"These Are the Best Negotiations": Zagorodniy on Strikes Against Russia and a Trap for Europe

While Ukraine, the US, and Russia held talks in Abu Dhabi, the Defense Forces continued to strike at strategic targets of the aggressor country. At the same time, the Kremlin returned to demands to review the European security system and is trying to prevent Europe from fully participating in the negotiation process.

Political strategist Taras Zagorodniy explained on Channel 24 why he considers Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries to be the most effective way to put pressure on the Kremlin and who should represent Europe at the negotiations. He also assessed the results of the meeting in Abu Dhabi, possible losses for Rosatom, the prospects for Western financing of Ukraine, and the risks of new Russian pressure on Armenia.

Strikes on Russian refineries

The second day of talks in Abu Dhabi ended rather quickly, but at the same time Ukraine launched new strikes on Russian facilities. The SBU reported the destruction of targets in Ust-Luga and a Buyan-M project ship, and there were also reports of an attack on the Omsk refinery. Is Ukraine right to hold such talks with Russia?

Perfect negotiations. In the morning, the SBU struck Ust-Luga, and the end of the negotiations is accompanied by an attack on the Omsk oil refinery. And judging by the reports, it is still ongoing. I hope that in the near future we will see other results of the work of the Ukrainian military.

The attacks on Ust-Luga, in my opinion, could be the beginning of increased attacks on Russian port infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. This is an important direction, because it is through such facilities that Russia provides a significant part of its exports. I have also seen reports that the fire after the attack was visible even from Estonia. If this is true, the scale of the fire could be significant.

But here it is not only the result of a specific strike that is important. We are talking about how Ukraine should build relations with Russia, which continues the war and does not demonstrate readiness to give up its demands. In my opinion, negotiations will only make sense when Moscow feels the real price of continuing aggression.

These are the best negotiations that Ukraine has demonstrated. I am reminded of an episode from "Star Wars" where they talked about aggressive negotiations. They ask: "What does this mean?" And they started fighting with swords. And so it is here: this is the only way to negotiate with the Russians, because they do not understand in any other way.

As Europeans debate who should represent them in the negotiations, Ukraine is already demonstrating real potential to influence Russia. If European states are not prepared to send their military to directly participate in Ukraine’s defense or increase pressure on Russian ships in the Danish Straits, then they should at least consider the role of the Ukrainian army in ensuring the security of the continent.

After October 30, Ukraine intensified attacks on major Russian refineries. Estimates are emerging that oil refining was reduced by about 30%, and drones flew to Omsk for about 15 hours. Could these attacks lead to new restrictions on gasoline and diesel in Russia?

First of all, it is important that restrictions have already begun to be introduced. There have been reports of reduced supplies of both gasoline and diesel fuel. In particular, Rosneft and Tatneft were mentioned in this context. Therefore, new strikes only exacerbate the problems facing the Russian oil refining industry.

I hope this is just the beginning. Russia still has enough refining capacity to support its economy and military machine. It is important to keep up the pressure so that the damaged plants cannot quickly return to normal operation, at least until the war is over.

There is also an economic aspect. The greater the losses, the more difficult it will be for the owners of the enterprises to make decisions about their restoration. After all, repairs require significant funds, and there are no guarantees that the plant will not be hit again after it.

The more losses there are, the less confident the owners of these refineries will be that they need to be repaired. There is still more to be hit there, more to be disabled. I hope we can inflict such damage that the enterprises will not be restored until at least the end of the war.

In my opinion, Ukraine should maintain this approach. The Russian economy should feel the consequences of the war that the Kremlin unleashed against our state. And the more opportunities Ukraine has for independent strikes, the stronger its position will be during any diplomatic contacts.

Who will represent Europe?

Volodymyr Medinsky blamed the Europeans for the deaths of Ukrainians and said that their participation in the negotiations depends on Russia's position. At the same time, Jared Kushner suggests that Europe should appoint a single representative. Could the Kremlin use this situation to impose its demands on European security?

I have already said who, in my opinion, should represent Europe in negotiations with Russia. This is Volodymyr Zelensky. Ukraine is also part of Europe, and it is it that directly protects the continent from Russian aggression. Of course, European states can elect their own representatives and seek a common position, but for me the most logical option remains the Ukrainian president.

The problem is that Russia is trying to turn European participation into a bargaining chip. They say, first ask Moscow, convince it, and then maybe they will let you join. This is a common manipulation aimed at demonstrating Russian superiority and increasing contradictions within Europe.

A seat at the negotiating table is not given - it is fought for. If the Europeans had sent their military, who would have at least used drones to hit the Russians, they would already have their seat at the table. And now Russia says: "Well, ask us, persuade us." This is simply an attempt to split Europe.

European states have different interests, political traditions and views on relations with Moscow. The Kremlin understands this perfectly well and tries to take advantage of such differences. But together with Ukraine, Europe is already gradually building up the potential to independently ensure its security. Without Ukrainian military experience and capabilities, this process will be much more difficult.

Regarding the old Russian demands that Medinsky recalled, it is necessary to take into account how much circumstances have changed. Previously, Moscow had much greater economic resources, received huge profits from oil and gas exports, and could use this money to increase its influence on European politics. Some European leaders were then much more inclined to cooperate with Russia.

I am particularly critical of the role of the German leadership at the time, particularly Angela Merkel's policies. In my opinion, Berlin's approaches at the time created too favorable conditions for Moscow and weakened the positions of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Russia also sought to limit the American military presence on the continent, returning to the NATO configuration of 1997.

The situation is very different now. Russia no longer has the economic and political clout that allowed it to dictate its terms. Nor can the United States simply make a decision about the future of European security and force everyone else to comply.

They are imposing talk about a new security for Europe, but by this they mean reducing Ukraine's potential and providing security guarantees for Russia. Russia and the US do not have enough capacity to simply impose such agreements on Europe.

That is why I do not believe in the success of such initiatives. The Kremlin can return to old documents as much as it wants, but today it is dealing with a different Ukraine and Europe, which is gradually realizing the need for its own defense potential.

Should the European Union have a single representative in such negotiations? Who could speak on behalf of Europe if its states still do not have a unified position?

This is the main problem: Europe is heterogeneous, so it is extremely difficult to identify a single representative. According to the Russians' logic, a more or less equal interlocutor could be France, since it has nuclear weapons. But the political situation within the country is changing, and the future of Emmanuel Macron after the end of his presidency remains a separate issue.

Theoretically, a representative of the Scandinavian states could be considered. This would be a good option for Ukraine, as the countries of Northern Europe understand the Russian threat well. This is especially true for Finland and Norway, which share a common border with Russia and are directly interested in deterring its aggressive policy.

A German candidacy is also possible, but this raises its own contradictions. I am critical of Berlin's historical role in issues of sovereignty of Central and Eastern European states. Therefore, I am not sure that a German representative will automatically please all European partners.

The only common denominator for all of Europe is to say that Ukraine will represent it. Of course, this will hurt the pride of Europeans, but, in fact, I see no other way out.

Ukraine has already demonstrated its ability to stand up to Russia and is developing its own military-industrial complex. It is this experience that, in my opinion, makes it an important participant in any future European security arrangements.

Abu Dhabi results

After two days of talks, an agreement was announced on a major prisoner exchange, although it has yet to be implemented. Politico also writes about the possible participation of Europeans in future meetings. Have you seen any real changes in Russia's position?

I didn't see anything fundamentally new. The agreement on the exchange of prisoners is very good, because the return of our people is extremely important. But for now it remains an agreement, and we need to wait for its practical implementation. Only after that will we be able to talk about a concrete result.

On other issues, the Russian delegation continues to repeat Putin's position. He demands that Ukraine leave the four regions, refuse to join NATO, and make appropriate amendments to the Constitution. Under these conditions, I see no real prerequisites for an agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

At the same time, Donald Trump should not be underestimated. After the election, political pressure on him increased, but he still has significant powers and opportunities to influence American politics. For example, Republicans did not support the initiative to impeach Pete Hegseth. This shows that the political situation in Washington remains more complicated than it might seem after the Republicans' electoral defeat.

I do not exclude that the American administration would like to use the negotiations to weaken Europe's position. But there is an important circumstance that prevents such plans: Ukraine is increasingly relying on its own military technology and production.

Our military-industrial complex is developing, new missile programs and unmanned systems are emerging. In particular, Ukrainian enterprises, including Fire Point, are creating weapons that allow us to strike Russian targets without complete dependence on supplies from the United States.

Ukraine also annoys the Americans because it has its own military-industrial complex and its own missile program. We are hitting Russia with our own developments. This gives us independence and subjectivity in many issues.

The US may want certain agreements, but desires do not always coincide with real possibilities. Ukraine already has much more tools for self-defense, so its position cannot simply be ignored.

Putin's plans for China

A meeting in the Asian region has been announced for November 18-19. According to the South China Morning Post, Xi Jinping does not want to discuss Ukraine with Trump and Putin, but is ready to focus on artificial intelligence and economic issues. Does this mean that the Kremlin's attempt to agree on a new division of spheres of influence is failing?

I don't see any subject for a full-fledged trilateral conversation at all. What can Russia offer China in terms of artificial intelligence? Russian technologies are largely dependent on Chinese electronics and components. Therefore, I don't understand what Putin can bring to the negotiating table as an equal partner.

China has its own economic and technological interests that it is important to discuss with the United States. And Russia in this configuration no longer looks like a state without which it is impossible to make decisions. Beijing has much more opportunities to influence Moscow than vice versa.

Therefore, the idea of a meeting of three leaders, supposedly to determine the future of the world, seems to me meaningless. The Kremlin is trying to return to the idea of itself as one of the states that can divide international spheres of influence. But Russia's current economic and political capabilities do not correspond to such claims.

There is no logic to the three-way meeting at all. The Russians dream that they will divide something again, negotiate about the security of Europe, about some non-aggression pacts. This is reminiscent of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, when Europe was divided.

It seems to me that Putin still imagines himself as a great geostrategist like Stalin. He is trying to recreate a model of international relations in which the fate of other states is determined by a few big players. But the world has changed a long time ago, and Russia has lost much of the capabilities necessary for such a role.

Even if the meeting takes place, I doubt it will bring the Kremlin the desired result. China has something to discuss with Trump without Putin's participation. Moscow is already so dependent on Beijing that the Chinese leadership does not need to create additional status for it on the international stage.

Putin comes to the Chinese anyway when they say he will and reports everything they need to. Why would they add him to serious negotiations when China can talk directly to the United States?

Therefore, I do not expect that possible contacts between Trump, Putin, and Xi Jinping will lead to new agreements on Ukraine or a revision of the European security system.

A trap for Europe

At the talks in Abu Dhabi, the Europeans met with Ukrainian and American representatives separately. Russia and the United States are simultaneously discussing a new security architecture for Europe that takes Russian interests into account. Could this not become a new trap like the Budapest Memorandum?

Of course, such a danger exists. We have already seen various formats of cooperation between NATO and Russia, in particular the Russia-NATO Council. But none of them prevented the Kremlin from launching aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, the restoration of such mechanisms in itself does not guarantee anything.

In all these talks about a new security system, the Ukrainian issue inevitably comes up. Russia will once again try to demand a reduction in our army, restrictions on the military-industrial complex, and other concessions. After all, a strong Ukrainian army directly prevents the Kremlin from implementing its plans.

In fact, this is a return to old Russian demands that were discussed during previous negotiations, including in Istanbul. Moscow wants Ukraine to voluntarily weaken its own defenses in exchange for some political promises.

But I don't think the Ukrainian leadership will agree to such a structure again. We already know very well what Russia's guarantees are worth. In contrast, its own weapons, missiles, and a powerful army give Ukraine much more real opportunities to defend itself.

I don't think Ukraine will ever fall for this nonsense again. Our leadership already understands what it means to have your own weapons and missiles. Then everyone talks to you and even gives you money. You can get more with a kind word and a gun than just a kind word.

This applies not only to military security, but also to economic relations. When a state has its own capabilities to influence the situation, partners are forced to take its interests more seriously. That is why the development of its own military-industrial complex is so important for Ukraine.

Russia and its partners can continue to discuss any models of post-war European security. Ukraine can also participate in the diplomatic process, but should not allow such talks to limit its defense capabilities.

We are interested in weapons, money, and strikes on Russian territory. And then they can talk about any security architecture. For us, the main thing is to have real opportunities to protect ourselves.

Without a strong Ukrainian army, all future agreements will remain vulnerable. Therefore, in my opinion, the issues of own armaments and defense financing should remain a priority, regardless of what diplomatic initiatives appear.

Rosatom's problems

There have been reports that Turkey is considering alternatives to cooperation with Rosatom and is in talks with South Korea and Canada on nuclear technology. Possible changes in Hungary are also being discussed. How serious a blow could the loss of such contracts be for Russia?

In Europe, the situation is more complicated than it might seem. In particular, in Hungary, Soviet-made reactors continue to operate. Therefore, refusing Russian cooperation there is not so simple: you need to understand whether it is possible to replace the relevant technologies and ensure the operation of existing equipment.

In my opinion, Europe is still not actively enough to get rid of its dependence on Russia in nuclear energy. Ukraine has done much more in this direction. In particular, we have worked on the transition from Russian nuclear fuel to Western alternatives, in particular for Ukrainian nuclear power plants.

At the same time, reactors related to Soviet technology remain in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and other European countries. According to my rough estimates, there are about two dozen such power units. Their maintenance requires appropriate fuel, equipment and technical solutions, so dependence on Russia remains.

In Turkey, as far as I understand, the possibilities for changing partners may be wider. Russia invested significantly in the construction of a nuclear power plant and offered financing on terms favorable to Ankara. Moscow was ready to actually build the facility at its own expense, providing loans, as was the case with some other international projects.

If Turkey really starts to refuse further cooperation with Rosatom and involves other technology suppliers, this will be a very painful outcome for Russia. After all, it will lose not only a possible contract, but also an instrument of long-term economic and political influence.

If new technology suppliers appear, that's a great story. It means that the Russians are gradually being squeezed out. Rosatom is a powerful company and an important lever of pressure, so the loss of such positions will be very noticeable for Russia.

It should be noted that Rosatom is not only involved in the construction of nuclear power plants. It is also a major player in the enriched uranium market. Even the United States continues to purchase certain Russian products in this area, although the American authorities have already spoken of their intentions to reduce dependence.

If restrictions on the purchase of Russian oil, gas, and nuclear technology are tightened at the same time, Moscow will gradually lose several important sources of influence over international partners. Therefore, I view Rosatom's possible problems as part of a broader process of weakening Russia's economic position.

For Rosatom, this is a clear punch in the gut. Given that the Americans are also pressuring partners to purchase Russian oil and gas, Russia's problems are gradually accumulating in various directions.

However, in Europe, this process will take time, as replacing nuclear technologies and fuels is a complex technical and financial task.

EU money for Ukraine

At a meeting in Dublin, European leaders are to discuss further financing for Ukraine. At the same time, Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico do not want to take on additional financial obligations, and Friedrich Merz is threatening to block the EU budget. Will these contradictions be overcome?

I would first pay attention to Fico's position. When Slovak companies receive defense orders from Ukraine and earn money on them, for some reason he does not show such indignation. And when it comes to the need to help Ukraine financially, loud statements immediately begin.

He also said that he was shocked after talking to the Ukrainian Prime Minister. But I don't think anything was so unexpected. Perhaps the Slovak leadership was simply told that European countries will have to finance Ukrainian defense for quite some time.

When Slovak companies work on Ukrainian defense orders, Fico is not shocked. And when he is told about financial obligations, he is immediately shocked. I think he was simply faced with the fact that the Ukrainian army will have to be supported for a long time.

In my opinion, these contradictions can be resolved. European states understand that the issue of financing Ukraine is directly related to their own security. Therefore, even if individual politicians try to avoid additional obligations, other EU members will look for ways to provide the necessary resources.

Trump, Congress and Iran

Republicans did not support the initiative to impeach Pete Hegseth. At the same time, the confrontation between Trump and Congress is expected to intensify after January 3. Will American politicians be able to make decisions in favor of Ukraine under these conditions, or will they focus on internal conflicts?

We should not be too interested in their internal disputes. The main thing for Ukraine is that support for our state becomes a subject of competition between American political forces. We must work in such a way that both Democrats and Republicans strive to show who helps Ukraine more.

To do this, it is necessary to demonstrate our own results. When the Americans see that Ukraine is capable of independently creating weapons and striking Russia, they have more reasons to invest resources in our defense. After all, this is no longer just helping a country that needs support, but cooperation with a state that has its own technologies and combat experience.

That is why I insist on maximum liberalization of Ukrainian exports, in particular defense products. Our enterprises should receive more opportunities to work in international markets, attract funds and develop production. This will also create additional connections with American politicians and companies.

We are interested in specifics: give us money, give us weapons, and then deal with your Trump as you wish. The main thing is that the topic of Ukraine be part of American politics and both parties compete to see who will help us the most.

As for Hegseth, I do not exclude that he is still being given the opportunity to complete certain tasks related to Iran. In my opinion, the American administration may still be considering a new military operation against Tehran. But this is only my prediction, not information about the decision made.

I believe that for the United States, refusing to take further action against Iran without achieving its goals could become a serious reputational problem. Washington has already invested significant political and military resources in this confrontation, and now any conclusion of the campaign will be judged by whether the Americans managed to implement their own demands.

Under these circumstances, Hegseth can remain in office while the administration determines its next steps. But I do not rule out that his situation will change later.

If the Americans simply leave Iran, it will be an image disaster for them. In my opinion, even worse than Vietnam, because then the US was at the peak of its power, and now there are more and more doubts about its capabilities.

At the same time, regardless of how Trump's confrontation with Congress develops, Ukraine should focus on obtaining the necessary resources and strengthening its own defense industry.

The Russian threat to Armenia

Amid new disputes within the CSTO, reports have emerged about restrictions on Armenia's rights in the organization. Nikol Pashinyan previously suggested the country's withdrawal from the organization, and some analysts have spoken about the risk of a repeat of the Ukrainian scenario. How real is the threat of Russian aggression against Armenia?

Armenia is somewhat protected by geography. It does not share a border with Russia, and Georgia is located between them. Therefore, it is much more difficult for Moscow to organize a large-scale military operation in the scenario it used against Ukraine.

A direct land invasion by Russia would have to resolve the issue of passage through Georgian territory. This would mean additional political and military problems. At the same time, Russian troops are still stationed on the territory of Armenia itself, which poses a separate risk to its security.

The question arises as to who could protect Armenia in the event of a serious escalation. After all, Moscow could theoretically be interested in strengthening control over this country, in particular through the possibility of creating a land transport corridor towards Iran.

But such a plan would require significant military resources. According to estimates I have come across, a large-scale operation could require around 100,000 troops. I am not sure of the accuracy of this figure, but it is clear that these are forces that Russia will not easily be able to allocate at this time.

Armenia is saved by the fact that it does not have a common border with Russia. There is Georgia. To implement such a scenario, the Russians would have to simultaneously resolve issues with Georgia. And do they have the resources for this?

However, the inability to easily organize a large-scale invasion does not mean that other threats are absent. Russia could try to destabilize the situation through provocations, sabotage, or the use of drones. Theoretically, it could launch them from its territory through Georgian airspace, although the practical implementation of such a scenario would depend on many circumstances.

And here another question arises - would Georgia have enough capabilities to intercept such aircraft? I doubt that its current air defense capabilities could completely eliminate such a threat.

Therefore, risks for Armenia remain, but they do not necessarily mean a repeat of a full-scale invasion along the lines of the Ukrainian scenario. Russia has limited resources and difficult geographical conditions, although it may still try to put pressure on Yerevan in other ways.

Zagorodny about strikes on Russian refineries: watch the video