The Petropavlivska Borshchahivka scandal has reignited debates about mobilization, military service, and the influence of Russian propaganda on Ukrainian society. At the same time, journalist Volodymyr Zolkin, who has himself joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine, spoke about Russian servicemen who approached him with requests to help surrender and voluntarily provide information about their positions.
On Channel 24, he explained how his service changed his perception of the Ukrainian army and why he sees danger in the events in Borshchahivka. He also spoke about corruption in law enforcement agencies, the humanitarian mission in Oleshki, the consequences of the US elections, and the prospects for negotiations in Abu Dhabi.
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How service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine changed the view on the army
During our previous meeting, you said that you don't know what your future will be like. Now you are a soldier in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. What does your everyday life look like and how different is the service from what you imagined in civilian life?
When we talked about my plans last time, I already knew that I would mobilize in any case. I just didn't know when exactly it would happen, so I didn't say anything in advance. Even after mobilization, I didn't publish photos in military uniform for four or five months. Only my closest circle knew about the service. I decided to publish photos when I first went directly to the position, and only then did people start actively writing about it.
As for everyday life, any civilian imagines military service somewhat differently than it actually looks like. This was well demonstrated even by the story in Petropavlivska Borshchagovka. Many were surprised that the servicemen were in an ordinary private house. When Budanov said that there were many such houses, some people took his words as confirmation of the existence of some special places for illegal detention of people. But as a military man, I understand this completely differently: in Ukraine there really are many private houses where servicemen live.
Civilians often think that all military personnel live in barracks, and in the morning they go out to the parade ground and march. But we don't have that many barracks either in the frontline areas or even in Kyiv. People rent apartments, houses, and in their free time from performing tasks they can walk around in ordinary clothes. I myself used to pay attention to journalists who, after mobilization, constantly appeared in front of the camera in uniform. Now I understand that it is quite strange to specially change clothes for the broadcast while being at home.
Civilians think that all military personnel live in barracks, go out in the morning and march on the parade ground. This is not true. Military personnel rent apartments, private houses, and live ordinary lives when they are not performing combat missions.
In Petropavlivska Borshchagovka, the military also rented a private house. They brought people there, some of whom, according to reports, had left the military units on their own. I don’t know if all of them had this status of having left the military units on their own. According to the people who were later taken away by ambulance, at least two of them said they didn’t need to be evacuated. They also talked about the conflict between those present in the house. But this is their testimony, and I cannot claim to know all the circumstances of the incident.
The problem is that some people initially did not understand the very fact of the military staying in a private house. At the same time, openly reporting where exactly the military personnel live is also dangerous, because such information can be used by the enemy. This is a complex issue that largely depends on the consciousness of society.
I was particularly struck by the behavior of the teenagers who were filming everything on their phones and live-streaming it on TikTok. In other videos I watched, they were seen holding a phone in one hand and rocks in the other. In my opinion, parents should explain to their children that this is not the way to behave during a war, especially when they don't even understand who they are throwing rocks at.
In frontline areas, people are much more aware of such risks. And in the suburbs of Kyiv, as this situation showed, some teenagers perceived everything as an opportunity to get views on social networks. I even compared it to how seriously the US takes private property. There, the laws differ depending on the state, but the very fact of entering someone else's territory can have very serious consequences.
I am also concerned about the involvement in the scandal of people whom I associate with the pro-Russian milieu. In particular, I previously published a video from 2021 with the participation of the activist Rachko, who now criticized Budanov and Pivnenko. In my opinion, his previous contacts and participation in relevant events deserve a thorough check. I also mentioned Stremousov, Stakhiv and other figures whom I consider to be associated with such an environment. But it is up to law enforcement officers to establish possible illegal connections.
It is especially outrageous when aggression is directed against the military, among whom are people who have passed through Mariupol, Azovstal, and some, according to reports, are also Russian prisoners. In my opinion, such actions require proper legal assessment.
Here it is worth returning to the topic of mobilization. Private homes can temporarily accommodate both those who have just been mobilized and military personnel returning to service. And the widespread notion that a mobilized person will necessarily immediately be involved in assaults does not correspond to what I see.
People undergo basic combined arms training, get acquainted with their units, master their specialties. There is a huge need for drone pilots, drivers, logistics specialists, even cooks are not always enough. If a person independently chooses a unit, he has more opportunities to determine his position in advance. During regular mobilization, it is more difficult to predict the assignment, but this does not mean that everyone automatically becomes a stormtrooper.
People are trained, sent to the BZVP (Basic Combined Arms Training), they choose their specialty. There is a great need for pilots, drivers, logistics, cooks. If you are mobilized, this does not mean at all that you will immediately end up in a trench or on an assault.
I often get messages saying that those mobilized don't want to and won't fight. But my experience is different. People can come scared because they've read scary stories, but after meeting their comrades and training, they change their attitude. Some even admit that they themselves didn't understand why they believed such messages before.
I can give an example of two brothers who lived in Poznan, Poland, for a long time and have been tattooing since about 2017. They had an established life, but they decided to return and mobilize. They listened to one of my broadcasts, talked to me, packed their things and came. There were questions at the border with the CCC, but our recruiter confirmed that they were heading to the unit. Now both of them are serving next to me.
And to answer your original question, it turned out that everything was organized more intelligently than I imagined. I already had previous experience of service and expected to see the usual army routine. Certain elements of it, of course, remained, but in my unit the work is result-oriented. After about half a year of service, I cannot speak for the entire army, but what I see is significantly different from my previous experience.
When I was in the army before, it was a typical Soviet approach. Now I see a normal modern army that is focused on results. And it is much better than I imagined.
Even when I was a civilian and came to the front to join the artillerymen or pilots, I did not understand all the internal processes. Then, a separate story about how the military was left without proper support could create the impression that this happens everywhere. I do not deny that such cases occur. They need to be investigated, and the guilty commanders should be held accountable. But you cannot automatically transfer every such case to the entire Ukrainian army.
It is especially dangerous when people start to equate the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the Russian troops. I see a significant difference in the attitude towards personnel, the organization of tasks, food and supplies. At the same time, I often meet people on social networks who criticize mobilization, and when asked who should defend their country, they can no longer clearly answer.
This scares me the most. People seem to forget about the torture, murders, and other crimes committed by Russians in Izyum, Kyiv region, and other occupied settlements. Instead, their attention is completely focused on the negative stories surrounding the CCC. I believe that such a shift in attention is extremely beneficial to Russian propaganda.
Pseudo-doctor and attack on military personnel
Let's go back to the incident in Petropavlivska Borshchagovka. Among its participants was a girl who posed as a medical worker. How do you assess her actions and what should be the responsibility of the people involved in the attack on the military?
I do not agree that she has already received the appropriate punishment. In my opinion, her actions require a much more serious legal assessment. Judging by the published correspondence that I reviewed, she could have understood where she was going and what she was going to do. If this is confirmed, it will not be just about changing into a medical uniform, but about conscious participation in actions against military personnel.
I even specifically read the legislation on the illegal use of medical uniforms. As far as I understand, such behavior in itself does not always entail liability, but the legal assessment changes if the actions led to serious consequences. In this story, in my opinion, it is necessary to check the possible incitement to attack the military and an attempt to illegally remove them.
If the investigation establishes connections between individual participants and Russian curators, there may be grounds for much more serious charges. I assume that with a certain qualification of such actions, the punishment could reach 15 years in prison. But it depends on the evidence, specific circumstances, and court decisions.
I think it was a deliberate attack on the military, a deliberate attempt to kidnap a military man. From the correspondence I have seen, it seems that she knew where she was going and what she was doing. If this is confirmed, the responsibility should be much more serious than for changing into a medical uniform.
I also don't understand the situation with activist Raczko. I saw a photo that showed the attention he received from the SBU, but I didn't see him in the courtroom. Later, unverified information appeared that he was allegedly going to be mobilized. I don't know how true this is, but personally I wouldn't want to see a person in my unit whose actions, in my opinion, could have been directed against the Ukrainian military.
I have similar questions about Ostap Stakhiv. There were reports of his mobilization, and then of his alleged desertion from the unit. This information should also be evaluated with caution, but the general principle is clear to me: people who pose a threat to national security should not automatically avoid responsibility through mobilization.
I am not against recruiting people who have previously committed crimes not related to national security into the army. There are cases when they started serving and demonstrated high results, sometimes even greater motivation than other servicemen. However, with regard to people suspected of collaborating with the enemy or consciously acting against the state, the approach should be different.
It is possible to mobilize people who have committed crimes not related to national security. Some of them have shown excellent results. But people whose actions contradict the foundations of national security should simply be sent to the army, in my opinion.
There was a lot of demonstrative behavior in this story: tears, kneeling, emotional scenes in front of the cameras. As for the teenager, I assume that his age, the influence of social media and the lack of parental attention played a significant role. But the actions of the adult participants, including people who posed as doctors or, according to reports, used tear gas canisters against law enforcement officers, require separate examination.
Not everyone can be charged with the same crimes, as the degree of involvement and evidence varies. But any attacks on military personnel and law enforcement officers must receive proper legal assessment. Otherwise, society will perceive such incidents as something that can be repeated without serious consequences.
I recall a similar situation in the Sykhiv district of Lviv, where, in my opinion, the reaction of law enforcement officers was not decisive enough. It seems to me that the lack of tangible consequences after previous incidents could have contributed to what we saw in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka. If there is no proper reaction in the future, the risk of new provocations will remain.
How Russia exploits mobilization problems
Russia is actively using scandals around the CCC and the military for information operations. But at the same time, there are real problems in the Ukrainian army, in particular, the story with "Skelia", where there were reports of the death of soldiers and an investigation into the beating. Are we not creating the conditions for hostile propaganda ourselves through our own mistakes?
Of course, if there were no such problems, the story in Petropavlivska Borshchagovka would not have received such resonance. Perhaps it would not have happened at all. But then we need to honestly talk about how prepared Ukraine was for a big war. In my opinion, the preparation was insufficient in terms of defense potential, mobilization, and the work of state institutions.
You can start with 2014, when it became clear that Russia was waging aggression against Ukraine. But if you look for deeper reasons, you will have to go back to 1991, the Budapest Memorandum and the renunciation of nuclear weapons. I am very critical of the role of the United States in this process. Ukraine was gradually losing part of its defense potential, and its military-industrial complex was not developing on the scale necessary to confront such an adversary.
After 2014, many people voluntarily joined the army, but this was not enough to fully prepare the country for a large-scale invasion. We approached 2022 in a situation where even some of our Western partners doubted that Ukraine would be able to defend itself for a long time. Serious weapons began to be transferred more actively only after the Ukrainian military proved its ability to resist.
I believe that since 2014, it was necessary to involve citizens in military training much more widely, at least for one or two weeks. It was necessary to conduct regular retraining, develop a reserve, and explain to people how mobilization would work in the event of a major war. Some of this was done, but far from the necessary scale.
If we were better prepared, better mobilized, if everyone underwent training and retraining, the situation would be different. It was necessary to involve people since 2014, at least for a week or two, so that they understood what military service is.
A separate responsibility lies with legislators. In 2022, a huge number of volunteers went to defend Ukraine, but people's deputies should have understood that this resource is not unlimited. Sooner or later, there will be a need for wider mobilization, therefore, it is necessary to create clear rules, mechanisms for training and staffing the army in advance.
Instead, we got a situation where problems were piling up, and some politicians later began to criticize the government without explaining their own role in passing the necessary laws. I find this irresponsible. In addition, corruption scandals have undermined people's trust in the state for many years, and during the war the consequences of this became especially noticeable.
No army has ever won on volunteers alone. In major wars, there has always been mobilization. Our deputies should have understood this and prepared normal laws in advance, rather than waiting until the problem becomes critical.
The role of society and the media is no less important. People should read different sources, analyze information and understand that a single negative case does not characterize the entire army. But I often see how popular bloggers and publications adapt to the mood of their audience. If criticism of the CCC becomes popular, they begin to cover almost every event through this prism.
For example, I was not satisfied with the initial coverage of the Petropavlivska Borshchagovka story by some media outlets. I believe that some publications created a certain impression even before all the circumstances were established. And when reports appeared about the possible participation of pro-Russian activists, some of the authors changed their emphasis.
The same applies to the story with "Skelya". If there were facts of beatings or improper treatment of soldiers, they must be investigated, and the guilty punished. But why not talk to other servicemen of the unit who perform combat missions every day, have experience and are respected by their comrades? You cannot automatically shift the blame of individual people to the entire unit.
If there were really violations, there should be an investigation and the guilty should be punished. But we should not put a stamp on everyone. In the same unit there are people who perform combat missions every day, good commanders who are respected.
In my opinion, Russian information campaigns use real Ukrainian problems, amplify their resonance and try to form in people the belief that the Ukrainian army is no different from the Russian one. At the same time, some people who do not want to mobilize are looking for information that will help justify their position. It is precisely for this audience that numerous manipulative materials are designed.
But there is a question that still has to be answered: who will defend the country without an army and mobilization? What should the elderly, women with children, and everyone who cannot leave do? I would like us not to forget about those whom the Ukrainian military is protecting from Russian occupation during discussions about the CCC and mobilization.
What the Carthage case showed about law enforcement officers
New details have emerged in Operation Carthage: according to the investigation, high-ranking law enforcement officials may have covered up fraudulent call centers and other criminal businesses for years. What does this case say about the state of the Ukrainian law enforcement system?
For me, there is nothing surprising in the fact that the law enforcement system can work in this way. I believe that similar problems have existed in Ukraine for a very long time. But I want to look at this story from the perspective of ordinary investigators and operatives who could work under the leadership of people suspected of covering up criminal schemes.
Imagine an investigator who is honestly working to expose drug trafficking. He collects evidence, establishes the supply chain, identifies those involved, and brings the results to his boss. And the boss, if he is really connected to the criminal network, can simply warn its representatives about preparing arrests. This is an example of how corruption at the management level can destroy the results of the work of conscientious employees.
The investigator worked, worked, uncovered the criminal scheme and brought everything to the boss. And the boss picks up the phone, calls those he is covering, and warns them that they will be detained now. How will investigators and operatives ever look their bosses in the eye after this?
If such circumstances are confirmed, it will mean a problem of circular responsibility, which is extremely difficult to overcome. I trace its roots back to the first years of independence, when some law enforcement officers could perceive new economic opportunities as a way of personal enrichment. And it is not only about the police. The question is with the prosecutor's office, courts and other state structures that must ensure legality.
But now I see a positive change: such cases have begun to be publicly exposed. Not just talking about possible corruption, but demonstrating the results of investigations and the circumstances of alleged criminal schemes. In my opinion, this is important, because society gets the opportunity to see the scale of the problem.
There have also been high-profile stories in the past, where records, evidence, and suspicions were discussed for months, but the public didn't always see a convincing outcome. Now, in the Carthage case, I'm seeing much larger-scale revelations than I remember from previous years.
It's great that this is being exposed and shown now. So, the fight continues, and we have a chance to overcome this system. I don't remember such a scale of public exposures before.
This does not mean that criminal schemes have only appeared now. In my opinion, they existed before, they just did not always become known to the public. Therefore, the main thing is that the investigation continues, and the involvement of each person is established on the basis of evidence.
Why do the Russians themselves transmit the coordinates of the Armed Forces of Ukraine?
You said earlier that you don't really want to continue interviewing Russian prisoners. But new videos are still coming out. What has changed and are the prisoners telling you anything new?
When I said that I no longer planned to actively engage in interviews with Russian prisoners, I was absolutely sincere. I had already served in the army, went to positions, carried out my tasks and communicated with my comrades. Everything suited me. And then one day I simply received a message from a Russian soldier who wrote that he wanted to surrender.
I first suggested that he contact the "I Want to Live" project. He replied that he had already written there, but, according to him, he had not received a response. Then I decided to try to help. I had contact with a soldier from the Spartan National Guard unit who worked in the relevant direction.
This interaction led to the escape of three people: two 19-year-old military men and a Cuban. A drone was used to escort them. After their capture, they agreed to talk about their experiences, and I recorded an interview with them.
I get a message: "I'm a Russian soldier, I want to surrender." I reply: "Write to "I want to live." Why are you writing to me?" And he says that he already wrote there, but didn't get a response. Then I decided to try to help.
After that, the Russians began writing again. Among them were those who wanted to surrender but had no way to safely leave their positions. And some voluntarily sent information about the location of Russian military personnel and other facilities that could be used in the interests of the Ukrainian Defense Forces.
I cannot show all such messages and tell the details of their use. But I can say that this information in some cases helps the Ukrainian military to hit Russian targets. Therefore, the brothers supported the idea of continuing such communication if the Russian military themselves get in touch.
They themselves transmit coordinates, voluntarily leak information because they want to surrender. Not everyone can be taken out from all directions, but the person remains in his position and transmits information to us. It would be simply unwise not to use this opportunity.
This does not mean that I have returned to my previous work schedule. I now record about two interviews a month in my free time. To do this, I travel, talk to several prisoners at once, usually three or four, and then gradually publish the recordings once or twice a week. All this takes about two days a month and does not interfere with the main military tasks.
By the way, civilians do not always correctly imagine work at positions. For example, at some electronic reconnaissance positions the main thing is to monitor the serviceability, power supply and operation of the equipment. This does not mean that a person is busy with some physical action every second. Therefore, time for messages and communication sometimes appears even while staying at the position.
So I returned to the topic of prisoners. Not because I decided to resume my previous activities, but because Russian servicemen began to contact me directly.
They themselves brought me back to this. I didn't want to do it, but they wrote to me, wanting to surrender and ready to record interviews. That's how it all happened.
Oleshky, Melania Trump and the risks for Ukraine
Melania Trump received Ukrainian and Russian representatives at the White House as part of a humanitarian mission related to the Oleshkas. Arakhamia and Lubinets were next to Russian representatives Dmitriev and Lantratova, after which the first lady handed over letters to Zelensky and Putin. Can she play a separate role in the negotiations and how do you assess this meeting?
I'll start with the main thing: we managed to save people in Oleshki. And this is the most important result of the whole story. According to the information I saw, approximately 14 buses with people left for Ukraine, and four for Russia. I may be wrong in the numbers, because there were other reports, but the difference, as far as I understand, was very significant.
For me, this is also a powerful information signal. Russia constantly says that it is supposedly liberating Ukrainian territories and protecting the population. But if people choose to leave for Ukrainian-controlled territory at the first opportunity, this destroys the corresponding propaganda picture.
I also saw reports that a Russian war correspondent who wrote about the situation is being tried in occupied Crimea. As far as I understand, he is being prosecuted for publishing information that contradicted the official Russian position. To me, this shows how afraid the Kremlin is of even reports that question its propaganda.
People are leaving the Russians at the first opportunity. This is a huge blow to their propaganda. And I think we are not talking about it enough, we are not communicating this information enough. We need to be much more active in showing such stories.
I believe that the Ukrainian media could pay much more attention to this. Russian propaganda tries to use almost every informational pretext against Ukraine, and sometimes we do not actively enough talk about events that demonstrate the real attitude of people towards the occupation authorities. Therefore, in the informational sense, I see here primarily a shortcoming, not a defeat.
As for Dmytro Lubinets' behavior, I don't think he personally determined the terms of the humanitarian operation. As far as I understand, the main agreements were reached at a different level, and his task was not to harm the process of returning people. Therefore, I do not condemn the participation of the Ukrainian Ombudsman in such a meeting.
Whether it was worth smiling so actively and shaking hands with the Russian representatives is another question. Everyone can have their own assessment here. Personally, I am much more concerned about how the accommodation of the meeting participants was organized in the White House and what photos appeared afterwards.
At one of the international summits, as far as I remember, the foreign ministers refused to be photographed with Sergei Lavrov. This was a demonstrative signal of unwillingness to normalize relations with Russian representatives while the aggression continues. And now Ukrainian officials are being seated next to Russian representatives and photographed together with them.
Tomorrow, other representatives may ask: why shouldn't we shake hands with Russians or take pictures with them, if Ukrainians themselves do it? It seems to me that there is a risk here of gradually legalizing Russian representatives on the international stage.
I am not an expert in international diplomacy, so this is my personal assessment. But I fear that such measures may create the impression of a gradual return of Russian officials to normal international communication. At the same time, I would not want these fears to overshadow the humanitarian result. For me, the most important thing remains that people were able to be taken out of Oleshki.
How the US election will affect aid to Ukraine
Democrats have won the US midterm elections and reportedly gained majorities in both houses of Congress. They have also won a number of traditionally Republican districts. How beneficial is this shift in the political balance for Ukraine?
Of course, this is positive news for Ukraine. But let me start by saying that we must rely on ourselves first. I am not a supporter of either the Democrats or the Republicans and I do not want to judge American politics by party sympathies. What is important to me is the specific result that our state gets.
If we recall history, Bill Clinton, during whose presidency Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum, was a Democrat. Barack Obama, whose reaction to the occupation of Crimea I consider insufficient, also represented the Democratic Party. Therefore, to claim that one American party is always better for Ukraine than another would be wrong.
Under Joe Biden, we received aid that was not always in line with our needs, but it was more or less stable. Under Trump, the situation has become much less predictable. His position can change within a day, sometimes even between separate public statements.
Under Biden, aid was sluggish, not as we would like, but stable. And under Trump, a person can change his mind not several times a year or a month, but several times a day. For Ukraine, stability is the most important thing.
Democrats now have more control over the White House's decisions. The American system of checks and balances allows Congress to influence the president, and therefore limit his ability to make decisions alone. In my opinion, this could be especially important in situations where Trump wants to meet Russia again.
There is also the specific issue of military assistance. I hope that in the near future we will be able to unblock the transfer of missiles for the Patriot systems to Ukraine, in particular those that have already been paid for by our European allies. There have been reports of delays on the part of the American defense leadership, and I attribute them to Pete Hegseth's position.
Now, after the administration's political failures, it is Hegseth who has been criticized for his decisions regarding Iran. It seems to me that they are trying to shift some of the responsibility for the problems of American foreign policy onto him. But it is important to remember that the responsibility for the appointments of officials and the overall course of the administration also lies with the president.
I believe that in the near future they will sign the transfer of Patriots to us, especially those that have already been paid for by European allies. I hope that the situation with military aid will also begin to change.
And the most important thing for me is to stop pressuring Ukraine to agree to a peace plan, which, in my opinion, primarily reflects the interests of the Kremlin. We have already seen how the American administration demanded concessions from the Ukrainian leadership. But an agreement without real security guarantees may not end the threat, but only create the prerequisites for new Russian aggression.
Therefore, strengthening the role of Congress can become an additional protection against decisions that would put Ukraine at a disadvantage. But even with a more favorable political situation in Washington, we should not lose our own initiative and depend solely on American assistance.
Why Zolkin doesn't believe in peace in Abu Dhabi
Negotiations are ahead in Abu Dhabi, where the Americans want to talk about security guarantees and an end to the war. Ukraine is interested in stopping energy strikes and prisoner exchanges, and Russia will again be represented by Medinsky. Is there reason to hope that this time the parties will reach a real agreement?
I'll save you time here: no. I think they'll agree to continue negotiations again, but I see no reason to expect the war to end right now.
I am often asked when the war will end. In a month, a year or two? But to name at least an approximate date, I need some concrete arguments, facts or changes in the situation that would indicate that the end of hostilities is approaching. At the moment, I do not have such arguments.
I also assess the negotiations in the same way. You can hold meetings, discuss security guarantees and prisoner exchanges, but this does not mean that Russia is ready to stop the aggression. I do not see any convincing reasons why the Kremlin would suddenly decide to abandon the continuation of the war.
Negotiations are being made, but the war, unfortunately, will continue. I have no arguments that would allow me to say that it will end in a month, a year, or two.
This is not pessimism for the sake of pessimism. I simply believe that it is necessary to soberly assess the situation and not create inflated expectations in people. It is especially important not to succumb to Russian propaganda and not to replace real problems with information manipulation. Ukrainian media should also be more careful about what messages they spread and how they present them.
I am convinced that Ukraine has enough strength and opportunities to continue the fight. But for this, it is necessary to understand reality, support its own army, and not expect that another meeting of diplomats will automatically bring peace closer.
Zolkin about the Russian military - why do they themselves transmit the coordinates of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: watch the video
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