Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure continue, and following yet another attack on one of Russia’s largest oil refineries, questions have arisen about the broader implications for the entire industry. Meanwhile, on the front lines, Russian troops have intensified their offensive operations, taking advantage of weather conditions, and new risks have emerged in the Kherson region due to the occupiers’ regrouping.
Military expert, flight instructor, and Ukrainian Armed Forces Reserve Colonel Roman Svitan explained on 24 Channel why strikes on Russian oil refineries could ultimately force the Kremlin to halt oil production. He also assessed the situation on the left bank of the Kherson region, predicted the possible depletion of Russian reserves, and commented on new initiatives by the U.S. Congress and Donald Trump’s statements regarding Ukraine’s borders.
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The Strike on Kirishi and the Threat to Russian Oil Production
The Kirishi oil refinery, one of the largest in Russia, was attacked again in the Leningrad Oblast. You mentioned the day before that another strike could be launched against the facility after it was restored. Why is this refinery so important?
There is a certain logic to the sequence of strikes against Russian oil infrastructure. We’ve already seen that, following the damage, the Russians restored operations at the Kirishnefteorgsintez facility – known as KINEF – as well as at plants in Syzran and Omsk. Therefore, a second strike on the Kirishnefteorgsintez refinery was entirely expected.
Omsk is located about three thousand kilometers away, so it is a much more challenging target. Syzran is much closer; it is part of the Samara group of oil refineries, along with the Kuibyshev and Novokuibyshevsk refineries.
These facilities are connected by a shared oil infrastructure. In particular, the Samara Linear Production and Dispatch Station ensures the supply of raw materials to the respective refineries.
According to my information, the Syzran refinery has already resumed operations. Gasoline, diesel fuel, and – most importantly – jet fuel have begun flowing from there toward Engels.
But Kirishi is even more significant. It is a major enterprise that not only meets Russia’s domestic needs but also exports petroleum products through the Baltic ports.
KINEF is Putin’s cash cow. It ranks among the top five largest oil refineries in Russia. Moreover, its products are shipped, in particular, through Primorsk
Therefore, we must look not only at individual oil refineries but also at the entire system that supports their operations and product distribution. The ports of Primorsk, Ust-Luga, and Novorossiysk play a key role in this system.
According to my estimates, Ukraine has already managed to shut down approximately one-third of Russia’s oil refining capacity. Among other large enterprises whose operations are crucial to the entire industry are the refineries in Volgograd, Perm, Ukhta, Syzran, and Omsk.
It is important to clarify one key point here: oil production cannot be viewed in isolation from oil refining, transportation, and export. Russia has thousands of oil wells, most of which are located far beyond the Urals. It is extremely difficult to reach them directly, but their operations depend on whether there is a way to utilize the extracted oil.
If refineries cannot process the crude and the export infrastructure is operating intermittently, difficulties arise with the sale and storage of the extracted oil. Ultimately, this could affect oil production itself.
There are several thousand wells, and most of them are located beyond the Urals. We simply won’t be able to reach them. But the wells can be shut down – and for a long time – if the Russians have nowhere to send their oil
Oil wells are not equipment that can simply be shut down and restarted the next day. Their operation involves complex geological processes, maintaining pressure in the reservoirs, and other technical conditions.
In my estimation, a prolonged halt in production at certain fields could create such serious problems that it would take years to resume operations.
Linear production and dispatch stations play an additional role in the Russian oil system. They house large storage tanks used for temporary storage and the blending of crude oil.
For example, the Samara Linear Production and Dispatching Station covers more than 200 hectares. According to the data I have cited, there are more than 70 storage tanks there with a total capacity of approximately 1.5 million cubic meters.
Individual tanks have a capacity of 20,000 or 50,000 cubic meters. They are necessary for the stable operation of the pipeline system, particularly for the preparation of the Urals crude blend.
Following previous attacks on the Samara station, based on my observations, at least ten storage tanks were damaged. This is yet another example of just how interconnected the various components of the Russian oil industry are.
The station in Unecha, which is connected to the “Druzhba” oil pipeline, is of particular importance. Russian oil is transported through this system to Belarus and European countries, including Slovakia and Hungary.
Europe is gradually trying to reduce its dependence on Russian energy resources. Among the examples I mentioned was Moldova, which is developing energy ties with Romania.
In my opinion, European countries’ continued move away from Russian oil and gas will also limit the Kremlin’s ability to generate export revenue.
Similar problems exist in Russia’s gas sector, although it has its own infrastructure and technological characteristics. Yamal, located approximately three thousand kilometers from Ukraine, remains one of the regions critical to Russia’s gas industry.
I view all of this as a long-term economic drain on Russia. If oil companies, the transportation system, and export routes suffer increasingly greater losses, this could set the stage for a deep crisis in the industry.
When the Russians are forced to shut down their wells, their oil industry will be as good as dead. And then we will see the consequences for the entire Russian economy
I consider Russia’s economic exhaustion to be one of the factors capable of affecting its ability to continue the war. But the scale and speed of this process will depend on many circumstances, in particular on the ability of companies to resume production.
Strikes on Bridges and Positions of Russia’s “Rubicon”
Footage has emerged of a strike on a bridge near Taganrog. The General Staff also reported the destruction of four positions held by Russian drone operators, including a “Rubicon” unit in Berdiansk. How significant are these results for the southern front?
Our military is systematically targeting “Rubicon.” This is one of the most problematic Russian drone units for us, so its operators and command-and-control system are under constant scrutiny.
Based on my observations, reports of strikes against such targets appear practically every day or every other day. Moreover, what matters is not only the elimination of individual crews but also the disruption of the system that enables the deployment of Russian drones.
Ukrainian radio intelligence capabilities help with this. In addition, our partners provide Ukraine with intelligence data that allows us to better understand the enemy’s activities.
We’re working on “Rubicon.” This is one of the most problematic units for us. Almost every day or every other day, its operators are located and eliminated. We have very good radio intelligence of our own, and our partners additionally share their data
As for the bridge, we’re talking about the Mius Bridge near Taganrog. Footage of the damage emerged after the strike, but that doesn’t necessarily mean traffic has come to a complete halt.
Bridges are complex engineering structures. Damage to individual elements can complicate transportation, but the enemy is capable of carrying out repairs or organizing temporary crossings.
Therefore, the results of such attacks must be assessed based on their actual impact on logistics. What matters is how long the enemy is unable to use the relevant route.
In the southern sector, the Russians have several road and rail connections that facilitate the movement of troops and cargo. Among these, the routes through the Kalmius area remain particularly important.
The rail link toward Volnovakha is of particular importance. From there, transport routes branch out toward Donetsk, Mariupol, and other occupied settlements.
This is precisely why strikes on rear logistics can affect the Russian army’s ability to transfer equipment, ammunition, and other resources between different sectors.
However, the duration of the effect is crucial here. A single instance of damage to transportation infrastructure does not guarantee that the enemy will lose access to that route for an extended period.
How the humanitarian mission in Oleshky might have affected the situation on the front lines
Following Melania Trump’s humanitarian mission to evacuate Ukrainians from Oleshky, representatives of the 34th Marine Brigade reported a Russian regrouping on the left bank of the Dnipro River. According to them, the occupiers have deployed approximately 1,000 troops there. At the same time, Ukrainian marines are conducting operations on the Dnipro. How might the situation develop in this area?
First and foremost, I want to distinguish between the humanitarian outcome and the military implications of how this mission was organized.
Melania Trump helped resolve the situation for several hundred Ukrainians who needed assistance. This is a positive development, and I do not deny the significance of her involvement.
But the way the evacuation was carried out raises serious questions for me. In my opinion, the humanitarian operation should have been organized in such a way that it did not create additional opportunities for Russian troops.
I had previously proposed involving the United Nations. Melania and Donald Trump could have sought an international mechanism that would ensure the safety of civilians and allow for their evacuation without reinforcing the Russian military presence.
For example, one could discuss the creation of a temporary humanitarian zone under international control, where the safety of the population would be ensured by authorized international forces.
Once the evacuation was complete, such a mission could be terminated without altering the military situation in favor of either side.
Instead, according to reports from the Ukrainian military, the Russians used this period to further regroup on the left bank of the Kherson region.
Melania apparently did a good deed by helping several hundred Ukrainians. But the organization of this humanitarian mission, in my opinion, benefited the Russians
According to information provided by Marine Corps representatives, the Russian army has deployed up to a thousand troops to the area. This is a significant reinforcement that could influence future combat operations.
It’s not just about the number of personnel. Along with the troops, the enemy may be moving ammunition, artillery, and other equipment necessary to hold their positions.
A distinctive feature of the left bank is that Russian units can use the terrain to build fortifications. Even in a short period of time, they are capable of preparing positions that will subsequently be more difficult to eliminate.
Therefore, the additional deployment of Russian troops in the Oleshky and Hola Prystan areas poses challenges for Ukrainian marines operating in the Kherson sector.
Representatives of the 34th Brigade have already spoken publicly about Ukrainian operations on the Dnipro River. Specifically, they discussed actions on the islands and maintaining a Ukrainian presence in certain areas.
However, the Defense Forces’ future capabilities will depend on the specific operational situation. An enemy that has managed to entrench itself in its positions creates more challenging conditions for any Ukrainian actions.
The threat to Kherson is of particular concern. Additional Russian weapons on the left bank could increase the danger to the city’s civilian population.
The Russians didn’t just deploy their troops there – they may have already managed to entrench themselves. And that means additional challenges for our marines. Moreover, they have brought in ammunition and deployed multiple-launch rocket systems capable of striking Kherson
Therefore, while I view the very fact of providing aid to Ukrainian civilians positively, I am critical of how this humanitarian operation was organized. Its military consequences, in my opinion, could prove dangerous for the future situation in the Kherson region.
Why the Russian army has intensified its offensive right now
Due to fog and weather conditions, the Russians are attacking Ukrainian positions more aggressively. Robert Brovdi’s drone unit reported a record 801 enemy casualties in a single day, while the General Staff cited a figure of 2,980 Russian servicemen. Why did the occupiers advance right now, and how long might this intensity last?
The Russians have begun actively deploying heavy equipment. According to the data provided, over the past 24 hours they lost approximately four tanks, 16 armored personnel carriers, and several dozen artillery systems.
This indicates that the enemy is deploying more than just infantry in its offensive operations. They are gradually introducing armored vehicles and other assets into the battle that were previously reserved for larger-scale operations.
But here it is important to recall what I spoke about back in the spring and summer.
At that time, many politicians claimed that the Russian summer offensive had already fizzled out. I did not agree with that assessment, as I believed that the main offensive campaign had not yet begun.
Throughout the spring and summer, the Russians used the remnants of their operational-tactical reserves for preparatory actions. They were creating conditions for the subsequent deployment of larger forces that they had been amassing in the rear.
This involved preparing for an offensive under weather conditions less favorable for Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance and drones.
Why are fog, rain, and low cloud cover important to the Russians? A significant portion of Ukraine’s surveillance and strike assets operate from the air, so visibility directly affects the ability to detect the enemy in a timely manner.
When visibility deteriorates, Russian units try to take advantage of this to move and launch attacks.
There was no Russian summer offensive that fizzled out. At that time, they were conducting preparatory operations, while strategic reserves were being built up in anticipation of fog, rain, and low cloud cover. Now we are seeing this offensive
In my assessment, the active phase began in late October. November may mark its peak, as the enemy will attempt to deploy its accumulated forces before conditions deteriorate significantly for large-scale combat operations.
At the same time, Russian reserves are not unlimited. A significant portion of the prepared units has already been moved from deeper areas to the army’s rear, closer to the front.
Previously, some of these forces were stationed approximately 200 kilometers from the front lines. Subsequently, they began to be deployed at distances of tens of kilometers from the forward positions.
According to my estimates, Russia has concentrated approximately 150,000–180,000 strategic reserve troops for the current campaign.
Now let’s compare this number with daily casualties.
If the Russian army continues to lose about 3,000 troops per day, that will amount to approximately 90,000 troops per month. And this rate will very quickly deplete the trained reserves.
Of course, the enemy can replenish its units and adjust the intensity of its offensive operations. But the current casualty rates call into question the possibility of a sustained offensive at the same pace.
What do three thousand casualties per day mean? That’s nearly one hundred thousand per month. And if they’ve mobilized approximately 150,000–180,000 reservists, they’ll exhaust those reserves very quickly at this rate
Therefore, I predict that Russian forces will be most active in November and, possibly, early December.
Toward the end of the year, their offensive capabilities may decline significantly. Some units will remain for defense and localized operations, but in my opinion, they will no longer have the capacity for a large-scale winter offensive.
I expect the enemy to begin losing momentum in about one to two months. However, this forecast depends primarily on actual casualties, reinforcements, and the intensity of combat operations.
Incidentally, when I speak of summer and winter military campaigns, I am not referring merely to the calendar seasons.
In military terminology, such concepts are often linked to temperature and weather conditions. Therefore, a campaign that I call “summer” may continue into the fall, as long as temperatures remain above freezing.
Understanding these processes allows us to assess the enemy’s actions based on its actual military capabilities, rather than just the calendar or high-profile announcements about the start and end of an offensive.
U.S. Congress Prepares New Aid for Ukraine
U.S. Democrats have already announced several initiatives following the election. These include the possible impeachment of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, a bill providing approximately $15 billion in aid to Ukraine, and attempts to remove Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner from negotiations with Russia. How do you assess these intentions?
First and foremost, we need to understand the role that Witkoff and Kushner play in the negotiation process. Their involvement is largely tied to their personal relationships with Donald Trump.
When it comes to removing them from the negotiations, the question arises as to exactly how this could be done. After all, this is not a matter of a routine change of officials within a government structure, where there is a clear procedure for appointment and dismissal.
I am critical of their activities and do not believe that such personal contacts serve Ukraine’s interests.
In my opinion, economic issues that benefit certain participants may be discussed primarily under the guise of these negotiations. Among them, I see agreements regarding Russian diesel fuel, energy companies, and other commercial ventures.
How can we exclude from the negotiations those who do not hold regular official positions there? These are people from Trump’s inner circle. And their activities, in my opinion, need to be investigated for possible violations of the law
If U.S. lawmakers suspect violations, they can initiate appropriate audits and investigations. But legal consequences must be based on established facts.
As for the very idea of U.S. mediation, I don’t see much point in it if Russia continues the war and shows no willingness to abandon its aggression.
Practical military aid remains far more important for Ukraine. This includes weapons and ammunition that will allow Ukraine to defend itself against Russian attacks and hold the enemy at bay on the front lines.
That is why Senator Richard Blumenthal’s initiative for a new aid package of approximately $15 billion deserves attention.
It is particularly important that U.S. lawmakers are discussing the need to help Ukraine get through the winter and protect its cities from Russian strikes.
At the same time, it remains to be seen whether the current Congress will have time to consider such proposals. New political opportunities will arise after the next Congress convenes in January.
Therefore, I support Ukraine’s more active engagement with U.S. lawmakers, but the results must be assessed based on specific decisions and the actual weapons received.
Separately, I was surprised by Donald Trump’s latest statements. He is once again speaking of allegedly phenomenal negotiations to end the war and suggests that, following them, Ukraine’s borders will look different.
At the same time, Trump expressed doubts about reports of restrictions on Starlink for Ukraine. He suggested that the Ukrainian side might have misrepresented the situation, although he also spoke of his own role in resolving it.
But what interests me most is on what grounds the American president believes he can decide what Ukraine’s territory should look like.
I am willing to agree with him on only one point: once the war ends, the issue of borders may indeed become the subject of very serious political discussions.
However, I view this possibility quite differently from how Trump apparently envisions it.
Let’s support Trump. I, too, believe that Ukraine’s borders may change after this war. Only to get larger, not smaller
Russia has inflicted enormous human and economic losses on Ukraine. Therefore, once the war ends, the issues of compensation and reparations will need to be resolved.
I believe that Ukrainians have the right to demand substantial payments from Russia for the suffering, destruction, and consequences of the aggression.
In my calculations, I even anticipate the possibility of claims amounting to tens of trillions of dollars. Specifically, I am referring to compensation for affected Ukrainians and separate payments for economic losses.
But it is obvious that Russia will not be able to pay such sums easily or quickly.
Therefore, I raise the issue of historic Ukrainian territories that are currently part of the Russian Federation. Among them, I mention Kuban, Taman, and certain districts of the Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, and Rostov regions.
Ukrainians have historically lived in these regions, and in some settlements, the Ukrainian language and cultural traditions are still preserved.
I also mention the Green Wedge in the Far East – territories linked to the history of Ukrainian resettlement and attempts to establish Ukrainian political structures.
In my reflections, I even consider the possibility of a different political map of the region following a deep crisis in the Russian Federation.
For example, I would like to see Ukraine sharing borders with Georgia and Kazakhstan. But such a scenario is tied to my vision of Russia’s possible future and does not mean that the relevant changes are already taking place.
In my opinion, the Kremlin itself set a dangerous precedent when it began justifying its territorial claims based on the presence of ethnic Russians in neighboring states.
I categorically disagree with Russian aggression and use this argument to highlight the inconsistency of Moscow’s policy.
The Russians have declared: “Where Russians live, there is Russian land.” To that I reply: “Where Ukrainians live, there is Ukrainian land.” We’ll see what the borders look like after this war
I see the future of the Russian Federation itself as tied to its economic and military exhaustion. In the event of a deep internal crisis, movements for the independence of certain regions could intensify, which would significantly alter the political situation.
But Ukraine must first and foremost focus on its own victory, the protection of its citizens, and the restoration of its sovereignty. It is precisely these issues that should determine our policy, regardless of what statements Donald Trump makes.
Svitan on the strikes against Russian oil refineries: watch the video
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