Онлайн Редакція Вакансії Контакти Ігри Гороскоп
17 November, 19:24
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The weapons were legal, 6 people died: What mistakes in the Polish system did the tragedy in Krakow reveal

On November 7, 2026, at approximately 3:00 p.m., a 24-year-old man opened fire on pedestrians and a tram on the Market Square in Kraków and the surrounding streets. Six people were killed, and 15–16 were wounded, including two police officers [1]; the attacker was wounded and arrested, and he died in the hospital on November 9 [2].

The shooter was not a criminal with a black-market weapon, but a person who legally obtained a sports firearms permit in March 2026 [3]. Therefore, the issue at hand is, first and foremost, the licensing system. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration has announced a review of procedures for accessing firearms [4], while the public debate is featuring more radical ideas: special powers for law enforcement agencies similar to those in the Patriot Act, automatic weapons for the police, higher pay for law enforcement officers, and broader rights for citizens to armed self-defense. Read more in an exclusive column for 24 Channel.. Read more in an exclusive column for 24 Channel.

The licensing system in Polish doctrine has been studied by K. Chałupka [5] and K. Jakubiak [6], while the limits on police use of firearms have been examined by M. Ilnicki [7] and K. Jałoszyński, who wrote in 2012 about the ambiguity of the “shot to save a life” [8], and the elements of a terrorist offense – by K. Burdziak [9]. In the Netherlands, there has been discussion regarding the state’s liability for harm caused by the holder of an unlawfully issued permit [10]. However, I have not found a comprehensive assessment of a shooting committed by a legal gun owner, taking into account EU law and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECHR”).

The investigation is ongoing, and the facts may still be clarified.

The purpose of my legal analysis is to assess the actions of the assailant, the police, and the Polish authorities, and to determine which of the proposed measures could prevent similar crimes within the framework of constitutional and treaty standards.

The initial assumption is as follows: the events in Kraków revealed shortcomings in the preventive oversight of legal gun owners, rather than a lack of authority on the part of law enforcement, so measures that strengthen precisely this oversight will be effective.

Classification of the Crime

The prosecutor’s office classified the events in Kraków under § 3 of Article 148 in conjunction with § 20 of Article 115 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Poland (hereinafter – CC RP) [11], and the murder of three people in Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski, which is linked to the assailant, under Section 148(3) of the CC of the Republic of Poland [12]. The first part of the classification raises no doubts: Section 148(3) covers the murder of several persons in a single act.

The situation is more complex with regard to the terrorist element. Under § 20 of Article 115 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Poland, a crime of a terrorist nature is an act punishable by imprisonment with a maximum term of at least five years, committed with the intent to “seriously intimidate many people” (serious intimidation of many people), to coerce a public authority into a certain course of action, or to seriously disrupt the state’s political system or economy. K. Burdziak rightly notes that one of these objectives is sufficient, and the consequences may not even materialize [13].

The motive is not decisive here. On Saturday, the attacker chose the city’s most crowded square and fired at random people; such a course of action is intended to intimidate everyone present in the urban space and corresponds to the definition of terrorism in Directive (EU) 2017/54114.

Polish courts apply this provision, and the most well-known case also took place in Kraków. Brunon K. was planning an explosion near the Sejm building; courts at both levels classified his actions as a terrorist offense, and in 2017 the appellate court sentenced him to nine years in prison, and the Supreme Court dismissed all cassation appeals as manifestly unfounded [15].

Injuries to people are classified as attempted murder (Section 1 of Article 13 in conjunction with Section 3 of Article 148 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Poland), and shooting at police officers is also classified as an active attack on a public official (Section 1 of Article 223, Section 2 of Article 11 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Poland). The origin of the weapons must be determined separately. The permit specifies the purpose, type, and number of firearms (Article 12(1) of the Law on Firearms and Ammunition) [16]; possession of items not covered by the permit falls under § 2 of Article 263 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Poland, and in 2020, the Supreme Court ruled that even the possession of ammunition for a weapon other than the one specified in the permit constitutes a crime [17]. A person who handed over a weapon to an assailant, while having the right to possess it, may be held liable under Section 3 of Article 263 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Poland.

The second issue to be considered is the legality of the police officers’ actions

I would like to remind you that the current rules were established following the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision of May 17, 2012, which declared it unconstitutional to delegate matters of direct coercion to subordinate legislation [18]; the following year, the Act on Means of Direct Coercion and Firearms (hereinafter “u.ś.p.b.p.”) was enacted [19].

The shootings in Kraków were authorized under paragraphs 1, 3, and 4 of Article 45 of this law (defending against an attempt on one’s life, pursuing and apprehending a person suspected of crimes under § 20 of Article 115 and Article 148 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Poland). It was permissible to forgo the command “Stop, or I’ll shoot!” and the warning shot because any delay would have endangered human lives (paragraph 1, part 3 of Article 48).

At the same time, the law requires causing as little harm as possible, exercising particular caution toward others, and resorting to the use of a weapon only as a last resort (Parts 1, 3, and 4 of Article 7 of the Law on the Use of Force and Special Means). The courts are strict on this point. In January 2013, the Supreme Court overturned the acquittals of four police officers who fired at a car: shooting is permitted only as a last resort, not as a “first instinct” and not without warning, and the police officers could have moved out of the car’s path [20]. That same month, the Court of Appeals in Warsaw ruled that shooting a mentally ill man armed with a knife was unlawful because batons or other less dangerous means had not been used [21]. Both decisions were made under the previous police law, but the principles have essentially remained unchanged since then [22].

The patrol officers who were the first to engage in the shootout could not rely on “special use of weapons” – that is, a shot that could result in death – under Article 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (hereinafter “u.d.a.”) [23]: such use is permitted only for a counterterrorism unit upon the decision of the commander in charge (Parts 1, 4–6 of Article 23).

In 2016, the legislature resolved the issue of the “rescue shot” only for special units; therefore, in the first minutes of an “active shooter” attack, police officers act according to general rules designed for routine interventions. I can assert that this is a loophole.

Based on the available data, there is no reason to doubt that the use of force was “absolutely necessary” within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter the ECHR). The assailant, however, died in the hospital, and if his death was caused by police gunfire, the state must conduct an effective official investigation [24].

Regarding the Actions of the Authorities

At the time of the attack, Poland was operating under the BRAVO and BRAVO-CRP alert levels (Decree of the Prime Minister dated August 25, 2026, Articles 15 and 16, et seq.), and patrols were equipped with long-barreled firearms [25]. A state of emergency was not declared, and, in my opinion, rightly so: Part 1 of Article 228 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland permits states of emergency only when ordinary constitutional measures are insufficient [26], and in this case, they were sufficient.

Vasyl Kostyuk believes that the key problem lies in the area of prevention. A few months before the attack, the Supreme Audit Office pointed out shortcomings in the supervision of firearm owners and the incomplete implementation of EU directives [27]. Article 15, Section 4 of the Law on Weapons and Ammunition requires medical and psychological evaluations every five years only for holders of permits for personal protection and the protection of persons and property; hunters, sport shooters, and holders of permits for training purposes undergo examinations only upon obtaining the permit [28], and the periodic examinations for hunters, introduced in 2018, were abolished in 2023 [29]. Meanwhile, Article 6(2) of Directive (EU) 2021/555 requires monitoring that ensures, throughout the entire validity period of the permit, in particular, the assessment of medical and psychological information [30].

The law provides grounds for revoking a permit: the police are required to do so if the holder poses a threat to themselves, public order, or public safety (clause 2, part 1 of Article 18, paragraph 6 of Part 1 of Article 15 of the Law on Weapons and Ammunition), and in 2008, the Higher Administrative Court upheld the revocation of a permit based on the individual’s character traits [31]. What is lacking, therefore, is not legal provisions, but information. There is also a convention-based dimension: in the case of Kotilainen and Others v. Finland (the school shooting in Kauhajoki), the ECHR inferred from the high risk inherent in firearms a duty of special care and found a violation of Article 2 of the ECHR, even though the threat did not concern specific individuals [32].

Experience of Other Countries

Following the terrorist attacks of November 13, 2015,France introduced, pursuant to a 1955 law [33], a state of emergency (état d’urgence) that lasted until November 1, 2017, and the SILT law incorporated some of its provisions into the Internal Security Code. Supporters of the “Polish Patriot Act” would do well to remember how easily the temporary becomes permanent. However, paragraph 5° of Article L. 435-1 of the same code allows police officers to use lethal force to prevent the recurrence of murders or attempted murders that have just been committed, if there are real and objective grounds to believe that such a recurrence is likely [34]. Polish law lacks such a provision.

Following the shooting in Antwerp on May 11, 2006, carried out with a legally purchased rifle,Belgium passed a new firearms law as early as June 8, requiring a permit and a lawful basis for purchasing firearms [35]. In response to the 2016 terrorist attacks, Belgium took a different approach: the law of April 27, 2016, expanded wiretapping in cases involving arms trafficking, authorized nighttime searches, and established a joint database on “foreign fighters” [36].

Following the 2011 shooting in Alphen aan den Rijn – carried out by a member of a shooting club with a history of mental illness – the Netherlands tightened background checks on applicants; In 2019, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the police were liable for damages because they had unlawfully issued a permit to the shooter [37], and in legal scholarship, this decision is already being called a “modern classic” [38]. In 2020, Germany introduced a mandatory inquiry to the constitutional protection authorities during the background check of a firearm owner (§ 5 Abs. 5 S. 1 Nr. 4 WaffG) [39]. As we can see, states have responded to the threat posed by legal firearm owners with stricter controls on access to firearms and increased information sharing among agencies.

Now let us turn to an assessment of the measures under consideration

The first of these – tightening controls on the circulation of firearms – seems the most justified, as it addresses the weakest link. Five-year medical and psychological examinations should be extended to hunters, sport shooters, and holders of permits for training purposes, as provided for in the bill submitted to the Sejm (Print No. 1931). Monitoring under Article 6(2) of Directive 2021/555 (which allows for both continuous and periodic monitoring) should, in my view, be made continuous, with information sharing between the police, healthcare institutions, and special services, following the German model.

For semi-automatic long-barreled firearms capable of firing more than 11 rounds without reloading (lit. “b” of paragraph 7 of Category A of Annex I to the Directive), the conditions of Article 9(6) should be consistently applied, and such permits should be reviewed at least once every five years (Article 9(7)). It is worth considering the possibility of limiting police discretion regarding the number of firearms specified in a permit, as noted by K. Chałupka [40].

Expanding law enforcement powers along the lines of the U.S. Patriot Act raises significantly more objections

Poland already has a law of this type: the 2016 Anti-Terrorism Act, together with amendments to the Police Act, significantly expanded the powers of the special services. As early as 2014, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the lack of independent oversight over the collection of telecommunications data was unconstitutional [41]; the Ombudsman has repeatedly emphasized that this ruling has not been implemented [42], and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in the case of Pietrzak and Bychawska-Siniarska and Others v. Poland, found that the regimes of operational surveillance, the retention of telecommunications data, and covert surveillance under Article 9 u.d.a. [43] Any further expansion would run afoul of the requirement of proportionality (Article 31, Part 3 of the Constitution).

I consider only targeted changes to be justified: the exchange of information between the Internal Security Agency, the police, and licensing authorities, as regulated by law; and a provision that would provide first responders with a clear legal basis for action against an “active shooter,” followed by independent oversight.

Automatic Weapons for the Police

Arming the police with automatic weapons is formally possible, as the Law on Internal Security does not specify the types of service weapons [44]. However, the requirements of Article 7 of this law and the ECHR’s standards regarding the planning and control of operations [45] make automatic fire in a public square or near a tram far too risky. In the case of Wasilewska and Kałucka v. Poland, police officers fired at a car using an MP-5 submachine gun and a burst from a Kalashnikov assault rifle, and the ECHR found a violation of Article 2 of the ECHR [46]. It would be wiser to equip patrols with semi-automatic carbines and train them for “active shooter” scenarios, while reserving automatic weapons for special forces.

Increasing Pay

At first glance, increasing pay seems to have little to do with terrorism, but there is a connection.

As of March 1, 2026, the police had 9,630 vacancies (8.7% of the authorized strength) [47], and the government’s 2026–2029 program to modernize law enforcement agencies, with a budget of 13 billion zlotys, calls for a 25% increase in pay [48]. Staffing levels and training determine how many patrols will be at the scene of an attack and how prepared they will be; therefore, it makes sense to link pay increases to tactical training.

Legal protection is also important: the law of July 12, 2024, preserved full pay for a police officer suspended from duty due to proceedings regarding the use of a weapon [49]. I support this measure as a supplementary one.

Broader Rights for Citizens to Armed Self-Defense

The argument that an armed citizen can stop an attacker before the police arrive should not be dismissed. However, Directive 2021/555 permits the possession of firearms only if there is a lawful basis and provided that the person does not pose a danger to themselves, others, public order, or public safety (Article 6(1)).

Polish law requires a “stałe, realne i ponadprzeciętne zagrożenie” – that is, a constant, real, and extraordinary threat – for a permit for personal protection (Article 10, Section 3, Paragraph 1 of the Law on Weapons and Ammunition), and the courts interpret this requirement narrowly [50].

The right to necessary self-defense is already guaranteed by the Polish Criminal Code, and exceeding its limits under the influence of fear or agitation justified by the circumstances of the attack is not punishable (Sections 1 and 3 of Article 25). The dispute, therefore, centers on access to weapons. Moreover, the Kraków attacker himself possessed a legal firearm, and armed civilians in the crowd would have made it more difficult for the police to identify the shooter. Without convincing empirical data, I see no grounds for liberalization.

Conclusions

Classifying the attacker’s actions as a terrorist murder is justified, and his death does not relieve the state of its obligation to identify accomplices and the source of the weapon. The police officers’ actions, as far as can be judged, were in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 2 of the ECHR, although they require an independent investigation. The tragedy also revealed a gap between the general rules governing the use of weapons and the “special use of weapons,” which is available only to counterterrorism units. The authorities acted within the ordinary constitutional framework; however, the findings of the Supreme Chamber of Control, Article 6(2) of Directive 2021/555, and the Kotilainen case law point to systemic flaws in the preventive oversight of legal firearm owners.

Therefore, measures in this specific area should be prioritized: periodic screenings and continuous monitoring of firearm owners with information sharing, stricter conditions for semi-automatic firearms, a standard for first responders modeled after French law, and adequate funding for the police. The Patriot Act model conflicts with Article 31, Section 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Article 8 of the ECHR, and there is a lack of both legal and empirical grounds for liberalizing access to firearms. In my opinion, we should start with the bill already submitted to the Sejm (Print No. 1931), supplementing it with provisions on continuous monitoring.

Vasyl Kostyuk, attorney-at-law, whose professional practice involves Ukraine and Poland.

REFERENCES

Journal articles

1. Chałupka K, “Firearm Possession Permits – Remarks de lege lata and de lege ferenda” (2014) 32 Nowa Kodyfikacja Prawa Karnego 103 (in Polish).

2. Ilnicki M, “The Use of Firearms as a Special Form of Law Enforcement in Peaceful State Conditions” (2020) 4(140) Przegląd Policyjny 59 (in Polish).

3. Jakubiak K, “Substantive Requirements for Issuing a Firearm Permit for Personal Protection” (2025) 2 Policja 19 (in Polish).

4. Jałoszyński K, “The Rescue Shot – Resolving Hostage Situations in Police Operations” (2012) 10 Culture of Safety: Science – Practice – Reflections 31 (in Polish).

5. van der Kooij, D.A., “Attribution of Damages in the ‘Groningen’ and ‘Alphen aan den Rijn’ Cases” (2021) 2 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 54 (in Dutch).

Case notes

6. Kulesza J, “Commentary on the Supreme Court’s Judgment of January 17, 2013, Case No. V KK 99/12”  (accessed: November 9, 2026) (in Polish).

Reports

7. Burdziak K, “The Definition of a Terrorist Offense Under the Polish Criminal Code in Light of the Provisions of the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations.” Research Project Report (Institute of Justice 2021) (in Polish).

8. Supreme Audit Office, Regulation of Access to Firearms. Report on Audit Findings (2026) (in Polish).

Newspaper articles and websites

9. “Access to firearms under scrutiny by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration. The ministry announces a review following the tragedy in Kraków” (InfoSecurity24, 2026) (in Polish).

10. “One million firearms in the hands of civilians. The Kraków tragedy raises questions about the licensing system” (Euronews, November 9, 2026) (in Polish).

11. “Modernization of uniformed services 2026–2029: 13 billion PLN for personnel, equipment, and headquarters” (Prawo.pl) (in Polish).

12. “Unofficial findings on the perpetrator of the attack in Kraków. The identity of Michał O. is known” (Polskie Radio 24, 2026) (in Polish).

13. “Investigation into the Kraków attack begins” (Interia, 2026) (in Polish).

14. “Shooting at the Main Market Square in Kraków. There are fatalities and injuries” (RMF24, November 7, 2026) (in Polish).

15. “Deputy Chief of the National Police Headquarters: Police Vacancy Rate Falls Below 9 Percent” (PAP, 2026) (in Polish).

Notes and Sources

1. “Shooting at Kraków’s Main Square. There Are Dead and Injured” (RMF24, November 7, 2026) https://www.rmf24.pl/regiony/krakow/news-strzelanina-na-rynku-glownym-w-krakowie-sa-zabici-i-ranni,nIdn,1025257 (accessed November 9, 2026).

2. “A million firearms in the hands of civilians. The Krakow tragedy raises questions about the licensing system’ (Euronews, November 9, 2026) https://pl.euronews.com/2026/11/09/milion-sztuk-weapons-in-the-hands-of-civilians-the-Krakow-tragedy-raises-questions-about-the-permit-system (accessed November 9, 2026).

3. “Unofficial findings on the perpetrator of the attack in Krakow. The identity of Michał O. is known.” (Polskie Radio 24, 2026) https://www.polskieradio24.pl/polska/nieoficjalne-ustalenia-o-sprawcy-zamachu-w-krakowie-wiadomo-kim-jest-michal-o (accessed November 9, 2026).

4. “Access to Weapons Under Scrutiny by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration. The Ministry Announces a Review Following the Tragedy in Kraków” (InfoSecurity24, 2026) https://infosecurity24.pl/bezpieczenstwo-wewnetrzne/dostep-do-broni-under-scrutiny-by-the-Ministry-of-Internal-Affairs-and-Administration-the-ministry-announces-a-review-following-the-tragedy-in-Krakow (accessed: November 9, 2026).

5. K. Chałupka, “Firearm Possession Permits – Remarks de lege lata and de lege ferenda” (2014) 32 New Codification of Criminal Law 103, 105.

6. K. Jakubiak, “Substantive Requirements for Issuing a Firearm Permit for Personal Protection” (2025) 2 Policja 19.

7. M. Ilnicki, “The Use of Firearms as a Special Form of Law Enforcement in Peaceful State Conditions” (2020) 4(140) Police Review 59, 61.

8. K. Jałoszyński, “The Rescue Shot – Resolving Hostage Situations in Police Operations” (2012) 10 Culture of Safety: Science – Practice – Reflections 31.

9. K. Burdziak, “The Definition of a Terrorist Offense Under the Polish Penal Code in Light of the Provisions of the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations.” Research Project Report (Institute of Justice 2021) 7 https://iws.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/IWS_Burdziak-K._Definition-of-a-terrorist-offense….pdf (accessed November 9, 2026).

10. DA van der Kooij, “Attribution of Damages in the ‘Groningen’ and ‘Alphen aan den Rijn’ Cases” (2021) 2 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 54.

11. Act of June 6, 1997 – Penal Code (Journal of Laws 1997 No. 88, item 553, as amended).

12. “Investigation into the attack in Kraków begins” (Interia, 2026) https://wydarzenia.interia.pl/malopolskie/news-rusza-sledztwo-w-sprawie-ataku-in-krakow-minister-of-justice,nId,23570723 (accessed November 9, 2026).

13. Burdziak (no. 9) 7.

14. Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 15, 2017, on combating terrorism [2017] OJ L88/6, Articles 3(1)(a) and 3(2)(a).

15. Decision of the Supreme Court dated April 17, 2018, IV KK 102/18 https://www.sn.pl/sites/orzecznictwo/OrzeczeniaHTML/iv%20kk%20102-18.docx.html (accessed November 10, 2026).

16. Act of May 21, 1999, on Weapons and Ammunition (consolidated text: Journal of Laws 2024, item 485, as amended).

17. Judgment of the Supreme Court of December 16, 2020, IV KK 420/19.

18. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of May 17, 2012, K 10/11, OTK-A 2012, No. 5, item 51.

19. Act of May 24, 2013, on Direct Coercive Measures and Firearms (consolidated text: Journal of Laws 2024, item 383).

20. Judgment of the Supreme Court dated January 17, 2013, V KK 99/12; see: “Use of Firearms by the Police” (Infor.pl) https://www.infor.pl/prawo/prawo-karne/policja/316840,Uzycie-broni-palnej-przez-Policje.html (accessed November 9, 2026).

21. Judgment of the Court of Appeals in Warsaw dated January 25, 2013, Case No. II AKa 7/13.

22. J. Kulesza, “Commentary on the Judgment of the Supreme Court dated January 17, 2013, Case No. V KK 99/12’ https://www.gov.pl/attachment/8c803dbd-34f4-4cc4-a4a9-c6e4dba03071 (accessed November 9, 2026).

23. Act of June 10, 2016, on Counterterrorism Measures (consolidated text: Journal of Laws 2024, item 92).

24. McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 18984/91 (ECtHR [GC], September 27, 1995), Series A No. 324, paras. 148–150, 161.

25. “Announcement: CHARLIE, BRAVO, and BRAVO-CRP alert levels until November 30” (City of Kraków, 2026) https://www.krakow.pl/aktualnosci/301026,29,komunikat,stopnie_alarmowe_charlie__bravo_oraz_bravo-crp_do_30_listopada.html (accessed November 9, 2026).

26. Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997 (Journal of Laws 1997, No. 78, item 483, as amended).

27. Supreme Audit Office, Regulation of Access to Firearms. Report on Audit Findings (P/25/089, Ref. No. 89/2025/P/25/089/LZG, 2026) 31, 53 https://www.nik.gov.pl/kontrole/wyniki-audit-nik/download,lzg~r_24_002_202502061136261738838186~01,type,kk.pdf (accessed November 9, 2026).

28. Parliamentary bill amending the Weapons and Ammunition Act, Document No. 1931 (10th Sejm of the Republic of Poland, September 19, 2025), explanatory memorandum https://api.sejm.gov.pl/sejm/term10/prints/1931/1931.pdf (accessed November 9, 2026).

29. Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 10th term, 26th session, Day 2 (January 9, 2025), remarks by MP E. Szymanowska https://api.sejm.gov.pl/sejm/term10/proceedings/26/2025-01-09/transcripts/138 (accessed November 9, 2026).

30. Directive (EU) 2021/555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 24, 2021, on the control of the acquisition and possession of weapons (codification) [2021] OJ L115/1.

31. Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court dated March 13, 2008, II OSK 141/07 (cited in: “When Can a Firearms Permit Be Revoked?” (e-prawnik.pl) https://e-prawnik.pl/temat/kiedy-mozna-cofnac-pozwolenie-na-bron.html (accessed: November 9, 2026)).

32. Kotilainen and Others v. Finland, Application No. 62439/12 (ECtHR, September 17, 2020), para. 85.

33. Law No. 55-385 of April 3, 1955, on the state of emergency, as amended by Law No. 2015-1501 of November 20, 2015.

34. Internal Security Code (France), Articles L. 226-1 – L. 229-1, L. 435-1 (as amended by Laws No. 2017-258 of February 28, 2017, and No. 2017-1510 of October 30, 2017).

35. Law of June 8, 2006, regulating economic and private activities involving firearms (Belgian Official Gazette, June 9, 2006).

36. Law of April 27, 2016, on Additional Measures to Combat Terrorism; see: Belgian Chamber of Representatives, DOC 54 1951/003, 2 https://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/54/1951/54K1951003.pdf (accessed November 9, 2026).

37. Supreme Court, September 20, 2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:1409; Kamerstukken II 2019/20, 33 033, No. 23, 1–2 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-33033-23.pdf (accessed November 9, 2026).

38. van der Kooij (note 10) 54.

39. Third Act Amending the Firearms Act and Other Regulations (Third Firearms Amendment Act – 3. WaffRÄndG) of February 17, 2020 (BGBl. I 2020, p. 166).

40. Chałupka (no. 5) 105.

41. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of July 30, 2014, K 23/11, OTK-A 2014, No. 7, item 80.

42. Ombudsman, press release regarding the implementation of Constitutional Court judgment K 23/11 (Ombudsman’s Public Information Bulletin) https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/node/25793/revisions/27859/view (accessed November 9, 2026).

43. Pietrzak and Bychawska-Siniarska and Others v. Poland, Applications Nos. 72038/17 and 25237/18 (ECtHR, May 28, 2024); regarding Article 9, see para. 54.

44. Ilnicki (note 7), p. 61.

45. McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (no. 24), para. 150.

46. Wasilewska and Kałucka v. Poland, Applications Nos. 28975/04 and 33406/04 (ECtHR, February 23, 2010), paras. 49–58.

47. “Deputy Chief of the National Police Headquarters: Vacancy Rate in the Police Has Fallen Below 9 Percent” (PAP, 2026) https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/zastepca-szefa-kgp-poziom-wakatow-w-policji-spadl-ponizej-9-proc (accessed November 9, 2026).

48. ‘Modernization of Uniformed Services 2026–2029: 13 billion PLN for personnel, equipment, and police stations’ (Prawo.pl) https://www.prawo.pl/samorzad/modernizacja-sluzb-mundurowych-20262029-13-mld-zl-na-etaty-sprzet-komendy,535487.html (accessed November 9, 2026).

49. Act of July 12, 2024, amending certain acts to streamline the operations of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, the Police, and the Border Guard in the event of a threat to national security (Journal of Laws 2024, item 1248).

50. Jakubiak (no. 6) 21.

The column is the personal opinion of the author, the editorial board of 24 Channel may not share it.