Russia continues to suffer strikes on strategic facilities, and its early warning and internal communication systems are proving vulnerable to cyberattacks. At the same time, Russian troops are trying to take advantage of even brief ceasefires to strengthen their positions, particularly in southern Ukraine.
Ivan Tymochko, a Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemember, explained on 24 Channel why reports of a nuclear threat have caused concern among Russians and how the tactics of Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries have changed. He also assessed the consequences of the ceasefire in Oleshky, the possibility of a crossing of the Dnipro River, and the prospects for a Russian offensive toward Zaporizhzhia.
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Cyberattacks laid bare the fears of Russian society
The systems of Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations and regional operational headquarters suffered a massive cyberattack. Russians received messages about the alleged launch of nuclear warheads, and information also emerged about attacks on the “Samara” oil transportation hub, which houses 71 storage tanks with a total capacity of over 1.5 million cubic meters. What did these events reveal, and just how vulnerable are Russian systems?
This is one of the military cyberattacks that have already occurred and, I believe, will continue to occur. We have repeatedly discussed the weak protection of Russian internal communication, document management, and alert systems.
Previously, websites of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Emergency Situations, as well as systems belonging to military-industrial complex enterprises, large factories, and weapons manufacturers, were hacked. Therefore, such incidents are not fundamentally new.
But the current cyberoperation has revealed another important point: just how tense and psychologically constrained Russian society has become. Previously, Russians were fairly calm and confident that the war in Ukraine did not concern them and would not directly affect them. Now they take such information much more seriously.
I believe such operations will have an even greater impact in the future, especially when combined with massive strikes on Russian military targets.
Here, Vladimir Putin and his inner circle have fallen into a trap of their own making. Recall their constant nuclear threats, statements about the possible use of nuclear weapons, and the continuous drills and readiness checks of Russia’s nuclear capabilities.
All of this has captured the attention of Russian society to such an extent that, I think, people have come to believe in the possibility of a nuclear war themselves. They acknowledge that problems could arise at industrial facilities or in the very mines where nuclear weapons are stored.
And while Putin spins tales about going to heaven after a nuclear war, Russians don’t seem to buy it. They understand that the consequences of a nuclear war would be devastating for them as well.
Moreover, given Putin’s current behavior, Russians may take his threats quite seriously. This shows just how willing they really are to die for the ideas of the Russian dictator, which propaganda has been imposing on them for years.
Russian propaganda itself has stoked this issue, and now it is reaping the consequences within the country.
There is another interesting point. Russians have always liked to boast that they have an extremely high level of cybersecurity, and that hacking foreign websites and communication systems is their specialty.
However, their own systems are now proving to be vulnerable. I suspect that attacks on Russian data centers may have played a role in this.
In my opinion, these attacks have weakened Russian propaganda and information campaigns both in Ukraine and abroad. At the same time, the defense and mutual support systems of the Russian cyberspace may have been compromised.
Ukraine has changed its tactics for striking Russian oil refineries
Three major Russian oil refineries were attacked within three days: Kstovo, Novokuybyshevsk, and “Bashneft-Novoyl” in Ufa. Prior to this, no attacks on oil refineries had been recorded for some time, a fact attributed to a request from the Donald Trump administration. Why might Ukraine have paused its attacks, and what has changed now?
Let’s start with the scale of these facilities. Together, the three refineries processed approximately 33 million metric tons of crude oil per year. The Kstovo refinery alone accounted for nearly half of that volume – about 17 million metric tons.
But I want to draw attention to another point. Ukraine has not made any official statements about halting strikes on Russian oil refineries.
These were conclusions drawn by analysts who noted that there had been no such attacks for a certain period of time. In other words, this refers to the absence of strikes during a specific period, not an officially announced cessation of operations.
I am more inclined toward a different explanation. We have had – and continue to have – a problem with anti-missile and anti-ballistic defense, particularly with the destruction of Russian missiles.
Our resources are far from unlimited. And we do not have enough specialists to simultaneously plan and carry out an unlimited number of operations.
Therefore, I think we have redirected part of our efforts toward the Russian chemical industry and facilities where missiles are assembled, components are manufactured, individual parts are produced, or rocket fuel is made.
The fact is that right now, the Russians are largely launching missile strikes straight off the assembly line. What they produce in a short period of time is used against Ukraine almost immediately.
Consequently, disrupting the production cycle of Russian missiles has become one of our top priorities.
And for Russia, protecting these facilities is also extremely important. Especially since there aren’t that many factories that produce critically needed components. For Putin, every such facility is literally worth its weight in gold.
Therefore, I suspect that the Russians have begun redeploying some of their air defense and even missile defense systems from oil refineries to chemical plants and other missile production facilities.
This could have weakened the protection of those oil refineries that were previously better defended.
Ukrainian intelligence and other agencies, for their part, have also been working to adapt their strike tactics. We are seeing a shift in the approach to targeting Russian facilities.
Whereas previously one or two drones – sometimes up to five – might strike an oil refinery, and that was enough to achieve a certain result, we are now seeing a completely different level of intensity.
We’re now talking about 15 to 20 strikes hitting a single enemy target almost simultaneously. This doesn’t just temporarily put the facility out of commission.
After such severe damage, the question may arise as to whether it is even economically feasible to restore the plant and whether such a restoration would be viable.
We must also correctly understand the 10% figure that is being discussed in the context of the latest attacks. According to estimates, these facilities accounted for a significant share of Russia’s oil refining capacity, but some of the other refineries had already been destroyed, damaged, or rendered unable to operate at full capacity.
Therefore, when assessing the current losses, one must take into account not only the Russian industry’s overall design capacity but also how many facilities were actually still operational prior to the latest strikes.
And let’s not forget that the oil refining industry in Russia is a major source of government revenue. It provides revenue for the state budget, including the funds Russia is spending on the war against Ukraine.
Russia took advantage of the ceasefire in Oleshky
The General Staff reported that during the humanitarian mission and the ceasefire in Oleshky, the Russians rotated their units, fortified their positions, installed anti-drone systems, and brought in ammunition. To what extent could they have strengthened their forces during this time, and does this pose a threat to Ukrainian troops?
Several factors need to be taken into account here. First and foremost, we all understand perfectly well that the Russian army always views any pause in hostilities as an opportunity to improve its position and regroup its forces.
This has happened during various ceasefires throughout the war. One can even recall the period starting in 2014.
Therefore, this turn of events was predictable. That said, Ukraine is prepared to take certain risks to secure the release and return of its citizens.
If there is an opportunity to evacuate people or bring them back through an exchange, we will continue to do so – even while realizing that the enemy will try to use this period for its own military purposes.
Now regarding the situation of Russian forces in this sector. The Dnipro region is one of the most challenging for the Russians from a logistical standpoint.
It is not easy to ensure the delivery of weapons and ammunition or the movement of large military units there. Moreover, the territory of mainland Ukraine in this area is quite narrow, especially for the simultaneous movement of significant forces amid active combat operations.
Until recently, no large-scale operational-level operations had been conducted in this sector. Russian troops were halted near Primorsk, driven out of Stepnogorsk, and were prevented from expanding their zone of control in the Orikhiv sector.
During the six-day ceasefire related to the evacuation of Ukrainian citizens, the enemy most likely did indeed attempt to rotate its troops.
First and foremost, they may have replaced units that had suffered significant losses and needed to be reorganized or replenished with personnel.
But there is a fundamental difference between conducting a rotation and the ability to organize a full-scale military operation.
A large-scale offensive requires substantial reserves, the ability to protect them from Ukrainian strikes, and secure rear areas. Without these, even additional units will not enable the Russians to quickly turn the tide of the conflict.
We know that there are approximately 40,000 Russian servicemen in occupied Crimea. But, in my opinion, they are more limited in their capabilities than they are prepared to conduct large-scale combined-arms operations.
Ukrainian defense forces have dealt serious blows to Crimea’s military infrastructure. Many warehouses, aircraft, S-400 systems, radar installations, and power plants have been destroyed.
In addition, Ukraine has significantly limited Russian capabilities at sea, particularly in the Sea of Azov.
Therefore, the enemy may carry out certain tactical actions and harass our positions, but I doubt that now, in late fall, it is capable of drastically turning the situation in its favor.
Let’s not forget that the Russians will have to cross the Dnipro River. Under current weather conditions, this is an extremely difficult task.
It’s already cold, and falling into the water at such temperatures drastically reduces the time a person can survive. The Ukrainian command was also aware of all these risks when it agreed to the humanitarian operation.
At the same time, it is very important to publicly demonstrate that we are aware of the enemy’s actions. This affects both the Russian troops and their generals.
They must understand that they are under constant surveillance and will not be able to regroup or prepare certain operations unnoticed.
There is another aspect – the international one. We need to show the international community that Russia is using even humanitarian agreements to gain a military advantage.
The Russians have repeatedly demonstrated that they are willing to violate agreements – including those they themselves propose – if doing so improves their position on the front lines.
Therefore, I admit that localized clashes may occur in this sector. But I do not believe that Russian troops are capable of turning the tide of the overall fighting thanks to this rotation.
Especially considering that the Russians have been pushed back on the Oleksandrivka front, their situation near Huliaipole is also far from ideal, and they are facing serious difficulties on the Orikhiv front and near Stepnogorsk.
Railway connections also remain a problem. The Russians themselves acknowledge that Ukrainian strikes have significantly damaged the railway infrastructure, which is of strategic importance for their logistics in this sector.
According to their own reports, some sections of track are still out of service.
However, this does not mean that all enemy actions have ceased. The Russians may continue to attempt to cross the Dnipro in small groups or with sabotage and reconnaissance units.
Missile and drone strikes, aerial bombing, and artillery strikes will also continue. The enemy has used these methods before, so such attacks will remain a real threat.
The offensive on Zaporizhzhia is being held back by the Defense Forces and logistical problems
The Russians may try to use the dried-up Kakhovka Reservoir to advance toward Zaporizhzhia. How realistic is such a scenario, given the challenging weather conditions, the width of the Dnipro River, and the capabilities of the Ukrainian defense?
A number of factors need to be considered here. But I want to emphasize that the main obstacle to crossing the Dnipro – whether in the area of the Kakhovka Reservoir or near the Antonivsky Bridge – is not even the geographical conditions.
The main deterrent is the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Believe me, if Putin knew this would lead to success, he would turn Russian soldiers into a ten-kilometer-long human barrier – dead or alive. He wouldn’t care in the least whether the military had enough watercraft or how many people would die during such an operation.
Moreover, the Russians have already attempted to create special units for operations on the water. As far back as 2024, they were forming a brigade of river boats.
Some of these vessels were destroyed at the time. As far as can be judged, this plan did not pan out.
At least to date, this brigade has not conducted any serious military operations. And I doubt it will be able to demonstrate significant results in the future.
Of course, seasonal factors also play an important role. But it’s important to understand that the Russians’ intentions to advance toward Zaporizhzhia have been evident for quite some time.
Attempts to break through Ukrainian defenses in the Orikhiv and Huliaipole sectors were specifically designed to fulfill tactical and operational objectives related to a subsequent advance toward Zaporizhzhia.
This direction was personally overseen by Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff. He identified it as one of the strategic directions for offensive operations in 2025–2026.
But Russian troops are far from being in the most advantageous position there.
At one point, a Ukrainian counteroffensive took place in these territories. The Russians built the so-called Surovikin lines there, and both sides established strong defensive positions and fortifications.
Therefore, achieving a rapid breakthrough under such conditions is extremely difficult.
At the same time, there is another serious threat to Zaporizhzhia. Russian troops continue to strike the city and its suburbs with guided aerial bombs and drones.
This is indeed a major problem, but it does not mean that Russian troops have advanced to within four kilometers of Zaporizhzhia, as Putin claimed.
The actual distance, in my estimation, is significantly greater. It’s just that modern weapons allow the enemy to strike the city from much farther away.
As for the possibility of a new large-scale offensive, the Russians currently lack not so much troops as the capacity to conduct several major operations simultaneously.
Their units have suffered significant losses in the Lyman sector. In the Kostiantynivka sector, the strike group was also unable to achieve the rapid results the Russian command had hoped for.
The enemy is currently continuing to press forward toward Dobropillia. A large number of Russian troops are indeed concentrated there.
This indicates that the occupiers have already defined their strategic priorities. However, they may use secondary fronts for isolated attacks, maneuvers, or to divert Ukrainian forces.
But I’m not very sure that the Russians will dare to launch a large-scale offensive toward Zaporizhzhia right now.
The fields are already heavily waterlogged, and the ground is becoming unstable, which hinders the movement of equipment and personnel.
Most likely, the enemy will wait for more favorable weather conditions. These could include frost, when the ground becomes firmer, or prolonged fog, which would allow for more covert troop movements.
Another option for the Russians could be to improve their logistics. But they are currently facing serious problems in this area as well, especially in southern and southeastern Ukraine.
Delivering ammunition, supplying personnel, and moving reserves remain challenging tasks. To carry out a successful operation – even at the tactical level – it is essential to have secure and adequately supplied rear areas.
In southern Ukraine, Russian logistics are quite vulnerable due to the geography of the region, the location of the occupied territories, and the Ukrainian Defense Forces’ ability to strike supply routes.
Therefore, although the Russians may continue to attempt offensive operations and seek weaknesses in the Ukrainian defense, their current capabilities for a large-scale breakthrough toward Zaporizhzhia remain limited.
Ivan Tymochko on cyberattacks against Russia: watch the video
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