Онлайн Редакція Вакансії Контакти Ігри Гороскоп
18 November, 21:00
22

It Was "Flamingo": An Interview with Khrapchynsky on the Strike on the Kerch Bridge, an Effective Way to Protect Kyiv, and Plane Crashes in Russia

Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi, director of development at a defense contractor and a reserve Air Force officer, revealed details of the unique operation to destroy the Crimean Bridge in an exclusive interview with 24 Channel. To blow up the bridge, they used the Flamingo missile, which acted as an aerial jack and knocked the structure off its supports.

The destruction of the Crimean Bridge was one of Ukraine’s most high-profile operations. An unconventional approach was used for the strike, which made it possible to overcome Russian air defenses and strike a strategic target.

How this operation was carried out, why the “Flamingo” missile was chosen, and how the “air jack” mechanism worked, Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi, director of development at a defense enterprise and a reserve Air Force officer, explained in an exclusive interview with 24 Channel . He also assessed the threats to the bridges across the Dnipro River and explained why Russian military aircraft have been crashing frequently.

Can this operation be called the most successful of all four known attempts to destroy or significantly damage the Kerch Bridge?

In terms of preventing the bridge from being repaired, this operation caused a significant delay in repair work. It will take the enemy much longer to restore such a span.

This significantly limits the logistical capabilities of the southern group of Russian troops, for whom the Kerch Bridge was a vital route.

At the same time, it’s important to understand that this operation wasn’t a one-day affair. It lasted much longer. It was precisely the systematic depletion of Russia’s air defense and electronic warfare capabilities that made it possible to strike the bridge so effectively.

Let’s recall how many successful operations Ukraine has carried out recently on Russian territory, and how many oil refineries and factories have been struck. This month alone, there have been five effective deployments of “Neptune” missiles. This also indicates a certain scaling up of production of such weapons.

I would say that Ukraine is already seriously demonstrating its capabilities to deliver long-range strikes and penetrate deep into enemy territory, inflicting significant damage.

This directly affects the enemy’s ability to continue combat operations.

When the Russians claimed that the Kerch Bridge was the most heavily defended structure in the world in terms of air defense, to what extent were they exaggerating?

They weren’t exaggerating, but they didn’t expect us to be able to reach Ust-Luga or penetrate 2,500 kilometers deep into Russian territory.

At the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia assumed it could protect only 40% of its strategic facilities. This refers specifically to military facilities, not oil refineries. Therefore, Russia actively redeployed air defense assets, electronic intelligence systems, and electronic warfare systems into the territory of temporarily occupied Ukraine.

Recall how many different radar systems and electronic warfare assets the Russians deployed in occupied Crimea. All of this significantly complicated the task of striking even targets such as those located in the Krasnodar Krai.

In other words, Russia did indeed build a high-quality defense system, but it could not withstand the pressure we began to exert through strikes across the entire country.

The same can be said about Ust-Luga, where during the attacks, towers equipped with “Pantsir” systems and radar systems were destroyed. This is a separate phase of operations prior to delivering the main strikes against key targets. First, the air defense system is destroyed or jammed, and weapons capable of flying at extremely low altitudes are also used.

Incidentally, the “ attack on Ust-Luga” operation was not only an attack on Russia’s oil infrastructure but also a strike against its air defense system. Drones struck three Russian radar stations simultaneously, which were protecting a strategic port on the Baltic Sea. Specifically, the “Nebo-SVU” and “Sopka-2” systems, as well as a radar station mounted on a 40V6 mobile tower, were hit. The loss of these systems could create gaps in Russia’s air defense and facilitate further Ukrainian attacks.

If you saw the video broadcast on TV showing a missile flying at an extremely low altitude, you’ll understand that the metal structures of such a bridge create obstacles for radar systems.

Due to the specific layout, they can lose targets from their field of view. A standard “Pantsir” system simply cannot detect such a missile. But to achieve this, it was first necessary to neutralize the air defense systems capable of detecting these missiles and drones. That is precisely why this required a comprehensive approach, which was implemented over a long period of time, to strike this bridge.

Full interview with Khrapchynskyi: watch the video

The Security Service of Ukraine reported that the operation lasted about a month and consisted of seven stages. First, Ukrainian forces neutralized Russian air defense systems, and then struck the bridge using various weapons. During the final stage, according to available information, a wide array of weapons was used: “Flamingo” and “Neptune” cruise missiles, “Ruta” and “Palyanytsia” drones, “Sichen,” and long-range FPVs. The Russians also claimed to have used Storm Shadow missiles, though the Ukrainian side has not confirmed this. Why did the operation require so many different types of weapons, and what roles did they play?

Let’s take a look at the video of the Kerch Bridge. We can see that metal barges are positioned next to it, and special smoke screens have been set up on the bridge itself. All of this was part of the facility’s defense system.

In addition, electronic warfare and air defense systems were in operation. In particular, systems such as the “Pantsir” were deployed on special earthen embankments. In other words, the enemy had built a fairly robust defense system for this logistics route.

That is precisely why the operation required a comprehensive approach involving various types of weapons, each with different flight profiles and speeds. The SBU reported that the operation lasted about a month. But I would also mention the earlier strikes on Russian airfields, which deprived the enemy of the ability to respond quickly using aviation.

These were attempts to push back the enemy’s tactical and transport aircraft. All of this, taken together, produced the result we saw.

A large number of various weapons was needed to overwhelm Russian air defense and overcome its resistance.

It was also necessary to destroy the smoke screens. After all, this isn’t just smoke – certain chemical components are used there that create obstacles even for radar-guided warheads.

As for the Storm Shadow missiles the Russians were boasting about, it’s important to understand that they weren’t needed in this operation. Ukraine was able to use all available tools, working in perfect harmony, to carry out this strike on the bridge.

In the footage we’ve seen, the missile is flying with a camera mounted on it. In other words, we can literally see from the missile’s perspective as it approaches the bridge. Is this something new? A theory has emerged in Russian social media circles that this is a new communication technology, which allows – even under active electronic warfare – for the strike to be corrected via video link and the missile to be guided to the desired target during the final meters of its flight. And the second question: is this a “Flamingo” missile or some other type of weapon?

What we’re seeing is a "Flamingo" rocket. I’ve already explained on my Facebook page why this particular system might have been used for this operation. To create a so-called “air jack” that would lift the bridge and tear it from its supports, a fairly powerful payload is required.

When it comes to FPV drones, their power is sufficient for a localized explosion, but this task requires a different scale of destruction. Let’s recall the classic methods of destroying bridges.

If you deliver a penetrating strike from the bottom up or from the top down, you can breach the bridge span, but it’s crucial to hit the main girders precisely. In this case, the rocket struck beneath a main girder, which allowed the structure to be blown up and the bridge to be dislodged from its supports.

Let’s also recall the operation involving a truck loaded with explosives that detonated on the bridge. Therefore, what matters here is not only the weaponry but also who planned the operation. The laws of physics and the specific characteristics of the bridge’s structural design were taken into account, which made such a demolition possible.

As for communications and the ability to monitor the flight in real time, most weapons systems now have the capability to receive a video feed to confirm the result. We quite often use automatic target acquisition and guidance systems. That is, we’re talking about a specific set of algorithms that ensure final guidance.

I won’t call this artificial intelligence, since the UN is currently trying to ban the use of artificial intelligence in weapons. These are algorithms that operate during the final stage of flight.

Video allows for objective monitoring and ensures that the strike hits exactly the intended target. Additionally, if a communication channel is available, certain adjustments can be made during flight.

Is this related to Starlink communication on the Ukrainian side? There were many concerns that our use of it had been restricted. What type of communication do you think could have been used during this operation?

There are specific types of communication we can use with certain weapons systems. If we calculate the flight time from the barges to the bridge pier, we can see that the missile’s average speed was about 400 kilometers per hour.

At the same time, let’s remember that we currently face significant restrictions on the use of Starlink and Starshield within a 160-kilometer radius. Therefore, I wouldn’t say it was Starlink. Most likely, we’re talking about certain Ukrainian developments that enable the use of effective communications to carry out such combat missions.

Was the objective to immediately destroy both arches – the road and rail arches? Or did they leave the second part of the bridge for later? And to what extent are these structures similar to each other? After all, we can see that there are tension cables there, and if this structure is significantly damaged, the railroad tracks could also collapse.

The Russians have stated that the railway bridge is already operational. But let’s remember that rail traffic there is operating under restrictions. They understand that an explosion could occur while transporting fuel tankers or other cargo. Ukrainian intelligence is active, and relevant information can be obtained.

Therefore, the Russians do not risk carrying out such freight transport. As for the specific design features of these bridges, it’s best to ask the builders. But it’s important to understand that destroying the second section of the bridge would also require a complex operation involving a large number of different weapons.

How important is the Kerch Bridge in providing logistical support to the Russian occupiers in Crimea?

Pontoon crossings offer limited capabilities. The Kerch Bridge had both a road and a rail section, which allowed for the most efficient supply of all necessary resources to Crimea.

As for the land corridor, it is constantly under fire control by our forces. We have already carried out effective strikes in this area.

Russia is trying to create local capabilities to defend this route. But previously, it was much easier for Russia to manage logistics and defend the Kerch Bridge, since it is located deep within the occupied territory. There are a large number of airfields nearby from which aircraft could take off to monitor the process and escort any cargo from the air. Therefore, this is a painful loss for Russia.

Now it will have to reroute its logistics through a land corridor and, in part, via the railway bridge. At the same time, I believe that any Russian attempts to rebuild the bridge or carry out repair work there must be stopped by our strikes.

To what extent can we counter this? We’ve seen footage of the Kerch Bridge’s construction, during which the Russians used large floating platforms with cranes to transport and install the arch structure. This looks like a prime target for missiles and drones: a stationary object on the water that can be struck. Could such platforms really become a vulnerable point during attempts to repair the bridge?

If the Russians do not restore their air defense system – specifically, if they do not deploy several S-400 divisions, as well as “Krasukha” and “Pole-21” systems, to the area – it will be difficult for them to carry out such work.

We will be able to control this territory, launch strikes, and continue to search for weak spots. But let’s return to the fact that Russia is currently actively concentrating a large number of electronic warfare assets and S-400 systems in the Kaliningrad, Leningrad, and Moscow regions. In other words, it is forced to defend facilities that are strategically important to it.

Therefore, the enemy will try to diversify risks, redeploy its remaining air defense systems, and use aviation for cover. But even the most complex defense system can be countered. We see this in the example of most military facilities on Russian territory.

Russia regularly strikes bridges across the Dnipro River. In Kyiv, both the North and South Bridges were attacked with ballistic missiles. What measures need to be taken to protect these structures from repeated attacks? And what alternatives can be found to maintain transportation and logistics links?

The first strikes on the bridges were meant to serve as a signal that a separate defense system for such structures needs to be developed. It’s no coincidence that I cited the example of the Kerch Bridge, near which the Russians had deployed barges.

As a reminder, on the night of November 16–17, when the Russians attacked, the Northern and Southern Bridges in Kyiv were struck by ballistic missiles. The strikes damaged the bridge structures; in particular, part of the stay cables on the Northern Bridge were severed. Traffic was temporarily restricted, causing traffic jams and disruptions to public transportation. In addition, due to damage to the heating networks, 317 buildings in the Darnytskyi district of the capital were left without heat.

Incidentally, the enemy is using non-modernized “Iskander” missiles to strike the bridges – the classic version currently in service. It features a radar homing seeker and an optoelectronic terminal guidance system.

Therefore, I propose reducing the contrast between the bridge’s metal structure and the water. To do this, we can use barges and aerosol sprayers to create clouds that will significantly complicate targeting. This will help protect bridges from Russian “Iskander” strikes.

The same aerosol smoke screens can also protect structures from drone attacks. Significant work is already underway, including the deployment of electronic warfare systems.

However, any air defense system requires a comprehensive approach to securing a specific area. Therefore, we need to discuss electronic warfare systems, kinetic defense, barges, and corner reflectors on bridges – which prevent radar heads from locking onto targets – as well as expanding air defense capabilities and increasing the number of detection systems.

Clearly, to counter ballistic missiles, we need to ramp up production of the PAC-3 and PAC-2, which can also intercept ballistic missiles if the missile is not maneuvering.

In addition, there is the Aster 30 Block 0 for the Franco-Italian SAMP/T systems. Here we return to a global problem: Europe is still operating within the confines of its old military commitments and is not making sufficient efforts to ramp up production.

I believe Ukrainian diplomacy needs to address this issue effectively. In reality, we’re talking about a massive amount of work that we’ve lost out on. Ukraine has combat experience that no other country in the world possesses. This experience needs to be properly presented, used to share expertise, or marketed.

Joint research and development (R&D), as was the case during World War II between the United Kingdom and the United States, would allow us to develop many interesting solutions much more quickly. After all, we have specific needs: we lack radar equipment, we don’t have enough detection systems, and we don’t have affordable interceptor missiles. We need to join forces to encourage Europe to help Ukraine more actively.

Let’s return to the Danish model. Europe simply allocates funds, which are spent on purchasing weapons from Ukrainian manufacturers. But this model does not give European countries the opportunity to gain their own experience and develop domestic production capabilities. And that could yield significantly better results.

At the same time, we must understand Europe’s red lines. It is afraid to cross them. Recall 2024, when proposals were made to fund the Ukrainian Armed Forces with European money, adopt the Danish model, and create a unified R&D center and a joint air defense system. In the end, it was decided to retain only the Danish model, under which funds are allocated and weapons are procured.

This does not involve crossing the red lines that Europe fears. But when Putin begins to draw future borders on the map of Europe with his own pencil, Europe will likely need to erase those red lines and begin cooperating more actively with Ukraine.

An An-12 military transport plane crashed in Russia. It caught fire while still in the air and crashed near the village of Yagunovo in the Kemerovo region. According to preliminary reports, everyone on board was killed. The plane was flying from Novosibirsk to Kansk but requested an emergency landing near Kemerovo, which it was unable to complete. Russian Telegram channels cite a fuel pump malfunction, an aviation fuel leak, and hydraulic system failure as possible causes. Can we identify any patterns in such disasters, and what preliminary conclusions can be drawn?

Let’s recall the Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3, which suffered non-combat losses during training flights or redeployment. Let’s also recall the losses of the Su-35 and Su-34 in Königsberg.

Looking at these cases, it becomes clear that the heavy strain on the air force and the concentration of resources on aircraft operating on the front lines lead to maintenance problems. As a result, the service life of the aircraft, hydraulic systems, and other components gradually diminishes.

It is important to understand that each aircraft has specific schedules for scheduled maintenance. This maintenance can be performed directly at the home airfield, but it requires specialists and the necessary components. Over the past year, the number of non-combat losses among pilots has increased by 200%. This also affects Russia’s ability to maintain its air force.

In fact, the Russians are losing the engineering staff capable of performing high-quality maintenance on the aircraft. Some specialists have been killed, and facilities – particularly in Akhtubinsk – have been targeted by strikes. All of this weakens their maintenance capabilities.

Problems are also arising with engines, which periodically fail due to delayed maintenance. This is comparable to a car: if you don’t perform regular diagnostics and repairs, sooner or later it will break down.

And it doesn’t matter whether it’s a Western car or a “Lada Kalina” – the only difference is when exactly it will happen. Therefore, we’re dealing with a complex set of problems: untimely aircraft maintenance, difficulties in obtaining spare parts, and the loss of some of the factories that used to manufacture them.

Russia purchases aviation fuel and special blends from other countries, raising questions about the quality of these products. All of this together contributes to an increase in non-combat losses of Russian aircraft and the deaths of personnel.

This interview has been condensed, corrected, and edited for better audience understanding.