Russia Has Abandoned the Production of "Kinzhal" Missiles: Kryvolap Explained the Reason and Assessed the Losses of the S-400

Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries have become significantly more precise, and the number of hits on a single facility has increased noticeably. At the same time, Russia continues its massive strikes against Ukraine, even though its missile production is facing constraints and its launchers are increasingly becoming targets of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Aviation expert Kostyantyn Kryvolap explained on 24 Channel how new technologies are helping Ukrainian drones strike Russian targets with greater precision and why the battle over electronic warfare capabilities is constantly evolving. He also assessed the actual capabilities of Russian missile production, discussed the reasons for abandoning the production of “Kinzhal” missiles, and addressed the loss of S-300 and S-400 systems.

Why Ukrainian Drones Have Become More Accurate in Striking Oil Refineries

The tactics of Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russia appear to have changed. Whereas previously an attack on an oil refinery would result in several fire outbreaks, now there can be more than ten, and the drones are focusing on a single facility. What is behind these changes, and how effective are they in achieving their goals?

First and foremost, our capabilities have changed. If we recall how we attacked Russian targets in the past, the main objective was simply to reach the target.

The Russians put up serious resistance, using air defense systems and electronic warfare capabilities. And even if a drone managed to overcome these defenses, we could only hope that it would hit something.

It could have been a tank, a pipeline, or other equipment. The main thing was to start a fire and cause damage to the facility.

But it’s impossible to operate on this principle for long. It’s not enough to simply deliver the drone to the site; we must ensure precise strikes on the intended targets.

Our designers, engineers, and military personnel have learned how to solve this problem. We are currently working to ensure that strikes are controlled.

In some cases, various communication methods are used for this, while in others, artificial intelligence technologies are employed to guide the drone to a specific target.

For example, the system receives a photographic image of the target in advance. The artificial intelligence is trained to recognize it, and when the drone approaches the attack site, it can identify the intended target and strike it with sufficient precision.

These technologies are constantly improving. But we shouldn’t assume that just because we’ve found a successful solution once, it will work unchanged from now on.

The Russians are also adapting. As soon as we improve our systems, they start looking for ways to counter them, after which we have to modify our technology again.

A good example is the battle of electronic warfare systems.

Recently, radio technology expert Serhiy Flesh reported the completion of tests on a unique electronic warfare “dome” over Kyiv. This is not a single unit, but an entire complex of systems working together.

They can block video signals and drone control channels. As a result, a drone that has lost contact with its operator continues to move according to a pre-programmed algorithm – for example, in a straight line.

The Russians are trying to use similar methods against our drones. They jam signals, attempt to divert drones from their routes, and interfere with precise guidance.

Therefore, this battle has been ongoing for many months now, with varying degrees of success. Approximately every two to three months, new guidance and countermeasure methods emerge, and both sides are forced to constantly improve their systems.

More precise strikes on Russian oil refineries have resulted from this work. But future effectiveness will depend on how quickly we can adapt to the enemy’s new defensive measures.

How Many Missiles Can Russia Actually Produce?

According to the Ministry of Defense, in October, the Defense Forces destroyed more than 8,000 Russian missiles and drones, not counting attacks on frontline communities. At the same time, the Main Intelligence Directorate’s estimates of missile production do not always match the number of actual launches. What explains this, and what capabilities does Russia have for massive strikes?

Recently, the Main Intelligence Directorate released data on Russia’s production capabilities for various types of missiles. And the numbers are indeed very alarming.

If one relies solely on these figures, one might get the impression that the situation will be extremely difficult for us. Although it remains difficult as it is.

But we need to understand who such reports are primarily intended for.

I believe they are largely aimed at our partners in Europe and the United States.

For Americans, this is a reminder of the scale of the Russian threat. After all, they see how many ballistic missiles Russia could potentially produce, and at the same time understand how limited the number of PAC-3 MSE interceptors remains.

Even if these missiles were supplied exclusively to Ukraine, they would still not be enough to counter all potential Russian launches.

There is also a separate message for European partners. They have formed the FREYJA coalition to develop Europe’s ballistic missile defense, but they are moving too slowly in this direction.

We, on the other hand, have already done our part. Ukraine has developed its own missile, which still needs to be equipped with a warhead and integrated with a command post and the necessary radars.

This work could be carried out much more quickly. If the necessary decisions had been made back in September, by December we could have already moved on to initial tests of the system’s interoperability.

But Europe is rolling out such projects very slowly. At the same time, Ukraine is under attack every day, so there is no time for a long wait.

Even if the Americans manage to reach an agreement with Greece and Spain on transferring missiles or PAC-2 systems to Ukraine, this will not solve the problem of ballistic defense. This requires appropriate anti-ballistic capabilities.

Now regarding the figures from the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR). I believe they reflect the production capabilities that the Russians themselves would like to achieve.

But the potential capacity to produce a certain number of missiles and the actual output of the factories are not the same thing.

Let’s take the Kh-101 as an example.

According to data cited by the Main Intelligence Directorate, the Russians can produce approximately 80 of these cruise missiles per month. In July, they even launched 87 X-101s, but that does not mean all of these missiles were manufactured within a single month.

I calculated the number of launches over the course of a year – from November of last year to October of this year. It turned out that, on average, the Russians used approximately 52 X-101 missiles per month.

In other words, actual usage does not reach the levels indicated in estimates of potential production.

The situation is similar with missiles for the “Iskander-M” systems. The Russians would like to produce at least 60 such missiles per month, but their capabilities are limited not only by the condition of the final assembly plants.

We are constantly striking at various links in the Russian military-industrial complex.

These are facilities involved in the production of explosives, chemical products, synthetic rubbers, electronics, and other components needed to manufacture missiles.

In particular, synthetic rubbers are used in the production of components for solid-fuel rocket engines. Therefore, damage to these facilities can affect Russia’s ability to manufacture new missiles.

Strikes against such production facilities limit the pace Russia aims to achieve, even if individual final-assembly plants remain operational.

In addition, we are not only destroying missiles and industrial facilities. Ukrainian special forces are targeting the launchers from which the Russians are firing their missiles.

This applies to the “Iskander” operational-tactical missile systems, as well as the S-300 and S-400 launchers that the enemy is using to strike Ukraine.

The Russians have stockpiles of old anti-aircraft missiles, which they are retrofitting for this purpose. By my estimates, they can retrofit approximately 50 missiles, and the total remaining stock of suitable units is about 350.

Therefore, even though Russia has certain production capabilities, this does not mean it is able to use all the weapons it manufactures without hindrance.

Why Russia Chose “Iskanders” Over “Kinzhals”

As for the production of the “Iskander-M,” in April–May of this year, according to my estimates, the Russians were manufacturing approximately 40–45 missiles per month.

Subsequently, they changed their approach and, in my view, abandoned the production of “Kinzhals,” focusing their resources on “Iskanders.”

The reason lies in the characteristics of these missiles and the problems the Russians encountered when using them against Ukraine.

The “Kinzhal” and “Iskander-M” have a lot in common. The main difference is that one is launched from an aircraft, while the other is launched from a ground-based launcher.

However, their flight paths differ.

The “Iskander-M” follows a ballistic trajectory and, at the end of its flight, approaches the target from above.

The situation is different for the “Kinzhal.” It travels along a more horizontal trajectory for a significant portion of its route and then must change its position and begin a dive toward the target.

It is during this maneuver, in my assessment, that problems with guidance accuracy arise.

The missile needs to refine its position, specifically using satellite navigation signals. And this is where Ukrainian electronic warfare systems come into play.

They can interfere with precise coordinate determination, causing the missile to deviate from its intended target.

The Russians have been trying to solve this problem for a long time, but, in my opinion, they have not been able to achieve the desired result.

Ultimately, they decided that the “Kinzhal” was not effective enough against Ukrainian countermeasures, and that the components used in its production would be better allocated to the “Iskander-M.”

This applies particularly to electronic equipment, since the relevant systems of these missiles are quite similar in their intended use.

Thanks to this reallocation of resources, Russia, according to my estimates, was able to increase production of the “Iskander-M” to approximately 55–60 missiles per month.

But even this increase in production does not eliminate another problem – the danger to the launchers.

We’ve seen that recently the Russians have been attempting to launch ballistic missiles in very quick succession.

This isn’t necessarily related to a desire to test the reaction time of Ukraine’s air defense. First and foremost, they’re afraid of losing their own launchers.

During launch preparations, the equipment remains in position for a certain amount of time. If the Ukrainian military detects it, they can strike before the preparations are complete.

Therefore, the Russians try to carry out all launches within five to ten minutes and immediately leave the position.

For example, if they deploy the S-300 or S-400, they may use two launchers to quickly fire approximately eight missiles.

Afterward, the crews try to withdraw as quickly as possible, knowing that the Ukrainian military is hunting them down.

Based on my observations, the Defense Forces destroy an average of one or two such launchers each week.

There have also been instances when the Russians were already preparing to move into launch positions but ultimately decided against firing.

They realized that there were many Ukrainian drones in the air that could potentially be redirected toward a detected launcher.

Thus, Russia’s ability to carry out missile strikes is limited not only by ammunition production. The enemy is also forced to take into account the risk of losing the equipment necessary to deploy them.

How Critical Have the Losses of S-300 and S-400 Systems Become?

The Ukrainian military regularly destroys Russian launchers. Is there a threshold of losses for Russia beyond which the situation could become catastrophic?

You know, many people used to believe that heavy human casualties would force Russia to stop.

They cited the Soviet war in Afghanistan, where approximately 15,000 soldiers were killed. Then it was assumed that 50,000 casualties in the current war would already be a critical threshold for the Kremlin.

But Russia has long since exceeded those figures and continues to fight.

It seems that human casualties do not deter Putin, the General Staff, or the Russian military leadership. As long as they have equipment, they will try to use it.

Therefore, I believe that the enemy’s capabilities should be assessed primarily based on its remaining weaponry and its ability to replenish it.

At the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia, according to my estimates, had approximately 1,200 S-300 systems and slightly more than 50 S-400 systems.

These were distributed among the relevant regiments and constituted an important part of Russia’s air defense system.

Now the situation has changed significantly.

According to my calculations, the number of S-300 systems has dropped to about 50. At the same time, Russia no longer manufactures these systems, so it cannot replace the losses with new ones.

As for the S-400s, their total number, according to my estimates, remains roughly at the previous level – about 50 systems.

But there is an important detail here: the Russians continue to manufacture them.

Each year, they produce approximately six to eight new S-400s. However, these deliveries largely offset the losses that the Russian air defense system suffers from Ukrainian strikes.

If we look at the results over the past four to five years, my estimates indicate that we have destroyed approximately 35 to 37 S-400 systems.

And these are already very significant losses.

Their impact is particularly evident in occupied Crimea.

The Russians previously deployed S-400s in the Feodosia area, specifically to protect key facilities and the Crimean Bridge.

But after numerous Ukrainian strikes on these systems, the enemy began to change its approach to their deployment.

Russia can no longer freely maintain the systems in positions where they are vulnerable to our weapons.

I would also like to remind you of the cruiser “Moscow,” which provided air defense cover for the western coast of Crimea.

Its shipborne air defense system was unable to prevent it from being struck by Ukrainian “Neptune” missiles, after which the cruiser sank.

Russia has lost a crucial element of its forces’ defense in the Black Sea. And the subsequent destruction of ground-based air defense systems has made it even more difficult to provide cover for the occupied peninsula.

Therefore, the losses of the S-300 and S-400 systems are significant not only in and of themselves.

The fewer such systems remain, the more difficult it is for the Russians to simultaneously defend their own facilities, provide cover for their troops, and use the corresponding launchers to attack Ukraine.

As long as Russia has enough equipment, it will continue to fight. But replacing lost systems is becoming increasingly difficult, especially as Ukraine simultaneously destroys both ready-to-use weapons and the factories needed to produce them.

Konstantin Kryvolap on the strikes against Russian oil refineries: watch the video