Cheaper than the "Kalibrs," faster than the "Shaheds": Why is the new "Filin" missile dangerous, and how will Ukraine respond?

The Russian military-industrial complex has encountered a serious technological obstacle in its attempts to modernize Iranian kamikaze drones. The enemy’s desire to increase the drones’ speed to complicate the work of Ukrainian air defense led to the realization that the classic “Shahed” design no longer works.

Aviation expert Kostyantyn Kryvolap provided a detailed analysis for 24 Channel on how Russia is shifting from slow-moving “mopeds” to mass production of cheap winged missiles, and explained how Ukraine could respond.

The Aerodynamic Impasse of the Flying Wing

The history of Russia’s experiments with drones began back in 2019, when General Sergey Surovikin attempted to obtain ballistic missiles and Shahed-238 jet drones from Iran. After being turned down, Russia focused on the licensed assembly of the classic Shahed-136 drones, which were dubbed Geran-2.

However, Russian engineers very quickly faced two challenges:

• to enhance the drone’s intelligence capabilities;
• to increase its speed.

Attempts at modernization led to the creation of a jet-powered version, the Geranium-4, capable of reaching speeds of 400–450 kilometers per hour. But further increases in speed proved impossible due to the technological platform itself. The flying wing design used in the Shaheds proved to be extremely inefficient at high speeds.

The laws of aerodynamics are inexorable: as speed increases, not only lift but also drag increases quadratically. Even installing a powerful Chinese engine from Telefly with 200 kilograms of thrust allowed the drone to reach a maximum speed of only 600 kilometers per hour. Beyond that, the platform is simply unable to accelerate further due to the enormous air resistance.

Aviation expert on Russian weapons and Ukraine’s countermeasures: video

The emergence of the “Filin” missile: a cheap replacement for the “Kalibrs”

Realizing the futility of further accelerating the flying wing, the Russians turned their attention to Ukraine’s experience in developing drone missiles. This led to the Geran-5 – a design that has nothing in common with its predecessors, as it is essentially a small winged missile. However, it, too, quickly reached its limits.

The next step in its evolution was a new development – "Filin" rocket. Its main distinguishing feature is the use of a swept-back wing, which provides significantly better aerodynamics. According to Russian claims, the Filin is capable of reaching speeds of up to 800 kilometers per hour.

Although there is no widespread confirmation of such speeds yet, the Ukrainian military has already detected unknown targets at an altitude of 6,000 meters moving in the transonic zone at a speed of nearly 1,000 kilometers per hour. The expert speculates that these could have been test flights of the Filin or the Geran-5.

The main goal of developing such missiles is mass production and low cost. Russia aims to bombard Ukraine with thousands of cheap cruise missiles, forcing our Defense Forces to expend extremely expensive Western ammunition to intercept them.

How Ukraine Will Counter New Threats

Using tactical aircraft to intercept such targets is becoming economically unfeasible. Launching an AIM-9 missile from an F-16 fighter or a MICA missile from a Mirage costs hundreds of thousands of dollars, which is disproportionate to the cost of the Russian Filin.

An alternative is the 20-millimeter six-barrel Vulcan cannon mounted on the F-16. It is capable of firing 100 rounds per second and effectively destroys such targets. However, the cannon’s ammunition supply is extremely limited (about 500–900 rounds), and the interception process itself requires the pilot to exercise extreme precision to avoid colliding with debris from the downed missile.

Therefore, Ukraine’s strategic response will lie in two other areas.

First, the development of new, significantly cheaper domestically produced anti-aircraft missiles for ground-based systems, capable of shooting down Russian surrogates in large numbers and at low cost.

Second, and most importantly, preventive strikes against production and logistics facilities.

Strikes on the “bottlenecks” of the Russian military-industrial complex

Instead of trying to intercept cheap missiles in the sky, Ukraine has begun methodically destroying the facilities where their components are manufactured. A striking example of this strategy is an attack on the "Proton" plant in Orel. This facility is a true “bottleneck” for the Russian military-industrial complex, as it manufactures optical-mechanical and electronic systems for a wide range of Russian missiles.

The strike on the heart of this plant with four Storm Shadow missiles was particularly telling. The missiles covered the 200-kilometer distance from the border in about 15 minutes. Thanks to stealth technology and flight at ultra-low altitudes, Russian air defense simply did not have time to react. The occupiers did not expect Ukraine to be able to covertly launch cruise missiles deep into their territory and deliver such a precise strike against a critically important production facility.

Background: Stealth technology is an engineering concept designed to reduce the detectability of combat vehicles and weapons systems, allowing them to evade enemy surveillance and air defense systems through a combination of radar-absorbing coatings and specialized airframe geometry.

It is precisely this comprehensive approach – a combination of low-cost ground-based interception systems and high-precision strikes with Western and domestic missiles (such as “Palyanitsa” or “Neptune”) against factories, chemical plants (such as “Azot” in Perm or “Kauchuk” in Togliatti), and forward airfields – is the only effective way to stop the Kremlin’s new missile tactics.