"There's Nothing Left to Fly": Kryvolap on Russia's Aviation Problems and Strikes by Its Own Air Defense Systems

Russian airports are increasingly being closed due to the threat of drones, and passengers are waiting for hours for their flights or facing flight cancellations. At the same time, Ukrainian strikes on facilities belonging to the Russian military-industrial complex are creating new problems for missile production, while Russia itself is gradually losing its air defense capabilities.

Aviation expert Kostyantyn Kryvolap explained in an interview with 24 Channel just how dangerous flying in Russia has become and why strikes on specific factories could impact the occupiers’ missile capabilities. He also assessed the pace of Russian combat aircraft production and discussed the potential consequences for Ukraine and the international arms market of Starlink restrictions and delays in the delivery of American missiles for air defense systems.

Russian Civil Aviation Is Losing Aircraft

Russians are increasingly complaining about flight cancellations and hours-long waits at airports. There have also been reports of a possible Russian air defense strike on a passenger flight from Minsk to Moscow, and Forbes has estimated the airlines’ direct losses at $2.5 billion. How safe is the Russian airspace right now?

Two and a half billion dollars is a very significant amount. Moreover, these losses affect both state-owned and private airlines. I don’t know to what extent the Russian authorities will be willing to help private carriers, since they’re facing problems not only with money but also with the planes themselves.

At the start of the full-scale war, the Russian fleet consisted of approximately 1,000 aircraft. About 800 of them were foreign-made, although not all were in service.

After sanctions were imposed, Russia effectively retained more than 500 aircraft that belonged to foreign leasing companies. Subsequently, the Russian government began buying out some of these aircraft, using, among other sources, funds from the National Welfare Fund.

State-owned carriers, including Aeroflot, as well as some other companies, received financial support. But the main problem is that the aircraft are gradually becoming unserviceable.

I haven’t counted the exact number of aircraft that remain airworthy recently. However, given the rate at which they are wearing out, the situation must be significantly worse than it was a few years ago.

First and foremost, there are difficulties with maintaining foreign-made aircraft. Airbus engines require scheduled maintenance, and onboard systems need appropriate software and updates.

There are also concerns regarding navigation and meteorological equipment. If these systems do not receive the necessary maintenance, it is difficult to assess how Russian airlines are ensuring an adequate level of safety.

Foreign aircraft still make up a significant portion of Russia’s passenger fleet, but their capacity is gradually shrinking. There are not enough Russian-made aircraft to fully compensate for the losses.

Additional problems arise due to frequent airport operational restrictions. Following drone threats, flights are delayed, planes are rerouted to other airports, and carriers are forced to cover the additional costs.

It is important to understand how the international aviation safety system works. There is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). They address issues related to flight safety, equipment compliance, and the operation of aviation infrastructure.

They assess whether an airport has the necessary navigation equipment, how well passengers and staff are protected, and whether there are facilities to shelter people and safeguard aircraft.

This is when insurance mechanisms kick in. If flight risks increase, insurance companies may significantly raise the cost of their services.

The carrier must either cover the additional costs itself or pass them on to passengers. This leads to higher ticket prices.

Take Israel, for example, where airlines faced similar problems during an escalation of hostilities. In particular, the government had to provide support to El Al to partially offset the increase in insurance costs.

But while Israel has a limited number of alternatives for international air service, Russian carriers also face the problem of maintaining their fleets.

And here, standard economic rules apply. If you want to fly under conditions of heightened risk, you must pay for the corresponding insurance. If a company cannot do so, flights become economically unviable.

As for the Minsk–Moscow flight, I wouldn’t draw any final conclusions just yet. We need to wait for more detailed information about what happened.

Last year, around July, there was already a report of a similar incident in which Russian air defense forces opened fire on a passenger plane. The aircraft was able to land, and the passengers were unharmed, although the fuselage sustained damage.

At that time, a recording of the pilot’s radio communications was even released, in which he very emotionally asked ground control why they were firing at his plane.

In the current situation, there could have been various circumstances. Perhaps the air defense systems were locked onto the plane; perhaps there was an error in target identification; or perhaps there was a problem with the “friend or foe” recognition system.

The use of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) cannot be ruled out either. The Russians are increasingly relying on MANPADS because they face shortages of full-scale air defense systems.

These systems operate on a different principle than large systems like the S-300 or S-400, and their ability to identify aerial targets is limited.

Furthermore, Russian air defense is suffering losses that are gradually altering its structure.

Prior to the full-scale invasion, Russia maintained a fleet of approximately 50 S-400 systems. By my estimates, it is capable of producing about 6–8 such systems per year, but Ukraine is destroying roughly the same number.

As for the S-300s, there were approximately 110–130 of them before the start of the major war, although some were already obsolete. I currently estimate the number of operational systems to be about 50.

Taking into account losses and the replacement of equipment, Russia may have lost a total of about 100 S-300 and S-400 systems. This is a very large number, although Russian industry continues to partially offset these losses.

Previously, the Russian air defense system was based on a combination of large systems with close-in defense assets. For example, an S-400 battalion could be protected by six “Pantsir” systems.

But now there is no longer a sufficient number of these systems. Before the start of the full-scale war, Russia had approximately 220 “Pantsir” systems, some of which it had also exported.

In particular, the United Arab Emirates received about 50 early-model units. However, their effectiveness against modern drones is also questionable.

Therefore, the Russians are increasingly forced to use man-portable systems, which are easier to deploy and do not require such complex infrastructure. But this represents a completely different level of capability, especially when it comes to defending large territories and numerous facilities.

Strike on the "Energia" Plant Threatens Russian Missile Production

Ukrainian defense forces have launched a new strike against the Russian “Energia” plant. There were reports of the use of drones and cruise missiles. How is Russian air defense trying to repel such attacks?

Much depends on the specific weapons used. In the case of the Storm Shadow, this missile can approach its target at low altitude, making it more difficult to detect in time.

Judging by the circumstances of the attack, the distance to the plant could have been approximately 250 kilometers or even slightly less. Therefore, I suspect that Storm Shadow missiles were used in this case.

These missiles are capable of approaching their target quite stealthily. And I wouldn’t rule out the possibility that the Russians didn’t even have time to sound the air raid siren.

If you listen to the recordings made by local residents, you can hear about three explosions. Based on the nature of the sounds, it seems that the missiles approached one after another.

First, the explosion itself is visible in the video, and then the sound wave arrives with a delay. These intervals allow for a rough estimate of the distance to the impact site.

Judging by reports of damage to specific workshops, the strikes were quite precise.

But the most important thing here isn’t even the number of missiles. It’s crucial to understand what the “Energia” plant actually manufactures.

It is not just a factory producing ordinary batteries. It manufactures power sources for military equipment, including the Kh-101, Iskander, and other systems.

Of particular importance is the new production line for thermal batteries. Such power sources are used in situations where significant electrical power must be provided in a short amount of time.

The operating principle is quite interesting. The electrolyte in a thermal battery is in a solid, essentially inactive state. When heated, a chemical reaction begins, allowing the required current to be generated quickly.

Under certain conditions, such a battery can deliver a voltage of about 27 volts and a current of up to 130 amps. This is sufficient to power the relevant rocket systems for the required duration.

The technology has been known for a long time, but such solutions have been used more actively over the past 10–15 years.

And here, a strike on the production line could prove far more significant than damage to a single warehouse of finished products.

Judging by what we’re seeing, the Russian missile industry operates with relatively small inventories of components.

For example, among the missiles used against Ukraine in early October were units manufactured on September 3. In other words, very little time elapsed between the production of individual components and the deployment of the finished missile.

This may indicate that the Russians do not have large intermediate stockpiles and are trying to deliver finished products to the military as quickly as possible.

Based on my estimates, stocks of the relevant components may last for about a month. And it will be difficult to restore the damaged production lines in less than a few months.

Of course, we need to see just how severe the damage turned out to be. But if the production of thermal batteries was specifically affected, this could impact the manufacture of several types of Russian weaponry at once.

I appreciate that Ukraine is paying increasing attention not only to the facilities where missiles are finally assembled but also to the factories that manufacture their components.

After all, you can have casings, engines, and other equipment, but without the necessary power source, a finished missile won’t be able to function properly.

And this could affect the production volumes that the Russian leadership promises to deliver.

We hear estimates that Russia is capable of producing dozens of missiles of various types. The Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) is right to report on the maximum potential threats, as we must prepare for the worst-case scenario.

But so far, I see no evidence that the Russians are consistently meeting all their stated targets.

Specifically, this refers to figures regarding 50 missiles of the 48N6 family, modified for strikes against ground targets, 60 “Iskanders,” and other weapons systems.

The same applies to claims regarding the capability to produce 3,000 jet-powered drones. In practice, I have not observed any such use that would confirm these capabilities.

Recently, during attacks, we have seen dozens of jet-powered drones, sometimes as many as 60 to 80. This is a very significant number, but it falls short of the maximum figures claimed by the Russians.

Ukrainian air defense forces are also improving their countermeasures against such targets. According to my estimates, on average, they manage to intercept about 70–75% of jet-powered drones, and during some attacks, this figure reaches 80%.

But even 15 hits per day is an extremely high number. Each such strike can cause serious damage.

Therefore, striking facilities that manufacture key components for missiles and drones remains a very important focus of Ukrainian operations.

Russia is unable to quickly replenish its fleet of Su-34s and Su-35s

The Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russia is capable of supplying up to 15 Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft per month. What are the occupiers using these aircraft for, and how significant are their production capabilities?

First and foremost, we need to clarify the figure: we’re not talking about 15 aircraft per month, but rather annual production volumes. This is a fundamental difference.

As for the Su-34, these are frontline bombers that Russia actively uses to strike Ukrainian positions with guided bombs.

The Russians have four regiments of these aircraft. Each regiment consists of two squadrons, with 12 aircraft per squadron. That is, approximately 24 aircraft per regiment and a total of about 96 Su-34s.

In addition, there are separate naval aviation units, but they are significantly less involved in the current bombing campaign.

Of course, not all aircraft are ready to carry out combat missions at the same time. I estimate that approximately 70–80% of the aircraft are airworthy.

However, even this number is sufficient for the Russians to regularly deploy guided bombs against Ukrainian positions and populated areas.

Su-34s are usually escorted by Su-35 or Su-30 fighters. The choice depends on aircraft availability and specific combat missions.

According to my estimates, Russia has about 100 Su-30-series aircraft and approximately 120–130 Su-35s.

If we count these types together with the Su-34s, the Russian command could concentrate approximately 310–350 aircraft around Ukraine. But again, we must take into account that not all of them are in operational condition.

Part of the air force is stationed in the Far East and in the northern regions of Russia, but the main forces involved in the war are concentrated near Ukraine.

As for the production of new aircraft, I am very skeptical of reports from Russian manufacturers about the delivery of new batches to the military.

Sometimes, a “batch” refers to just two aircraft. In other words, once two aircraft are delivered, they can already report the delivery of a new batch.

There are reports that, over a certain period, the Russians delivered approximately two Su-30s, four Su-34s, six Su-35s, and six Su-57s. But these figures raise questions for me.

We know that the Russian aviation industry has faced serious problems with the production of modern equipment. First and foremost, this concerns the electronics of the so-called glass cockpit, hydraulic systems, and the supply of certain components.

Previously, they produced approximately 6–8 aircraft per year, but now they are reporting significantly higher figures. Theoretically, this is possible, but we need to understand what enabled production to increase so dramatically.

I tried to cross-reference reports of new aircraft with their tail numbers, their deployment to specific squadrons, and the actual increase in the number of aircraft.

So far, I have not received confirmation of all the reported figures. Perhaps I have overlooked something, but I would not go so far as to speak of a sharp increase in production as an established fact.

Moreover, for combat aviation, it’s not just the number of aircraft produced that matters. They must be equipped with engines, equipment, weapons, maintenance, and trained crews.

Therefore, reports of new aircraft deliveries do not necessarily mean a corresponding increase in the actual combat capabilities of the Russian Air Force.

Starlink restrictions have undermined trust in the U.S.

On October 24, Starlink service was restored in Ukraine. According to estimates by the Institute for the Study of War, during the restrictions, the interception rate of jet-powered “Shahed” drones dropped from 77% to 74%. How much damage did this situation cause, and how do you assess the actions of Musk, Trump, and Hegseth?

If you look only at the percentages, the difference between 77% and 74% may not seem that significant. Especially since, during certain attacks, we’re already seeing interception rates of around 80%.

But I believe the main problem lies not at all in those three percentage points.

We have strategic partners with whom we’ve signed a large number of agreements, declarations, and memorandums. And at a critical moment, it turns out that we can’t always rely on their help.

This is a blow to all of Europe – not just to us, but also to future deliveries of American weapons.

I don’t know exactly how the global market will react to such incidents, but it’s already clear that they are forcing countries to rethink their approaches to defense procurement.

The United States has a great many types of weapons for which it is difficult to find a fully adequate replacement.

In particular, these include PAC-3 missiles for the Patriot systems, THAAD interceptors, ATACMS missiles, and other high-tech systems.

And this is where a serious dilemma arises. On the one hand, you realize that you may be dependent on political decisions made in Washington, which could at some point restrict access to critical technology.

On the other hand, it’s necessary to find an alternative that will provide comparable capabilities. And it’s impossible to do this quickly.

But I think the situation in the arms market has already begun to change. Countries are paying increasing attention not only to the technical specifications of the equipment but also to the reliability of the supplier.

Defense contracts are usually signed for long periods. It’s a fairly inert market, but even here, political decisions can quickly shift overall trends.

Buyers need weapons that can be obtained in sufficient quantities, at a reasonable price, and without the risk of unexpected restrictions on their use.

And here, American products face yet another issue – cost.

In my opinion, the prices of some American systems, particularly the Patriot, significantly exceed their production costs. I estimate that the difference could be as much as three times the cost.

For comparison, consider the Israeli “David’s Sling” system, which Finland purchased. This was done in agreement with the United States, since the system uses American technology and components.

According to my estimates, it is about three times cheaper than the Patriot. At the same time, in terms of certain characteristics, it may even offer better capabilities.

However, there is an important caveat: “David’s Sling” has not undergone such large-scale testing in repelling intense missile barrages as the Patriot systems have already faced in Ukraine.

Therefore, it would be premature to speak of one system having a complete advantage over the other.

But for buyers, the balance of capabilities, cost, and the political reliability of supplies is already becoming a key factor.

And if the United States continues to demonstrate that it can restrict the operation of critical military technologies based on current political decisions, this will influence the choices of other countries.

Delays in missile deliveries for Patriot and NASAMS create new risks

Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that Ukraine has been waiting nearly a month for Pete Hegseth’s signature on the supply of missiles for the Patriot and NASAMS systems. Prior to this, there were restrictions on Starlink and issues with the transmission of intelligence data. What does this sequence of U.S. decisions indicate?

Here I see an approach that can be described as “it’s not me, and it’s not my problem.”

After all, it’s very awkward to officially acknowledge restrictions on aid to Ukraine – especially when it comes to military satellite communications, intelligence, and the weapons needed to protect the civilian population.

We’ve seen the situation with Starlink and Starshield. At the same time, there were problems with the transmission of certain types of intelligence data.

And this wasn’t about a complete halt to the exchange of information, but rather about specific details – in particular, those related to Russian ballistic missile launches.

I view such actions as a demonstration of Ukraine’s dependence on American capabilities. As if to say, “Look what you can do without our help.”

But we already have our own and alternative mechanisms for obtaining the necessary information.

When there were instances of delayed reports on missile launches, Zelenskyy said that Ukraine was aware of the threat from other sources.

And this is very important. We cannot afford to be completely dependent on a single partner in matters on which human lives directly depend.

Delays with the missiles for the Patriot and NASAMS systems only heighten this concern. If a necessary decision can remain unsigned for nearly a month, it raises the question of how predictable future deliveries will be.

And here we return once again to the need to overhaul the entire system of defense procurement and the organization of military aid.

Just last year, I remarked with a certain irony that at least it was a good thing Russia wasn’t receiving American weapons. At the time, it really did seem like a joke.

Now, as we see Washington’s decisions, such jokes no longer seem funny. Of course, I don’t think the Americans will start supplying weapons to Russia, but the very unpredictability of their decisions creates very serious problems.

The world is drawing its own conclusions. Countries understand that their defense should not depend on a single supplier, especially if that supplier is prone to changing its political stance.

Therefore, it is necessary to seek alternative technologies, expand domestic production, diversify procurement, and create independent communications systems.

We already faced similar problems last year and drew certain conclusions. But, in my opinion, not all the necessary decisions were implemented.

And now we have to revisit these issues under much more challenging circumstances.

U.S. arms manufacturers could lose orders

So, will restrictions on military aid to Ukraine primarily damage the reputation of the United States itself?

Yes, first and foremost, it’s the U.S. reputation that’s at stake.

And I think the consequences could be much more serious than they seem right now.

If countries begin to turn away from American weapons or reduce the share of such purchases, this will affect production volumes in the United States itself.

Large corporations, including Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and others, may face a decline in orders and profits.

And for the American military-industrial complex, the international market is of enormous importance. This is not just about individual contracts, but also about long-term production, technology programs, and funding for new developments.

These companies also wield significant influence over U.S. politics. They support politicians from both major parties, engage with Congress, and have a vested interest in stable domestic and international orders.

Therefore, a potential decline in arms sales will create problems not only for the manufacturers themselves but also for the political forces whose decisions have influenced buyer confidence.

I suspect that the Republicans may face the most criticism, since current decisions regarding Ukraine are linked to the Donald Trump administration.

If American corporations begin to lose major contracts, their executives will want to understand which political decisions led to this outcome.

But it’s important to keep in mind that such changes won’t happen overnight. The defense market operates on long-term contracts, and switching to another manufacturer takes time.

However, the loss of trust alone could influence buyers’ future decisions. And then it will be much more difficult for American manufacturers to regain the positions they previously held.

Therefore, I believe that the consequences of the Starlink restrictions, delays in the delivery of missiles for the Patriot and NASAMS systems, and other decisions by Washington may be felt not only by Ukraine and its European partners, but also by the U.S. defense-industrial complex itself.

Russian air defense systems are shooting down their own planes, while the U.S. is losing its reputation as a reliable partner: watch the video