The "New Munich" Syndrome: Why Peace Agreements Made Behind Ukraine's Back Are Doomed to Fail

The idea of a trilateral meeting between Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin in China – where the war in Ukraine is set to be the main topic – evokes direct historical associations. This format, which leaves no room for Ukraine itself, is reminiscent of the events of 1938 in Munich. Back then, the fate of Czechoslovakia was decided without its participation, with the outcome simply announced after the fact.

According to Western media reports, Putin proposed the meeting on the sidelines of the APEC forum in Shenzhen, China. Although these are currently only statements and leaks, the very precedent of discussing another country’s borders behind the back of the victim of aggression is extremely dangerous. The danger lies not so much in the hypothetical agreement itself as in the principle: the strong decide for the weak.

The authors of the Khmarynka HISTORY channel analyze in detail how Russia, with Trump’s help and by involving Xi Jinping, is attempting to repeat the “Munich Pact” and decide Ukraine’s fate behind its back. 24 Channel presents a text version of their analysis.

The Anatomy of Appeasement: From Czechoslovakia to Ukraine

History shows that a policy of concessions to an aggressor does not stop war, but only postpones it, making it even more devastating.

In 1938, London and Paris, wanting to avoid war, put pressure on Prague, forcing it to cede the Sudetenland. Hitler promised that this would be his final territorial demand.

In less than a year, Germany occupied all of Czechoslovakia, seizing its military industry, and later invaded Poland.

The West demonstrated a similar approach toward Russia between 2008 and 2022. In 2008, the NATO summit in Bucharest promised membership to Ukraine and Georgia without a Membership Action Plan (MAP).

That same year, Russia attacked Georgia, but instead of imposing tough sanctions, Washington announced a “reset” in relations.

In 2014, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas prompted only targeted sanctions, which failed to halt the fighting.

From 2015 to 2021, construction of the “Nord Stream 2” pipeline continued, and just before the full-scale invasion, Biden met with Putin in Geneva.

Each act of aggression ended with attempts by the West to maintain dialogue. The Kremlin perceived this as weakness and confirmation that the consequences of aggression could be weathered.

What 1938 and a Possible Summit in Shenzhen Have in Common

Analyzing the likely negotiations without Ukraine, four alarming parallels with the Munich Agreement can be identified.

• First, the absence of a key player at the table.

They are discussing the country without it. Not a single report on the possible summit mentions an invitation to Kyiv.

• Second, the legitimization of the aggressor.

Munich made Hitler a full-fledged partner. Today, there is talk of negotiations on equal footing with a leader for whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant. Putin needs to project an image of emerging from isolation.

• Third, a distortion of concepts.

The agreement is being marketed under the slogan of averting war. However, peace on Moscow’s terms would mean the redistribution of other countries’ territories, not an end to violence.

• Fourth, a pause for rearmament.

After Munich, Germany gained time and resources. Today, the Russian economy and the oil refining industry – which is suffering from attacks by Ukrainian drones – are in critical need of a breather to prepare for a new offensive.

Why 2026 Is Not 1938: Key Differences

Despite the frightening parallels, the current situation has fundamental differences that undermine the scenario of unchallenged domination by major powers.

The main difference is that Ukraine is fighting back.

Czechoslovakia had a modern army but succumbed to pressure from its allies and surrendered without a fight. Ukraine has been repelling a full-scale invasion for five years, has its own defense industry, and possesses long-range weapons.

A country capable of striking at the enemy’s economy is far less dependent on decisions made by others. Furthermore, Europe is an active player. In 1938, European leaders themselves initiated the agreement.

Today, European sanctions are in effect, and the U.S. sanctions law remains in force. It is also worth considering the lack of a unified bloc.

The trilateral format consists of three states with their own, often conflicting, interests. China is cautious about agreements that could legitimize American and Russian spheres of influence at its expense.

Finally, no documents have been signed yet; only intentions are being discussed.

Implications for the World: The Price of Backroom Deals

If the principle that the strong decide for the weak is put into practice, the consequences will extend far beyond Europe.

For Putin, this is a chance to cement his country’s status as a great power, even though he comes to the negotiating table weakened by a fuel shortage and dependence on Beijing.

For Trump, it is an opportunity to play the role of a global mediator, while risking the trust of his allies.

For Xi Jinping, it is an attractive but risky role as an arbiter.

For Ukraine, the main risk lies in pressure to make territorial concessions. However, the presence of a combat-ready army allows Kyiv to act preemptively rather than accept outcomes after the fact.

The global dimension is even more alarming. A weakening of U.S. security guarantees would send a signal to Asia. In 1994, Ukraine gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees.

If Ukraine’s fate can now be decided behind its back, then the question of the reliability of these guarantees will arise for Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. This will set a precedent that future aggressors around the world will rely on.

Possible Scenarios

Based on the current situation, there are three possible scenarios surrounding these hypothetical negotiations.

• First: The meeting will not take place due to an inability to agree on an agenda.
• Second: the leaders will meet and exchange general statements on stability without signing any binding documents.
• Third, the most dangerous scenario: the emergence of a vague framework statement on the balance of interests, which each side will interpret in its own favor, thereby creating a tool to exert pressure on Kyiv.

The main lesson of history is that a peace agreement reached without the participation of those whose borders it alters is never sustainable. It merely gives the aggressor the confidence that it can negotiate again at someone else’s expense. However, the shadow of Ukrainian resistance will inevitably loom over any negotiating table.

The Policy of Appeasement: Lessons from Munich for Ukraine – watch the video: