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21 November, 01:48
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The attack on the Crimean Bridge ruined Putin's "image": Yunus on the summit in China

Ramiz Yunus, a professor of political science, explained why the meeting between Trump, Putin, and Xi Jinping in China failed to yield concrete results, how the strike on the Crimean Bridge affected the Kremlin’s plans, and why Ukraine must intensify its military pressure on Russia. He also discussed the dangers of Russian propaganda and the conditions for true peace.

The meeting between Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in China was supposed to demonstrate the three countries’ willingness to discuss the future of global security. However, the talks resulted in more political statements than concrete decisions, and the Ukrainian strike on the Crimean bridge became an uncomfortable backdrop for the Kremlin’s attempts to present Russia as one of the world’s leading powers.

Political science professor Ramiz Yunus, in an exclusive interview with Channel 24, explained why he considers the trilateral meeting empty and how Ukraine's military successes affect Kyiv's negotiating positions. He also spoke about Russian attempts to divide Europe and explained the concept of "Koschei's needle", which, in his opinion, helps to understand why the end of hostilities does not yet guarantee true peace.

Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping held a one-and-a-half-hour meeting in Shenzhen, China. The Chinese leader called it a breakthrough. Can these talks really be considered historic?

First, this is not a historic meeting. This is an ordinary, empty meeting that all three leaders needed, first of all, for the sake of a pretty picture. And it is no coincidence that it was Vladimir Putin who needed it the most. In second place in terms of interest, I would put Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping needed it the least.

It is enough to look at how the participants behaved after the negotiations. Only Putin held a press conference, while Trump did not appear before journalists at all, and Xi Jinping said practically nothing, except for general formulations distributed by his press service. All this resembled a meeting for the sake of nice words about good intentions. This also includes the declaration, the promotion of which was especially important for the Russian side.

If these were truly historic or breakthrough negotiations, they would have to end with concrete documents. Such agreements would take years to prepare, involving expert groups, diplomats, and experts on relevant issues. For example, if the participants were going to discuss nuclear disarmament, it should be understood that the United States, Russia, and China are in different weight categories.

According to the estimates we are talking about, China has about nine to ten times fewer nuclear warheads than the United States or Russia. Therefore, the issue of reducing arsenals primarily concerns the Americans and the Russians. Beijing is ready to discuss such agreements, but assumes that the other two states must first reduce their own stocks.

Think about how much time the Soviet Union and the United States spent preparing the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty. The last of these treaties expired in February 2026, but it took teams of people years to get it done. And here it seems as if the leaders simply called each other and decided to meet.

I would call this meeting "two and a half" or "two plus a half". This is not a meeting of three. If we talk about the power of states, then today there are two superpowers on the planet - the United States of America and China. There is no third country,
– Yunus emphasized.

When we talk about superpowers, we mean primarily economic power. According to my estimates, the United States accounts for about a quarter of world GDP, China - about 20%. It is economic capabilities that determine their weight, and not just the number of nuclear warheads. If we were to evaluate states solely by nuclear arsenals, China would generally be in third place.

But then the question arises: why are both Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin trying so hard to please Xi Jinping? So, China has what both of them desperately need today. For Trump, these are primarily economic issues - rare earth metals, contracts for American farmers, cooperation in the aviation industry and many other areas that are largely dependent on Beijing.

In addition, the American president is mired in problems in the Middle East. Political conflicts await him within the United States, including in Congress. Putin, meanwhile, is mired in a war against Ukraine and today is very dependent on China's favor. And Beijing does not take direct part in these wars and continues to gradually develop.

Therefore, Xi Jinping could afford to hold such a meeting on his own territory. He created the necessary political image for both guests and at the same time used it for his own interests. But I do not think that to understand the results, one should pay so much attention to who met whom at the airport and where they stood during the photo shoot.

And was the fact that Donald Trump personally met Xi Jinping at the airport a violation of diplomatic protocol?

Yes, it was a violation of American protocol. But you need to understand that diplomatic protocol is approved by the president of the country. If he decides to change the order of a meeting with a foreign leader, he has the appropriate authority to do so. Tomorrow another president will come, approve other rules, and officials will already carry out his orders.

I worked in government and managed the process for a while, so I understand how it works. Chinese protocol requires a different approach to meeting foreign leaders at the airport. But if the American president met Xi Jinping in person, the Chinese leader might decide to reciprocate with a similar gesture.

As for Putin, he and Xi Jinping regularly meet at roughly the same protocol level. Therefore, I do not consider attempts to seek humiliation for the Russian dictator solely in the person who approached him at the airport to be serious analysis.

Journalists and commentators who have never worked with state protocol often try to see a hidden political signal in every detail. One person was supposedly given more attention, another was humiliated, a third was put in the wrong place. But such things are usually agreed upon in advance between protocol services.

All this talk about one being greeted higher, another lower, that someone was given more attention and someone was humiliated – this is the talk of couch experts who don’t know how the protocol service works. This has nothing to do with serious analytics,
– explained the political science professor.

For serious analysis, something else is more important: this meeting did not make decisions that could significantly change the international situation. And the fact that Trump and Putin tried to demonstrate their commitment to Xi Jinping testifies, first of all, to the strong negotiating positions of the Chinese leadership. Xi understands perfectly well that it is important for the American president to maintain stable relations with Beijing over the next two years.

Trump loves agreements, constantly talks about deals and seeks to showcase them as his own achievements. That is why he can speak very favorably about both the Chinese leader and Putin, call them friends and make other compliments. Especially when he tries to present himself as a mediator in the Russian-Ukrainian war, although I do not consider the United States to be a neutral mediator in this conflict.

After January 3, when the new Congress takes office, Trump's political situation, in my opinion, will become even more complicated. He may continue to write friendly messages about Putin, but representatives of the American authorities will at the same time make tougher statements about Russia. Therefore, one should not take every compliment from the American president literally.

I always suggest looking at what remains after the negotiations. What documents were signed, what agreements were reached, and what specifically will change? In the case of this meeting, there are practically no such results.

But on the eve of the summit, Ukraine made a very strong move - it struck the Crimean bridge. And this was an extremely uncomfortable gift for Putin. That is why he was forced to talk about the crossing at his press conference, although he had previously avoided detailed comments about its damage.

For Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, the Ukrainian issue was not the main topic at this meeting. They had their own agenda, primarily related to economic relations and international security issues. And here it is important to consider where exactly they gathered and which countries represent the relevant region.

For example, I often explain this by the attitude towards other regional conflicts. How much does the average Ukrainian know about the confrontation between Cambodia and Thailand? And how closely do residents of Southeast Asian countries follow the daily events of the Russian-Ukrainian war? For different societies, the priority of international conflicts can differ significantly.

Therefore, one should not expect that every international meeting will automatically be dedicated to Ukraine. If leaders have gathered to discuss economic issues in the Asia-Pacific region, their agenda will be shaped in accordance with these interests.

Another situation is the meeting in Berlin, where representatives of the so-called coalition of the willing gathered. The central topic there is Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky, European leaders, as well as Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, who continue to represent the American side in diplomatic contacts, participate in the negotiations.

I think that as a result of the Berlin meeting, Ukraine may receive new financial agreements, assistance for air defense, missiles, and other practical results. But this does not mean that such a meeting will automatically lead to an end to the war. The issue of cessation of hostilities remains much more complicated.

At the same time, the very existence of a European meeting is a good counterbalance to the Chinese summit. The Kremlin is trying to create the impression that Putin is already one of the top three world leaders, and everyone else should come to him for talks. It is even inviting representatives of Europe to gather in Moscow.

Russia is taking advantage of the lack of a unified European position. Putin is asking who exactly he should talk to: Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy or Poland? Who will represent all of Europe – one person, five or ten? European states do not really have the same views on everything, and the Kremlin is trying to take advantage of this.

In my opinion, Moscow is specifically raising the issue of the European security system in order to continue to divide European countries and prevent them from developing a common position. But this does not mean that the trilateral summit in China was directed against Ukraine. I see no reason to call it an anti-Ukrainian meeting.

The Ukrainian issue was primarily needed by Putin himself to demonstrate his own importance. However, Kyiv was able to respond to this political picture with concrete military actions.

You can put pressure on Ukraine, and Ukraine is currently hitting the Crimean bridge. Tomorrow it will do something more. Because in the modern world, as always, everything is decided by what happens directly on the battlefield,
– Yunus emphasized.

That is why I do not take seriously the talk about a new Yalta or a new Potsdam. This demonstrates a misunderstanding of history. In Yalta and Potsdam, the victorious powers were at the negotiating table, determining the conditions for defeated Germany. There were specific military results there, on the basis of which political decisions were made.

And who won now? Donald Trump is announcing successes in the war with Iran, but I don't think he achieved his goals. Putin has been waging war against Ukraine for five years now and has also failed to achieve his initial goals. Therefore, comparing the current meeting with the Yalta or Potsdam conferences is simply incorrect.

Russian propaganda is trying to create such an image, and some commentators in the post-Soviet space are picking it up. But it is enough to look carefully at historical documents to understand: there is no real analogy. This is just a political picture that the Kremlin and Trump personally needed.

Xi Jinping has also benefited. On the eve of a new party cycle, it is important for him to show Chinese society and the political leadership that Beijing's international weight has increased. He can demonstrate that US and Russian leaders come to him and try to negotiate with China.

In the objective plane, in the dry residue, the result of this meeting is zero. There is nothing there at all. This declaration is a blank piece of paper,
– emphasized the professor of political science.

For example, the participants talk about reforming the United Nations. But who exactly will reform it, on the basis of what principles, and how? Three participants in the meeting are permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the system itself, in my opinion, has found itself in its current state largely due to the actions of the great powers.

There are also the United Kingdom and France, which have permanent seats on the Security Council and their own positions on European security and Russia's war against Ukraine. How can this system be reformed without taking their interests into account? What to do about the veto and other fundamental issues? General statements without answers to these questions have no practical meaning.

I believe that international law today does not actually provide adequate protection of states from aggression. And when legal mechanisms do not work, military force becomes increasingly important. That is why Ukraine must first of all strengthen its own capabilities on the battlefield.

Ukraine is fighting against a permanent member of the UN Security Council, while its European partners also include states with permanent membership in this body. They all have different interests in the future of the world order and European security. And without Ukraine, this system can no longer be built.

That is why I constantly emphasize: Kyiv's negotiating position strengthens when the Ukrainian military component is strengthened. It is under such conditions that Kushner, Witkoff, and all other participants in diplomatic contacts will take Volodymyr Zelensky into account.

Note that American representatives have begun to come to Kyiv more actively. In my opinion, this is also due to changes on the battlefield. When Trump previously pressured Zelensky in the Oval Office, I believe he proceeded from the conviction that the Ukrainian position was weak. Moscow tried to support this idea, but subsequent events showed a different picture.

Therefore, I do not consider it a coincidence that the attack on the Crimean Bridge took place on the eve of the meeting of the three leaders. In my opinion, the Ukrainian political and military leadership, together with the special services, chose the moment for the operation very wisely. It allowed to neutralize the political effect that Moscow was counting on.

After all, a state that claims the status of one of the three largest superpowers in the world should not find itself in a situation where its capital and strategic objects remain vulnerable. Russia has an extensive air defense system around Moscow, but this does not guarantee it complete protection. And if in the future Ukrainian ballistic missiles can overcome this defense, this will become an even more serious problem for the Kremlin.

Putin has been at war for five years against a country that has no nuclear arsenal and is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council. He continues to threaten with nuclear weapons, but this argument alone does not guarantee victory. Russia can send tens of thousands of new troops to the front, but even such a resource is not unlimited.

The Soviet Union also fought in Afghanistan for years, but in the end this war became one of the factors that weakened it. Therefore, one should not think that Russia is able to continue the current war indefinitely without consequences for its own state. The political situation in the United States and Europe may also change, new leaders and new approaches to supporting Ukraine will appear.

Germany is of particular importance in this process. It is a powerful European economy that has historically demonstrated the ability to recover from extremely difficult shocks. I do not exclude that in the future the German political elite may take a much more decisive position on European security.

Europe as a whole is also gradually becoming stronger, in particular due to the awareness of the Russian threat. At the same time, it still lacks a unified defense system and a common army. Ukraine already has vast experience in modern warfare and an army of almost a million people, while the total number of European armed forces, according to the estimates I am talking about, is about 1.4 million.

Therefore, I am convinced that Ukraine should be one of the main participants in the formation of the future European security system. Instead, the Kremlin is trying to bring Europe back to discussing its own ultimatums, which are reminiscent of Putin's approaches since his Munich speech in 2007.

Russia may offer non-aggression pacts or other agreements to individual European countries to weaken the unity of the continent. I see this as an attempt to return to the old policy of dividing states, which has already had dangerous historical consequences. That is why the European security system must be discussed first of all with Ukraine, and not built according to Moscow's wishes.

Trump, meanwhile, is interested in avoiding a new confrontation with China. Early next year, as we discuss, the question of extending the trade agreements between Washington and Beijing will arise. If they are not extended, additional political and economic problems will arise for the American president.

In addition, after the elections to Congress, he will have to pay much more attention to domestic politics. Therefore, he seeks to demonstrate international achievements, in particular in humanitarian issues related to Ukraine. Here, initiatives may appear on Oleshki, Kostyantynivka, prisoner exchanges and other topics that the White House can present as its own success.

But neither the Chinese summit nor the meetings in Abu Dhabi, in my opinion, will bring about a real end to the war. At best, the parties can agree on individual humanitarian issues or prisoner exchanges. For a serious negotiation process, it is necessary to change the balance of power.

To dispel Russia's desire to continue the war, it is necessary to increase its price. The price of war today is determined by Ukraine's foreign policy, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and those allies who can really help. Real talks will begin when Ukraine starts to increase the price of war,
– Yunus emphasized.

I hope that in the near future Ukrainian ballistics will begin to play a much greater role. Such prospects can be judged from the statements of President Zelensky and representatives of his entourage, although concrete results are yet to be seen. If Ukraine receives additional capabilities for long-range strikes, the damage to the Crimean bridge may be only the beginning of new problems for Russia.

The Crimean Bridge and Moscow are of particular symbolic importance to the Kremlin. If Russia loses confidence in its ability to defend these sites, it will affect not only the military situation but also its international standing. And then negotiations with Ukraine could take on a completely different meaning.

In your work "Koscheya's Needle" you draw parallels between the experience of Azerbaijan, the conflicts in the South Caucasus, and Russia's war against Ukraine. Why, even after the end of hostilities, can the memory of aggression and hatred remain in society for generations?

First of all, let me clarify: this is my lecture. I previously wrote the article "Koscheya's Needle", but later expanded it and presented it in Azerbaijan in the format of a large lecture. In total, I came with two lectures dedicated to issues that I consider extremely important for modern states and societies.

The first continued the theme "Occupation of Consciousness". The second was called "Being a Subject" and was dedicated to the place of Azerbaijan in the modern world, its role in the South Caucasus and the capabilities of a state that today can be called a middle power. I spoke about the challenges, risks and opportunities that arise for a country that seeks to be an independent participant in international politics.

But the main issue I raised is the occupation of consciousness. We live in a world of modern technology, artificial intelligence and huge information flows. Through the Internet, gadgets and various soft power tools, it is possible to seriously influence the mood of society. People begin to be afraid, adopt other people's narratives and accept the picture of the world imposed on them.

This is important not only for Azerbaijan, but also for Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and other post-Soviet countries. In my answer to your first question, I tried to show how much information propaganda influences the perception of international events. It is enough to look at how many people discuss diplomatic protocol or the headlines of Western publications without trying to understand the content of the events themselves.

Today's youth often do not read large texts and do not always know enough about history. I was formed at a time when there was no Internet and it was necessary to independently study geography, history, sociology and other disciplines. This helped me form a more holistic view of international processes.

For example, when I hear representatives of the American administration discussing Russian history, it seems to me that not all of them understand its origins well enough. I can talk about the history of the Russian Empire, about Ivan the Terrible, the Rurikovichs and the further development of this state. And a person who does not have such a historical background is much easier to mislead.

That is why societies must be able to protect themselves from information influence. For many years, Russia has used historical myths, culture, propaganda, and other tools to spread its influence. In my opinion, in 2014, it largely succeeded in taking advantage of how strong the elements of the "Russian world" remained in the Ukrainian information and public space.

The occupation of consciousness is an extremely important topic. This applies to Azerbaijani, Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian societies. Russia was able to do a lot against Ukraine in 2014 precisely because at that time the consciousness of Ukrainian society was very much occupied by the "Russian world",
– Yunus explained.

Today the situation in Ukraine is different, but a certain influence of the Russian cultural and imperial heritage, in my opinion, still remains. Similar processes have been going on throughout the post-Soviet space since the times of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. And I am very glad that my native Azerbaijan, I believe, has largely freed itself from this influence.

This was especially evident during the Second Karabakh War. During the first Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijani society was divided, there were internal political contradictions, a struggle for power, and different foreign policy orientations. As a result, Azerbaijan lost control over Karabakh and seven adjacent regions.

But later our society was able to unite. A generation of people grew up who had never seen Karabakh, but were ready to fight for its return. They participated in the battles for Shusha and other territories, because they understood what the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state meant to them.

I always emphasize that the army is not only about modern technology. You can have the best weapons, but without motivated people, it is not enough. Servicemen must realize what they are fighting for and what state they are defending.

It is not HIMARS, tanks, missiles, or Patriots that win. It is the people who control it all that win. They must have the motivation to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their state,
– emphasized the professor of political science.

Ukrainians also need such motivation. I am critical of the situation when, in my opinion, only a part of society bears the main burden of the war, while millions of people were forced to leave the country. I believe that victory requires much broader social consolidation, when the defense of the state becomes a common cause.

The Azerbaijani experience, in my opinion, shows the importance of such a union. During the Second Karabakh War, support for a common goal united people with different political views, including those who were in opposition to the government or lived outside the country. I myself belong to the people who lived abroad for a long time and were critical of the Azerbaijani government, but on the issue of territorial integrity we had a common position.

However, social consolidation is only one component. We need a modernized army, strong state institutions, an effective foreign policy, and the ability to adapt to new international circumstances. That is why I tell Ukrainians that the experience of Azerbaijan is worth studying carefully.

Now let's return to "Koschey's needle." We all know the fairy tale about Koschey the Immortal, whose death is hidden in a needle. The needle is contained in an egg, the egg is hidden far away, and to get to it, many obstacles must be overcome. But as long as the needle is not broken, Koschey remains immortal.

I use this tale as a metaphor for social consciousness. You can end a war, conclude a peace treaty, change state borders or political leadership, but this does not mean that the norms that have maintained hostility for decades will disappear from society.

This is how I view the issue of future peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In my opinion, historical grievances and antagonisms that have been maintained by political propaganda for generations do not automatically disappear after the signing of a document.

For example, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declares his recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and readiness for peaceful agreements. But for Azerbaijan, the issues of constitutional provisions are also important, which, according to his position, may contradict the future agreement. And even if these provisions are changed, this will not guarantee a change in public sentiment.

A similar question faces Ukraine. Russia has included a provision in its constitution that claims Ukrainian territories as its own. Even if these provisions are repealed in the future and Moscow recognizes Ukraine's internationally recognized borders, will this mean immediate reconciliation between Ukrainian and Russian societies?

I doubt it very much. After everything that happened between Ukrainians and Russians, the memory of the war will remain for generations to come. One can also mention the difficult historical relations between Russia and Poland, in particular the memory of the Katyn tragedy, which still affects the perception of the past.

In the cases of Azerbaijan and Armenia, I also draw attention to the difference between support for a particular politician and the willingness of society to accept historical compromises. For example, the results of the elections in Armenia that I analyzed do not automatically allow us to conclude that the majority of the population supports all of Pashinyan’s decisions regarding the future of peace.

In my analysis, I drew attention to the fact that approximately 30% of voters supported the current government, about 20% - the opposition, and a significant part of citizens did not participate in the vote at all. I do not believe that the fact of non-participation automatically means support for a certain position, but it certainly does not allow us to equate support for the government with support for every decision it makes. Especially when it comes to complex issues of historical memory and constitutional changes.

For me, the monuments and historical symbols that continue to exist in Armenia are an important example. I mentioned the monument to Garegin Nzhdeh in Yerevan, as well as the Nemesis memorial. In my opinion, they demonstrate that even against the backdrop of peace negotiations, conflicting historical cults can persist in society.

According to the information I had at the time of our conversation, a film about Monte Melkonian was also planned to be shown in Armenia on November 26. I am critical of the honoring of such figures, as I associate their activities with the history of the conflict between our peoples. And for me, the question arises: how can we make real peace if, in parallel, symbols that the other side perceives as hostile continue to spread?

At the same time, I am not saying that this is just a question of monuments. This is about a much deeper process of forming public consciousness. If, after signing a peace agreement, people continue to raise the next generations in anticipation of revenge, then the document itself will not be able to guarantee stability.

Even if some documents appear tomorrow, this does not mean automatic peace between nations. What happened leaves a memory for generations to come. We need to break this "Koschey needle" in consciousness, otherwise the conflict may return sooner or later,
– Yunus explained.

Azerbaijan today, in my opinion, is interested in real peace in the South Caucasus. For the prosperity of the entire region, stability is needed not only in Azerbaijan, but also in Armenia and Georgia. If such stability is not there, the threat of revanchism may arise again with the next change in international circumstances.

I do not exclude that certain political forces may count on future changes in relations between Russia, Iran, Europe and the USA. Today the geopolitical conditions are one, and tomorrow they may be different. And if society does not rethink its own past, such changes may again be used to incite conflict.

Therefore, I appeal not only to Azerbaijani society, but also to Armenian society. Peace should be concluded not just between Pashinyan and Aliyev, but between two states and peoples. For this, it is necessary to work on changes in public consciousness, and not be limited to signing political documents.

I even prepared my lecture for the Armenian audience so that they could familiarize themselves with my position. It is important for me that people on both sides understand why I consider the problem of historical memory to be so serious. Although I have no illusions about a quick voluntary rethinking of all these issues.

In this context, I draw a parallel with post-war Germany. After the victory over the Nazi regime, the victorious states carried out denazification, changed the political system and banned the corresponding symbols. In Germany, there is no state cult of Hitler, Goering, Goebbels or other leaders of the Nazi regime.

This process was complex and took years. Over time, a new political culture emerged in the Federal Republic of Germany, and figures like Konrad Adenauer played an important role in its development. That is why I ask: is Pashinyan capable of playing a similar historical role for Armenia?

So far I do not see enough grounds for such a conclusion. In my opinion, this would require much deeper changes in the attitude towards historical symbols, the cult of war and neighboring peoples. And here we return to the same "Koschey's needle".

Ukraine also has its own problems of historical memory. For a long time, different views on its own statehood, the Soviet past, and the figures of the Ukrainian liberation movement coexisted in Ukrainian society. Some considered Bandera and Shukhevych to be important symbols of Ukraine's independence, while others continued to focus on the Soviet historical heritage, Lenin and Stalin.

In my opinion, Ukraine must form a holistic awareness of its own statehood. People must understand what independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity mean to them. This is how we can reduce the possibilities of external influence on society.

I have repeatedly said that after the return of the occupied territories, Ukraine will face not only military and economic tasks. It will have to deal with the consequences of many years of Russian influence on people's consciousness. And this task may turn out to be much longer than the military operation itself.

Certain historical and territorial disputes remain in the South Caucasus region. I recall, for example, the names Geycha and Zangezur, which are used in Azerbaijani historical discourse regarding Lake Sevan and Syunik. These issues show how acutely the parties can perceive the past and how important it is to prevent its use for a new war.

I believe that Azerbaijan must remain ready to defend its own interests, but at the same time strive for a stable peace in the region. My experience shows that declarations alone are not enough for this. And if societies do not work to overcome mutual hostility, the danger of a new conflict will remain.

You must first uproot your internal "Koschey's needle" - everything that prevents Ukraine from being a unified and independent state. And then ensure that there is no such imperial "needle" in Russia. Only after this can true peace come between you,
– emphasized the professor of political science.

That is why I draw parallels between the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict, and the history of Europe after World War II. In all these cases, the end of hostilities did not automatically mean the disappearance of historical grievances and political contradictions.

In my opinion, true peace begins when societies realize the causes of the previous conflict and change their attitude towards their neighbors. This is the main idea of my lecture "Koscheya's Needle". And that is why I consider it important not only for Azerbaijan or Armenia, but also for Ukraine and Russia.

I would like to see an example of voluntary overcoming of such historical guidelines, but so far I cannot say that I have enough grounds for optimism. Therefore, I call on our society not to build illusions, to remain prepared for possible threats, and at the same time to work on the conditions for real peace.

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