"Trump's Personal Fiasco": Yunus Names Two Countries That Could Put Pressure on Putin

The Republican defeat in the US midterm elections has changed Donald Trump's political situation and strengthened the position of the Democrats. Now the American president will have to reckon with a new majority, and his closest allies may already be thinking about their own political future.

Political scientist Ramiz Yunus explained on Channel 24 why he considers the voting results to be Trump's personal fiasco and what opportunities open up for Ukraine. He also assessed the prospects for American military aid, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's influence on Vladimir Putin, and the causes of the contradictions between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Why the Republican defeat was Trump's personal fiasco

In the US Congressional elections, Democrats received significantly more votes than expected. Is this a Democratic victory, a Republican defeat, or a personal fiasco for Donald Trump? And what will change for Ukraine and Russia now?

First of all, I urge you not to pay attention to the loud headlines, but to soberly analyze what happened. The media presents the results as an extraordinary event that no one expected, but for experts there is nothing surprising in this.

If you take the last 22 midterm elections in the United States, then by my count, in 20 cases the party of the incumbent president was defeated. This is a normal process of American politics, regardless of whether the president represents the Republicans or the Democrats.

Any candidate comes to power with a lot of campaign promises. He tells voters how their lives will change, but then he is faced with real economic and political circumstances.

Donald Trump, as a famous showman, is very good at working with public opinion. His second victory was largely the result of protest voting in a polarized American society.

But he promised cheap gasoline, no more wars, and an improved economy. Instead, the United States found itself embroiled in a war in the Middle East, fuel prices soared, and inflation soared.

Immigration policy has become a separate issue. A significant portion of Latino voters who supported Trump in the presidential election have now turned their backs on him.

As a result, Democrats gained strong positions even in states where Republicans had dominated for decades.

Therefore, I believe that, first of all, this is a personal defeat for Donald Trump. Because of him, it has turned into a defeat for the Republican Party.

But I wouldn't call it a major independent victory for the Democrats. They got much more than they could have expected, thanks to the mistakes of their political opponent.

For example, even before the election, almost everyone expected that the Republicans would lose their majority in the House of Representatives. The main issue was simply the balance of power.

At the same time, Trump could easily hold the Senate. Even a 50-50 split would leave Republicans with the option of relying on the vice president's casting vote.

However, Trump created problems for his own party. During the primaries, he rejected candidates proposed by experienced Republicans and insisted on nominating his own people.

This also included candidates supported by the president's closest allies, including J.D. Vance. Politicians whose candidacies were actively promoted also included Vivek Ramaswamy and other representatives of the MAGA movement.

As a result, Republicans lost the opportunity to retain control of the Senate.

Now we have a situation that is quite traditional for American politics: the president represents one party, and Congress is controlled by another.

Something similar happened under Ronald Reagan. And it didn't stop him from remaining an influential president.

But there is an important difference: Reagan had extensive political experience, while his vice president, George H.W. Bush, was already a well-known and professional politician.

The current situation in the Republican Party is much more complicated, in particular because of whom Trump has chosen as his political successor.

Vance could suffer more than Trump

J.D. Vance entered big politics relatively recently. His career developed rapidly thanks to the support of Donald Trump, who first helped him become a senator and then made him his vice president.

Vance has a well-constructed public image. He comes from a poor family, has written a best-selling book, and presents his own biography as the story of the American dream.

But a beautiful political biography is no substitute for experience.

Vance has begun to emulate Trump's style, rhetoric, and foreign policy approaches. And now that the president has suffered a crushing defeat, it is Vance who may suffer the most.

I even think that in the current situation he is in a worse position than Marco Rubio.

Rubio is a professional politician with many years of experience. When his candidacy was confirmed, he received unanimous support from the Senate. This speaks volumes about his political capabilities and connections.

Note how Vance and Rubio have behaved differently in international forums, particularly in Munich. One has acted as a harsh critic of European allies, the other has tried to maintain the image of a moderate diplomat.

In effect, they played the roles of bad cop and good cop.

Rubio is also trying to work more with the Latin American direction and distance himself from the most controversial issues of the war in the Middle East and the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Therefore, I do not rule out his resignation as Secretary of State. He could explain this by health or other personal circumstances in order to step away from the Trump administration and preserve opportunities for a future presidential campaign.

And Rubio doesn't necessarily need to run in two years.

He is still a young politician and can wait until the next political cycle. If Republicans realize that they will have a hard time regaining the White House in 2028, Vance could become the candidate and take the risk of another defeat.

And Rubio will have the opportunity to try his hand at it later, when the political situation becomes more favorable.

This is one of the possible scenarios that I consider from the perspective of political technology.

Difficulties will arise for other members of the administration as well. For example, the possible resignation of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is already being discussed.

He became one of the most unpopular members of the cabinet due to the war in the Middle East, decisions on Ukraine, and conflicts with parts of the professional military.

Politicians are also appearing in the new Congress, ready to actively raise issues regarding its activities.

I do not rule out personnel changes among other officials close to Trump, in particular Stephen Miller.

Some representatives of the administration will try to leave on their own, while others may be sacrificed to ease political pressure on the president.

Democrats will prepare new pressure on the White House

Now we need to forget about November 3 as the main political reference point. The results of these elections are already known, and all subsequent events should be evaluated through the prism of what will happen in two years.

Then the US will re-elect the president, completely renew the House of Representatives, and re-elect approximately a third of the Senate.

Every congressman, senator, or politician who wants to run for high office is already starting to think about their own future.

Everyone sees that Trump has become a lame duck. They also understand who is largely responsible for the Republican defeat.

Therefore, more and more politicians may distance themselves from him.

Democrats, on the other hand, have had a chance to unite. They were in a fairly divided state before the election, but now they have a common goal for the next two years.

And I expect that they will increase pressure on the administration in various directions.

Each possible resignation of Hegseth, Miller, or another official could be an additional political victory for Democrats.

This is reminiscent of a chess game, in which one side gradually forces the opponent to sacrifice pieces.

Two years ago, when Trump returned to power, Republicans actively attacked Democrats. They tried to change the work of government structures and put pressure on the media, in particular, Voice of America and Radio Liberty.

At first, this tactic brought results. But then the administration made many mistakes in both domestic and foreign policy.

Think of the conflicts with Canada, Greenland, Denmark, the European Union, and Poland. Add to this the war in the Middle East, the position on Ukraine, and the story with Russian diesel.

Republicans actually gave Democrats the opportunity to regain political influence.

And now the main tool of confrontation will be finance.

The House of Representatives has important budgetary powers. The Senate is involved in approving ministers, judges, and other high-ranking officials.

This means that Trump will have to negotiate. He will no longer be able to make all decisions regardless of the position of Congress.

If the president starts constantly threatening to veto, that will also have a political cost.

Americans didn't elect him to endlessly block legislative initiatives. Voters want to see concrete results.

New budget crises, shutdowns, and disputes over immigration policy are possible. And each such conflict can be used by Democrats against Republicans before the next election.

A similar situation will arise in foreign policy.

The new Congress may more actively scrutinize the activities of Trump's inner circle, including Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff, and members of the presidential family.

Investigations may be launched into their business interests, international contacts, and possible conflicts of interest.

Therefore, Trump will have to think not only about his own decisions today, but also about what will happen to him and his entourage after the end of his presidency.

What could a new escalation with Iran mean for Trump?

One possible scenario is the president's attempt to once again intensify the military operation against Iran.

I, however, consider this an extremely risky decision for Trump himself. He would essentially be shooting himself in the foot.

After all, the war in the Middle East has already been one of the reasons for the Republicans' defeat. A new escalation could further increase fuel prices and increase American discontent.

The president has significant powers in the field of foreign policy. He is subordinate to the Department of Defense, intelligence agencies, and for a certain period of time he can conduct military operations without a separate decision from Congress.

But what happens if he launches a new campaign against Iran and fails to achieve results in 60 days?

Then American politicians will be asked why the president once again dragged the country into a military confrontation that has already caused political damage to his party.

I don't think J.D. Vance will be thrilled with this decision. He has tried to distance himself from the Iran war before, and now he may use its consequences for his own political future.

I'm also not sure that Marco Rubio will agree to take responsibility for a new escalation.

Here another possible scenario arises.

In the American political system, there is the 25th Amendment to the Constitution, which provides a mechanism for responding to the president's inability to fulfill his or her powers.

I do not rule out that in the event of an extremely acute political crisis, some American politicians may begin to discuss this option.

In the Senate, according to my calculations, the Democrats have 54 votes. For decisions that require a qualified two-thirds majority, they would have to seek the support of some Republicans.

And I admit that under certain circumstances such Republicans could be found. After all, they will also be thinking about their own political careers.

This does not mean that the removal of the president is already being prepared. I am considering a possible scenario of a deep political crisis, when Vance could theoretically find himself at the head of the executive branch.

But for Trump, all this means one thing: making a decision on a new military operation is now much more difficult than before.

He will have to take into account not only his own desires, but also the position of the party, its sponsors, and politicians who are counting on victory in the future.

Elon Musk may lose Trump's protection

I would like to draw special attention to Elon Musk.

He has shown his power by making controversial decisions about Starlink and Starshield. But what has he achieved by doing so?

Now Donald Trump will no longer be able to defend him so easily. The new Congress will have the ability to conduct investigations and demand sworn testimony.

And Musk will have to answer questions.

Remember what happened to Tesla shares when Musk got into a fight with Trump. The market reacted very quickly to their conflict.

In the United States, even the richest businessman cannot completely ignore government authority.

If Congress begins to seriously consider the activities of his companies, it could create risks for their capitalization.

And it's not just about political disputes. Decisions about satellite communications, which can affect people's lives during war, also raise questions about the reputation of the United States itself.

Musk needs to understand that big business and big politics are not the same thing.

If you want to engage in politics, be prepared for responsibility. If you want to engage in business, you should not assume that your wealth allows you to ignore the decisions of American government institutions.

This is where I see additional opportunities for Ukraine.

But they need to be used wisely, without getting involved in the intra-party struggle of the United States.

Ukraine should not side with either the Republicans or the Democrats.

We have already seen how political stories surrounding Hunter Biden influenced Trump's attitude towards Zelensky. Similar situations should be avoided in the future.

Today, Ukrainian diplomacy has enough experience to work with both parties and use their interests to protect Ukraine.

Why Melania Trump may be preparing for the Nobel Prize

Look at how Ukraine works with Melania Trump.

I even suggest that after the failed attempt to get the Nobel Peace Prize for Donald Trump, his entourage may try to achieve such an award for the first lady.

And the Russians, in my opinion, are ready to play along with this story, because they are interested in maintaining influence over the American president.

It is important for Ukraine not to allow the Kremlin to single-handedly set the agenda for these humanitarian initiatives.

Therefore, I believe the decision to award Melania Trump with the Ukrainian Order is correct. It is an opportunity to maintain personal contact and influence the process.

If Russian representatives are left alone with the Trump administration, they will use these meetings to advance their interests.

We have already seen how this can happen, particularly during the contacts in Anchorage.

I view the story with Russian diesel mainly as a political campaign before the elections on November 3. Similarly, the humanitarian arrangements regarding Oleshky could have been used to create a positive image of the administration.

But the humanitarian direction has another feature: it can and should be continued.

It is useful for Ukraine, because it is about helping people. Russia needs such contacts to maintain relations with Trump.

The American president has two years left in his term and retains a lot of power. Therefore, the Kremlin will try to maintain cooperation with him.

And for Trump, a possible Nobel Prize for his wife could be a great symbolic achievement.

The First Lady is already actively talking about her role in humanitarian arrangements. In particular, she mentioned 800 people, although this data, as far as I understand, has not been confirmed by either the Ukrainian or Russian sides.

I suggest that such public activism may be part of a campaign aimed at international recognition of her humanitarian work.

Imagine how this would affect the political image of the Trump family. A president who did not win a Nobel Prize could point out that his wife did.

And then this would become an additional argument in his confrontation with political opponents.

Therefore, Ukraine should understand the interests of both American parties, the Trump administration, and his inner circle.

I do not rule out that changes in the Pentagon may also open up new opportunities.

For example, if Hegseth is replaced by an official who has a different attitude towards military aid to Ukraine, decisions regarding the supply of Patriot missiles may also change.

After all, there are certain stocks of weapons in American warehouses. The question is what decisions the political leadership will make regarding their use.

All of this must be taken into account in working with Washington over the next two years.

Ukraine should seize new opportunities in Congress

I don't think the war will end anytime soon. That's why Ukraine needs to strengthen its own positions, using not only opportunities in the US, but also the help of its European partners.

First of all, this concerns work with the Ukrainian diaspora, Canada, and Western European countries.

Each of these states has its own interests in relations with Washington. And for them, the results of the American elections are also of great importance.

Canada, European countries, and other partners have been waiting for a shift in the political balance in Congress. They may now reconsider their own approaches to working with the Trump administration.

Ukraine must seize this moment.

Europeans have begun to take their own defense much more seriously. This was partly a result of Trump's own policies, which demanded that allies increase military spending to 2%, and then to 5% of GDP.

His pressure forced European states to invest more actively in the defense industry and their own armed forces.

And this militarization of Europe is beneficial to Ukraine.

European partners support our state not only out of solidarity, but also because they understand the threat posed by Russia.

They have significantly greater financial and diplomatic resources than Ukraine and are able to influence United States decisions.

Therefore, Kyiv should work more actively through European capitals and strengthen the Ukrainian lobby in both chambers of Congress.

The answer to the question about further military assistance is also related to this.

Will free US military aid return?

The new Congress will begin work on January 3. They are already discussing the investigation into Elon Musk and a new bill on aid to Ukraine. Is it realistic to restore free American arms supplies, as under Joe Biden?

I wouldn't count on that.

For Trump, returning to such a model would mean effectively admitting that his previous policies were wrong. This would only add to the arguments of Democrats who criticize his decisions.

But I suggest looking at the situation differently.

What is the fundamental difference for Ukraine if it receives the same American weapons and intelligence data, but its European partners pay for it?

In one case, the weapons are transferred directly by the United States, in the other, they are purchased for Ukraine by European countries.

For the Ukrainian military, the main thing is that the necessary equipment actually arrives.

Therefore, it is not worth spending all your energy on fighting for a specific model of aid financing.

It is much more important to ensure its stability, proper quality, and timeliness.

Ukraine cannot wait another two years for the next elections in the United States.

Winter is coming. Russia continues its bombing, attacking Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure.

Weapons, air defenses, and intelligence are needed today, here and now.

And for me, this is much more important than the question of who will pay for American supplies – Washington or European capitals.

Erdogan can negotiate with Putin, but not stop the war

After meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he plans to talk to Putin about ending the war. How much influence does he have over the Kremlin and can he achieve real concessions?

Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Recep Tayyip Erdogan have very good personal relations. And importantly, they also have a strong foundation at the state level.

Ukraine and Turkey are countries of one large region. Ankara consistently does not support the occupation of Ukrainian territories, the annexation of Crimea and other regions of our state.

Turkey supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

In addition, large-scale military-technical cooperation is developing between the two countries. And not all of its areas are discussed publicly.

Over the past 20 years, Turkey has significantly strengthened its international position. Today, its interests are taken into account not only in Russia, but also in Europe and the United States.

Erdogan has become one of the most influential political leaders in his region.

And Putin understands this. He is trying to avoid direct confrontation with the Turkish president.

Remember the story of the downed Russian fighter jet. After that, Moscow and Ankara had extremely difficult relations for about six months.

But in the end, Russia had to back down from its previous tough stance.

In broader regional politics, Turkey has also strengthened its position. This is clearly seen in Syria, where the pro-Russian regime of Bashar al-Assad was overthrown and the new leadership is much closer to Ankara.

Of course, other contradictions are now emerging, notably between Turkey and Israel over Syria and Iran. The Middle East remains a very complex region with many conflicts of interest.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy is actively working not only with Turkey, but also with other countries in the region.

And I believe that Ukraine is doing this quite successfully.

During the years of full-scale war, Ukraine has gained unique military and technological experience. Not only European and Middle Eastern states, but also the United States itself are interested in it.

Given the development of the Turkish military-industrial complex, there are many promising areas of cooperation between Kyiv and Ankara.

Therefore, I assess Zelensky's visit to Turkey positively. This is not the first and, I am sure, not the last such meeting.

But now let's return to Erdogan's ability to influence Putin.

If even the United States cannot force Russia to end the war, can Turkey?

I believe that the most that Ankara is capable of achieving is in the humanitarian sphere.

This is where specific agreements are possible, because these are issues in which it is easier for the parties to find common interest.

But the war itself has a completely different political basis. Its continuation is directly related to the existence of the current regime in Russia.

In order to force the Kremlin to change its strategic position, completely different levers of influence are needed.

And today I see such levers in only two countries – the United States of America and China.

But they have not yet reached an agreement on this issue.

Therefore, I am convinced that the war will continue. And negotiation initiatives with the participation of Turkey may soon bring results, primarily in the humanitarian sphere.

What is happening between Turkey and Azerbaijan?

There has been talk of contradictions in relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan recently. At the same time, Erdogan conveyed his congratulations to Ilham Aliyev and announced his intention to come to Baku on November 8 for Victory Day. How serious is the conflict between the two countries?

Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan have deep historical roots.

When they say that this is one people and two states, many people pay attention only to the first part of the formula.

But I constantly emphasize the second: these are two sovereign states.

And each has its own national interests that must be respected.

The same goes for the Organization of Turkic States. It is not a structure created around Turkey, where all other countries must follow Ankara's decisions.

The idea of such a union arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was actively promoted by the then President of Turkey, Turgut Ozal.

I remember that period well, because I was personally present as part of the delegations during the contacts of the Turkish leadership with representatives of other states.

At that time, Ozal visited Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, proposing to develop cooperation among Turkic-speaking countries.

But for a long time, this idea remained mainly a cultural project.

TURKSOY's activities focused on music, art, cultural exchange, and joint events.

The situation began to change significantly after Azerbaijan regained control over Karabakh.

Over the past three years, the Organization of Turkic States, in my opinion, has taken on a completely different meaning.

Economic, transport, political, and military-technical ties between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the countries of Central Asia began to develop more actively.

And here it is important to understand geography.

Turkey is located at one end of this vast expanse, Central Asia at the other. And between them are Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea.

Through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, transport routes lead to Azerbaijan, and from there through Georgia to Turkey and Europe.

Therefore, Azerbaijan is one of the key elements of this system.

Without it, a significant part of transport and economic projects cannot operate in this form.

It is the strengthening of these ties, in my opinion, that causes discontent in Russia, Iran, and certain political centers of other states.

But this does not mean that there cannot be contradictions within the Turkic world.

Why did the differences between the allies become visible?

Turkey itself is a very heterogeneous country.

There are several major ideological trends in its political life, and this must be taken into account when we analyze its relations with other countries.

The first trend is supporters of the republican tradition of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who created the modern Turkish state.

The second is the supporters of neo-Ottomanism, who appeal to the history of the Ottoman Empire and seek to strengthen Turkey's international influence.

These ideas are actively represented in society, the political environment, and even in popular culture.

For example, Turkish films and TV series often refer to Ottoman history, particularly the figure of Sultan Abdul Hamid.

A separate direction is political Islam.

Turkey seeks to position itself as one of the leaders of the Muslim world. Hence its active policy towards Palestine, the Gaza Strip, and relations with Israel.

At the same time, Turkey and Iran have complex historical relations and represent different religious and political traditions. But this does not prevent Ankara from raising issues important to the Muslim electorate.

All of these trends influence Turkish political life.

And even if contradictions do not manifest themselves directly at the level of presidents, they can arise in the media, social networks, or among representatives of the political environment.

This is roughly what we have been observing for the last few months.

Information disputes between Turkey and Azerbaijan gradually intensified, although at the highest level, relations between Erdogan and Aliyev remained good.

I have repeatedly said that the significance of these conflicts should not be exaggerated.

In my opinion, the current contradictions constitute no more than 5% of the entire complex of bilateral relations.

And a significant part of this 5% is simply information noise.

Instead, approximately 95% of the strategic interests of the two states coincide.

This is primarily the Shusha Declaration, military-technical cooperation, economic ties, and a large number of joint projects.

All of this continued to work yesterday and today. None of the key programs were stopped due to disputes in the information space.

I've always thought that sometimes it's even helpful when hidden problems become public.

After all, then you can see them, determine the causes, and correct the situation.

The main thing is to prevent the red lines from being crossed.

And for every sovereign state, these red lines are primarily related to its national interests.

Why Azerbaijan is no longer dependent on Moscow's position

Previously, post-Soviet countries were often perceived as objects of major international politics.

Moscow believed that it could influence their decisions, and Western powers often agreed with this approach.

But Azerbaijan has significantly changed its own positions in recent years.

I believe that today Baku has become an independent subject of international politics, with whose interests Moscow, Tehran, and Western capitals are forced to reckon.

Changes in relations with the United States are particularly noticeable.

In my opinion, Azerbaijan now has the highest level of strategic partnership with Washington in the last 30-35 years.

And this was possible despite difficult relations with previous American administrations.

Think back to the 44-day war of 2020, which took place at the end of Trump's first presidency. Joe Biden then came to power, and his administration, in my opinion, was much more oriented towards Armenia's position.

But this did not prevent Azerbaijan from advancing its own diplomatic interests.

In particular, on August 8, a peace agreement was initialed in the White House on the terms demanded by Baku.

In addition, Azerbaijan received an invitation to the G20 summit in Miami.

And I consider this to be important evidence of its growing international role.

Azerbaijan is no longer just a regional leader in the South Caucasus. It is gradually acquiring the status of a middle power, whose influence extends beyond its own region.

In the modern geopolitical situation, its transport position has become especially important.

Routes through Azerbaijan are needed by China, Europe, the USA, and Central Asian countries.

This applies to both the East-West transport corridor and the North-South direction.

Previously, Azerbaijan's geographical location often created problems. Now it has become one of its main advantages.

But these opportunities did not arise by themselves.

According to the estimates I have provided, Azerbaijan has invested approximately $50 billion in its own infrastructure and another $25 billion in the reconstruction of the Karabakh region.

They are building roads, tunnels, airports, hotels and other facilities there. According to my information, approximately 100 thousand people have already returned to these areas.

Foreign delegations come, see these changes, and are forced to reconsider their own attitude towards Azerbaijan.

This applies to representatives of European institutions, diplomats, and politicians, who previously assessed Baku's actions regarding Karabakh much more critically.

The same change in approach is taking place in relations with Russia.

After the incident with the Azerbaijani civilian plane, Moscow was forced to change its behavior towards Baku.

I would like to remind you that Russia has very rarely admitted responsibility for such tragedies. One can recall the South Korean Boeing shot down by the Soviet Union in 1983 and the Malaysian plane destroyed during Putin's rule.

And in the case of Azerbaijan, the Russian side, in my opinion, was forced to apologize and make compensatory decisions.

This is due to the fact that Moscow understands the strategic importance of Baku.

Russia does not need another major conflict in a region that is so important for transport routes and international trade.

Azerbaijan has also demonstrated its willingness to defend its own interests in relations with Iran.

After the incident with four drones, which, according to me, entered Azerbaijani territory, Baku showed that it has no intention of ignoring such threats.

Today, other states are forced to reckon with Azerbaijan not because of beautiful diplomatic statements, but because of its real capabilities.

Where are the red lines between Turkey and Azerbaijan?

There should be no older and younger brothers in the relations between Turkic states.

We see the problems Russia has in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union.

Moscow continues to behave as if surrounding states remain part of its empire. And this is not liked even by those partners who are still forced to cooperate with it.

Azerbaijan does not want to repeat this model of relations.

We truly consider Turkey a brotherly state, but brotherly relations do not mean abandoning one's own national interests.

Every country has its own red lines.

For Azerbaijan they are one thing, for Turkey they are another. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also have their own interests that must be respected.

Azerbaijan has no right to dictate to Turkey what its foreign policy should be. And Turkey should not interfere in issues that Baku considers fundamental for itself.

For example, Turkey's relations with Israel have recently deteriorated.

But this does not mean that Azerbaijan is obliged to automatically worsen its own relations with the Israeli state.

Baku has its own interests in cooperation with Israel, and they remain important.

At the same time, when an issue arises that could directly harm the strategic interests of Turkey and Azerbaijan, Baku is able to intervene through diplomatic methods.

I have already given an example of a situation where the issue of recognizing the Armenian genocide was raised in Israel.

In my opinion, this was related to the political confrontation with Turkey.

But Baku believed that such a step could also harm Azerbaijani-Israeli relations.

Therefore, after contacts with Azerbaijan, the Israeli leadership, in my opinion, changed its approach.

This is an example of how diplomacy can work without public conflicts between strategic partners.

And that's how I understand true alliance.

One can have different positions on individual international issues, but one must remember the strategic relationships that have been built over decades.

Turkey and Azerbaijan have a common historical experience that existed long before the emergence of the current presidents.

We can also mention the period of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and the role of the Turkish military in the struggle for statehood.

Therefore, the relations between our peoples are much deeper than the current political disputes.

But this does not negate the need to respect the sovereignty of the two states.

What does Erdogan's decision to come to Baku mean?

The recent disputes between Turkey and Azerbaijan have largely unfolded in social media and the information space.

At the highest level, the presidents continued to maintain good personal relations.

However, certain events, in particular Azerbaijan's participation in the events of the Organization of Turkic States at the level of foreign minister instead of president, have given rise to additional talk of a possible cooling of relations.

I believe that Erdogan understands well the need to resolve these contradictions.

After his last contacts with Baku, the situation began to change.

While on a trip to South Korea, the Turkish President sent greetings to Ilham Aliyev.

And upon his return, he announced that he planned to take part in the celebrations marking Azerbaijan's Victory Day on November 8.

For me, this is an important political signal.

Erdogan is demonstrating that strategic relations with Azerbaijan remain a priority and possible misunderstandings need to be corrected.

I would like to see the reaction of those who have been talking about a serious rift between the two countries in recent months.

I said it before and I'll repeat it now: the strategic interests of Azerbaijan and Turkey are ironclad.

Yes, even brothers can have conflicts. Sometimes they may not communicate for a long time or have fundamentally different views on certain issues.

But it is much better to openly discuss the problem, correct mistakes, and continue cooperation than to hide contradictions and allow them to accumulate.

And I believe that Erdogan's current actions indicate precisely his desire to preserve and strengthen these relations.

Ramiz Yunus on Erdogan's influence on Putin: watch the video