Ukraine’s air defense system needs a conceptual overhaul. Instead of providing point-defense coverage for individual targets, the state should transition to a perimeter-based, and eventually a barrier-based, defense system that will destroy Russian drones and missiles as they approach cities or even outside the country’s borders.
Military expert and Reserve Colonel Roman Svitan provided Channel 24 with a detailed analysis of the mechanisms that would allow Ukraine to effectively secure its airspace.
How can Ukraine protect its cities from air attacks?
Installing machine-gun turrets in cities, particularly in Kyiv, is a necessary but limited measure that addresses only local challenges.
The effective range of such a turret is about one and a half kilometers. It is capable of protecting a specific bridge pier or a single building, but cannot cover hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of Ukrainian territory.
This is a classic example of a point-defense air defense system. The Russians took this approach in the past by mounting “Pantsir” systems on the roofs of high-rise buildings in Moscow. However, such a stationary system becomes an ideal target for ballistic missiles, as its coordinates are known in advance.
The conceptual solution to the problem lies in extending the defense perimeter beyond city limits. Enemy drones must not be allowed to enter urban areas at all. They must be intercepted on the approaches, creating a multi-layered ring based on short-range anti-aircraft missile systems.
In the long term, this perimeter should be extended directly to the front line and the state border, forming a continuous barrier. Turrets, meanwhile, should serve a supporting role – protecting the air defense systems themselves from attacks by low-flying drones while the systems engage targets at ranges of 10–12 kilometers.
How Ukraine’s Air Defense Is Changing: Watch the Video
Airpower and Low-Cost Missiles
The primary tool for combating massive swarms of Russian drones should be aircraft armed with inexpensive missiles.
The use of aircraft cannons, such as the M61 Vulcan on the F-16 fighter jets, is more of a backup option. The optimal solution is unguided aircraft missiles such as the Hydra, retrofitted with laser guidance systems (APKWS). These are the cheapest munitions available and are effective at neutralizing enemy targets.
A single F-16 fighter jet can carry pylons with pods holding more than forty such missiles. In a single sortie, the aircraft can destroy a dozen or more Russian drones simply by entering their rear hemisphere and firing along a laser-guided path.
Such tactics can be employed not only by Western aircraft but also by Soviet MiG-29s or Su-27s, provided they are appropriately retrofitted.
Light aircraft should occupy a separate niche in this system. Training and combat aircraft, such as the Czech L-39 or the British Hawk, have sufficient speed (500–600 km/h) to intercept drones. The cost per flight hour for such an aircraft is an order of magnitude lower than that of a full-fledged fighter jet, making them an ideal tool for operations in the mid-tier of defense.
How can NATO help?
The most reliable way to protect Ukraine’s western regions is for neighboring NATO countries – particularly Poland – to intercept Russian targets.
From a military standpoint, shooting down cruise missiles over one’s own territory is dangerous due to the risk of falling debris. Therefore, the logical step for Warsaw is to destroy Russian targets while they are still in Ukrainian airspace.
This mechanism is already working successfully in the Middle East, where U.S. bases in Jordan intercept targets flying toward Israel outside of Israeli airspace.
If NATO decides to secure its borders to a depth of 100 kilometers, this will automatically provide a protective umbrella over a significant portion of western Ukraine. Such a buffer zone will help secure key Ukrainian airfields. Once several dozen missiles have been destroyed, the Russians will simply stop planning routes through these regions.
Implementing this scenario requires not only political will but also close cooperation among aviation specialists. The military must develop a joint concept for the allocation of interception zones and security management, which will subsequently be presented to policymakers as a decision ready for signing. This requires a modern approach to Air Force management and the involvement of commanders with experience working with NATO structures and platforms.