Ukraine has resumed strikes on Russian oil refineries, and attacks on oil infrastructure and disruptions at Moscow’s airports are creating new problems for Russia. At the same time, threats persist on the southern front: Russian troops are concentrating near Hola Prystan, raising concerns about possible attempts to cross the Dnipro River and launch an offensive on Kherson.
In an exclusive interview with 24 Channel, military analyst Denys Popovich analyzed the consequences of the strike on the Novokuybyshevsk oil refinery, the effectiveness of Russian air defense, and problems with enemy logistics. He also assessed Ukraine’s capabilities in producing missiles and drones and explained how serious the threat to Kherson is after November 1.
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Why the attacks on oil refineries have resumed and what effect the strike on the Novokuybyshevsk refinery had
Russia’s good times didn’t last long – and now everything’s blowing up again. Eleven fire outbreaks were reported at the Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery in the Samara Region. This facility has been attacked repeatedly. The Russian Ministry of Defense reports that over a thousand drones were shot down overnight. At the same time, the Wall Street Journal reported late last night that Ukraine allegedly would not strike Russian oil refineries until the U.S. midterm elections – and possibly even longer. But, as we can see, the strikes resumed. What should we make of this strike and the resumption of attacks? Did you expect this?
It was expected. Although I didn’t think it would happen before the election. I was certain the strikes would resume, but I didn’t expect it before November 4. However, they have resumed.
There’s no question here of waiting for the results of the U.S. election on November 3. The fact that they’ve started striking Russian oil refineries again is very encouraging. I’ll say it again: I predicted this would happen. My mistake was thinking it would happen after the election. We’re human; we can make mistakes.
To be honest, I also thought the strikes would resume on the night of Tuesday into Wednesday, after November 3. But there was a lot of noise in Kremenchuk. People living there and in the surrounding area say there really were explosions. We also saw the aftermath of the strike on Kyiv. Please tell me: if 11 fire outbreaks were recorded at a single oil refinery, could that paralyze more than one unit? How extensive is the damage?
Yes, it’s a significant scale. It’s clear that out of the 1,043 drones that, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, were shot down by their air defense forces, eleven still managed to get through. That happens.
They claim they’re shooting them down, but it’s clear that drones are still reaching their targets. And this isn’t the first night Russia has reported shooting down 1,200 or 1,040 drones. Do you think this trend will continue? It’s clear that it’s becoming increasingly difficult for them to shoot down such large numbers. Swarms of drones are flying in.
Right now, based on data from the Russian Ministry of Defense – assuming it’s even relevant or accurate – we can’t determine exactly how many drones were actually flying or how many were shot down. Some were definitely shot down; there’s no doubt about that, since their air defense system is still operational.
But a trend is evident. Each time, the reported number increases. It may be inaccurate, and the absolute figures may be wrong, but the fact that we’re launching more drones each time is 100 percent certain. We can use this data from the Russian Ministry of Defense as a rough guide.
And the Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery itself is quite large. Eight million metric tons of petroleum products per year – it’s not Russia’s largest refinery. There are larger ones, notably the Omsk Refinery beyond the Urals, which, it seems, processes 13–15 million metric tons. But the Novokuybyshevsk refinery is definitely one of the largest. Are all Russian refineries actually involved in the production of military fuel?
That depends on the type of equipment at these refineries. You also have to look at the degree of oil refining. If it exceeds 80 percent, then such a facility produces all types of fuel.
I can’t recall offhand what the exact refining depth is at the Novokuybyshevsk refinery. But it had modern equipment – after all, this isn’t the first time we’ve attacked it. If the refining depth is high, then all types of fuel can be produced there. As for the Novokuybyshevsk Refinery, this includes, in particular, rocket fuel, jet fuel, and rocket propellant, among others.
Note that satellite images from Planet Labs showed consequences of the attack on the Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery in Russia’s Samara Region, which was attacked on October 30. A thick cloud of black smoke rose above the facility, covering a significant area; however, due to the fire, it is not yet possible to determine the exact extent of the damage. The refinery processes about 8.8 million metric tons of raw materials per year and produces, among other things, jet fuel used by the Russian military.
Full interview with Denis Popovich: watch the video
"Thousands of Downed Drones" and the Collapse of Moscow’s Airports
The governors of the Kaluga and Tula regions reported dozens of drones; in Bryansk, a factory producing canned food for the Russian army was attacked. And Moscow’s airports have once again ground to a halt. What do these regular disruptions to air traffic mean?
The economic consequences need to be calculated separately; that’s not really my area of expertise. But it’s important to understand the structure of Russia’s air travel system itself.
Moscow is the country’s main aviation hub. It is home to four major airports: Sheremetyevo, Vnukovo, Domodedovo, and Zhukovsky. From this hub, routes radiate across the entire territory of Russia like rays from a star. To travel abroad from remote parts of Russia, you often have to fly through Moscow. And even for domestic flights, a layover in the capital is often required.
If air traffic in Moscow comes to a halt, many flights are immediately canceled or delayed. This disrupts Russia’s domestic logistics and transportation networks. Not even St. Petersburg and other major airports are capable of fully replacing Moscow’s aviation hub.
For a country as vast as Russia, it is very difficult to travel without air service. A train trip from east to west – or vice versa – can take days or even weeks.
It’s a great advantage that we have this kind of influence. Moreover, Russia’s vast territory works against it, since it’s simply impossible to defend all its facilities.
Even the Soviet Union, which was significantly stronger than Russia in many respects, long struggled to establish a comprehensive air defense system and radar network. And what can be said about Russia? Moreover, Ukraine has done a tremendous job destroying air defense systems and their components.
In the spring and summer, hardly a day went by without some element of the air defense system being destroyed in the occupied territories or in Russia – a launcher, a radar station, and so on. And what can replace them? These aren’t bullets that can be manufactured by the dozen.
We’re talking about high-tech systems, the production or repair of which requires specialists, time, and resources. That’s why every strike against such systems creates problems for Russian air defense. Now they’re short on all of that. At the same time, they are trying to focus their defenses on the targets most critical to them: Moscow, Putin’s residence, the so-called Crimean Bridge, and, ultimately, the front lines, which also need to be protected from the air.
Ukrainian Missiles and Drones: What’s Happening with the “Flamingo,” “Neptune,” and Expectations Regarding Ballistics
Fire Point stated that reports of the cessation of “Flamingo” cruise missile production were misunderstood. The company’s co-owner and chief designer, Denis Shtilman, assured that production is continuing and even ramping up. This refers, in particular, to new missile models, while the FP-5 continues to be manufactured. How important is it for Ukraine to increase production of the “Flamingo,” which are already reaching key targets in Russia?
I haven’t seen an analysis of exactly what Ms. Terekh said or what she meant. Perhaps her words were taken out of context, so they may have sounded different than they actually were. At the same time, I am not in favor of concentrating all efforts on a single manufacturer.
Yes, I also don’t understand why orders aren’t distributed among several manufacturers. We’re talking about hundreds of billions of hryvnias here.
We have Fire Point, which manufactures drones capable of reaching the most remote parts of Russia, including beyond the Urals. The company is also working on the development of cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as air defense systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. This is excellent, and such a manufacturer deserves our support.
But we must not forget about other Ukrainian companies. For example, there is the “Luch” Design Bureau – a well-known organization that develops high-precision weapons. It was there that the “Stugna,” “Neptun,” “Vilha” missiles, and other weapons systems – which have proven themselves – were created. In particular, we used "Neptune" missiles to destroy Russian tactical aircraft at airfields.
It was precisely these missiles that hit the Su-34s. Therefore, it’s wrong to support only one manufacturer while ignoring the others. The more manufacturers and weapons we have, the better it is for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Absolutely. We’ve also been waiting a long time for the ballistic missile from Fire Point. They said it would be launched in the fall, but it’s already November. Do you think they’ll make it in time?
November 30 is still fall. But December 1 is already winter. I’m in favor of keeping public hype around the development of any weapon to a minimum. When they constantly promise that something will be launched in three, four, or five months, and it doesn’t happen, questions arise.
There can be various reasons: it didn’t pass testing, there were no orders, or other problems arose. But once a public promise has been made, people expect results and won’t always accept explanations for why the weapon didn’t take flight. That’s why such statements should be made with caution, only when there is complete certainty that what was promised will actually happen.
I’m not a fan of excessive publicity surrounding weapons development. Of course, the public needs to be kept informed and their questions answered. But almost every day we hear announcements of new developments, promises, and stories about how something is about to take flight. In my view, this isn’t quite right.
Threat in the South: Is Russia Preparing an Offensive on Kherson After November 1?
A servicemember with the call sign “Osman” reported yesterday that the Russians are moving troops, ammunition, and food toward the Kherson area. Bild also reports on preparations for a Russian offensive on Kherson. It turns out that, as part of a PR stunt for Trump, Russia is using the declared ceasefire not for peace, but to regroup and prepare for new attacks. How threatening could the scenario be once the ceasefire ends?
I noticed one troubling detail. When Dmytro Lubinets explains the situation and outlines future plans, he is flanked by microphones from American Newsmax journalists, while no Ukrainian media outlets are present. This is a serious oversight.
Perhaps “Ukrainska Pravda” was preparing a report there, but I didn’t see any Ukrainian television outlets. Instead, there were Newsmax, “Izvestia,” RT, NTV, and “Rossiya-1.” The Russian channels produced an entire special report lasting 16 minutes and 45 seconds.
In addition, I saw a video from the Russian side emphasizing the demining of the territory and foreign-made mines, hinting at who left them there. It’s important to understand how Russia will portray this operation once it’s over.
It’s very unfortunate that our journalists and major TV networks aren’t there. They should have been invited, as this is extremely important for information policy and the coverage of such events.
Regarding your question, there are many reports of a concentration of Russian troops and the redeployment of equipment and personnel to the Hola Prystan area, primarily in the direction of Oleshky. Artillery, multiple launch rocket systems, and ammunition are being moved there.
Russian troops are taking up more advantageous positions for a further offensive, setting up positions for drone operators, and laying the groundwork for intensified operations after November 1.
I am very concerned that the Russians may resort to more aggressive actions, including attempts to cross the Dnipro River and penetrate directly into Kherson.
Russia considers this city its own and has even included it in its constitution as part of its territory. They have plans to capture Kherson. At the very least, shelling of the city could resume, and it could be quite intense.
Therefore, after November 1, I would expect the situation to escalate. The only positive aspect is that Ukraine can also use the ceasefire to prepare to repel possible attacks. I hope our command understands this and is preparing for such a turn of events.
This interview has been condensed, corrected, and edited for better audience understanding.
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