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19 November, 19:01
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Putin Could Pay a Heavy Price for Meeting with Trump and Xi: Chaly on a Dangerous Bargain

Valeriy Chaly, former Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.S., explained what Putin might have offered in exchange for a meeting with Trump and Xi Jinping, why the talks are unlikely to end the war, and how the forced mobilization of Ukrainians in the occupied territories could heighten the threat to Europe.

Ahead of scheduled talks between the leaders of the United States, China and Russia, the Kremlin is trying to bring Vladimir Putin back into the circle of state leaders who determine the future of global security. But each side has its own interests, and the Russian dictator approaches the meeting in the face of new military losses and a weakening of his position.

Diplomat and former Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Valeriy Chaly, in an exclusive interview for Channel 24, explained what Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin expect from the talks and why a decision on ending the war in Ukraine is unlikely to be made at this meeting. He also spoke about the possible price of the Kremlin's participation in the talks, the threat of a military conflict around Taiwan, new Russian ultimatums to NATO, and the danger of Western partners' procrastination in supporting Ukraine.

What does each of the three leaders want to achieve at the meeting in China? And could these talks have an impact on the war in Ukraine?

The interests of each participant have already been formed. In short, the main interest of the host of the meeting, Xi Jinping, is to demonstrate that it is in China today that major geopolitical projects, the future world order, and how the world will live on can be discussed. For him, this will be enough, because the very fact of holding such negotiations on Chinese territory will emphasize Beijing's international role.

In addition, China wants to demonstrate its economic achievements during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum - APEC. The format of such meetings is familiar, but this time it is taking place in Shenzhen. This is a city where the Chinese sought to create a large technology center and an economic alternative to Hong Kong, although the initial plans were not fully implemented. At the same time, there are many objects there that can be shown to international guests, including cascades of tunnels and bridges.

I think Putin will not be very pleased to see the new bridges if he sees them. But that is another matter. The main thing is that China does not intend to make the Ukrainian topic central at this forum. Beijing does not want to discuss Ukraine right now, and it is not on its main agenda.

As for Donald Trump, he has suffered a serious loss of personal prestige after the US midterm elections. It is not just a matter of declining trust among Americans. Trump has so tied the political process and election results to himself that the Republicans' failure is now perceived primarily as his personal fiasco.

That's why the American president really needs success. He is trying to find an area in which he can still demonstrate results while the previous Congress continues to work, whose term ends on January 3. Already now, Trump cannot feel as free as before, in particular on issues of the war in Iran.

But he can come up with new initiatives on nuclear weapons, artificial intelligence, and other areas where the United States maintains a leading position. And such an international platform can help him improve his own political image. On Ukraine, Trump is ready to talk, but I doubt that he will be able to achieve a concrete result with China's current position.

As for the Russian leadership, it must be admitted that the Kremlin's diplomatic efforts have yielded some results. As far as I understand, the Russians have managed to secure a trilateral meeting. And the very fact that Putin will be sitting at the same table with Donald Trump and Xi Jinping is already an important achievement for him.

This picture - I don't know, we'll see for what price he bought it - of the three of them sitting together. Of course, it won't be "Yalta-2", as the Russians wanted. Although they will sell within their information space precisely the picture of Russia's participation in the new division of the world,
– Chaly explained.

This image will be spread not only within Russia. Through English-language propaganda channels, in particular Russia Today and Sputnik, corresponding messages will also reach the American information space. And this may also affect the perception of Trump.

But for Putin now the main thing is to show that he is not in international isolation. In my opinion, he will not achieve more there. As far as I know, the Russian side also got the opportunity to hold a separate working breakfast with Xi Jinping. This is another protocol event that will be presented in Russia as an extremely great success.

In fact, Beijing's position on Moscow has long been determined. China uses Russia to achieve its own goals, and Putin is unlikely to be able to change this approach. Therefore, I believe that fears that Ukraine will be made a kind of dish at the table at which other states will negotiate its fate are exaggerated.

The outcome of the European war will not be decided there. That time has not yet come. And not with President Trump, who is now weakened, not with Putin, who has also recently suffered serious, unexpected losses for him,
– the diplomat emphasized.

We see problems that are very symbolic for the Kremlin, in particular with the Kerch Bridge, which the Russians call the Crimean Bridge. There are also difficulties on land. Therefore, the situation is no longer what it was imagined a few months ago, when these negotiations were being prepared.

What the leaders of China, the US, and Russia were counting on will not be fully realized. At the same time, the greatest benefit from holding these meetings, in my opinion, will come to only one participant.

Overall, the picture is that what was being prepared for a few months ago will no longer be possible for the leaders of China, America, or Russia. But the beneficiary of all this will be only one - Xi Jinping.
– Chaly noted.

The Chinese leader will in any case be able to demonstrate that Beijing has become a meeting place for the leaders of major powers. For him, this is already a significant political result, regardless of whether the parties agree on anything specific.

It turns out that most of the results of this meeting will be primarily of image significance?

There will also be specifics. For example, tariffs may be discussed, because this is primarily an economic summit. The APEC forum itself was created to solve problems of trade and economic cooperation in the Pacific region. And it is important not to forget that it will not only be China, the United States and Russia.

The summit is attended by representatives of Canada, Australia, Peru and other economies in the region. It is a natural platform for countries that have access to the Pacific Ocean and are linked by common economic interests. But our attention is now quite understandably focused on a possible Sino-American-Russian meeting. Although I still do not understand why Trump and Xi Jinping gave Putin this gift - the opportunity to be next to them.

In my opinion, this is a mistake. But let's return to economic issues. There is an important feature here: APEC is a forum of economies, not just states. That is why the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong and Taipei are represented separately there. In total, we are talking about 21 economies.

And here's an interesting point. Beijing believes that Taiwan should be under its control, but at the same time, Taipei's representatives participate in the forum as a separate economy. This shows how complex economic and political relations can be, even between parties that have fundamental disagreements.

Trump and Xi Jinping may discuss trade tariffs, as well as the issue of controlling the development of artificial intelligence. Here, too, the approaches of Washington, Beijing, and major American technology companies differ significantly.

I will recall one statement by Donald Trump, which many took as a joke. It seems that it was during a speech at the UN General Assembly. He proposed using the term "superintelligence" instead of the usual concept of artificial intelligence or its advanced models. At the same time, he even divided those who would agree with this name into friends and enemies.

But behind this story lies a serious question. The Chinese distinguish several levels of development of artificial intelligence. One of them is systems that can approach human thinking and independent decision-making in their capabilities. Another is simpler tools that people already use to perform everyday tasks. Although among them, self-guided models are emerging that are able to independently formulate their own tasks.

Americans are eager to remove restrictions that may hinder the development of these technologies and maintain their leadership. Therefore, Trump, in my opinion, is ready to allow their further development even when there are serious reservations about the possible consequences. Such threats are spoken about, in particular, by Elon Musk.

The most important topic that the US and China could discuss is the use of artificial intelligence in weapons systems. This applies not only to strategic nuclear weapons, but also to weapons directly on the battlefield. We still do not have international rules that would clearly define the limits of such applications.

Discussions have been going on for several years, particularly in Paris. But even the basic principles have not been fully agreed upon. The parties have only come close to understanding that the final decision on the use of weapons should be made by a person, but the relevant agreements have not yet been signed.

Imagine if China and America don't reach at least some minimal agreement on the use now, then in a few years' time artificial intelligence will be ruling the battlefield at its own discretion. And this is a situation we have never been in before, particularly in terms of understanding the choice of targets,
– Chaly warned.

For example, imagine launching 100 or 200 drones into a city, and then they independently, under the control of artificial intelligence, determine which objects to attack. Today, there are already targeting systems and certain parameters for selecting targets. But we are talking about the possibility when the system will make decisions independently, in particular, focusing on the external features of people, facial type or other characteristics.

This is a whole new level of danger. Therefore, at least minimal agreements on the use of artificial intelligence in the military sphere would be an important outcome of the negotiations. But I do not think the parties will go much further.

The world also needs a serious discussion on nuclear non-proliferation and strategic arms control. This is also important for Ukraine, which does not participate in this forum. After all, the system of international treaties in this area has effectively ceased to function in its previous form.

There is no longer a major treaty like New START. There are still some restrictions on air, sea, and space testing, but there is currently no full-fledged strategic arms control system. Therefore, expectations from the meeting of the three leaders, in my opinion, are significantly overstated.

China has stated its willingness to discuss nuclear disarmament if the US and Russia first reduce their arsenals. Are such agreements possible?

That's why I'm saying that there will be no quantitative reduction now. This is a long story. The United States would like to involve China in relevant agreements, but the Chinese nuclear potential is still much smaller than the American and Russian ones.

Based on the estimates we are discussing, China has about 800 warheads. Russia and the United States have many times more. And Beijing, of course, will not agree to limits that do not take into account this difference. The Chinese can continue to produce about 150-200 warheads per year to gradually approach the potential of the other two states.

I think they will talk about artificial intelligence in the use of nuclear weapons, maybe some other parameters. But not about quantitative limitations for today,
– the diplomat explained.

Therefore, I do not expect a full-fledged agreement on reducing nuclear arsenals from this meeting. Certain security issues will be discussed, but the positions of the parties are still too different to count on a significant breakthrough.

Putin failed to achieve his goals in the war against Ukraine, and Trump faced problems in Iran. Could Xi Jinping make a similar mistake if he decides to attack Taiwan?

This is a well-known topic, and we have discussed it many times. The two great powers have demonstrated that even a significant military advantage does not guarantee the achievement of political goals. The United States has used almost every type of modern weapon in the Middle East, except nuclear ones, but has not achieved the result it was hoping for.

Russia also failed to achieve its initial goals in Ukraine. Although we must also remember our situation in 2022: Ukraine then did not actually have sufficient military potential to counter a large-scale Russian attack. However, the Russian plan still failed.

Now that leaves China. And I would be very surprised if Beijing decided to follow the path of other major powers and launch a large-scale military adventure against Taiwan.

Of course, tensions between Beijing and Taipei remain. There are also disputes over the South China Sea, control of the straits and other territories. But it seems to me that China has the ability to increase its influence on Taiwan without the use of large-scale military force.

There are already signs that the Kuomintang, the party that played a key role in the establishment of the Republic of China on Taiwan, is looking for opportunities for compromise. I believe Taiwanese politicians are also closely watching Russia's war against Ukraine and seeing what the consequences of a major military conflict could be.

We discussed this issue at our center during geopolitical dialogues, in particular with Pavlo Stupkansky, who has significant diplomatic experience in the Asian region and once headed the Ukrainian embassy in China. And I agree with the conclusion that the Chinese are acting differently than the Russians.

They want to have control, not destroy everything when they enter the territory. So they don't need to just destroy Taiwan, Taipei because of some historical emotions. This is not Putin with his completely sick ideas about the modern development of the world,
– Chaly explained.

My prediction today is that there will be no major military clash around Taiwan. Although China is preparing its naval forces even for a possible confrontation with the United States, which has certain security obligations to Taiwan.

At the same time, I really hope that in 2028 the European confrontation with Russia will end successfully for Ukraine. Then China will have no example that could convince it that a large-scale military adventure gives the desired result. I hope for the historical wisdom of the Chinese leadership.

Can China act on the principles of Sun Tzu, using economic and political tools instead of military conquest of Taiwan?

Sun Tzu is wonderful. But if we recall his principles, it is worth paying attention to the experience of Ukraine itself. In 2022, we, without realizing it, actually used one of the principles when the enemy is shown weakness and thus lured into our territory.

The Russians did indeed enter Ukraine without understanding our real strength. And that was one of the reasons why they launched a large-scale invasion, hoping for a quick result. But I don't think we should have shown weakness.

The military treatises of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and other thinkers need to be read carefully and applied creatively. Sometimes it is indeed advisable to show one's weakness, but in other situations, on the contrary, it is necessary to hide it. In 2022, Ukraine, in my opinion, should have demonstrated strength, and not created the impression of a weak position.

We were not as weak as Putin thought. And I believe that in 2022, on the contrary, we should have shown strength, not shown weakness to the Russians. That is why Putin entered our territory. He saw a weak position,
– the diplomat noted.

China could also find itself in a similar trap if it decides that military means are faster and easier to achieve than gradual economic and political influence. For now, Beijing is acting through economic expansion, political pressure, and programs like the Belt and Road Initiative. But future decisions by the Chinese leadership will also depend to a large extent on the outcome of the war in Europe.

We remember how Putin traveled to Beijing before the large-scale invasion and tried to secure a favorable position from China. None of us were present at those negotiations, but there are assumptions that he assured the Chinese leadership of the rapid completion of his so-called special operation.

Now the Chinese see that the war has been going on for years. And I don't think they want to have a similar situation around Taiwan. So, most likely, they will use a combination of economic, political and other tools of influence.

However, we must not forget about the upcoming political changes. No one knows yet what the United States will do in the 2028 presidential election. The political landscape in Europe will change, especially in France, where important elections are expected.

In Germany, there are also serious challenges from right-wing political forces. I do not rule out early elections, although I expect the country to survive this period and hold the next elections in 2029. Therefore, a final assessment of the future balance of power will need to be made closer to these events.

We have already seen how unpredictable the decisions of great powers can be. For example, the United States declared a retreat from active intervention outside the Western Hemisphere. In this context, the priorities regarding Venezuela, Cuba, and China were understandable. But then the Trump administration became actively involved in events in the Middle East, which contradicted its previously stated approaches.

I don't know what will happen in 2028, what forces, what balance of forces there will be. But I know for sure that Ukraine will be stronger than today, and Russia will be weaker,
– Chaly emphasized.

Therefore, it is important not to draw final conclusions about a possible military conflict over Taiwan at this time. Much will depend on the outcome of the war against Ukraine, changes in the US and Europe, and how effective China will consider its current tools of influence.

You said that we will see what price Putin paid for the opportunity to participate in the trilateral meeting. Do you have any suggestions as to what he might have offered?

This is not just speculation. The Russians have already drawn up a huge number of contracts and proposals for China's access to their minerals. They themselves spoke of amounts equivalent to trillions of dollars. But they had one problem: the Russians have also made similar proposals to Washington and to Donald Trump personally.

As far as I could see from the leaks on the eve of the Shenzhen meeting, the Chinese side was not happy with this. The Russians were effectively asked to decide what resources and capabilities they would promise to Beijing and what to Washington.

And now the Chinese are offended, because ahead of Shenzhen, as far as I saw from the information sources, they simply said: "You somehow decide, Moscow, what you give there and what you give to us." It has already turned out that some things appear both there and there,
– said the diplomat.

The Americans and the Chinese also exchange information with each other. Therefore, Moscow's inconsistency is unlikely to have gone unnoticed. Russia has effectively found itself in a situation where it promises the same thing to different parties, although it has long been clear to us that such Russian promises should not be trusted.

I still think that we will see what exactly Putin paid for the opportunity to participate in these negotiations. But I do not rule out another option: a weak Putin could be situationally advantageous for both Trump and Xi Jinping.

Perhaps, situationally, it turned out that such a weak Putin and his participation are a tool for both: Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. We will see this even during the forum itself and draw conclusions,
– suggested Chaly.

The Chinese are good at organizing such events and using protocol details. So I am not completely sure that everything will happen exactly as the Kremlin wants. The Russians dream of recreating the image of the Yalta Conference after World War II – three chairs, three leaders, who supposedly determine the future world order.

But I doubt that Putin will be allowed to achieve such a symbolic outcome. My prediction is that the Chinese side will organize the meeting in a way that formally fulfills the promises to the Russian dictator, but at the same time does not create any resemblance to the historical Yalta.

Therefore, even if Putin gets the desired joint photo opportunity or individual protocol events, this will not mean that he has been allowed to truly determine the future of the world.

There has been information that Russia wants to conclude separate non-aggression pacts with some NATO countries. Is this an attempt to split the Alliance on the principle of "divide and rule"?

Yes, it's very simple. You said it right: the goal is to divide NATO. And there's nothing new in that. This is the usual Russian policy of recent years and even decades. I don't see a future in such initiatives.

In addition, there are principles of international law that do not need to be constantly duplicated by new agreements. Yes, today it is often said that international law is broken and the rules do not apply. And there are grounds for such assessments. But Russia itself uses the UN Charter for its own interests, just as the USA and China do.

Therefore, Ukraine should also appeal to the UN Charter and other international documents. The prohibition of aggression and seizure of the territories of other states is already enshrined in international law. For this, there is no need to sign any additional pacts with a state that itself violates these principles.

This is just an attempt to divide NATO. There is nothing more to it. An aggressor is an aggressor, and no one will sign anything like that with him now,
– Chaly is convinced.

Russia is trying to present itself as the initiator of peace processes and the guarantor of security, although it itself is undermining the basic principles of international relations. I do not think that Europeans will agree to such artificial constructions that will only create the appearance of peace initiatives.

Russia is once again demanding that NATO retreat to its 1997 positions and limit the Alliance's military presence. Is Putin returning to the 2021 ultimatum, knowing that the West will not meet these conditions?

First, I would like to clarify the chronology. Other issues were discussed in Geneva in 2021. In my opinion, then it was actually possible to postpone the Russian invasion, but the Americans mistakenly made certain concessions, in particular on the Nord Stream gas pipeline and other issues.

Putin perceived these concessions as a sign of weakness and decided to move on. And already on December 17, 2021, Russia sent documents to Washington and Brussels that were in fact an ultimatum in the form of draft security treaties.

And here it is important to understand the Russian demands correctly. It is often said that Moscow demanded that the states that joined NATO after 1997 withdraw from the Alliance. But it was primarily about the withdrawal of the American military presence and equipment from these countries.

For example, Russia raised the issue of Aegis systems, missile defense in Romania and Poland, and other military facilities. If these demands were transferred to the current situation, they would also concern the military presence of the Bundeswehr in Lithuania, Italian aircraft in Estonia, and other allied forces.

That is, in 2021, it was indeed a tough ultimatum. At the same time, there were issues on which the parties could have a discussion, in particular, about medium-range missiles and dual-purpose systems.

The Americans explained that certain elements of their missile defense were aimed at threats from Iran. The Russians claimed that these systems could have a dual purpose. At the same time, Russia itself was developing its own missile systems, increasing the capabilities of the Iskanders and hiding other developments, in particular the one we now know as the Oreshnik.

Therefore, certain issues for diplomatic discussions did remain. But Russia decided to present them in the form of an ultimatum, and these demands were rejected.

I have a question: why was the ultimatum sent to Brussels and Washington, and the war started against Ukraine? This is a basic question that our partners today must answer,
– the diplomat emphasized.

We understand why Putin chose Ukraine. He is afraid to attack the strong, so at that moment he decided to attack a country he considered weaker. But why is he now returning to his old demands for NATO?

I think Putin senses Donald Trump's weakness after the US election, as well as the political uncertainty in European countries where election campaigns are expected. He is trying to take advantage of these circumstances and resume the discussion on the issues that he once put forward in the form of an ultimatum.

At the same time, the Kremlin is trying to shift attention from the war against Ukraine to broader European security concerns. After all, if we look at the war in terms of Russia’s original goals, Putin has not achieved them. And now it is more profitable for him to talk about new negotiations, the future security architecture, and possible agreements with world leaders.

But for Ukraine, there is also an important point here. We need to correctly define the nature of the current war. For example, I believe that it has long gone beyond the bilateral Russian-Ukrainian confrontation.

I believe that the war is no longer Russian-Ukrainian. The Russian-Ukrainian war ended in 2023. The war is European. On the Russian side, the allies are North Korea, Iran, Belarus. At least three countries that are already participating in the war on the Russian side, in one way or another,
– Chaly explained.

There are also states that politically support Moscow. Therefore, Europe cannot pretend that this is only a problem of Ukraine. If Russia's ultimatum was addressed to Washington and Brussels, then it is they who must demonstrate a strong position regarding the repetition of these demands and the continuation of Russian aggression.

I believe that Ukrainian diplomacy should use the Kremlin's return to old ultimatums to finally show their futility. A strong response from the US and Europe could destroy these plans of Putin.

But the longer the war in Europe continues, the higher the level of negotiations on its conclusion must be. Ultimately, a large international forum involving Ukraine, Russia, the European Union, the United States, and China may be needed. This will no longer be a simple discussion of the cessation of hostilities, but a question of reformatting the global security system.

But wasn't the 2021 ultimatum just a pretext? After all, Putin was probably planning a full-scale invasion of Ukraine anyway.

I don't entirely agree with this explanation. Of course, this version has the right to exist, but in order to implement the already prepared invasion plan, Putin did not need to be tied to the West's response to the ultimatum. Especially since Russia put forward demands not to expand NATO, but later Finland and Sweden joined the Alliance anyway.

In my opinion, the decision to prepare an attack on Ukraine was made even before the Geneva talks. I have researched this issue, including working with sources in the United States, so I can say that Russia was already preparing for a large-scale invasion at that time.

Joe Biden tried to avoid this development, although at that time Russia had not yet concentrated enough forces for an attack. But military exercises and other preparatory measures were already underway in 2021. Putin actually began to implement his plan long before February 2022.

Therefore, I agree that he was already preparing to attack Ukraine. But the reason was not the lack of a response to the ultimatum, but the way he assessed the state of our country.

He felt weakness. And in many ways this weakness was, most strangely, feigned. We were not as weak as he thought. And it is a paradoxical thing that everything was done then to supposedly avoid a large-scale invasion,
– noted Chaly.

At that time, many decisions were perceived as compromises that were supposed to help prevent war. It was about finding humanitarian agreements, the issue of checkpoints, de-escalation and other measures. But some of these decisions, in my opinion, created additional opportunities for Russia.

A particularly serious mistake was the withdrawal of entire military brigades from the northern direction. This effectively opened up certain windows of opportunity for a Russian offensive. There were also overestimated expectations regarding the position of the Belarusian military leadership and intelligence.

We were told that Belarus would not participate in the attack. Alexander Lukashenko himself assured that only tractors could move from Belarusian territory. But these promises turned out to be false, and Russia used Belarusian territory for the invasion.

We must draw conclusions from these events, because, in my opinion, one important pattern is still being underestimated.

As soon as the Russians sense weakness, they push further. As soon as they are repulsed, they stop. That's it! Everything is very simple there,
– the diplomat emphasized.

Why is this principle not always taken into account? This is almost a philosophical question. Someone continues to hope that they can avoid what Ukraine has to go through practically alone.

We are exercising our right to self-defense, enshrined in the UN Charter. But I am convinced that international partners should have gone further and used mechanisms of collective self-defense, forming an appropriate coalition. An example of such an international response can be the experience of the Korean War.

Instead, they did not do this. I believe that this is a serious problem of implementing the provisions of the UN Charter. And when Ukraine today calls on other countries to join the defense before the war spreads to their territories, we are talking not only about our own interests.

Of course, the presence of partner military forces on the Ukrainian side would strengthen our positions. But at the same time, we are trying to explain that early counteraction to the aggressor is necessary for the security of all of Europe.

History has already shown that underestimating aggression in the initial stages allows the attacker to become stronger. Remember how Hitler acted, seizing the resources of other states. At the beginning, Nazi Germany did not have all the necessary resources, including oil, aluminum and iron ore. But the gradual seizure of territories and industrial capabilities of other countries allowed it to strengthen its own army and continue its aggression.

Today, one dangerous process that Putin understands perfectly well is also being underestimated. In recent years, Russia has recruited a significant number of Ukrainians from the occupied territories into its occupation army.

My estimates are that this is already in the tens of thousands of people. These are residents of the temporarily occupied territories, including young men who were about 15 years old at the start of the full-scale invasion. Now they have reached draft age, and the Russian occupation authorities are mobilizing them into their troops.

Moreover, such people are used directly in the front lines, while Russian units can remain behind. And this process, according to my observations, is only intensifying.

There are over 120 recruitment points for the Russian army operating in the occupied territories. Similar structures operate not only in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and in Crimea, but also in the occupied territories of Zaporizhia and Kherson regions.

A few more years and there will be 50-60 thousand Ukrainians, who, together with 30 thousand Belarusians, will be under Putin's leadership, together with the Russians. And this armada will no longer be only Russian, but will stand at the European borders,
– Chaly warned.

I don't understand why Western partners continue to delay taking strong decisions. They still have the opportunity to prevent this from happening, but time is running out. If Russia is allowed to continue using the resources of the occupied territories and forcibly recruiting their population into the army, the danger for all of Europe will only grow.

Meeting between Trump, Xi Jinping and Putin: watch the video