In Poland, a long-standing political crisis unexpectedly escalated on Halloween. A full-scale political battle erupted in the center of Warsaw following an attempt to remove the leadership of the Constitutional Tribunal (Constitutional Court).
The decision was supported by Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government, but on the evening of October 30, right-wing protesters gathered outside the court building, demanding that the decision be revoked.
Police cordoned off the perimeter, citing security concerns, while President Karol Nawrocki turned his plane around mid-flight, canceled his visit to Senegal, and returned to Warsaw to force his way through the crowd to the Tribunal building. It got to the point where the Polish right-wing openly accused Tusk of attempting a “coup d’état.”
24 Channel analyzed the situation surrounding the Constitutional Tribunal in Warsaw to determine when and why the Polish judicial system turned into a battleground for political struggles, how this crisis might affect future elections in Poland, and whether such political instability in one of the EU’s largest countries poses a threat to Ukraine and Europe itself.
Ihor Reiterovych, a political scientist and head of political and legal programs at the Ukrainian Center for Social Development, comments on the details of the conflict between the Polish government and the president.
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The Struggle for Judicial Reform: How PiS Has Controlled the Constitutional Tribunal for Years Against the Will of the EU
To understand why Polish opposition politicians have suddenly started talking about a “coup d’état,” we need to go back eleven years. In 2015, Jarosław Kaczyński’s conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party came to power in Poland and almost immediately set about restructuring state institutions to suit its own interests.
The new government paid particular attention to the judicial system, including the Constitutional Tribunal – the body responsible for reviewing the constitutionality of laws and other regulations and declaring them unconstitutional if necessary.
The problem was that, under the guise of judicial reform, PiS effectively began to establish political control over the judiciary.
Ultimately, the appointment of PiS-loyal judges, disputes over the legality of their selection, and restrictions on judicial independence led to a protracted conflict between Poland and the European Union. Brussels quite rightly accused Warsaw of violating the principles of the rule of law, for which it even imposed various fines and sanctions on Poland, as well as blocked the flow of funds and subsidies.
When Donald Tusk, the leader of the pro-European democratic forces, returned to power at the end of 2023, he promised to put an end to the PiS legacy in the judicial system. However, doing so proved to be much more difficult than defeating Kaczyński and his allies in the elections. The fact is that a significant portion of the judges appointed by the previous administration remained in their positions, and the Constitutional Tribunal itself continued to openly oppose the new government, taking advantage of its immunity and the president’s protection.
Although, according to the law, power in Poland is concentrated in the hands of the government, the president also has considerable opportunities to influence processes and act as a powerful spoiler. President Duda actively exercised this right, but still proceeded cautiously.
The situation escalated even further when Karol Nawrocki won the 2025 presidential election in Poland. The newly elected head of state, who was openly supported by the Law and Justice party, became Donald Tusk’s key political opponent. By the spring of 2026, this confrontation had escalated into an open war for control of the judicial system.
In March, the Polish Sejm elected six new judges to the Constitutional Tribunal, but Nawrocki agreed to administer the oath of office to only two of them. Four of the newly elected judges eventually took the oath in the Sejm without the president’s participation, but the Tribunal’s leadership never recognized their authority.
Political analyst Ihor Reiterovych, in an interview with 24 Channel, noted that, in effect, the Polish parliament and president were unable to agree even on who has the right to serve as a constitutional judge. According to the expert, this situation is quite typical for “young democracies” with weak institutions and powerful politicians who cannot restrain their own desires.
Ihor Reiterovych
political scientist
This is a problem characteristic of many countries with a parliamentary or semi-presidential form of government, where the president has certain powers regarding the appointment of judges. Sometimes the head of state may abuse these powers for his own interests or for the interests of the political party he represents.
On October 30, 2026, the conflict over control of the judicial branch in Poland finally erupted. Judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska, elected by the current parliamentary majority led by Tusk, as the person who has held her position the longest (albeit by only a few months), issued an order suspending Bogdan Świenczkowski, the president of the Constitutional Tribunal, and his deputy, Bartłomiej Sochański, for one month.
She herself stated that she was taking over the management of the Tribunal, citing her longest tenure as a judge (such a provision is indeed stipulated in Polish law, but it is highly questionable whether these rules apply to the Tribunal – 24 Channel). Among the reasons cited for this decision were precisely the obstruction of the work of the newly elected judges and violations of the tribunal’s own operating rules.
However, the current president of the Constitutional Tribunal had no intention of giving up without a fight, and a post appeared on the court’s official X page reporting that the court’s website had been hacked, along with a statement that all those involved were attempting to carry out a “coup d’état.”
“A Coup d’État” or Just “Another Ordinary Weekend in Warsaw”
Despite all the bombast in the Constitutional Tribunal’s anonymous statement, in reality there was no “coup” at all. Political scientist Ihor Reiterovych believes that accusations of a “state” coup do not, after all, reflect the true nature of this conflict:
Ihor Reiterovych
political scientist
I don’t think this is specifically a coup d’état. It’s more of a standoff between the president and the Sejm, centered on the Constitutional Tribunal. But this is definitely a political – I would even say a political-constitutional – crisis that could have unpredictable consequences. Specifically, this involves the possibility of early parliamentary elections or a complete paralysis of the judicial branch on issues critical to the country’s development.
Subsequently, supporters of right-wing parties – including PiS, “Confederation,” and “the political movement of the controversial Grzegorz Braun” – gathered outside the Tribunal building, demanding that Korwin-Piotrowska’s decision be overturned. The tribunal was then also surrounded by police, who explained that this was necessary to protect the staff there and, in fact, the judges themselves. There were also isolated clashes with protesters, and several of them were even detained, but it did not escalate into “street battles.”
Ultimately, the current leadership of the Constitutional Tribunal refused to recognize their own removal, and President Nawrocki, who canceled his African tour and arrived in Warsaw, personally supported their position. In his statement on October 31, he accused the government of forcibly seizing the constitutional body and demanded that the police be withdrawn from its premises.
In contrast, Donald Tusk – whom the opposition holds politically responsible for these events – stated outright that restoring the rule of law after years of PiS rule requires decisive action.
But the most interesting aspect of this story is that the dispute surrounding the Constitutional Tribunal has long since gone beyond the scope of a legal conflict. After all, what is at stake now is not only control over the country’s judicial system, but also the political future of Donald Tusk and his opponents, including Karol Nawrocki.
And while Polish politicians accuse one another of a coup d’état, the battle over the Constitutional Tribunal is gradually turning into a dress rehearsal for a much larger power struggle in Poland.
Tusk vs. Nawrocki: How the Battle for the Constitutional Tribunal Became a Preview of the Upcoming Elections
Donald Tusk's key problem is that even after returning to power in 2023, he has still not been able to completely rid himself of the political influence of his predecessors. Although his coalition controls a majority in the Sejm, President Karol Nawrocki has the right to veto laws, and the government simply lacks the votes to override a presidential veto. So while Tusk is trying to dismantle the PiS legacy, his political opponents have entirely legitimate tools at their disposal to block these changes – which is exactly what they’re doing.
Moreover, Nawrocki himself is increasingly using the standoff with the government to strengthen his own position. On October 31, the Polish president held emergency consultations with representatives of parliamentary parties regarding the constitutional crisis.
They even discussed the possibility of forming a temporary caretaker government. However, Tusk himself refused to participate in the negotiations and, in his address, ruled out any compromise with opponents of judicial reform.
And this is where things get interesting, as the battle over the Constitutional Tribunal is unfolding just one year before the next parliamentary elections in Poland. For Tusk, this is an opportunity to demonstrate to his voters that his government is finally fulfilling its promises regarding judicial reform. Meanwhile, Nawrocki and PiS have been given a pretext to accuse the prime minister of authoritarian tendencies.
And the longer the conflict lasts, the more opportunities the parties will have to use this crisis to mobilize their supporters.
Ihor Reiterovych
political analyst
Tusk came to power promising that he would rectify this situation. That is why, I think, he got involved in this issue – because if he lets this problem fester and it continues to escalate, it could lead to very negative consequences for Poland, primarily financial ones. And Tusk’s government cannot afford to lose financial opportunities. All of this is very important to them on the eve of the elections.
However, it is by no means certain that Poles themselves are ready to support one side or the other en masse. According to a Rzeczpospolita poll conducted on the eve of the crisis, 32.7% of respondents believed that none of the politicians was in the right in the dispute over the Constitutional Tribunal. At the same time, in the same poll, 32% of respondents supported Nawrocki’s position, while 27.8% supported Tusk’s. Thus, the conflict not only divides Polish society into three nearly equal parts but also shows that a significant portion of Poles do not directly support either side. This means there will be no easy (or quick) way out of the crisis.
And for Tusk, this is a particularly unpleasant situation, as his government may spend the final year before the elections not on economic or social reforms, but on an endless struggle with his own country’s president and judges who, instead, see themselves as political figures.
Moreover, even some organizations that generally support judicial reforms in Poland, such as the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, are nevertheless warning that such questionable attempts to remove the tribunal’s leadership could set a dangerous precedent for the future.
The result is a rather ambiguous situation. Donald Tusk, who returned to power under the banner of restoring the rule of law in Poland, is now himself forced to face accusations of attempting a “coup d’état.” Regardless of how the battle over the Constitutional Tribunal ends, the prime minister’s political opponents have already been given a good reason to criticize his government ahead of the 2027 parliamentary elections.
However, the greatest danger lies in the fact that this struggle may not be limited to Poland’s domestic politics. After all, while Warsaw is sinking ever deeper into a struggle between the president, the government, and the judges, Europe is trying to unite in the face of the threat from Russia. And if one of the EU’s most important states becomes mired in its own political disputes, the consequences of this confrontation could be felt far beyond Poland’s borders. Thus, Shevchenko’s famous line may come true once again: “Poland fell and crushed you all.” Only this time, it won’t be about Ukraine. Or, more precisely, not just about Ukraine.
The Crisis in Relations with Brussels: Why the EU Has Been Criticizing the Polish Judiciary for Years
In fact, Donald Tusk himself returned to power with a promise not only to restore order in Poland’s courts but also to finally reconcile with the European Union. After all, during the PiS’s eight years in power, Warsaw had managed to fall out so deeply with Brussels over judicial reform that in 2017, the European Commission sanctioned Poland for the first time in history over its judicial issues.
In short: the country was accused of undermining the principles of the rule of law, and Poland even faced the prospect of losing its voting rights in the EU Council.
And at first, Tusk did indeed manage to rectify the situation. In May 2024, riding a wave of optimism, Brussels suspended the relevant proceedings against Poland, giving a positive assessment of the new government’s promises and initial steps toward restoring the independence of the courts.
But just two and a half years later, the very same Tusk – whom European officials had praised for restoring the rule of law – found himself at the center of a scandal surrounding the Constitutional Tribunal. And now, officials in Brussels are deeply dismayed that they are once again forced to figure out what exactly is happening with the Polish judiciary.
On October 31, the European Commission stated that it was closely monitoring events in Warsaw and reminded Polish authorities of the need to abide by the Constitution. At the same time, European officials emphasized that it is the Sejm that has the right to appoint judges to the Constitutional Tribunal. In other words, on this aspect of the dispute, Brussels effectively supported the arguments of Tusk’s supporters, although it did not offer an unequivocal assessment of the removal of the court’s leadership itself.
Political analyst Ihor Reiterovych notes that the events in Poland and the unresolved judicial crisis are a major headache for the EU. The problem is that Brussels has no ready – and, most importantly, painless – solutions.
Ihor Reiterovych
political analyst
The European Union has no way to intervene directly in this situation. But it can restrict the allocation of funds, and for Poland, that would be very painful. There may also be restrictions on the adoption of certain decisions at the EU level until the issue of the rule of law is resolved. The Poles would actually prefer to avoid this, since under the previous government, Poland already suffered from similar restrictions and missed out on much of what it could have received from the European Union.
The most interesting thing about this situation is that, so far, neither side has any intention of backing down. Donald Tusk insists on the need to finally rid the Polish courts of the PiS legacy, while Karol Nawrocki and his allies refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the new leadership of the Constitutional Tribunal. The problem is that both camps have enough political clout to block each other’s decisions, yet not enough to end this crisis on their own.
In fact, the next escalation could occur as early as November 3, when the Tribunal’s new leadership plans to hold a general meeting of judges. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Justice Minister Waldemar Żurek has already initiated proceedings to strip Bogdan Świenczkowski and Bartłomiej Sochański of their judicial immunity. In other words, the conflict over who has the right to lead the court could escalate into criminal prosecution of the previous leadership.
Ultimately, the most realistic outcome of this situation appears to be not the early resignation of Tusk’s government, but the continuation of these political battles at least until the 2027 parliamentary elections.
Moreover, regardless of who ultimately prevails, Poland risks ending up with an even more deeply divided society and a judicial system whose legitimacy will continue to be challenged by at least half of the country’s political forces.
Ihor Reiterovych, assessing the crisis’s impact on Ukraine, notes that Poland may put its “historical wars” aside for a while, but sooner or later it will inevitably return to this topic.
Ihor Reiterovych
political analyst
If politicians become engrossed in internal conflict, they may pay less attention to Ukraine, but sooner or later this issue will resurface. The issue is highly sensitive for conservative political forces, and they will seek to exploit it in the future. For example, the opposition might start claiming that Tusk allegedly seeks to establish an authoritarian regime in order to continue providing aid to Ukraine for free. Or that the government needs control over the Constitutional Tribunal to resolve migration issues.
And for Ukraine, this is not the best prospect either. After all, as long as Warsaw is forced to deal with its own constitutional crisis, it will be more difficult for it to focus on common European issues. And for Kyiv, which relies heavily on Polish support within the EU and NATO, the political stability of its neighbor is far from a secondary concern.
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