December 2023 – Polish politician Grzegorz Braun grabs a fire extinguisher and, right inside the Sejm building, uses it to extinguish the candles of a Hanukkah menorah, thereby sparking one of the most high-profile anti-Semitic scandals in modern Polish history.
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It would seem that such an irrational outsider could have no political future in one of the leading countries of the European Union. But in reality – he can.
In September 2026, Braun smashes a memorial to fallen UPA soldiers with a sledgehammer, and in October ,Polish President Karol Nawrocki raised the possibility of forming a coalition of Polish right-wing forces and potentially inviting the “Confederation of the Polish Crown” – Braun’s own far-right party – to join it.
24 Channel explains how a former film director became one of Poland’s most prominent far-right politicians, why his radical views are increasingly appealing to voters, and how the Polish conservatives’ struggle for power threatens to turn Ukraine into the main target of their political campaigns.
From Documentary Filmmaker to Political Provocateur: Who Is Grzegorz Braun?
Grzegorz Braun’s political career did not begin with a fire extinguisher, anti-Ukrainian rallies, or anti-Semitic scandals. In fact, in his youth, the future far-right politician himself opposed an authoritarian regime – albeit a communist one at the time.
Brown was born on March 11, 1967, in Toruń, Poland, and in the late 1980s joined the anti-communist movement in Wrocław, specifically the famous“Orange Alternative,” whose members mocked the Polish communist authorities through street performances and absurdist actions.
After the fall of the regime and the triumph of democracy in Poland, Grzegorz Braun earned a degree in philology from the University of Wrocław, studied filmmaking, and worked as a documentary filmmaker (he even has his own page on IMDb). His films have primarily focused on Polish history, though he has also experimented with the melodrama genre and even trash sci-fi.
However, cinema gradually gave way to politics. Grzegorz Braun aligned himself with Catholic traditionalists, monarchists, and nationalist movements.
Grzegorz Braun positions himself as a staunch Catholic traditionalist, but not in the modern sense of the term, but rather in the context of the Middle Ages, when the ideological predecessors of the modern Polish politician organized the Crusades and carried out ethnic cleansing under the guise of fighting for the purity of the faith. Brown is fighting for roughly this kind of “tradition,” publicly demonstrating his intolerance toward practically everything (except Russian gas). Fortunately, modern laws significantly restrict his “zealotry”; however, his status as an elected official gives him considerable leeway, granting him a certain degree of impunity.
Moreover, Brown himself has never particularly hidden his own convictions, even when they seemed too radical for his political allies. For example, back in 2011, Brown called the late Archbishop of Lublin, Józef Życiński, a “liar and scoundrel, ” for which he even received public condemnation from the Polish episcopate.
The following year, Brown proposed shooting every tenth journalist from the liberal newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza* and the TVN television channel. The Polish prosecutor’s office did not take kindly to this statement and even opened a criminal case on suspicion of publicly inciting a crime, but later closed it. And all of this happened even before Brown won his first seat in parliament.
As early as 2015, he made his first attempt to become president of Poland, but received only 0.83% of the vote. After this setback, the politician continued to develop his own movement, “Pobudka,” and in 2019 founded the “Confederation of the Polish Crown” party, which joined the broader far-right coalition “Confederation.”
It was through this coalition’s electoral lists that Braun first entered the Polish Sejm in 2019 and was subsequently re-elected in 2023. The following year, he won a seat in the European Parliament.
However, it was neither his legislative initiatives nor even his calls for the murder of journalists that brought the politician his greatest fame. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Braun actively spread anti-vaccine rhetoric and opposed quarantine restrictions, thereby attracting the attention of the first wave of extremists.
This was later compounded by increasingly frequent and overtly anti-Semitic and anti-Ukrainian provocations. As early as 2022, shortly after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, Brown launched a campaign under the slogan “Stop the Ukrainization of Poland, ” opposing aid to Ukrainian refugees and arms deliveries to Kyiv.
Subsequently, Brown and his fellow party members repeatedly removed Ukrainian flags from public buildings in Poland, such as the Kosciuszko Mound in Krakow and the city council building in Biala Podlaska. Following the latest incident, the Polish prosecutor’s office even brought new criminal charges against him.
But the culmination of his political career in the eyes of the general public was that very scandal involving Hanukkah candles in December 2023. After that, the whole world learned about the Polish politician.
Brown himself was quite pleased with this attention. In July 2025, he went even further, publicly denying the historical facts about the genocide at the Nazi concentration camp Auschwitz-Birkenau. In fact, these statements led to yet another case filed against him by Polish law enforcement, and in March 2026, the European Parliament even lifted his immunity as part of this investigation.
Interestingly, even for some members of the Polish far-right, Braun ultimately proved to be too radical. In January 2025, he was expelled from the “Confederation” after deciding to run for president on his own, in defiance of the party’s nomination of their candidate, Sławomir Menczen.
However, this political ostracism unexpectedly turned into a triumph for Braun. In the 2025 presidential election, he came in fourth with 6.34 percent of the vote – meaning that as many as 1.2 million Polish voters cast their ballots for him, more than ten times the number he managed to garner in the 2015 election.
In fact, at this point, the story of Grzegorz Braun ceases to be the tale of yet another political outsider and provocateur. Over the past decade, a politician who was once supported by less than 1% of Poles – and who was even rejected by his fellow radicals – has suddenly transformed into an independent leader of the far-right movement with an electorate of millions. And, what is particularly alarming, he didn’t even have to renounce his own ultra-radicalism to achieve this.
It was enough for Braun simply to remain unchanged and wait until at least part of Polish society had changed and was ready to cast its vote for him.
Poland Is Shifting to the Right: Why Radicals Are No Longer Marginalized
Of course, it would be a serious exaggeration to claim that Poles have suddenly, en masse, become Ukrainophobes, anti-Semites, and conspiracy theorists. However, Grzegorz Braun’s popularity illustrates a telling – yet rather dangerous – trend: the gradual radicalization of a segment of the Polish electorate, unfolding against the backdrop of an increasingly fierce battle for votes within the conservative camp.
For a long time, Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice (PiS) party remained the dominant force on the Polish right; despite certain deviations, it sought to position itself in the center-right of the political spectrum. But after a failed election and the de facto loss of power in 2023, PiS had to contend not only with Donald Tusk’s government but also with fierce and highly aggressive rivals on its own political flank.
A major split occurred within PiS; Morawiecki and a group of other lawmakers left the party in July 2026, so party leader Jarosław Kaczyński was also forced to adopt a more radical stance and start making outrageous statements just to hold on to his position / Photo – East News
Things are indeed looking grim for PiS. On the one hand, they’re under pressure from the increasingly popular “Confederation” led by Sławomir Menczen and Krzysztof Bosak, which combines nationalism with carefully crafted populism and right-liberal economic slogans. On the other hand, there is the even more radical “Confederation of the Polish Crown” led by Grzegorz Braun, which relies on religious traditionalism, Euroskepticism, and openly anti-Ukrainian rhetoric.
And what is particularly disheartening is that it is precisely this strategy that has proven to be Brown’s ticket to the Polish political pedestal. According to a CBOS poll, Braun’s party is currently supported by 7.3% of Poles who have made up their minds and intend to vote. In addition, another survey, published on October 15, showed support as high as 11.3%. That is nearly as much as Menczen’s “Confederation” has, and it is by no means a result that can simply be ignored.
The profile of Grzegorz Braun’s voters is also noteworthy. According to a survey by the same CBOS, approximately one-quarter of adult Poles trust him. These are predominantly very religious men with right-wing views who live in rural areas. Moreover , among those who trust Braun, 35% oppose Poland’s membership in the European Union, whereas among the general population, this figure does not exceed 13%. Furthermore, it is precisely this group that more often expresses hostility toward Ukrainians, Jews, and Germans.
But not toward everyone. For example, as paradoxical as it may seem, Grzegorz Braun has no issues whatsoever with the far-right and the “ the ultra-pro-Russian party "Alternative for Germany".” Proof of this came during a meeting with AfD leaders, at which he, standing shoulder to shoulder with his German comrades, called for the revival of the Russian “Nord Stream” gas pipeline and uttered the line “I love the smell of Russian gas in the morning, ” a twist on Lieutenant Colonel Bill Kilgore’s famous line from the movie *Apocalypse Now*.
Grzegorz Braun and his colleagues from the AfD are calling for a resumption of business with Russia, the occupying power / Screenshot – TVN24
However, it is important to understand that the rise in popularity of right-wing populists is almost never driven solely by ideology. Often, people are simply disillusioned with more traditional parties, concerned about the economic situation and large-scale migration.
The populist’s task in this situation is simply to highlight existing problems, accuse predecessors of inaction, and offer an attractive alternative. Another factor working in Brown’s favor is that Poles aren’t used to seeing him in the ranks of the major parties, which lends his image a certain anti-establishment charm.
And in Poland, in particular, populists often link the issues of migration and the economy specifically to Ukraine. This is not true, as the economic impact of Ukrainians in Poland is literally the opposite of what Brown claims. Nevertheless, many Poles find his explanation convincing.
According to CBOS polls, for the first time since records began , the number of people opposed to accepting Ukrainian refugees in Poland has exceeded the number of supporters – 52% versus 42%. At the same time, 54% of respondents believe that their country provides too much assistance to Ukrainians. Moreover, as many as 46% of respondents give a negative assessment of Polish-Ukrainian relations, which has also set a kind of “anti-record.”
However, there is no need to overreact, as the overwhelming majority of Poles still believe that Warsaw and Kyiv should work together in the face of the threat from Russia. At the same time , 73% are convinced that politicians from both countries are stoking hostility between the two nations for their own gain. However, for figures like Braun, even a slight dissatisfaction with Ukrainian refugees is enough to actively build up his political capital.
Grzegorz Braun attacks a Ukrainian monument – watch the video:
And here it is especially important to understand that the main challenge – and a certain “litmus test” – today does not lie with Grzegorz Braun. He is merely a symptom of the underlying problems, which is why he will continue to rally support with anti-Ukrainian slogans – at least as long as it earns him political points (or benefits him financially).
We should look instead to PiS and the inner circle of Polish President Karol Nawrocki, who must decide right now whether to fight the radicalization of the Polish far right or to cast aside all moral principles and lead this a conveyor belt for producing hatred and xenophobia.
The Alliance Against Tusk: Why Nawrocki and PiS Are Willing to Court the Far Right
We once naively believed that the anti-Ukrainian rhetoric of Polish politicians would end with the elections. But the elections came and went, followed by another round, and the attacks against Ukraine – and, in particular, against Ukrainian refugees in Poland – not only continued but have escalated significantly since then.
And suddenly, Polish President Karol Nawrocki decided that there should be no limits to these destructive trends. On the contrary – it would be better to ally with the most radical representative of this “movement.” The main thing is to oust Donald Tusk’s government from power in the 2027 elections, and then let the world go to hell.
In fact, as they prepare for the new electoral cycle, Navrotsky’s inner circle is actively seeking allies and, according to the publication Onet, has already begun negotiations to form a broad coalition for the Senate. Moreover, they plan to bring together all the “cream of the crop” from the right-wing camp: “Law and Justice” led by Jarosław Kaczyński, the “Confederation” led by Menczen and Bosak, the “Development Plus” party of former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, and, of course, the “Confederation of the Polish Crown” led by Grzegorz Braun.
Navrotsky’s idea is quite simple. The Polish Senate is elected in 100 single-member districts, where the candidate with the most votes wins, so instead of competing against each other and splitting the right-wing vote, the parties could agree to field a single joint candidate in each of the 50 promising districts.
In this way, PiS could potentially win 17 districts, “Confederation” 9–10, Morawiecki’s party 6–7, and Brown’s party four. The remaining promising districts are planned to be reserved for candidates from the president’s inner circle.
But while critical questions regarding the other coalition members might arise only among Ukrainians – a factor that is unlikely to be taken into account in preparations for the Polish elections – Brown’s participation in this arrangement is forcing the other members of the bloc to actively “change their tune.”
For example, in June of this year, Jarosław Kaczyński publicly called Brown a “dangerous politician” and insisted that PiS would not cooperate with him even at the cost of losing the election. Now, however, Onet reports that as early as October, Kaczyński had informally forbidden his party colleagues from criticizing Navrotsky for his willingness to negotiate with Brown’s inner circle.
The situation is made particularly piquant by the fact that Brown himself is not overly concerned with diplomatic niceties. In recordings released in October, he insulted members of the president’s inner circle, comparing them to the “Judenrat” – the Jewish administrative bodies established by the Nazis in the ghettos. And even after such a scandal, the possibility of negotiations with his party has not been completely ruled out. In other words, PiS’s and Navrotsky’s thirst for power has prevailed over their distaste.
However, it is important to understand that this is still only a potential agreement, not a government coalition that has already been formed. Moreover, not everyone in PiS is happy with the prospect of ceding their own districts to fundamentalist rivals. For Grzegorz Braun himself, however, even participating in negotiations with the presidential camp represents an important step toward breaking out of political isolation.
And this is where the key question for Ukraine arises. After all, unlike Braun, Navrotsky and PiS do not currently deny the Russian threat and continue to recognize the strategic necessity of supporting Kyiv, although this does not prevent them from using the Ukrainian issue in domestic political struggles. One example is Navrotsky’s veto of the extension of aid to Ukrainian refugees and his demand to limit social benefits for unemployed Ukrainians.
The conflict with Kyiv reached its peak when Volodymyr Zelenskyy was stripped of the Order of the White Eagle – Poland’s highest state honor. The formal reason cited at the time was the Ukrainian leadership’s decision to name one of its military units after UPA fighters. Prior to this, Nawrocki had even proposed criminalizing the “propagation of Banderaism” in Poland and warned that historical disputes could affect Ukraine’s European prospects.
Of course, the demand to investigateThe Volyn Tragedy is not in itself a manifestation of Ukrainophobia (but the ultimatums demanding recognition of the Polish version of events as the only correct one certainly are – 24 Channel). However, it remains telling that the closer the next elections get, the more prominently this topic features in the Polish president’s rhetoric.
But the problem lies not even in the historical disputes themselves, but in the fact that support for Ukraine risks gradually becoming a bargaining chip in the election campaign. After all, Warsaw now has to take into account not only its own strategic interests and the threat from Russia, but also Nawrocki’s desire to appeal to voters of far-right parties.
And this, perhaps, is the main phenomenon – and at the same time, the threat – posed by Grzegorz Braun. After all, the Polish far right does not necessarily have to come to power on its own to influence state policy. It is enough for traditional right-wing parties to begin adopting their rhetoric and taking the radicals’ demands into account in the battle for voters’ support.
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