"You Can't Trust Moscow": Bezsmertnyi on Oleshky and Negotiations with Putin

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gar Støre held talks with Vladimir Putin, but the Kremlin continues to insist on its demands regarding Ukraine and European security. At the same time, reports of a humanitarian ceasefire in Oleshky have raised concerns about the possibility of civilians being forcibly taken to the occupied territories.

Historian, politician, and diplomat Roman Bezsmertnyi explained in an interview published by 24 Channel why contacts with Putin without a coordinated European position could weaken the West’s diplomatic efforts. He also discussed what lies behind Russia’s demands regarding NATO, the dangers involved in the evacuation from Oleshky, and why the U.S. Congress may launch investigations into the decisions made by Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and Pete Hegseth.

Calls to Putin Have Exacerbated Divisions in Europe

According to Reuters, Putin told Stubb and Støre that he is not backing down from his demands regarding Donbas. He also reportedly agreed to meet with Zelenskyy only in Moscow, promising to guarantee his safety. Why did European leaders call Putin if his position remains unchanged?

If we judge solely by the fact of the call itself, it is very easy to criticize it. Under the current circumstances, such contacts create additional divisions within Europe and exacerbate the problem of misalignment between European and U.S. positions.

Right now, Ukraine’s Western partners particularly need well-thought-out and coordinated actions. Instead, isolated diplomatic initiatives can introduce additional uncertainty.

At the same time, I acknowledge that Stubb and Støre may have been trying to gauge Moscow’s readiness for the upcoming meeting in Abu Dhabi or potential trilateral talks at the G20 summit.

In this sense, their call is not very different from Emmanuel Macron’s telephone conversations with Putin in 2025. At that time, too, they were trying to determine whether there was an opportunity for further dialogue.

More information about the preparations for the conversation is gradually emerging. Judging by the reactions of European politicians, a significant number of partners were aware of this initiative in advance.

Donald Tusk assessed the contacts rather cautiously, while Friedrich Merz even called them constructive. Giorgia Meloni and Mette Frederiksen, on the other hand, drew attention to the issue of coordination.

In my opinion, conducting such negotiations without first publicly explaining their purpose is a mistake. Especially when there is no common understanding of exactly what Europe wants to achieve from Moscow.

Here, it is worth noting the position of the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaia Kallas. She has consistently emphasized the need for a coordinated approach to contacts with the Kremlin.

The European Union has already discussed draft rules that call for coordinating positions before engaging in direct communication with Moscow.

But we see that some politicians continue to act on their own initiative. This was the case with previous contacts, particularly regarding discussions of a possible conversation with European Council President António Costa, and now similar questions have arisen regarding Stubb and Støre.

Why did they decide to call after all? I am convinced that they received certain signals beforehand from both Washington and Kyiv.

It is quite difficult for Zelenskyy right now to ensure full coordination of actions with European partners. At the same time, problems are arising in the United States involving individuals who have so far played an important role in negotiations with Russia.

I’m referring primarily to Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Reports are emerging about their financial ties and business interests, which, in my opinion, could seriously complicate their continued participation in the negotiation process.

I suspect that because of these scandals, Washington will have to look for other avenues for diplomatic contact with Moscow.

It is no coincidence that Russia has also begun to adjust the timeline for resuming the trilateral dialogue. Instead of the previously discussed dates, there are now reports that the talks may be postponed until mid-November.

In this situation, I believe Marco Rubio and the U.S. State Department may be interested in exploring other diplomatic channels.

After all, the Trump administration’s current policy raises very serious questions for me. I see a risk that the negotiation process is being used not to end the war, but as a cover for economic and business agreements between Washington and Moscow.

There is another fundamental factor. Putin tells European leaders not quite the same things he tells U.S. representatives.

We need to pay close attention to these differences. If the Russian leadership makes different demands to different interlocutors, Ukraine and European countries must compare these statements and develop a unified response.

Instead, we are once again seeing coordination issues. Europeans need to agree not only on their own actions to assist Ukraine but also on a common approach in their relations with Donald Trump.

Europe needs sanctions and weapons, not just phone calls

Perhaps the European position should be expressed not through phone calls with Putin, but through tougher sanctions, increased funding, and the supply of weapons to Ukraine?

You’re absolutely right to ask that question. After all, the essence of a common European policy toward Ukraine lies precisely in increasing pressure on Russia and stepping up aid.

But I suspect that the current phone calls may be an attempt to partially offset the difficulties Europeans themselves are facing in carrying out these tasks.

Serious domestic political developments are currently unfolding in Europe. We are seeing protests in France and Italy, and tensions are rising in Germany as well.

In my view, these issues are affecting the ability of leading European governments to quickly make decisions regarding new large-scale sanctions and additional aid to Ukraine.

This is particularly true for the countries that previously played a leading role in shaping Europe’s common position – France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

That is precisely why I was interested in Merz’s reaction. He said that the contacts between Stubb and Støre were constructive, as they open the door to further dialogue.

Tusk expressed a similar view. But Frederiksen and Meloni’s positions differ.

They proceed from the need to provide Ukraine with more weapons and aid in order to create conditions for Russia under which it will be forced to engage in genuine negotiations.

And here lies the fundamental difference between attempting to reach an agreement with Putin and the possibility of forcing him to negotiate.

I see no signs at this time that the Russian leadership is prepared to voluntarily abandon its goals. Therefore, it would be a mistake to rely solely on diplomatic talks.

This also applies to potential high-level meetings. For example, the prospect of trilateral talks between Zelenskyy, Putin, and Trump at the G20 summit has been discussed.

However, Putin has previously stated that a meeting of the leaders is possible only when an agreement is ready and needs to be finalized.

We do not have such an agreement at this time. The parties have not even agreed on the key conditions for ending the war, so I would not expect a summit meeting anytime soon.

Instead, Europe needs to find ways to increase military aid, impose new sanctions, and monitor compliance with existing restrictions.

Without this, telephone contacts with the Kremlin will remain largely tactical diplomatic moves that do not change its behavior.

What Putin Is Hiding Behind the “Root Causes” of the War

Putin is once again talking about security guarantees for Russia and NATO’s return to its 1997 configuration. Viktor Shlinchak suggests that the Kremlin might use the years 2027–2030 to launch a new aggression against Europe while European states are rearming. How real is this threat?

I acknowledge this danger. But I want to point out that Putin is now essentially repeating the demands that Russia made even before the full-scale invasion.

In December 2021, Moscow drafted two international documents. One concerned security guarantees from the United States, and the other concerned corresponding guarantees from NATO.

These drafts set out Russia’s vision of European security in considerable detail. They address the Alliance’s military presence, the deployment of weapons, spheres of influence, and requirements regarding states that joined NATO after 1997.

These documents are often overlooked today, even though they help us understand exactly what Putin means when he speaks of the so-called root causes of the war.

In my opinion, a major problem with the current generation of European politicians is that they do not always correctly understand the meaning of this phrase.

Behind this phrase lie three specific Russian demands.

The first is for NATO to return to its 1997 configuration. The second is recognition of Russia’s so-called legitimate interests. The third is the application of the principle of indivisible security, according to which the security of one state allegedly cannot be ensured at the expense of another.

But the Russian leadership interprets these provisions in a way that justifies its own claims to influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

In essence, this reflects a desire to restore to Russia the control over European states that the Soviet Union held during the era of the Warsaw Pact.

Note that Putin reiterated these points specifically during his talks with Stubb. Finland joined NATO after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine had already begun.

I suspect that the Russian leader deliberately emphasized the issue of NATO expansion while speaking with the president of a country that became a member in 2023.

We do not know whether Stubb disputed these claims or exactly how he responded. There is no complete transcript of the conversation.

According to reports, the talks lasted about an hour and a half. However, this does not mean that the parties spent the entire time engaging in substantive discussions of specific agreements.

Each participant needed to state their own position. Therefore, the actual time spent on serious discussion of individual issues may have been significantly shorter.

That said, Putin’s statements are sufficient to understand his intentions. He seeks to restore Russian influence in territories that have long been part of independent European states.

And he seems unconcerned that these countries have no intention of returning to the previous system of international relations.

Ukraine remains the Kremlin’s primary target. I am convinced that behind Russia’s slogans of “demilitarization” and “denazification” lies a desire to destroy Ukrainian statehood and Ukrainian national identity itself.

And after that, Moscow would like to restore its imperial influence in other regions as well.

The West underestimates the scale of Russia’s plans

Putin makes no secret of his desire to restore Russia’s imperial sphere of influence, particularly in the territories of the former USSR. Why do some Western politicians still not take this threat seriously? What might compel them to change their position?

In my opinion, if the current situation continues to develop at this pace, the realization of the scale of the danger may come only through a much larger war on the European continent.

So far, I do not see sufficient understanding on the part of either the United States or most European countries.

After all, the current situation provides an opportunity to join forces, strengthen support for Ukraine, and create the conditions for defeating Russian aggression.

But this requires unity among the collective West. And that is precisely what is lacking right now.

In my opinion, the biggest political obstacle to such unity is Donald Trump.

His approach to Russia, his attempts to negotiate with Putin based on economic interests, and his discussions about a possible easing of sanctions are influencing the behavior of European politicians.

We see this even in how differently they assess Stubb’s and Støre’s contacts with the Kremlin.

Some view the phone calls as an opportunity for diplomacy, while others emphasize that without military and economic pressure, they will yield no results.

Europe now needs an official, unified position. If negotiations with Russia are to take place, a representative must be designated who is authorized to speak on behalf of European nations.

This is precisely what Giorgia Meloni emphasizes. It is not enough to simply hold individual talks; a clear framework for Europe’s participation in the negotiation process must be established.

And Ukraine must defend this position.

If the negotiations concern our territory, the future of the Ukrainian state, and the security architecture in Europe, European partners must participate fully in these discussions.

Otherwise, there is a risk that talks will drag on, which Moscow uses to advance its demands without demonstrating a willingness to end the war.

The evacuation from Oleshky may conceal a danger

Melania Trump announced the expansion of the ceasefire in Oleshky beyond the city limits. At the same time, the Financial Times reports on the risk of people being transported through occupied territories to Crimea or Russia. What dangers do you see in this humanitarian operation?

As far as I know, at the time of our conversation, the ceasefire was supposed to be in effect throughout the entire Kherson region on both sides of the line of contact. In fact, this line runs along the Dnipro River.

But this is where the first serious problem arises – transportation links between the right and left banks.

Today, there are almost no accessible roads that could be used to safely transport large numbers of people. There are a few routes known only to local residents, but this does not solve the problem of mass evacuation.

Take the Antonivsky Bridge, for example. It’s impossible to cross it by regular vehicles. Theoretically, one could try to organize a crossing on foot, followed by transportation to the other bank.

But this would require transportation on both sides, designated meeting points, and appropriate safety measures.

People must take at least the bare essentials with them to be able to survive the first few days after evacuation. And among the residents are elderly people and those who are physically unable to cover even a short distance.

The second problem is a lack of trust in the Russian side.

Moscow cannot be trusted, especially when it comes to such a sensitive issue as the evacuation of civilians.

We have seen time and again how the Russian army has violated international agreements. Therefore, mere statements about a ceasefire are not enough to guarantee people a safe exit.

Moreover, even in pro-Russian online communities, calls have begun to appear urging that residents of the occupied territories not be allowed to leave.

The reasoning there is quite telling: people might reveal what happened to them under Russian occupation.

This raises further questions about whether Russia will actually allow civilians to leave unhindered for territory controlled by Ukraine.

I also do not rule out the possibility that, under the guise of a humanitarian operation, Russian military forces may attempt to restore the system they previously used to shell Kherson.

This danger must be taken into account when planning the movement of people across the Dnipro River.

There is also the question of the number of civilians in need of assistance. As far as I understand, the Ukrainian side does not have precise data on all residents who need to be evacuated.

The figure usually cited is approximately 2,000 to 2,500 people in Oleshky. But if we include the surrounding communities, the total number could reach 6,000.

Some residents have likely left the city itself and moved to neighboring settlements, as life in Oleshky has become extremely difficult.

Now these people need to be gathered and transported to designated evacuation sites. And not everyone will be able to do this on their own.

Special attention should be given to people who cannot move around without assistance. Separate transportation and escorts must be arranged for them.

Another threat is the possibility of provocations involving the civilian population. The Russian military has already employed such tactics, and I do not rule out attempts to take people hostage or stage an incident during the evacuation.

Note how the ceasefire was announced. Reports of it appeared before the shelling actually stopped.

According to the information I have, Kherson was still being shelled by artillery for several hours afterward. This could have been an attempt to provoke a response from the Ukrainian side so that they could later be accused of violating the agreements.

Therefore, I expect there to be a lot of conflicting reports, disinformation, and possible provocations surrounding this humanitarian operation.

I am particularly concerned about the issue of monitoring compliance with the ceasefire.

When I hear that journalists might be tasked with monitoring, I have serious doubts about the effectiveness of such a mechanism.

A journalist can document events, but professionally recording ceasefire violations requires special training, technical equipment, and an understanding of military procedures.

Not every media representative is capable of determining exactly what type of ammunition was used, where the shot was fired from, and who is responsible for the violation.

Therefore, reports of possible involvement by Newsmax representatives in monitoring compliance with the agreements also raise questions for me.

I do not understand how exactly such a system is supposed to ensure objective documentation of shelling and responses to violations.

It seems to me that the organizers have not sufficiently taken into account the technical complexity of a humanitarian operation.

It is necessary to determine in advance the assembly points, transport routes, the procedure for transferring civilians between the parties, escorts, and subsequent transport to safe territory.

Separately, the issues of demining and route verification must be addressed.

Without such preparation, even an officially declared ceasefire does not guarantee safety.

What concerns me most is the possibility that, under the guise of evacuation, people will be taken not to territory controlled by Ukraine, but to occupied Crimea or Russia.

Under the current circumstances, I assess this risk as quite high. Therefore, all components of the humanitarian operation must be worked out down to the smallest detail before beginning the mass relocation of civilians.

Congress may scrutinize the decisions of Trump, Musk, and Hegseth

Could effective investigations into Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and Pete Hegseth begin after the November 3 election, particularly regarding decisions that affected support for Ukraine?

In my opinion, the current Congress could already initiate such actions.

That is, even before January 3, when the new Congress is set to begin its work?

Yes, even before January 3.

Take note of the statements by Brian Fitzpatrick and Richard Blumenthal. Judging by their remarks, the relevant requests have already been drafted, and committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate have begun working to obtain the necessary information.

I assume that active investigations could begin immediately after the November 3 election.

Another question is when concrete results will emerge. But some decisions, in my opinion, could still be made by lawmakers in the current session.

A great deal will depend on how Republicans’ behavior changes after the vote.

This is especially true for politicians who will no longer depend on Trump’s support in the election. He effectively eliminated some Republican candidates as early as the primary stage, so they may no longer have any reason to hold back from publicly criticizing the president.

I expect that after the election, some Republicans will cooperate more actively with Democrats on matters of congressional oversight.

This may also apply to decisions regarding U.S. aid to Ukraine.

First and foremost, we need to determine exactly who made the decision to halt the transfer of certain intelligence information and restrict satellite communications.

Based on the reports currently emerging, I conclude that the relevant instructions regarding intelligence data may have come directly from Donald Trump.

It is also necessary to investigate the role of SpaceX’s leadership in the Starlink restrictions. In my opinion, the company’s management could not have made such decisions without Elon Musk’s knowledge.

Separately, questions arise regarding Pete Hegseth’s decisions related to Starshield.

I suspect that the actions of these officials and company executives may have been interconnected. However, this can only be officially established through a review of documents and the collection of testimony.

Key information could be provided by the individuals who directly carried out the technical orders.

These are the people who facilitated the transfer of intelligence data or made changes to the operation of satellite systems. They can explain from whom they received instructions and on what basis they carried them out.

I am convinced that such testimony can reveal the actual decision-making process.

If it turns out that there was a coordinated scheme between U.S. administration officials and the leadership of private companies to limit aid to Ukraine, this will have serious consequences.

But this requires official hearings and confirmation of the relevant circumstances.

That is precisely why I believe it is important for Congress to take action immediately after the election, without waiting for the new session to begin.

The Financial Times also reports on Donald Trump Jr.’s contacts with Umar Kremlev, specifically regarding a joint hunting trip. Previously, questions arose regarding the financing of events linked to the Trump family, and now the risks of such contacts for U.S. intelligence agencies are also being discussed.

Add to this another story that, in my opinion, deserves attention.

It concerns reports about the Polar gas project in Alaska. According to the information I’ve reviewed, the Russian company Novatek may have been involved in financing the transfer of certain production capacities from Russia to the United States.

This project is linked to the production of liquefied natural gas for subsequent export to Asian countries.

The reports mention a sum of approximately $25 billion. If this information is confirmed, it will raise very serious questions about a possible circumvention of sanctions.

I am also interested in the role of people in Trump’s inner circle, particularly Witkoff and Donald Trump Jr.

I suspect that there may be links between certain financial transactions and contacts with Russian business circles that need to be investigated.

This story also mentions Umar Kremlev and the possible use of intermediaries for financial transactions.

Therefore, I believe that future investigations may concern not only decisions to limit aid to Ukraine but also the broader business relationships between individuals in the U.S. president’s inner circle and Russian entities.

Here, specific circumstances need to be established: who made the decisions, where the money came from, who benefited, and whether these contacts influenced U.S. public policy.

Full version of the interview: watch the video