"It's Not That Simple": What Is Cognitive Warfare and Why You're Already in It

It’s hard to imagine anyone who hasn’t seen photos of the atrocities committed by the Russians in Bucha, hasn’t heard of Mariupol, or is generally unaware of Russian war crimes.

There is so much information about this that, it would seem, everyone should have reached clear conclusions long ago. And yet, for example, in Europe, the U.S. (particularly in the White House), or even in Ukraine, there are still people who equate the aggressor with the victim, speak of the guilt of both countries, call for understanding toward Russia, and ponder the possibility of returning to business as usual with Moscow.

It’s not enough to explain this simply as propaganda. The nature of the modern information war runs deeper.

What if the enemy is attacking our very ability to distinguish truth from lies? What if the Kremlin’s true goal isn’t to convince the world that it’s right at all? What if it’s not about what a person believes, but about the very mechanism by which they decide what to believe?

Why do Russian propagandists repeat absurd claims and say that “not everything is so clear-cut,” while hostile intelligence agencies plunge the world into an information fog? Read about it in this article from Channel 24. This article was prepared by the Institute for Cognitive Defense based on research by Lydia Smola, Ph.D. in Political Science.

A New Battlefield

The scale of the theater of operations, the type of weapons, the number of participants, the number of casualties? What comes to mind when you hear the phrase “modern warfare”? This is important because, more recently, it has also come to mean the ability to capture the attention and emotions of the enemy’s society, as well as to influence human decision-making on a large scale.
This year, for the first time, the U.S. Department of Defense allocated $13 billion for artificial intelligence as a separate, protected line item in the defense budget, making the term “cognitive warfare” extremely popular. It is used by politicians and journalists, military commanders and analysts, media experts, and researchers of information and psychological operations (IPSO).

They start off on the right foot: they state that cognitive warfare is not about what a person thinks, but about how they think, evaluate, and make decisions. But then they write about disinformation on Telegram channels, debunked fakes, statements by propagandists, and the spread of Russian narratives, such as “denazification” and “protection of the Russian-speaking population.”

Yes, these reports are documented and important. But this is propaganda. It can be measured, documented, and refuted. It always leaves traces – posts, articles, images, videos, and ultimately memes – to shape a certain worldview. Cognitive warfare, on the other hand, operates not through messages themselves, but through the environment in which these messages are perceived.

The goal of cognitive warfare is not to impose a specific worldview, but to undermine the mechanisms that allow us to distinguish the true from the false, the verified from the manipulative, and the real from the fabricated.

We’ve grown accustomed to believing that freedom of access to information automatically leads to a better understanding of the world. But that’s not the case. And totalitarian states take advantage of this.

A researcher who analyzes how many times Russia has repeated the narrative about “Nazis in Ukraine” is studying propaganda. A researcher who asks why, after four years of full-scale aggression, some Western elites still question whether Russia is an aggressor is getting closer to understanding cognitive warfare. The first is important, but the second is more dangerous.

Hence one of the most widespread myths about Russian information policy – the claim that the Kremlin seeks to convince the world of its own righteousness. In reality, Russia is creating an industry of doubt and, for the most part, does not need to be believed.

The Industry of Doubt

How does it work? Let’s consider the example of the downing of Flight MH17 by the Russians. The international investigation lasted for years: a vast body of evidence was gathered proving the Russian military’s involvement in the tragedy that claimed the lives of 298 people; the route taken by the “Buk” missile system was established; and specific individuals were identified. But in parallel with the investigation, Russia launched its own special information operation.

The state-run media there and so-called experts – often publicly claiming no connection to the Kremlin – mass-produced and promoted alternative versions of the event: allegedly a Ukrainian fighter jet; a Ukrainian “Buk”; a NATO missile; a special operation by Western intelligence agencies; an American provocation; or planted bodies. None of these versions were consistent with one another, but that was not the goal.

The goal was to create information noise, chaos, and a fog of information, not to prove an alternative position.

When a person is presented with two versions of events, they set out to verify the facts. But when twenty versions are offered, many people stop verifying them altogether. Experts call this cognitive overload.

Successful disinformation appeals to quick, primarily intuitive reactions: fear, outrage, anger, and moral shock. It exploits what Nobel laureate and psychologist Daniel Kahneman called “System 1” and tries to prevent people from switching to the slow, analytical mode of thinking – System 2.

The human brain dislikes uncertainty, but it dislikes an endless number of contradictory explanations even more. So at a certain point, a person begins to look for the least energy-consuming solution. Eventually, the brain, trying to conserve energy, gives up and says, “We’ll never know the truth anyway.” At that moment, the aggressor revels in their success.

If you read this text to the end, you’ll learn how not to become a casualty of Russia’s cognitive warfare.

Photos of unarmed Ukrainians killed by Russian soldiers in BuchaEyewitness accounts, satellite images, and journalistic investigations have created one of the most thoroughly documented accounts of a war crime in modern history. However, the Russian propaganda machine reacted in a surprisingly familiar way: allegedly, “there was no tragedy at all; the dead turned out to be actors; it was a setup by Ukrainian special services; a provocation by the West; the result of actions by the Ukrainian army; a NATO information campaign.” None of these versions stood up to factual scrutiny, but the facts were not the main battleground.

Similarly, in March 2022, the Russians released an obvious deepfake depicting Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s “surrender.” Their goal was to undermine the very category of video evidence as a reliable tool for verifying reality. So that, going forward, the audience would doubt any genuine footage.

Prior to that, a network of pro-Kremlin media had been operating in Ukraine for years. These included TV channels, radio stations, newspapers, and websites, which were sanctioned by a decision of the National Security and Defense Council in February 2021. They created the illusion of “pluralism” because they ostensibly provided a platform for different political camps to express themselves. The editorial policy implemented by editors, journalists, and certain on-air guests usually consisted of highlighting problems without showing how to solve them. Such media outlets fostered conflict and contempt among participants in discussions, undermined authority figures, and called into question society’s fundamental values.

In particular, by carefully selecting program topics, manipulatively using certain examples, and creating uncomfortable situations on air, these media outlets undermined the image of the Ukrainian soldier as a defender of the homeland. Audiences were persistently encouraged to view him in a negative light. Whether facts or fake news, they served merely as tools in this manipulation of public consciousness.

Something similar is now happening with the shaping of attitudes toward the Ukrainian language on certain Telegram channels, which deliberately publish even the smallest scandals between Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians. By regularly spreading such content, they create the impression that the language issue in Ukraine is still extremely contentious. Moreover, they suggest that society still does not unequivocally accept the status of the Ukrainian language as the official language.

Mobilization and Cognitive Shift

Separately, we must take into account the Russian information operation aimed at discrediting mobilization efforts in Ukraine. To this end, they exploit people’s natural fear of death, fatigue from the prolonged war, and social injustice (issues of economic favoritism or corruption) through a network of anonymous, geotargeted Telegram channels, as well as mass-distributing emotional videos on TikTok with the hashtag #TCK and using AI bots to simulate public outrage in the comments.

Due to the constant barrage of emotional content, a shift in perceptions has occurred in many people’s minds. This is what is known as a cognitive shift.

The image of a TCC servicemember has transformed in people’s minds into that of an “internal enemy.” As a result, some people’s internal rational analysis – that without mobilization, the state will cease to exist – is shut down. Instead, an imposed logic takes over: “The state is my enemy; I must flee from it.”

In cognitive warfare, the goal is not to force a person to believe a specific lie, but to undermine their ability to distinguish between lies and the truth. That is why Russia is unconcerned about its own contradictions. From the perspective of classical propaganda, this seems absurd. However, from the perspective of cognitive warfare, it is entirely rational. After all, inconsistency itself becomes a tool that erodes trust.

In this sense, cognitive warfare resembles not the capture of territory, but the destruction of road signs. If an army knows where to go, it will reach its goal. However, without landmarks and an understanding of the situation, the army is doomed to defeat.

Nothing is impossible if you’re a liar

Neuroscience over the past few decades shows that attention, memory, assessing the truthfulness of information, decision-making, and other cognitive functions have limited resources. When trust is destroyed, a destructive process begins. People become more vulnerable to manipulation.

An important goal of cognitive warfare is total disillusionment. This is one of its least obvious but most dangerous characteristics.

When, after Bucha or Mariupol, comments appear in Western media such as, “It’s not all that clear-cut,” or “We’ll probably never know the truth” – this is no longer the result of a lack of information. It means that people there are gradually getting used to the idea that any fact has countless equally legitimate interpretations, and none of them is true.

This is precisely where the line between information warfare and cognitive warfare lies. The former fights over the content of messages, while the latter fights over the rules by which society determines what is true in the first place.

Thus, Russia is attacking not knowledge itself, but the very ability to produce knowledge.

As early as the middle of the last century, the Soviet mathematician and psychologist Volodymyr Lefebvre was working on a concept now known as “reflexive control.” It holds that the most effective way to influence an opponent is to create a picture of reality for them in which they themselves will make the desired decision – and will be absolutely convinced that it is their own choice.

Take, for example, the media campaign allegedly orchestrated bya mass influx of migrants into Ukraine. Through such reports about the brazen behavior of new arrivals from the East and Africa, they seek to provoke the expected outrage among the Ukrainian population. The goal is to create the impression that there are a great many migrants in Ukraine and that they behave extremely aggressively. In reality, however, statistics show that in recent years, far fewer foreigners have been arriving in our country than in the past. It is quite obvious that the Russians are behind this information sabotage in Ukraine. This is a prime example of reflexive governance.

Propaganda tells people what to think. Reflective control, on the other hand, changes the conditions under which people reach their conclusions.

It is no coincidence that the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov has publicly stated that non-military measures should outnumber military ones by a ratio of 4 to 1.

It is no coincidence that a Kremlin-controlled internet troll factory simultaneously influenced elections in the EU and the U.S. and destabilized support for Ukraine within the EU.

“Nothing is true and everything is possible,” as British journalist and researcher Peter Pomerantsev once remarked.

Modern Russia has adapted so easily to the realities of the information age because it came with experience in shaping the very terms of the debate.

When a Western politician declares that we must “give Putin a way to save face,” when Business elites are proposing a return to normal relations with Russia, when the media tries to find “both sides” where one side is waging an aggressive war, – what we see is not so much the result of direct propaganda as the consequence of a long-term influence on the decision-making environment. People sincerely believe they have reached this conclusion on their own. But that is not the case.

It is worth mentioning the so-called “anti-establishment populists,” whose incredibly rapid rise in popularity in Europe was driven by Russian intelligence agencies. With the help of Kremlin money and social media, they deepen social divisions and exacerbate contentious issues, propose attractive but absurd solutions, and discredit the authority of public figures as a whole.

Populists, who are all the rage in Europe today, are turning politics into a “fun show” almost everywhere. At the same time, amid all this fun and chaos, nearly all of them are calling for the normalization of relations with Moscow. This is the most effective way to undermine European states while simultaneously strengthening the Kremlin.

How to Avoid the Russian Trap

It may seem that constantly repeating the same thing is a sign of propaganda’s intellectual poverty. But in reality, one of the best-documented cognitive mechanisms lies behind this. As early as the late 1970s, psychologists Gasher, Goldstein, and Toppino in the U.S. identified a phenomenon that would later be called the “illusory truth effect.” The essence of this effect is that people tend to believe statements they have heard repeatedly in the past.

The brain interprets something familiar as a signal of truthfulness. In this context, the long-standing repetition of Russian narratives about “denazification,” “oppression of Russian speakers,” or “an aggressive NATO” no longer appears to be merely propaganda blunders, but rather a deliberate cognitive attack.

But if cognitive attacks exist, is there a way to defend against them? The answer to this question is provided by the theory of cognitive vaccination developed by Cambridge researchers van der Linden and Rousenbeck. Its logic resembles the principle of vaccination: people are not given the disinformation itself, but are instead taught how it works. They are taught the very techniques and methods of manipulation.

Since 2014, Ukrainian society has endured an unprecedented number of information attacks. We were, in effect, a testing ground for Russian information and psychological operations. So this, too, became a kind of collective immunization. Not for everyone, of course, but quite a few people certainly understand the tactics and methods of the Kremlin’s information fog.

A military acquaintance, a volunteer, a local activist, a journalist you know, or a neighbor often become sources of information no less credible than official channels. In other words, additional levels of reality verification have emerged in Ukraine.

And this is very important, because the aggressors’ main target is our values. Once a person believes that their efforts are futile, the enemy no longer needs to send troops after them – the person will surrender on their own, because “that’s the right thing to do.” It is a “virus” in the mind that does not break down “walls” but changes the way we see the world.

While propaganda sought to capture a person’s attention, cognitive warfare aims for much more – to control the conditions under which that attention is transformed into knowledge. Even the most advanced Western weapons or the best physical training won’t help if the enemy has already taken root in your mind and is dictating its own rules from there.

What is cognitive warfare and why are you ALREADY in it? Watch the video: