Russia has amassed units from five armies in the Zaporizhzhia region: Svitan revealed the true goal of the offensive

Russia continues its offensive operations in the Donetsk region and is amassing armored vehicles in the Zaporizhzhia sector. Near Huliaipole, the occupiers have concentrated units from five armies and one corps in an attempt to create conditions for expanding the land corridor to Crimea.

Roman Svitan, a reserve colonel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and a military expert, explained on Channel 24 why the Russians need to push Ukrainian fire control away from supply routes in the south and what could thwart their plans. He also assessed the strikes on Russian infrastructure, negotiations with the U.S., and the potential for developing low-cost Ukrainian missiles for air defense.

Strikes on Russia’s Rear

Ukrainian drones attacked the “Nikolskoye” pumping station in the Tambov region, which is part of Transneft’s pipeline system. The facility is involved in the transportation of petroleum products, including diesel and gasoline, and Svitan estimates its throughput capacity at approximately 300,000 metric tons per year.

Similar stations also operate in the Unecha area, where routes for transporting oil and petroleum products pass through a single logistics corridor. Specifically, part of the infrastructure is involved in supplying diesel fuel, gasoline, and jet fuel from the Mozyr Oil Refinery.

At the “Nikolskoye” facility, according to the expert, at least one tank caught fire. However, he believes that significantly more tangible results can be achieved by striking large pumping stations where substantial reserves of raw materials are concentrated, such as the Samara station.

If there is an opportunity to destroy or shut down such a station, it must be seized. But the main focus right now is on oil pumping and refining. A massive strike against a key station, such as the Samara station, makes much more sense,
– Svitan explained.

He offered a cautious assessment of the results of the latest airstrikes on St. Petersburg. The drones were able to reach industrial facilities near the port; however, according to him, they did not hit a key target in the Primorsk area. The intensity of attacks specifically on oil refineries has also decreased.

It’s already been two weeks, and not a single oil refinery has even been damaged. Most likely, we’re currently experiencing a slowdown in drone production. I don’t see any other reason yet. Perhaps there’s a prolonged buildup of drones before they’re deployed on combat missions,
– the reserve colonel speculated.

The reasons for the decrease in the number of strikes on oil refineries are not precisely known. At the same time, according to Svitan, resuming such attacks is particularly important given the Russian troops’ preparations for offensive operations involving armored vehicles.

Another target was a communications hub in occupied Donetsk. The Russians have adapted the former “Ukrtelecom” infrastructure to their own needs, using the building and equipment to support communications for the occupying forces.

This building housed Ukrtelecom’s main communications hub. The Russians have converted it for their own communications system. It also houses servers used by Russia’s FSB and local occupation security services. This is one of the main communications systems in the occupied Donbas,
said a military expert.

The exact extent of the damage to the facility is unknown. However, damage to such equipment could disrupt the occupiers’ communications if the Russians do not have a sufficient number of backup systems.

Focus on the U.S. Congress

Donald Trump continues to speak about negotiations with Vladimir Putin regarding Ukraine and other international issues. At the same time, Kyiv is expanding its contacts with American politicians who can influence White House decisions.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy discussed with Secretary of State Marco Rubio the operation of Starlink, early warning systems for ballistic missile strikes, and arms deliveries. Meanwhile, debates in the U.S. Congress over Trump’s policy toward Russia are intensifying. In particular, it was reported that Republicans Brian Fitzpatrick and Don Bacon are prepared to block certain administration initiatives unless Washington takes a tougher stance toward the Kremlin.

Svitan believes that Ukraine should focus on institutional contacts rather than constantly reacting to the U.S. president’s controversial statements.

“Trump is old news. We need to forget about him. We shouldn’t pay attention to him, and under no circumstances should we argue with him. There’s no point. He’ll say whatever he wants right now, mainly for the American domestic audience,”
said the reserve colonel.

On the eve of the midterm congressional elections, the political situation in the U.S. may change. According to Svitan’s forecast, the Republicans risk losing control of the House of Representatives and, under certain circumstances, the Senate as well. This could limit Trump’s ability to push through his own legislative initiatives, although the election results remain unknown.

At the same time, the U.S. president is facing discontent over rising prices for oil, gasoline, and diesel. Svitan attributes some of these problems to the war in the Middle East and believes that Trump is trying to avoid a public escalation of tensions with the Israeli leadership.

It is important for Ukraine to maintain relations with both U.S. political parties without tying military aid to the position of any single politician.

We need to refocus our efforts on building relationships with Congress, the House of Representatives, and the Senate – and with both parties. If politicians support Ukraine and maintain a principled stance toward Russia, we should work with them regardless of their party affiliation,
Svitan emphasized.

The expert explains this approach by citing the role of parliaments in democratic states. In Ukraine, decisions requiring legislative approval cannot depend solely on agreements between presidents, as the Verkhovna Rada holds the relevant authority.

Trump, according to Svitan’s assessment, may seek to involve Putin in potential negotiations with Xi Jinping in order to strengthen his own position vis-à-vis China. However, Russia itself is largely dependent on Beijing, so its participation in such a format would not necessarily give the U.S. president an advantage. The motives behind a possible trilateral meeting remain a matter of political speculation.

F-16 or Gripen

Ukraine is discussing with representatives of Lockheed Martin the localization of repair and maintenance of military equipment. For combat aviation, one of the most important tasks remains establishing the capability to fully repair F-16 fighter jets without lengthy waits at foreign facilities.

Currently, the need to perform some of the work abroad may reduce the number of aircraft available for combat missions. Ukraine has aviation enterprises and specialists with experience in repairing military equipment; however, servicing the F-16s requires the appropriate technology and equipment.

If we are unable to fully maintain these aircraft, we will have several dozen F-16s, but only half of them will be available to carry out missions. The other half will be waiting their turn for repairs. In that case, what is the point of having so many aircraft?
– Svitan explained.

Repair capabilities can be deployed in Ukraine provided there is reliable air defense cover or near the border with partner countries. The Ministry of Defense should take the lead in organizing such cooperation, particularly regarding procurement and funding.

At the same time, in the long term, Svitan suggests focusing on the Swedish Gripen. The existing F-16s can remain in service, but the expert links the future development of Ukraine’s combat aviation to a European platform, particularly its two-seat configuration.

The optimal option is to transition to the Swedish Gripen. Moreover, two-seat aircraft should be ordered immediately in order to expand the range of missions. The second crew member can handle drone control, reconnaissance, jamming, and electronic warfare,
the reserve colonel noted.

With the appropriate equipment, the aircraft could serve as an airborne command post, maintaining communication with drones over significant distances. Svitan explained this approach to the use of two-seat combat aircraft using the example of South Korean T-50-series aircraft.

He considers the Swedish direction promising for political reasons as well. Sweden is a member of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), which operates under British leadership, and cooperation with Northern European countries could reduce Ukraine’s dependence on shifts in U.S. policy.

Negotiations with Moscow

The U.S. side continues to seek opportunities for negotiations to end the war. In particular, discussions have centered on Steve Witkoff’s meetings in Oslo and his possible subsequent visit to Moscow, although the specific terms of any future agreements remain unclear.

Svitan is extremely skeptical about the possibility of a lasting peace with Russia under its current model of state policy. He believes that the Kremlin’s imperial ambitions will remain a threat to Ukraine even after a potential cessation of hostilities.

There will be no peace with Russia. There can be no true peace with such a neighbor as long as the Russian Federation exists as an empire. After everything that has happened, it is impossible to simply return to previous relations,
the military expert is convinced.

As a historical example, he cites the collapse of the Soviet Union, when economic and political conflicts led to Moscow losing control over the union republics. According to Svitan, similar processes could one day occur in the Russian Federation as well, although this is merely his prediction.

That is precisely why he suggests exploring broader political contacts with representatives of individual Russian republics and movements that oppose Moscow’s centralized authority.

There is no point in talking only with Moscow and Putin. We need to talk with the constituent parts of the Russian Federation – the republics. If contacts already exist, they need to be developed. If not, they need to be established,
– Svitan stated.

Among possible areas of focus, he mentioned Tatarstan, the Republic of Sakha, and representatives of Ingush political groups in exile. He also mentioned the historic Ukrainian communities of the Green Wedge in the Far East, with whom he sees potential for developing future contacts.

The practical prospects for such initiatives remain uncertain. Meanwhile, Svitan does not consider the latest trips by American mediators to Moscow to be a sufficient tool for changing the Kremlin’s position without serious economic pressure.

Low-Cost Air Defense Missiles

As early as 2024, Ukrainian developers were tasked with creating low-cost surface-to-air missiles to combat Russian drones. The maximum cost of such systems was set at $20,000, and according to Andriy Hrytsenyuk, former head of Brave1, some companies are already offering solutions for around $10,000.

However, the existence of these designs does not mean that Ukraine has received a sufficient number of mass-produced missiles. Svitan believes that over the past two years, funding priority has been given to interceptor drones, even though some of them have limited capabilities against high-speed targets.

The task of developing such missiles was set, but production was not funded. That’s where the problem lies. We’ve been saying for two years now that the optimal option is cheap, short-range missiles, but the money has been directed primarily toward interceptor drones,
– emphasized the reserve colonel.

In his opinion, with large-scale production, the unit cost of individual missiles could be as low as a few thousand dollars. These are relatively simple systems with a small engine, guidance system, and warhead, whose components can be manufactured more cheaply in mass production.

Twenty thousand dollars is too much for such a missile. For twenty thousand, you could make ten such missiles, not just one. The main goal is a low price to prevent the cost from being inflated again,
– Svitan believes.

The figures he cited are estimates, not the confirmed production cost of a specific product. The actual price will depend on components, technical specifications, the scale of the order, and the costs of setting up production.

As an example of more affordable missile weaponry, the expert cited the American APKWS, based on Hydra rockets with a laser guidance system. They can be launched from aircraft, helicopters, and ground-based launchers.

According to Svitan, Ukraine could have received a batch of approximately 20,000 such missiles, but the planned deliveries were redirected to meet Israel’s needs.

Svitan attributes the development of domestic production to changes in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. Among promising developments, he mentioned the RK-19 missile from the Luch Design Bureau and suggested that the first production units could be ready by the end of the year.

When the missile costs about 2,000 dollars, it will be possible to deploy two hundred launchers along the front line. With a combat range of approximately ten kilometers and a strike altitude of seven to eight kilometers, a powerful air defense barrier can be created,
the military expert suggested.

Such a scenario will depend on the actual characteristics of the missiles, production rates, and the capabilities of target detection systems. Svitan is also considering the possibility of using such weapons against guided aerial bombs, although the effectiveness of such interception has yet to be confirmed.

The need for low-cost air defense systems is growing due to Russia’s use of jet-powered drones and new, relatively inexpensive missile systems. In particular, Svitan mentioned “Banderole” and other makeshift missiles, the number of which, according to his forecast, the enemy will attempt to increase in order to wear down Ukraine’s medium-range air defense.

Offensive in Donetsk Oblast

Russian troops continue to attack along the Dobropillia axis, suffering significant losses. Soldiers of the 20th “Lubart” Special Operations Brigade reported areas where the occupiers are advancing through positions where the bodies of fallen Russian soldiers remain.

Earlier, the enemy attempted to advance near Lyman to threaten an encirclement of Sloviansk from the north via Sviatohirsk. However, according to Svitan’s assessment, the Ukrainian “Vivaldi” operation disrupted these plans and forced the Russians to change the directions of their further advance.

Currently, the occupiers are trying to consolidate their positions closer to Chornyi Zherebets, where, according to the expert, forces from the 1st Tank Army have been deployed. Fog, low cloud cover, and precipitation may facilitate the use of armored vehicles, as they complicate the work of Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance.

Svitan considers a direct advance through Dobropillia to Barvinkove to be too risky. The Russian force could come under attack from the flanks, so the enemy will likely try to expand its occupied positions first.

They will attempt to expand in the area of Myrnohrad and Rodynske, put pressure on Dobropillia, and then, most likely, move toward Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk. But this is a forecast, and it is unlikely that a large-scale offensive in this direction will take place this year,
Svitan noted.

Control over the Dobropillya area is important to the Russians due to the threat of flanking attacks during a possible advance toward Kramatorsk. At the same time, by the end of 2026, the expert expects localized attempts to expand Russian positions rather than a major offensive operation.

The Goal of the Offensive in Zaporizhzhia

In the Zaporizhzhia sector, the Russians have assembled a significant force in the Huliaipole and Orikhiv areas. Reports of the presence of five armies do not mean that the enemy has deployed five full-fledged army formations there: forces have been building up over the course of several years.

These are not five armies at full strength. These are units from five armies and one corps, attached to the main force in the Huliaipole area. They have been building up these forces there for several years, particularly in the Polohy area,
– clarified the reserve colonel.

Polohy has become an important military and transportation hub for the occupiers. Railroad routes lead to the area via Tokmak, Melitopol, Chernihivka, Berdiansk, and Volnovakha, while a line from Mariupol passes through Komysh-Zorya. According to Svitan, some of the Russian group’s command posts have been deployed specifically near Polohy and Chernihivka.

Over the past few weeks, the occupiers have continued to bring in armored vehicles. These could be used for attacks in the direction of Huliaipole and Orikhiv, although capturing these settlements is not the Russian command’s ultimate objective.

It is important for Russia to expand the strip of occupied territory along the land route from Rostov through Mariupol and Melitopol to Chongar. Ukrainian weapons pose a threat to these logistics, so the enemy is seeking to increase the distance between the transport routes and the front line.

The main strategic objective is to push back our ability to provide fire control over the land route from Mariupol – effectively from Rostov – to Melitopol and Chongar. To do this, they need to push the front line back by approximately 150 kilometers,
– Svitan explained.

According to his assessment, implementing such a plan would involve capturing the entire left bank of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast and advancing southeast into the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast toward the Donetsk–Zaporizhzhia highway and the town of Pokrovske.

The occupiers have set similar objectives in the past, but carrying them out is complicated by the significant distance from their main supply bases. As they advance deeper into Ukrainian territory, Russian troops will be forced to extend the routes for delivering fuel, ammunition, and equipment.

An additional problem may be the need to restore or extend rail service. Such routes will remain within range of Ukrainian weapons, posing a constant threat to transportation.

The Russians may take advantage of autumn fog and low cloud cover to move armored vehicles, when it is more difficult for Ukrainian drones to monitor their movements. However, for sustained offensive operations, the enemy must secure significant quantities of diesel fuel.

The best option is to immobilize the Russian army and destroy its diesel fuel reserves and production facilities. I don’t see any other option. Without diesel, a tank won’t move. You can’t pull it on horseback either – it’s too heavy,
– the military expert emphasized.

According to Svitan’s assessment, strikes against Russian oil refineries could significantly complicate the supply of armored units even before larger-scale offensive operations begin. Of particular importance will be Ukraine’s ability to strike the enemy’s fuel reserves and transportation infrastructure as the enemy attempts to stretch its own logistics routes in the south.

Full interview with Roman Svitan: watch the video