An unexpected protest in Moscow, Trump’s pressure on Russia regarding China and India, and the U.S.’s growing focus on Ukraine’s experience with war – these developments could influence the war’s future course and the Kremlin’s stance. At the same time, Washington is facing new challenges in its relations with Canada and Europe, which may also affect its policy.

Political analyst and a member of the European Leaders Network in the UK, Oleksandra Filipenko, explained in an interview with Channel 24 why the protest in Moscow was an unexpected signal for the Kremlin and what could actually trigger larger-scale demonstrations in Russia. She also explained whether Trump is capable of using 100% tariffs as leverage against Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi, and why the U.S. military is changing its view of Ukraine’s experience with modern warfare.

A protest took place in central Moscow under the slogans “Down with the tsar! We want fair elections and freedom.” It began as an officially sanctioned rally organized by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Protests erupted immediately after speeches by party representatives, which ultimately led to clashes with security forces and the detention of 65 participants. What does this reveal about the current state of political discontent in Russia, and how dangerous is it for the Kremlin?

This is completely unexpected for the Kremlin because they have destroyed the opposition – or any semblance of it – and have been doing so since 2014; in fact, since the very first days of Putin’s administration – one could even say as far back as 2003.

It all began back then, nearly a quarter-century ago, but they began cracking down on this new wave of opposition more than 10 years ago.

And now we’re seeing protests from the Communist Party of Russia. This is a party that is completely controlled by the Kremlin, fully aligned with the Kremlin’s agenda, and whose worldview, let’s just say, doesn’t differ much from that of the Kremlin. But even they were dissatisfied. Even they saw that the elections were completely rigged. There was nothing genuine about the elections that took place in Russia.

For the Kremlin, this isn’t a particularly dangerous situation at the moment. Rather, it’s a tense situation, because they, of course, see an enemy in anyone who opposes a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the war in Ukraine in general. And the Communists weren’t that strongly opposed to it. They didn’t speak out against it, but they’re still dissatisfied with the Kremlin.

Full interview with Oleksandra Filipenko on the influence of China and India on the war in Ukraine: video

So for now, this isn’t a threat. It’s, let’s say, a reformatting of the system. The Kremlin is currently trying to reconfigure the system so that everything runs smoothly.

They’ve forced many people to leave the country, or killed them, or imprisoned them. The people in prison are, of course, political prisoners and so on. And they thought there was no one left – literally no one – who could take to the streets to protest. And then suddenly they see protests from people who, as they were absolutely certain, support the Kremlin. So I wouldn’t use the word “dangerous,” but I think they’re a little nervous. This is definitely not what they expected.

What needs to happen for the fear of the security forces to stop acting as a deterrent? What needs to change within Russia for isolated outbreaks of protest to grow into large-scale street demonstrations? What could serve as a trigger?

Protests in Iran showed many people in various dictatorships that there’s no point in taking to the streets to protest. You’ll simply be killed. The same thing is happening in Russia or Belarus. You’ll simply be thrown in jail. There’s no reason to go out.

When it comes to a dictatorship, no number of people will force the authorities to see anything or feel any pain. Of course, they’ll just imprison everyone. They’ll kill everyone, like in Iran. Or in Iran, they used heavy artillery to kill tens of thousands of protesters. We still don’t know the exact numbers. Some say 30,000. That’s the lowest figure anyone is citing. Others say 40,000 or 50,000 people were killed during the protests.

The same thing happened under the Maduro regime in Venezuela. People who took to the streets to protest were simply killed because the regime had special operatives riding motorcycles. One person sits in front and drives, while another sits behind with a weapon and simply shoots at the opposition or anyone on the streets.

So this is very well known in Russia and Belarus. For protests to really work, the people who go out and risk being killed – and who aren’t even just taking a risk, but are certain they’ll be jailed – need to know that there’s a possibility that something will actually change.

For anything to actually change, there has to be someone at the top – say, some kind of opposition within the Kremlin. It’s pointless to even talk about it. Right now, it seems ridiculous to even talk about it. But it seems to me that this is the only possibility, especially after the protests in Tehran, after what we saw, and even after President Trump said, “Hang in there, we’re coming to save you.”

He said that in early January, but Operation "Epic Fury" didn’t begin until late February, when people were already being hanged and executed for participating in the protests – including family members of protesters, who were also hanged or imprisoned for many, many years.

Some people were also flogged, whipped in accordance with Iranian law. This showed people that it’s hard to hope that someone from outside will come to save them. They’ll simply be shot in the streets.

So, I think the emergence of some kind of opposition movement within the Kremlin or close to the Kremlin – to seize power – makes it very difficult to view such power as positive; but still, a power like Prigozhin’s, or a mutiny in the army or anywhere else, could be seen as a ray of hope for everyone taking to the streets to protest.

Could Trump use the threat of 100% tariffs on buyers of Russian oil not to actually impose them, but as a bargaining chip with Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi?

The problem right now, of course, lies primarily with China. And without an agreement – without a trade deal – it’s very hard to say that President Trump will actually impose any sanctions. And we understand that China is the backbone of the Russian military economy.

As many China observers and experts have noted, Xi Jinping is the person who could simply press the stop button and cut off this support for the Russian military machine. And that would mean China would have to stop helping Russia. What they’re doing supposedly helps circumvent certain sanctions. We also understand that China is selling Russia just about everything. And China gets cheap resources in return.

If he were to “flip the switch,” we know that China would stop aiding the Russian war machine, and this is one of the greatest opportunities the U.S. president has to stop the war in Europe. However, without a trade deal, President Trump is hesitant to use the pressure and leverage he actually has over China, especially after Lindsey Graham’s bill became law.

But now, according to Bloomberg, we’re seeing another problem emerge with India. Indian officials have signaled that trade negotiations with the United States are currently on hold. India’s Ministry of Finance reported this to Bloomberg, and, of course, they also discussed the application of the “Lindsey Graham's bill.”

These 100% tariffs on Indian goods are currently in effect, and India wants assurances from the United States that it will not impose these tariffs and sanctions under the Lindsey Graham Act if India reduces its purchases from Russia. So everything is on hold right now, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury is finding it difficult to negotiate not only with China but now with India as well.

However, they need to put pressure first on China, and then on India, to weaken Russia. Otherwise, the Russian war machine cannot be stopped. Russia needs money to produce weapons.

Russia needs money to pay its contractors. They aren’t particularly concerned about the budget or social issues – that’s not a problem for the Kremlin or the Russian government.

It’s not that they care about their people, but what concerns them is the military budget. If they don’t have enough resources to produce weapons, they’ll have problems.

They’re trying to intimidate Ukraine into negotiating, sitting down at the table, and discussing the ideas Russia wants to implement.

The Kremlin always pretends that they didn’t start the war. And now the Kremlin is pretending that it will respond to President Zelenskyy with new attacks on Kyiv, acting as if they weren’t the ones who started the war in the first place. They are the ones who need to stop.

So, they’re trying to put on a brave face now that the economy is in dire straits – without China and without India. India, of course, comes in second, but especially without China, Russia wouldn’t be able to put on such a brave face. And President Trump is currently hesitating to impose these sanctions, partly because of high global oil prices resulting from the Iranian operation, “Epic Fury.”

There’s a very interesting point regarding Belarus. Lukashenko has apparently found a product for Trump. For the first time in four years, following the easing of sanctions against Belarus, the United States is set to receive a shipment of potash fertilizer from the regime of self-proclaimed President Alexander Lukashenko. A ship carrying 30,000 metric tons of cargo is expected to arrive at the port of New Orleans. Could Trump apply the same model to Russia – using sanctions or restoring access to the U.S. market for certain Russian goods in exchange for something? If so, what could Moscow realistically offer in return?

Moscow is doing everything it can to offer its oil; it is doing everything it can to offer its capacity to supply oil – or anything else – to the United States.

They are desperately trying to seal this deal with Lukoil, but the American side – of course, when we’re not talking about Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, but rather American officials – find it difficult to discuss a deal with Lukoil. But oil, of course, would be the United States’ greatest need.

The situation with Belarus is very interesting, and the situation with potash is very interesting, because for President Trump and the current administration, this isn’t about striking a deal with Belarus. We must understand that they don’t really care about a deal with Belarus. They are primarily concerned with putting pressure on Canada.

That is first and foremost, and second, and third – it’s about putting pressure on Canada to strike a deal with the United States, since the United States buys nearly 80%, over 75%, of its potash from Canada.

This is important for Canadian importers. It’s important for the Canadian economy, and, of course, President Trump is currently very angry with Canada because he sees that Canada isn’t agreeing to his new demands and new ideas. He tried to intimidate Canada, for example, by renaming Lake Ontario “America,” but that had no effect on Canada. It just annoyed Canadians a little, but nothing changed in business.

Now this is a real opportunity for the United States to receive potash fertilizers from a different angle. Perhaps it’s not so simple logistically, but politically it’s a major plus for the Trump administration.

So, this isn’t about a deal with Belarus. It’s not about a deal with that dictatorship that’s killing its own people. And it’s also very important to understand that this isn’t a deal with Belarus, with the Belarusian dictator who is too friendly with Putin in Russia, and who doesn’t close off any possibilities for the Russian army on his territory.

What’s more, it allows the Russian army to deploy nuclear missiles – at least that’s what they say – in Belarus.

So, Belarus is far too friendly toward Putin’s aggressive, terrorist regime. But for President Trump, that doesn’t matter when it comes to potash, because all that matters is putting pressure on Canada. We must keep these issues separate. It’s not about striking a deal with Lukashenko; it’s about putting pressure on Canada.

Moscow currently has nothing of the sort, and, of course, it is much harder for the Trump administration to lift any sanctions against Russia – especially now that Lindsey Graham’s bill has become law – since they would have to present the idea of lifting sanctions to Congress. And Congress, especially after the midterm elections, is unlikely to approve any lifting of sanctions until the war ends.

As you may have seen, the European Union and Canada are set to announce a new, large-scale partnership later this month. It will include not only joint efforts to address geopolitical risks but also increased support for Ukraine, according to Politico. What message does this send to Trump?

The idea of Canada’s associate membership in the European Union – which will be discussed in Montreal later this month – is causing great concern within the Trump administration. This is a major source of anxiety for the White House.

Because, not to mention potash, the volume of trade between the two countries is enormous. Currently, only a few percent – some say 7%, others say at least 10% – of trade between Canada and the U.S. has been disrupted; the remaining 90% continues and is quite successful. But the economic ties are so close, and the trade ties are so close.

This could mean fewer opportunities for American farmers, first and foremost, and for American companies in Canada in general.

If Canada turns away from this partnership with the United States, if Canada decides to move closer to the European Union, it will be a major problem, first and foremost, for those farmers, those companies, and those people who typically vote for the Republican Party.

If we’re talking about Iowa, if we’re talking about Ohio, if we’re talking about other states that are largely made up of farmers and farmland, this is potentially a major problem. President Trump believes he can intimidate Canada into coming to the negotiating table.

He may be able to intimidate Canada into accepting a new agreement or signing a new agreement, but we don’t see anything like that happening. Certainly, the White House will be watching very closely what unfolds between Canada, the European Union, and Europe.

And speaking of Ukraine, we must keep these issues separate, because when we talk about Ukraine, when we talk about providing more aid to Ukraine, the United States fully supports that, because it wants to see Europe take on more responsibility, pay more for aid to Ukraine, and purchase American goods and American military equipment.

But that is what they want to see; at the same time, another issue – one that is completely unrelated to Ukraine – namely, trade relations with Canada – is a potential problem for the White House.

A former U.S. Secretary of the Army called it humiliating that Ukraine, with a much smaller defense budget, turned out to be better equipped for modern warfare in some respects. How awkward will this assessment be for Trump and the Pentagon, and does it suggest that the U.S. also views support for Ukraine as an opportunity to gain unique combat experience?

Absolutely, and it’s very important to remember who Dan Driscoll is. He’s not only a former Pentagon official; he’s also a close friend of J.D. Vance. He was also the person in charge of J.D. Vance’s campaign in the last election. Most likely, he’ll be part of J.D. Vance’s campaign if Vance decides to run for president in 2028.

So Dan Driscoll is an interesting figure right now in this American government puzzle, so to speak. Although he is not currently part of the government. He represents the views of some people who were initially skeptical about aid to Ukraine, about sending or selling weapons to Ukraine.

At first, he was even skeptical about Europe paying for American weapons for Ukraine. But he changed his position. He did a complete 180 after he visited Ukraine, saw what was happening on the front lines, and received firsthand information.

So he represents a very interesting group that is close to the Pentagon or the White House and now views the war in Ukraine from a completely different angle. This is very important. It gives us pause, and we know that Dan Driscoll had a tense relationship with Pete Hoekstra, the head of the Pentagon.

And this shows that the United States needs to do more to stand closer to Ukraine, as well as learn how to fight the current war – a modern war.

Bloomberg also reported that NATO is developing a plan to repel a Russian attack using drones and artificial intelligence. And the biggest player in this is the United States. Alexus Grinkewich, an American general, is working on this plan to defeat Russia.

This shows just how serious the American military – career officers, four- and five-star generals – are, as they view the situation on the front lines not through a political lens, but through a military one. They look at it through the eyes of the military.

It is particularly important to emphasize that there is a post from the U.S. Ambassador to NATO – let’s just say that it’s not that Matthew Whitaker is skeptical about aid to Ukraine, but he is part of the Trump administration. And he wrote that weapons systems that exist only on paper are not a deterrent.

He speaks of this need – not just a theoretical one, but a real need – to be closer to what’s happening on the front lines in order to understand the situation there and how Ukraine is waging a modern war.

So, all these signals are coming not from politicians, but from real military personnel – actual generals – who truly understand what is happening on the front lines, and this shows how the American establishment views the war right now.

The Ukrainian experience raises another question: Can a large, technologically advanced army adapt quickly enough when the very nature of war is changing at an unprecedented pace? In this sense, Ukraine’s experience is a lesson about more than just weapons. It is a lesson about speed, flexibility, and the ability to learn on the battlefield in real time.