Russia continues to threaten Europe with war, test NATO’s patience, and use nuclear blackmail to force concessions from the West. At the same time, European leaders continue to try to find ways to communicate with the Kremlin, although such contacts do not always yield the expected results. Against this background, the question arises: is Europe finally able to develop a common position on Russia and move from statements to real actions?
In an exclusive interview with Channel 24, Volodymyr Ogryzko, Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2007 to 2009, analyzed what Putin is really trying to achieve with his threats, why phone conversations with the Russian dictator can only strengthen his confidence, and how the West should respond to Moscow's provocations. Read more in the article.
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Why Putin has started threatening Europe again
Putin said that he is now assessing Russia's ability to be ready for war with Europe by about 2030. He added that he doesn't really want it. It seems that he previously ruled out such an option in interstate relations. What has changed? Where does he get this drive from?
I think you mean his close associate, assistant Surkov. They've pushed him aside a bit for now. I honestly don't know what the internal reasons were. He was responsible for the attack on Ukraine. He was responsible for Ukraine in principle, for the post-Soviet space.
And I'm leading to the fact that about 2 years before the full-scale war, he wrote an article supposedly on his own behalf. But you understand that if he is embedded in this vertical, then you can't write a single unnecessary word, let alone without permission.
So, he wrote an article in which he reflected on the role of Russia, on civilization, that it is a separate civilization, unlike anything else, that it is special, that it is one that, in principle, cannot be compared to the West. And among other things, he led to the idea that war is also a way of communication. I'm almost quoting. I remember that article well.
I think that such ideas have settled quite well in the head of this war criminal, Putin. And I think that he takes it from his philosophy, so to speak, from Dugin himself, from Ilyin himself. And you can look even further at Zinoviev and these great methodologists of theirs. Or Nikolai Obukhov, Berdyaev and so on. That is, it has formed into a system in Putin's head, which is absolutely acceptable to him.
Of course, you can fantasize about anything, but these fantasies require resources. Human, financial, economic, military, and so on. That is, if it is a fantasy without support, without this foundation, it is simply a delusion. If it is a fantasy to which all these elements are added, then it is a threat.
That's why I would always divide all these statements into two parts. Either it's a bluff, blackmail and intimidation, or it's preparation. And then you have to study very carefully what will actually happen.
If we see that six months have passed, what has Russia done to consolidate its offensive capabilities? We see nothing. They checked the box. Another six months have passed. They built a base somewhere in the Kola Peninsula. There may be some specific element. And so on until that very year 2030.
And then we sum up: was it all just said like that, or was it some kind of developed program? Given what we hear from Putin every day and every week, we can, of course, believe his words.
But it seems to me that the main goal here, among other things, is to re-sow fear, uncertainty, the desire to negotiate, the desire to look for some solutions or beginnings, etc. Honestly, I don't see any other logical option.
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Why are European leaders calling the Russian dictator?
The leaders of Norway and Finland contacted the Russian dictator directly, and they talked about something. What do you think could have been between the lines and why did they make these calls? Or why did they have this conversation? Ultimately, it seems that the position of a united Europe was to keep Putin basically in political isolation.
This is the right position. And here I would be in the place of Ms. Frederiksen, the Prime Minister of Denmark, who expressed her lack of understanding of why all these talks took place and what they achieved.
You know, you can look at it in different ways here. The Americans, our president, the president of Finland, and the prime minister of Norway meet in Norway and discuss something. While they were discussing it, the Americans left.
They presented a kind of joint position, but definitely not a pan-European one, but only those leaders who gathered there and returned back. So he is already listening to this information on the phone. And then, perhaps to feel whether it has reached them or not, they make this joint call.
Although I have to tell you, in my opinion, this makes no sense at all.
So what should our European partners have done long ago? Not to run around in circles, not to ask who will represent us, but first to sit down at the table, gather everyone who determines the security policy of the European Union, and say: "Dear friends, perhaps we should now write down our pan-European position on Russia. What suggestions do you have? The European Commission has prepared a draft. It looks like this. See what you like and what you don't. Let's take a week to refine it."
Later, they would have to discuss this position with Ukraine. And then, no matter who called, spoke, traveled, or met somewhere on the sidelines, there would be a single position. Yes, it can be changed. For example, a month passes. Perhaps some changes occur. And then the Europeans gather again and finalize it.
If we go down that path, then I say you can expect 27 calls, or maybe 32 calls, or 31 calls if you count NATO. So what do we have in the end? We have a political cacophony. Does it produce any results? No. It just emboldens the Russian dictator.
If we take that side, of course they make requests. They beg. Listen, how long can you beat your head against the wall and explain that pleading with Putin only gives him another argument to hit harder, kill more, and so on? This point still hasn't arrived. It simply hasn't arrived.
But the leaders of Norway and Finland are far from stupid. These two countries want to secure some kind of self-interest.
Here we can only fantasize with you. Look, perhaps, at the answer of the Americans, which they brought, which Witkoff brought and conveyed in Oslo to Støre and Stubb himself. Perhaps it did not satisfy them.
And they decided to check again, so to speak, whether the signals transmitted on their behalf by Witkoff were perhaps correct or perhaps incorrect. And, perhaps, in order to be sure that the same Witkoff did not distort, did not lie, did not put them, perhaps, in some convenient position for Putin, then, perhaps, they decided: we should probably call again, clearly and plainly state what our position is, and once again, so that later there would be no complaints against us.
This option is quite possible. We don't know. But the distrust between Americans and Europeans is going through the roof. You understand and know this perfectly well.
That is, they conveyed the main thing - that they are on Ukraine's side, that they are not mediators. So you see, when you have very little information, it is very difficult to put all these things together. But this option seems more or less logical to me.
Let me share my own opinion. In my opinion, Putin was not ready for this call: having heard a position that did not suit him, he decided to follow the beaten path, as was the case with Trump and the Americans. However, they were ready to listen, knew clearly what they had to do, and acted accordingly. So Putin tried to do the same thing – play the fool.
This option is, of course, possible. Although from what has become known, he said, in essence, he repeated his position about the root causes of the war and all that other heresy that they continue to carry, and so on. That is, if there are root causes, then there is no change in position, and then, in fact, what is there to talk about?
So I think there's more to it. And don't discount the personality factor. Maybe Stubb really wants to play some kind of special role in this. We don't know, do we? Maybe Stoltenberg wants to play a bigger role too.
By the way, let's thank them. I mean the people of Finland, Norway, and Sweden for their tremendous support.
So we can criticize them a little, maybe, but on the other hand, we should thank them for the enormous help they provide. They provide it. And maybe this political move was not fully thought out. And maybe, as I said, there were some individual motives involved.
Look, they're both diplomats, and they've both been foreign ministers. So they feel like they can use their experience to at least push things to a positive conclusion.
So we can consider that option. In conclusion, I think they have drawn conclusions from the fact that there was criticism, and it was most likely justified. So, moving forward, I think we need to follow the same path of agreeing on a position, identifying who represents this position as the main speaker. And everyone else, to the extent possible and necessary, voice this same position in certain cases, and so on and so forth.
I had no criticism of their actions. I had a desire to understand what was happening. After all, it really seems strange. Europeans are very clearly aware of the need for Ukraine in the security context of Europe.
Actually, they both confirmed it. If they called thinking that after their call Putin would change his position, I said in an interview that it was naive, because the result of this call is zero. In the political sense of the word.
They received the answer that we have known for a long time, that Putin, based on his own political considerations and motives, does not respond to political appeals, requests, and so on, and does not intend to do so.
If our dear friends from Finland and Norway wanted to make sure of this once again... You know, in science and diplomacy, there is no such thing as a negative outcome. There is simply one that must be taken into account.
And it seems to me that, by the way, this also had its positive side. I mean, Europeans are realizing once again that calling, asking, begging, persuading - it would be more effective to bang your head against a concrete wall. Because with Putin, this logic simply does not work. It simply does not work, and that's it.
But that's not the main thing they had to understand. You know, this is a very important point. Did they understand that in this situation, looking at how the course of military operations and the course of interaction with the Russian dictator are developing, you just need to raise money, gather resources and help Ukraine as much as possible. This is what should have been done at the beginning of this year.
You know, I think that the militaries of these countries, and not only these countries, understand everything very well. But they are not the ones making the decisions.
In this context, it is very important that we work at the military level, our military and, say, Norwegian, our military and Finnish, our military and Swedish, and so on down the list, so that this direction works as effectively as possible. Because the generals understand each other without translators. They have their own, so to speak, channel of communication and their own understanding.
But how to convey this information and this concern of Western generals to the political level – that is the real challenge. And that is why I think that if, on the one hand, you are being pressured from below by your military elite, and on the other hand, you want to do something at the political level but you are running into a brick wall, that gives political leaders another clue.
This means that perhaps the military is actually right. The option here does not work. Therefore, it is necessary to: A - increase our own security, and B - help those who are actually protecting this security today.
How the West should respond to Russian provocations and nuclear blackmail
It has become known about another drone attack on a cargo ship heading to the Romanian port of Constanta. NATO aircraft were alerted, but they were unable to prevent the strike. What more warning do Europeans need to realize the threat? Will they continue to demand verification before admitting that Russia is attacking ships heading to NATO countries?
You know, I think we need to go a different way. We just need to destroy everything that is sailing to Russia in the same Black Sea. We have no other options.
We can try to convince them for a long time, and perhaps even longer than we imagine. We need results. Results that will show our NATO partners that there are other ways to influence the situation than just expressing concern. Again, saying we'll figure it out and so on and so forth.
This example, it works, you know? But I'm talking about something else. I'm talking about the fact that there is no response to what is practically a direct aggression against interests. We have to provide an example of a response. That's what I'm saying.
In other words, we should say: "Dear Romanian friends, we Ukrainians do it this way. Why can't you protect yourself from Russian attacks in your own territorial waters? That's a question for you. But if we were in your place, we would shoot down those drones flying at commercial ships. But we shoot them down, so why are you silent?"
This is also a way to make our Western partners realize that they have to react this way because what they are demonstrating now is not working. This means that they will be hit harder. What other logic could there be here?
One of NATO's fears is a nuclear confrontation with Russia. In my opinion, the only way to influence Russia and avoid nuclear blackmail is to use an intermediary. And in this case, the situation is such that there is this intermediary who exerts influence. "Pumping" Ukraine with weapons does not mean receiving a nuclear threat. This straightforward logic, why is it not being used?
Of course, we need military help. There's really nothing to argue about here. But I would go the opposite route.
As we've discussed, Russia has deployed, or at least claimed to have deployed, nuclear missiles in Belarus. Yes, it's not known whether they have warheads attached to them. They're in other warehouses somewhere and so on. But regardless, it could theoretically be done quickly.
Why shouldn't our French or British colleagues station their nuclear forces in Poland? That's a direct and clear answer.
Why don't our French and British colleagues have their nuclear submarines in close proximity to the Russian borders? It's just a political decision. Just have them patrol where it's a five-minute flight time to key Russian military, political and economic centers. And that's it. And there's no war.
Because for any attempt, so to speak, to use your weapon, another one immediately arrives, from which you cannot defend yourself. Because it is impossible to imagine that Russia will be able to suppress what Britain and France have.
I'm not including America here. That's a separate story. But even these two countries, which can use their nuclear forces in the event of a Russian attack using nuclear weapons, say, on Ukraine or some other country, and so on. We need to wage this very war of blackmail, you know? A war of mutual intimidation, of mutual fear.
But do you believe that Europe can respond to blackmail, to exert influence on Russia with nuclear weapons? Do you believe that the Europeans, under certain conditions, will be the first to use nuclear weapons against Russia?
Of course not. And why? And that is the answer. And could Russia or, say, the DPRK be the first to use nuclear weapons against their state opponents? I doubt it. Let's leave the DPRK aside. That's a completely different story.
You see, when the level of threat you face is equal to the level of threat you may pose to another, then that is parity, which is the answer to the question of why not.
Because you can only deliver a powerful, perhaps even preemptive strike if you know you won't get the same in return. If your own level of security is equal to the damage you can inflict on the other side, any chance or reason to use it disappears, because you will inevitably and surely be destroyed yourself, which makes the operation pointless. What do you gain? Yes, you destroy someone, but you are destroyed in return. Who wins?
The Europeans will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and therefore cannot use them as a hard argument. At the same time, Russia, as an aggressive country, does not guarantee that it will not use them against them. And therein lies the fundamental difference. This is the fundamental imbalance. Russia is feared because it can use them. The Europeans cannot even theoretically use them.
Why not? They can use it in response to a nuclear attack. And that's written in there.
Today, there is no such thing as "first." None. The problem is that each side conducts such serious analysis and monitoring of what is happening at all of the other side's nuclear facilities that it is impossible to deliver a surprise nuclear strike, either theoretically or practically.
What about the "dead hand"?
I tell you this as someone who has been involved a little bit in nuclear issues and nuclear disarmament. And recently, within our center, we discussed in great detail this so-called Russian nuclear threat. We invited our specialists, generals, who have worked all their lives with our nuclear ballistic missiles that were supposed to fly towards America.
They simply explain that today it is impossible to take a single step that would go unnoticed by the other side. So the question arises again: if I am a Russian bandit and want to launch a nuclear strike on any country in Europe, I will automatically be detected even at the preparation stage, because there are protocols for preparing for these nuclear launches and so on.
So at the preparation stage, the other side will already ask on the red phone: "What are you doing? We are now entering the same preparation mode." Then tell me, what will be Putin's reaction? He will say: "I will continue the preparation." He says: "We also continue to prepare."
In other words, it escalates until someone blinks first. You see? And no one blinks because they know full well that this blink will be the last in their personal lives, including Putin. No one can escape a nuclear catastrophe. Not Putin, not anyone else.
I asked a general who once commanded missile forces with tactical nuclear weapons. How long does it take to prepare tactical nuclear weapons for a strike? He gave me a specific time – up to 15 minutes.
This is in case these weapons are not on combat duty. And I can just tell you later, and even give you a map that shows, with precision to this circle we are sitting on, where what is located under what number, which warheads are in this warehouse, which are in that one, and how they are protected.
But this control no longer exists. This interaction between countries has already ended.
From space. And this is the best control, because, yes, of course, it was good when inspectors went there, looked and checked, but that's how it was. It doesn't work, but from space you can see any movement. But over these objects it is really carried out 24/7 without days off.
What will really accelerate the depletion of the Russian economy?
On the one hand, the US seems ready to resume trade with Russia. On the other hand, American businesses are in no hurry to buy Russian diesel fuel, as it is not of very good quality and there is not much of it, despite Moscow's claims of large exports. Also indicative is the statement by the leader of the Russian communists, Gennady Zyuganov, about the need to withdraw Russians' money from banks to replenish the budget. It can be perceived as a political scarecrow, but Zyuganov has been in Russian politics for a long time and may see what the "United Russia" does not want to show.
As for the communists in today's Russia, nothing has changed at all. These are people who serve the Putin regime, who are parasites on this regime, who have become attached to it, who are sitting on its salaries, and so on. Therefore, we cannot expect any real opposition activity from them that would serve the interests of the people. We have already been through this.
What could have happened and what he could have, so to speak, pushed for is that since the treasury is already empty, you and I have just discussed one of the last pleasant things for us. They say it themselves. 30% of Russian enterprises are unprofitable.
For me, this is a very good indicator, because it means that the Russian economy is starting to lose what is called the ability to stay afloat. It starts like a ship that is already a third submerged in water. That is, it starts to roll and it is still floating, it is a trough. But the roll is already such that it may soon start to take on some water overboard.
The question is, how do we make this roll finally become such that the water starts to flow, so to speak, from above? And this is the key question that I ask myself. What do we, not Trump, not anyone else, what do we, Ukrainians, have to do to make this U-turn finally irreversible?
So that after the drones fly, the missiles fly, and everything that can explode starts exploding, and so on and so forth. Whether Trump wants it or not. So at what point do we need to get this Russian ship to start taking on water? And when the question arises: either it sinks, or I stop, or I turn on all the pumps to start pumping out this water, but the ship can no longer move forward.
This is the answer to so many questions. How long will the war last, what funds do we need for this, where to get them, where to get weapons for this money, many things, many things. But the key is how quickly we can bring this ship to a state where it will actually cease to be able to move forward.
We are in the process of bringing it to this state. This is the key point right now. If we can accumulate the financial support of the West, if we can accumulate the military support that we need together with the Europeans. By the way, there are good plans. We get the European Starlink, the same joint missile defense, the production of drones, the production of equipment and so on. Everything is in the works.
But all this was needed yesterday. In fact, all this was needed the day before yesterday.
But we'd rather imagine that we need it yesterday or the day before than sit around and wait for Uncle Trump to give us something. He taught us that we'd think even faster and act even faster. We're doing great.
The Europeans – not so much. They are slow, bureaucratic. But, by the way, there are signals from that side, I repeat, returning to the military. They ask to teach them, they ask to understand, they ask for help and so on, and so on.
That's what I think is on the agenda now. We can sort of resolve these issues, so to speak. That means the chances of this Russian ship finally starting to sink will increase significantly.
What "framework" should Ukraine set for peace negotiations?
What prospect of negotiations can we even think about? I mean negotiations with Russia, the States and Ukraine, and taking into account the fact that they do not really want to allow the Europeans into these negotiations.
I would ask the question differently. What do we and the Europeans need to do to get the Europeans involved in the negotiations? And then everything falls into place. We should not constantly consider ourselves second-class citizens.
But Americans don't want that.
We don't want to go to negotiations without the Europeans. That's all. So there won't be any negotiations. Will there be? But then we add EU representatives to our delegation.
We need to look for options. I mean, we shouldn't ask Russia for permission for Europe to be present in negotiations about Europe. That's crazy. That's just how it works.
That is, we must take a completely different position. Not a pleading one, but a declarative one. When we write to the Americans and Russians that representatives of the European Union will be present at the next round of negotiations in Abu Dhabi or somewhere else, for example, as part of the Ukrainian delegation. That's it, period. We simply inform them. We do not ask for permission. We say that it will be so.
I would like to see what the Russian and American representatives say. Why not? We can do it like this. We can agree with the Europeans to invite them to join our delegation as associate members and sit them next to us. And someone will sit there representing the European Union and say the same thing, that this is our common position with Ukraine and we support it.
So, you see, I'm against constantly running after a thug who wants to set an agenda. We must, with Europe, unfortunately without the US, put him in his place.
If we assess the overall picture of what is currently taking shape around Ukraine, it is a dynamic process with changes on the front, with changes in European reactions, with changes in the United States. And where is Ukraine now? Have we already pushed off the bottom? Are we still sinking towards it, or are we ready to push off from it?
No, no. I think we shouldn't think about any bottom at all. Ukraine is not just not at the bottom. Ukraine is now among the countries that determine what will happen over the next decades.
So, as for the bottom, I think we can't talk about it at all. Today we are in a situation where many issues simply cannot be resolved without us. Look, Russia will again throw, by the way, at these meetings, or rather at the meeting in Abu Dhabi, its next political bubble about a new system of European or, perhaps, even Eurasian security. You know, a kind of bait, to which, I really hope, the European partners will not react.
But do you doubt it?
No, there are, of course, a couple of people like Fico, people like that, who will say: what a great idea. We need to sit down and talk. Why is this being done? To continue the war and blind the Europeans with the delusional idea of some new security system with mandatory guarantees for Russia.
We have been going through these systems, these are more like ideas for 30 years. It's all heard and forgotten. But, so to speak, the idea will be that even if we talk about cutting off this nonsense from real European security, Ukraine will be among those countries that will determine its essence. And the forms of this work are already known. They work.
And by the way, what is already being discussed and what I think should happen is 2027 is the year of the birth of the European anti-missile system. This is something that will change the situation very seriously. This is something that, again, will very quickly establish clear red lines for Russia, so to speak, on what they can scare the Europeans with and what they cannot.
Because now, for example, some Medvedev comes out and says: "Tomorrow we will hit Berlin with ballistic missiles." And Berlin has the same missiles. 50 of them. And Russia has hundreds of them. So it is obvious that this is a serious threat.
And that same Berlin will think: maybe we should wait a little longer until we have our own. And we will have ours during 2027.
So Ukraine is now also part of this process. We are already in a state where, firstly, nothing about us without us, and in another state where we are already part of what we all need to protect ourselves from the Russian threat.
So I think that we are now, on the contrary, moving into this new quality thanks to what we are going through every day. So I think that the perspective here is not to reach the bottom, but that, by becoming part of this European security space, we will establish ourselves as a country without which the Europe of the future, the normal democratic Europe of the future, will no longer be able to exist.
This interview has been shortened, corrected, and edited for better understanding by the audience.
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