- 1. Russia may lose the opportunity to restore the Crimean bridge
- 2. Up to 300,000 occupiers may find themselves in operational encirclement
- 3. Strikes on oil system could force Russia to shut down wells
- 4. Russian resources could be discussed at meeting in China
- 5. Putin's statements about a new Yalta have nothing to do with history
- 6. Trump should demand that Putin withdraw troops from Ukraine
After new attacks on the Crimean Bridge, the Russian occupiers have faced problems using the crossing, in particular its railway section. Damage to the bridge and Ukrainian attacks on land supply routes could significantly complicate the provision of Russian forces in southern Ukraine.
Military expert, reserve colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Roman Svitan, in an exclusive interview for Channel 24 , assessed the consequences of the attack and explained why up to 300,000 Russian soldiers could be under threat of operational encirclement. He also spoke about the strikes on Russia's oil infrastructure, the capabilities of Ukrainian weapons, and the results of the meeting between Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping.
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Russia may lose the opportunity to restore the Crimean bridge
The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported that Ukrainian Neptune missiles damaged the railway track of the Crimean Bridge. Trump also said that Putin was angry with Zelenskyy over the attack. How serious is the damage to the crossing, will the Russians be able to repair it, and how will this affect Putin's reputation?
And how could this affect his reputation? If Putin were asked where the bridge beam went, he would have no choice but to say that it sank. He is already an expert at such answers. Remember the Kursk submarine? When asked what happened, he replied: "It sank."
The Kerch Bridge is in much the same situation now. At least one beam that supported the bridge crossings over the main fairway has fallen into the water. Now the Russians will have to get it out, in parts, as they did when they raised the Kursk submarine. But the question arises whether they will be able to organize this work at all.
Will our Defense Forces, which continue to hold the Kerch Bridge under fire control, give the Russians the opportunity to restore the bridge? The Neptune strikes clearly demonstrated that we still have such an opportunity. This is the so-called window of opportunity, and it is still open
Russian air defense currently does not know where to get additional anti-aircraft missile systems and radar systems to increase the density of defense in the area of the crossing. And if they cannot provide cover for the bridge itself, they will not be able to fully protect the repair crews. At the same time, work is needed not only to restore road or rail connections, but also to clear the fairway.
By my estimate, thousands of vessels of the Volga-Don group are currently blocked north of the Kerch Strait. They cannot pass this route normally, which means daily economic losses. Ship downtime, restrictions on port traffic, reduced cargo shipment opportunities - all this creates additional problems for Russia.
We are talking about millions of dollars in losses every day. And this is not only a matter of military logistics, but also of economics. The Russian leadership will have to look for ways to restore the passage of ships as soon as possible, but doing so under the constant threat of new strikes will be extremely difficult.
At the same time, I believe that the Ukrainian military will continue to work on the structures of the crossing. If further strikes are successful, the Russians may lose the second arch of the bridge over the fairway. Then the problems with using the crossing will become even more serious.
Pay attention to the weapons that were used. The Luch Design Bureau once again demonstrated the capabilities of Ukrainian developments. In my opinion, the Palanytsia missiles participated in the destruction of the bridge span, and the Neptunes worked on the railway track.
The Russians will not be able to use the railway crossing to its full extent now. And I think that in the coming nights a fairly serious amount of forces and resources will be used there to finally put this arch, in particular the railway crossing, out of action.
Preparations for this operation lasted almost a month. During this time, the Defense Forces worked to weaken Russian air defenses, destroy radar stations, and suppress electronic warfare systems covering the Kerch direction. It was a comprehensive preparation, the results of which we are now seeing.
I think the Ukrainian military will continue to use the created window of opportunity. The Russians will have to simultaneously look for means of protection, try to restore damaged structures and ensure the passage of ships. Doing all this in conditions of fire control from the Ukrainian side will be very difficult.
The Kerch Bridge will no longer be fully operational. And we'll see how Putin responds to this. This is a serious problem for him now, because further strikes could bring the matter to an end
It is the possibility of continued Ukrainian attacks that makes the prospects for a quick restoration of the crossing so doubtful. Russia may attempt to repair the bridge, but it will have to consider that Ukrainian weapons of mass destruction remain capable of reaching the facility.
Up to 300,000 occupiers may find themselves in operational encirclement
Can we say that Crimea is turning into an island for the Russians? What will happen to supplies for the military and civilians, and does the current situation create opportunities for intensifying Ukrainian actions in the south and de-occupying the peninsula?
We have been talking for several years about how this could happen. Crimea itself is a kind of operational geographical cauldron, since it is sandwiched between two seas. And if the main routes of communication are blocked, there is a possibility of seriously limiting the supply of Russian troops on the peninsula.
From the east, the entrance from Taman via the Kerch Bridge is currently damaged. And the northern direction, in my assessment, is under fire control of Ukrainian weapons. The section from Berdyansk to Melitopol, where the depth of the relevant zone is approximately 100 kilometers, is especially important.
This distance allows for direct control of drones and control of the transport routes that the Russians are trying to use to supply their group. If these routes are constantly under attack, it becomes much more difficult to organize a stable flow of military cargo. And this applies not only to Crimea.
The attack on the Kerch Bridge and control of the land corridor cut off not only Crimea, but also the enemy's Crimean-Kherson group from supplies from Russian territory. This also partially applies to the Zaporizhzhia group, which is located west and northwest of Melitopol
It is now very difficult for the Russians to organize a full supply of military ammunition, munitions and other resources for both offensive and defensive operations. Imagine a route of approximately 500 kilometers from Rostov to Oleshki or Vasylivka via Tokmak. And this route is constantly under threat of Ukrainian strikes.
This creates problems with delivering cargo in the required volumes. Especially when it comes to a large military group that needs huge amounts of fuel, food, ammunition, and military equipment every day. The more active the fighting, the greater the burden on the entire supply system.
According to my estimate, the number of the Crimean-Kherson group, which may be under threat of operational encirclement, is approximately 250-300 thousand Russian military personnel. This is a very large number of people who must be constantly provided with everything they need. Moreover, during offensive operations, the expenditure of ammunition and other resources can be three to four times greater than during defense.
About 250-300 thousand Russian soldiers may now be in operational encirclement. And 300 thousand people need to be fed, provided with ammunition and everything else. And in offensive mode they use three to four times more resources than in defensive mode
Therefore, it is extremely important for us to increase pressure on this group. Damage to the Kerch Bridge and the complication of movement along the land corridor create the prerequisites for the further displacement of Russian troops from the southern occupied territories. And I am talking specifically about the Crimean-Kherson direction, and not just about the peninsula.
Now, in my opinion, the Ukrainian military-political leadership should not talk on all international platforms about freezing hostilities or abandoning the occupied territories. The task should remain the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine to the internationally recognized borders of 1991.
If the operational environment intensifies, the Russian military will have to decide how to get out of this situation. We have been saying for several years that it is better for the occupiers to leave Ukrainian territory on their own while they still have the opportunity.
Otherwise, after a while they simply won't be able to get out of this cauldron. All they'll have to do is cross the Kerch Strait on some inflatable vehicles towards Taman. Therefore, it's better to leave our occupied territories in advance
I have also repeatedly spoken about the historical ties of the Kuban and other adjacent regions with Ukraine. I believe that these territories have preserved a significant Ukrainian linguistic and cultural heritage, including local dialects and the so-called balachka. And I have my own vision of their future, although this is a matter of much broader historical and political processes.
But now the main military task is to deprive the Russian group of the ability to stably supply its forces in the occupied south. Strikes on the Kerch Bridge and control of transport routes create conditions for this that must be exploited.
Strikes on oil system could force Russia to shut down wells
Ukrainian drones have struck an oil terminal in Kaleikinoye, Tatarstan. According to Reuters, the drone attacks have reduced oil processing at Russian refineries by 45% since the end of October. How are these strikes affecting the Russian economy and what facilities are the Ukrainian military currently targeting?
They did a good job. Kaleikino is located near Almetyevsk, and it is a very important area for the Russian oil industry. It was from there that the Druzhba oil pipeline once started, so it is a facility that is important for the entire Russian oil transportation system.
As far as I remember, the Security Service of Ukraine already struck this linear production control station on February 23. Such facilities perform important technological functions, in particular, mixing different grades of oil to obtain the Urals blend, which is then pumped into the main oil pipeline.
Oil from various regions of Russia passes through this system. These include Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Western Siberia and Yugra. The oil is transported through the appropriate infrastructure, mixed, and then enters the Druzhba system.
We should not forget about the Samara linear production control station, which was also damaged. All these facilities are parts of a large system that ensures the transportation of Russian oil. And when the Ukrainian military consistently disables its components, it creates interconnected problems.
Now it is very important to follow the correct algorithm. First, the oil refineries are destroyed, then the Russians have nowhere to put the oil, they send it for export and begin to fill the storage tanks at dispatch stations and ports
When refineries stop working, oil continues to flow from the fields. The Russians have to decide where to send it, which puts pressure on export infrastructure and storage. And if these facilities are already full, further attacks on them cause much more serious damage to the entire system.
That is why, in my opinion, the Ukrainian army is now demonstrating a professional approach to the destruction of the Russian oil and gas infrastructure. The strikes are not carried out randomly, but taking into account how this system works. First, problems are created with processing, then with accumulation and transportation.
If this continues, Russia will increasingly lose the ability to refine oil and export it. In the long term, I believe, this may lead to the shutdown of large oil refineries and a significant reduction in the operation of port infrastructure.
Ultimately, this could lead to the fact that no major Russian refinery will be operational, no port will be able to ship oil for export properly, and storage tanks will no longer accept additional volumes. Then the Russians will have to stop drilling. And this is the main task
The shutdown of oil wells, in my opinion, will be an extremely serious blow to the Russian economy. Especially considering how difficult it may be to resume production in the future. I even assume that some of these facilities will no longer operate under the current Russian Federation.
This is related to my forecast for the future of Russia itself. I believe that economic problems, which are deepening due to the war, may accelerate its internal political changes. And I do not exclude that in the future the issue of restoring individual oil facilities will be resolved by other state entities.
Ukrainian strikes on Kursk and Russian rear areas will continue
Explosions have been heard in Kursk, Russia, particularly in the city center. What military facilities may be of interest to the Ukrainian Defense Forces in this region and what means is the Ukrainian army currently using to operate behind Russian lines?
The Ukrainian professional army is now helping Putin create the very buffer zone he keeps talking about. Only he obviously counted on its creation on Ukrainian territory, and no one promised him that it could not appear on Russian territory. Therefore, we are actually working on the infrastructure of the Russian operational rear.
We are talking about military facilities and the infrastructure that ensures their operation. This is an important point, because the facility can perform not only civilian functions, but also be part of the supply or support system of the Russian army. And such facilities will remain among the targets of the Ukrainian military.
The relevant zone includes Kursk, Bryansk, Belgorod, Voronezh, and Rostov. These are border and adjacent regions that the Russian army uses to supply its troops. For us, they constitute the enemy's operational rear.
Putin wanted to create a buffer zone, but no one promised him that it would be on Ukrainian territory. That's why the Ukrainian army is helping him. It's working out pretty well
I have also repeatedly spoken about the historical Ukrainian influence on some of these territories. In the border regions of Russia, you can still hear the Ukrainian language, Surzhik, and closer to the Kuban - local slang. In my opinion, this indicates deep historical ties of these lands with Ukraine, and I do not exclude significant political changes in the region in the future.
But if we return directly to military capabilities, drones remain the main means of striking Russian rear areas. At the same time, Ukraine is developing a wide range of relatively cheap missile systems that are capable of performing tasks at operational depth.
These include, in particular, "Ruta", "Bars", "Palyanytsya", "Peklo" and other developments. In my opinion, Ukraine already has the capacity to produce dozens of such missiles per day. Their range is shorter than that of strategic missile systems, but sufficient to hit targets in the near and middle Russian rear.
We have a large number of cheap missiles. We can produce dozens of such missiles per day. Their operational range is approximately 300-500 kilometers, and this allows us to work on a large number of objects in the Russian operational rear
Kursk, Bryansk, Belgorod, Voronezh, Orel, Rostov, and Taganrog are within range of such weapons. Therefore, I expect that reports of military and related infrastructure targets in these regions will continue to arrive.
In my opinion, this work will continue for at least the next year or a year and a half. The Ukrainian army will continue to develop its own means of destruction, increase their number, and use them to weaken Russian military capabilities.
Russian resources could be discussed at meeting in China
After the trilateral meeting between Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping, statements were made about international security and nuclear disarmament. Did anything change for Ukraine and who really benefited from this meeting?
Donald Trump issued another statement of a few lines. And what to call all this? About nothing. Everything that we are hearing now after this meeting, in my opinion, can be characterized that way. They talked, held negotiations, exchanged certain formulations, but I did not see any concrete results for Ukraine there.
Moreover, I assume that these contacts were not aimed at dividing Ukraine, as many feared, but at discussing Russia itself. First of all, its natural resources, minerals, and certain economic interests. After all, both the United States and China have their own economic goals.
As for Putin, in my opinion, he looked extremely weak at this meeting. I did not see a leader there who, on an equal footing with two other leaders, determines the future of the world. On the contrary, I got the impression that he ended up in the role of an unnecessary participant.
The third one is superfluous. He was clearly shown: do not come close. Both one and the other demonstrated where his place is. Putin was pushed far away, and Trump ended up to the right of Xi Jinping. Therefore, all these statements about the huge international significance of the meeting are just diplomatic etiquette
I even ironically called Trump Xi Jinping's "favorite wife" because of his location during protocol events. But for me, the main thing is not the photo shoot itself. What is more important is that after the meeting there are no concrete actions that could change the situation around Ukraine.
Now the parties will distribute diplomatic statements, talk about cooperation and international security. But these are mostly general formulations that have no practical continuation. I do not expect from them any decisions that can force Ukraine to agree to Russian conditions.
In my opinion, Putin is effectively left alone in his confrontation with the democratic world. He attacked Ukraine, which is part of it, and therefore created a threat to both Europe and the United States. And I think Trump is already beginning to understand the scale of this problem.
Now the Russian dictator faces a difficult question: what to do next? He can continue the war, make demands, and show discontent. But his international position, in my opinion, will gradually deteriorate.
Putin now has a serious dilemma: either surrender now or Russia will be dismantled for parts. Knowing his character, he can still stomp his feet all winter, but I assume that by spring he will have to change his behavior
I do not see any immediate threat to Ukraine in the results of the Chinese meeting. On the other hand, I believe that Russia has less and less opportunity to dictate its own terms. And if Washington and Beijing's economic interests are truly focused on Russian resources, the Kremlin may find itself in an even more dependent position.
Putin's statements about a new Yalta have nothing to do with history
Putin said that in Yalta, a victory over Nazism was once recorded, and now it is supposedly necessary to record a victory over neo-Nazism. Who is such rhetoric aimed at, and can the Kremlin use the meeting in China for its own propaganda?
The connection with Yalta here is completely illogical. In Yalta, the leaders of states whose armies participated in the victory over Nazi Germany and its allies met. And we must remember that the Yalta Conference itself did not win anything - it was the military and the peoples who paid for the victory with tens of millions of lives.
It was about confronting a huge military bloc that included Germany, Italy, Japan and other states. After this war, the winners got the opportunity to determine the future of the post-war world. And one of the tasks of the negotiations at that time was to delimit spheres of influence so that the victorious states themselves would not start fighting among themselves.
It was a real victory, won at a huge cost. So I don't see how those events can be compared to the meeting in Shenzhen. The participants in the current negotiations are not in the position of the winners of a great war who can determine the conditions for the defeated side.
The leaders of the victorious armies gathered in Yalta. And who gathered now in Shenzhen? The leaders of the armies that did not achieve their goals. What were they trying to share? Their own failures? Therefore, comparing this meeting with Yalta is completely illogical
I even draw parallels between various modern ideologies and their historical origins, although I admit that experts can clarify my formulations regarding Nazism, fascism, and other concepts. But if we return to the military content of the Yalta Conference, the current situation is fundamentally different.
China, for example, also has a history of unsuccessful military experience. I recall the war with Vietnam, in which the Chinese army did not achieve the desired result. The United States, in my opinion, did not achieve the expected results in the confrontation with Iran. And Russia has not been able to defeat Ukraine for several years.
That is why I ironically call the participants of this meeting three commanders-in-chief who do not have the victories necessary to dictate a new world order. And I do not think that they could have made any serious military decisions, because even in the joint statements, the military topic was not central.
But economic issues were probably important. And here, for me, the most interesting thing is whose resources could be discussed. I don't think China and the US were going to share their own mineral resources and industrial capabilities.
The most interesting thing is who was at this table and whose resources they could trade. Of course, not American or Chinese. I think it was about Russian resources, minerals and spheres of economic influence. Putin found himself in a very weak position in these negotiations
I do not exclude that the US and China could discuss the division of their own economic interests in Russia. In the future, this may concern individual regions, natural resources and other assets. But for now, this is my assumption, based on an assessment of Putin's position and the interests of other participants.
Trump, in my opinion, is primarily interested in economic agreements. China is also trying to increase access to global resources, in particular minerals. Therefore, it is Russia that may become the subject of such a bargain, not Ukraine.
And I see no reason to consider the results of this meeting a threat to our state. On the contrary, the Kremlin has not received convincing confirmation of its status as a great military power. And all attempts to compare the talks in China with the historical Yalta remain, in my opinion, propaganda statements.
Trump should demand that Putin withdraw troops from Ukraine
Trump said that he would not make final decisions on ending the war without consulting Zelensky. At the same time, he assures that Putin allegedly wants to end the war. How should we evaluate such statements and has the American president's approach to Ukraine changed?
If Trump wants to consult with someone so much, let him first turn to the Constitution of Ukraine and the legal system of our state. The source of our power is the Ukrainian people. And this is the main principle that must be taken as a starting point in any talks about ending the war.
Trump himself understands perfectly well that in the United States the president is not the sole source of power either. The American people express their position in elections, and after the last vote, Trump, in my opinion, felt this firsthand. Therefore, he must understand that decisions regarding Ukraine cannot be made contrary to the basic principles of its statehood.
The Constitution of Ukraine defines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our state. We are talking about the internationally recognized borders of 1991. And it is on this basis that any possible peace agreements should be considered.
One can also turn to the Ukrainian army, which swore an oath to the people of Ukraine. The servicemen swore to defend not a specific politician or a specific state institution, but their country, its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, no international negotiations should ignore these principles.
If Trump wants to consult, let him consult with the Constitution of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. The Constitution clearly defines everything: sovereignty and territorial integrity within the 1991 borders. You can also consult with the Ukrainian army, which swore to protect the Ukrainian people
We have repeatedly said that a real end to the war is possible only after the Russian army leaves the territory of Ukraine. I believe that this should be the basis of any peace initiatives. First, the restoration of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and only then further negotiations.
At the same time, sovereignty is not only control over one's own territory. It is also the absence of external control and the ability to independently make decisions about the future of the state. And this point should also be taken into account by Trump.
Therefore, the American president now needs to talk not so much with Ukrainian representatives, but directly with Putin. It is from him that we should demand the withdrawal of Russian troops from our territory. After that, we can talk about reparations and other issues related to the consequences of aggression.
Trump now needs to talk to Putin and demand that he withdraw Russian troops from Ukraine. First, the liberation of the occupied territories and the restoration of our territorial integrity, and only then reparations and all other issues
In my opinion, Trump is now directing his efforts in the wrong direction. He is trying to put pressure on Ukraine, although the main reason for the continuation of the war is Russian aggression. And I attribute this to his own worldview, in particular, the desire to seek economic agreements first of all.
We see that Trump and Putin are paying significant attention to possible economic issues. Xi Jinping is also trying to use this negotiation process in his own interests. But all this does not mean that they are able to single-handedly determine the future of Ukraine.
There are international legal mechanisms, state institutions, and other participants in international relations. Therefore, I do not believe that Putin's wishes can be automatically realized only through agreements with Trump or the Chinese leadership.
The same applies to the statements about reforming the United Nations. I do not understand how three heads of state can try to decide the fate of an organization that includes almost two hundred countries. Especially since the UN Security Council consists of more than just the USA, China and Russia.
There are also the United Kingdom and France, which also have permanent membership in the Security Council. In addition, the global nuclear system has long been limited to these five states. India, Pakistan and North Korea possess nuclear weapons, and the issue of Israel's nuclear potential is also constantly discussed in international politics.
Therefore, attempts by the three leaders to define new rules for global security solely from their own positions will, in my opinion, not yield any serious results, especially when each of them is facing their own domestic and international problems.
They take on a lot, to be honest. Trying to solve everything from their own position alone will not lead to anything. This is another conversation of people who are trying to demonstrate their own greatness, although their positions have seriously weakened both within states and in international politics
Therefore, I see no point in perceiving every statement after the meeting in China as the beginning of some new global agreements. For Ukraine, its own military capabilities, protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity remain decisive. And international negotiations should take these principles into account, and not replace them with the desires of individual political leaders.
Roman Svitan about the attack on the Crimean Bridge: watch the video
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