large energy facilities by building cogeneration plants with private-sector participation. But here, too, the situation is disappointing. As far as I understand, as of now, they are mainly completing projects that were started last year or early this year.

In fact, no one is planning to build any new projects. The reason is that in March of this year, the government decided to change the rules of the game after seeing windfall profits where none actually existed.

Private businesses cannot operate effectively under conditions of unpredictable government decisions that frequently change and render previous calculations obsolete.

As a result, the new circumstances have effectively derailed plans to implement a whole series of projects related to cogeneration plants, gas piston, and gas turbine facilities that the private sector had been trying to launch.

Full interview with Viktoria Voitsitska: watch the video

Why does Kyiv face major risks regarding its water supply?

This year, Russia may focus more attention on attacks on the water supply systems of Ukrainian cities. Do you really expect such attacks? Should Ukrainians already start stockpiling water, and will the situation in Kyiv be particularly difficult?

When we talk about water supply, we need to understand that there are two key risks.

The first and most significant is the lack of a stable power supply in the quantities needed to operate the entire system. It’s a massive complex through which about 700,000 cubic meters of water must flow every day in Kyiv. Kyivvodokanal is one of the largest consumers of electricity in the capital. When the centralized power supply is insufficient, problems arise with the operation of pumping stations, water intakes, and so on.

Without the necessary amount of electricity, the system cannot function properly, and additional power sources have not yet been built. Simply put, it’s not enough to just purchase, say, 10, 20, or 100 diesel generators and install them at key water utility facilities. That’s not how this system works.

The main source of electricity for Kyiv is the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant. Along the route from the plant to the capital are high-voltage substations, including those with powerful transformers. When the enemy attacks such facilities, the amount of electricity that can be transmitted from the power source to consumers in Kyiv can decrease significantly – even by an order of magnitude. Therefore, protecting these facilities is of strategic importance.

What have we done to protect them? Previously, we built two layers of protection, and over the past year we’ve been working to complete a third layer before the start of winter. These are special protective structures that can be loosely described as sarcophagi.

However, the enemy began attacking before we had time to protect all key substations with such structures. This is our main challenge: we lack the protection needed to safeguard these facilities from missile attacks, particularly ballistic ones.

The second risk is direct strikes on water supply system facilities. The Russians have tried to destroy them in previous years as well, which is why we have already experienced water shortages. However, in my opinion, the enemy will not succeed in completely destroying this system.

To do so, they would have to focus all their resources on destroying the entire network of facilities, rather than a single facility. Therefore, the risks here are lower than those associated with power shortages.

What should people do?

It’s worth preparing for scenarios that have been experienced before, for example, in Lviv. For a while, water was supplied there on a schedule: one to two hours in the morning and one to two hours in the evening. Similar scenarios are possible in other cities, where schedules will apply not only to electricity but also to water supply.

People should definitely have a supply of drinking water at home. This applies not only to water for household use but also to drinking water. It’s better to buy a few bottles of clean water in advance than to rely solely on tap water, since problems with it may also arise.

What you definitely need to prepare for is possible water rationing schedules – or at least periods without water. Every family needs to have a supply of drinking water at home.

Is another blackout possible, and what is our plan of action?

The New York Times previously reported that Russia has a plan to disable the Ukrainian power grid, specifically to force three operating nuclear power plants – the Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, and South Ukraine plants – to shut down by launching missile strikes on distribution substations. How should we prepare for such a scenario if it actually happens? Do we have a Plan B, or perhaps even Plans C and D?

First, the enemy has already made such an attempt November 23, 2022. At that time, strikes on key substations disconnected all of our nuclear power plants from the power grid, causing a nationwide blackout. However, we were able to restore the power grid’s operation, return to scheduled operations, and manage emergency outages. In other words, we succeeded in restoring the power grid.

Second, Russia had already attempted to disconnect the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine nuclear power plants from our power grid. At that time, while we were repairing substations and restoring the power grid, the electricity generated by these nuclear power plants was being redirected to Europe.

This was achieved on an emergency basis thanks to Ukraine’s integration into the unified European power grid. Our European partners, particularly Poland, were of great assistance to us during this period.

At the same time, it is important to understand how the current situation differs from previous years. First, due to Russian shelling, several major electricity consumers were taken offline from the power grid, as large metallurgical enterprises halted operations.

As a result, in August and September, Ukraine even had a surplus of electricity, which it exported to Europe. Therefore, total electricity consumption this year will be significantly lower.

Second, the number of renewable energy facilities – solar and wind power plants – has increased significantly. They helped us, in particular, throughout the summer. In addition, alongside the construction of solar power plants, we have begun to more actively develop energy storage systems. These are large-scale installations that allow us to store electricity generated from renewable sources and then feed it back into the grid.

The main bottleneck remains the capacity to transmit electricity via the grid, especially from the right bank to the left. All three key nuclear power plants are located on the right bank, as is a significant portion of the renewable energy infrastructure. Therefore, it is important for us to protect power lines and be able to repair them quickly.

Incidentally, this year the enemy began employing a new tactic – using drones to damage and destroy power lines. Another important point: some communities have already implemented projects that allow them to rely on cogeneration and local electricity generation instead of centralized supply.

However, there are still not enough such projects. The key problem is that in 2023 and 2024, we did not prepare for winter as we should have. We realized too late that the war would continue, that the Russians would keep shelling us, and that energy infrastructure and other critical facilities would become increasingly high-priority targets for the enemy.

Assuming this winter isn’t as cold as the last one, will we be able to avoid large-scale blackouts? Is Ukraine’s energy sector still not sufficiently restored to avoid planned and emergency power outages?

No, we cannot. Emergency blackouts are already occurring, for example, in Kyiv. The difference is that right now they last for days, not weeks. Additionally, there are cities that have prepared much better. There, blackouts will be fewer, and they will last for shorter periods.

Could we face a complete blackout? It’s important to use the terminology correctly here. A blackout is a situation where the power grid completely stops functioning and cannot supply electricity to consumers. That’s exactly what happened on November 23, 2022.

But now we are much better prepared than we were then. We have the equipment needed for repairs, and we already know how to restore the power grid.

The question is to what extent Russia will be able to increase the number of attacks on our energy facilities and how quickly we will be able to restore them. On the one hand, it’s important to have sufficient defenses against these “Shaheds,” and on the other, to carry out repair work promptly after attacks.

Let’s hope this winter really won’t be as harsh as the last one. But we already need to prepare for various scenarios. We are living under scheduled power outages and also facing emergency outages, when the schedules do not apply and it is impossible to plan the electricity supply.

But I want to emphasize once again: due to the shutdown of large industrial consumers, the load on the power grid has decreased. This year, we will need less electricity than last year. If the winter is warmer, this will also reduce the demand for electricity.

In addition, we have sufficient reserves of power generation equipment, and our international partners continue to ask what else we are lacking. And here I’d like to make a brief comment, which our viewers probably won’t be very happy to hear.

Our partners have provided Ukraine with equipment totaling one gigawatt of capacity, which has not yet been commissioned or connected to the grid.

What does one gigawatt of capacity mean? It’s roughly the capacity of a single reactor unit at a nuclear power plant. It’s also half the volume of electricity imports we previously relied on to compensate for the shortfall in our power grid.

Kyiv’s Left Bank: Heat in Winter and the Government’s Responsibility

Recently, “Ekonomichna Pravda” reported that all three of Kyiv’s main thermal power plants have lost the ability to generate electricity. At the same time, Russia is attempting to sever the so-called “energy loop” through which electricity flows to the capital. Where, then, will Kyiv – especially the left bank – get its electricity?

It is necessary to protect existing power lines, substations, and other key energy infrastructure facilities. As for electricity, residents of the left bank will likely feel the shortage more acutely than those on the right bank.

But we must talk not only about electricity but also about heat supply. Combined heat and power plants generate not only electricity but also heat. Therefore, it is extremely important to implement programs to install mobile boiler rooms.

In some cities, such projects have already been partially or fully implemented. As I mentioned earlier, last winter was not as difficult in Vinnytsia and Kharkiv as it was in Kyiv, thanks in part to the implementation of such projects. Local authorities have realized that they need to take responsibility and do everything possible to prepare cities for such challenges.

A number of such projects have also been implemented in Kyiv, but they are not enough. As far as I understand, the existing capacity will not be sufficient to provide heat to all residential areas, especially apartment buildings. Therefore, there may indeed be problems with heat supply.

In other words, Kyiv residents – especially those on the left bank – need to prepare for a difficult winter. We’ve already discussed the water situation. But what about heat and electricity? Can buildings that didn’t manage to take advantage of energy efficiency programs still prepare in some way? And how should we view Vitali Klitschko’s advice to leave the capital, given that winter will be difficult?

That’s irresponsible advice. I believe that no politician has the right to simply tell people to leave. If he suggests such a solution, he must immediately explain whether he has a fund and the resources to pay for people’s housing in another city or outside Kyiv. After all, no one is going to provide housing for free.

It’s telling that, against the backdrop of such statements, rental prices in cities across western Ukraine have begun to rise sharply. Where are people supposed to get the money to move? How will they make a living in their new location? Where will they work? What will their children do? There are a huge number of questions with no answers.

Simply telling people to “just pack up and leave” is irresponsible. Especially when it comes to the capital, where, even during the war, funds continue to be spent on urban improvement projects that could have been postponed until the war ends.

For example, I see this across from Holosiivskyi Park, where they’re removing asphalt that people could have used and piling up large stacks of new paving stones. These could easily have been laid after the war ends. The same applies to the improvements at “Natalka” Park, the construction of glass bridges, the replacement of pavement in the Kharkivskyi neighborhood, and the repeated repair of roads.

It’s a matter of priorities. If local authorities consider it more important to allocate budget funds to yet another paving contract or park improvements rather than preparing the city for winter, it raises the question of how fully they understand the risks and difficulties people will face. And that is truly regrettable.

I’d also like to share the results of a study recently conducted by our analytical center. We surveyed more than 145 communities across Ukraine. It turned out that most of them are not prepared to provide even backup power for their basic infrastructure facilities.

There are three main problems. The first is a lack of funding. For Kyiv, this is not a major issue, as the capital has significant financial resources. However, for most other communities, a lack of funds remains a serious obstacle.

The second is insufficient cooperation and coordination between local authorities and regional administrations. The third is a shortage of specialists.

Communities often simply do not know what technical solutions need to be implemented. Community representatives are asking to be granted the necessary authority, expertise, and model solutions that will help them understand how to operate under current conditions and ensure the functioning of their cities.

I was pleased to see that a meeting was recently held between the Prime Minister, the Cabinet of Ministers, and community representatives. At the same time, it was held too late – this work should have begun earlier.

Why Has the 1-Gigawatt Facility Still Not Been Connected?

How is it that the equipment our partners provided to Ukraine to ensure energy resilience has still not been put into operation?

This is a very interesting story that demonstrates the capabilities of our communities. The equipment was transferred to specific communities, but it’s still sitting there – and, excuse me – gathering rust.

First, there is a shortage of specialists on the ground who could prepare the documentation needed to connect this equipment to the gas and electricity grids. In other words, the communities simply don’t have enough people who know how to do this. In this situation, the central government should conduct an audit of all the equipment and determine exactly what the communities lack in order to install it.

If there are no crews or specialists, the Ministry of Energy could urgently set up a task force that would work around the clock to help prepare documentation, carry out technical connections, and test the equipment.

Second, there are communities that are ready to install the equipment but lack people with the necessary expertise to maintain it. It’s not as simple as just turning on a diesel generator. And, by the way, communities are having problems even with those, even though reports mention hundreds and thousands of purchased generators.

Communities are asking perfectly logical questions. Where will the money come from for generator fuel? Who will ensure its delivery and refueling? Who will maintain the equipment and repair it in case of a malfunction?

This requires specialized services, and if third-party organizations are brought in, their services will have to be paid for. And so we return once again to the issue of funding.

But there’s another interesting point here. It turns out the money is available. State-owned banks could be one source of funding, and this has also been something of a revelation for us. Just a few days ago, we held a joint event with representatives of local communities, the Association of Ukrainian Cities, and three state-owned banks – Oschadbank, Ukrgasbank, and Ukreximbank. All three banks have loan programs that communities can use to install cogeneration plants and solar power plants, as well as to replace outdated equipment in boiler rooms.

This equipment dates back to the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, and modernizing it would help use energy resources more efficiently. How many of the approximately 1,700 communities do you think have taken advantage of these loan programs?

According to our data, only 100. And this is despite the fact that interest rates range from approximately 1% to 7% per year, long repayment terms are available, and there is the opportunity to secure grant funds that do not need to be repaid.

Why have so few communities taken advantage of these opportunities? Primarily due to a lack of expertise at the local level. If the government had done the same work that we did at our think tank, it would have reached out to communities to ask what they lack and what challenges they face when preparing for winter and implementing resilience plans. Then it would be possible to see the big picture and identify specific solutions.

For example, if the main problem is funding, we need to find out which donors can help the communities. If donor funds are insufficient, it’s worth offering bank financing and helping to secure loans. But this must be a joint effort between central and local authorities.

If communities lack the necessary expertise, it must be developed, and relevant best practices should be shared throughout Ukraine. We cannot expect every rural or small-town community to have its own financial experts and economists who can independently prepare all the documents required for a loan application.

Solutions exist. The problem is that we are implementing them too late and are not fully utilizing the opportunities we already have.

There is also a fear of taking responsibility: making a decision, taking the necessary steps, and then facing complaints because you took the initiative. Unfortunately, this is the reality we live in.

This interview has been condensed, corrected, and edited for better understanding by the audience.