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17 November, 08:00
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Two-thirds of Russia’s oil refineries are under attack – and Russia won’t be able to hold out: how Ukraine can stop Putin’s war machine

In a new analytical report for 24 Channel, military expert Roman Svitan explains the Defense Forces’ strategy for destroying Russia’s oil refining industry and logistics routes. To bring about a complete collapse of the Russian economy and halt its military machine, it is necessary to destroy at least two-thirds of the enemy’s oil refining capacity.

Ukraine is systematically weakening the Russian war machine by striking not only frontline targets but also facilities on which Russia’s ability to wage war depends. Oil refineries, ports, bridges, air bases, and strike drone production facilities are all being targeted. However, even after half of its oil refining capacity has been destroyed, Russia still has reserves that allow it to mitigate the effects of the attacks.

Military expert and reserve colonel Roman Svitan explained to 24 Channel why Ukrainian forces need to destroy at least two-thirds of Russia’s oil refining capacity, which facilities should be the next targets, and how strikes on logistics are gradually depriving the occupiers of their ability to wage war.

Over the past few weeks, the Ukrainian Defense Forces have carried out a series of effective strikes against key Russian oil refineries. The President of Ukraine announced that 55% of the aggressor’s oil refining industry had been put out of commission. However, as Roman Svitan notes, this figure does not yet signify a critical turning point for the Russian war machine.

The reason lies in the specific design of these facilities, which dates back to the Soviet era. At that time, oil refining capacities were built with triple redundancy in mind.

Ukrainian intelligence data’s data also atteststo the scaleof the problems facing the Russian oil refining industry. According to the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR), as of the end of September 2026, 15 of the 38 largest Russian refineries had completely halted operations, while another 12 had reduced production. Total oil refining volumes at these facilities fell by 55.4% compared to the beginning of the year.

In other words, Russia’s refining capacity has historically been three times greater than its oil production. Most refineries were operating at only one-third of their actual capacity under normal conditions.

That is precisely why taking half of the refining capacity offline does not completely destroy Russia’s capabilities – they simply redirect flows to other, intact facilities. The Russian oil and gas system functions like the human circulatory system: if one vessel is blocked, the blood finds a detour.

For the enemy to begin experiencing a real shortage of fuel – especially diesel, which powers armored vehicles – it is necessary to destroy at least two-thirds of their refining capacity. Only after this threshold is crossed will an irreversible decline in production begin.

Full interview with Roman Svitan: watch the video

Despite the safety margins,Russia is already facing disruptions in the supply of high-octane gasoline. This is because pure high-octane grades are produced using the latest, expensive foreign equipment, which cannot be quickly restored under sanctions. However, they still have low-octane straight-run motor fuel, which is brought up to the required specifications with additives.

In parallel with strikes on the refineries themselves, Ukrainian forces have begun targeting port infrastructure and storage tanks. As refining capacity declines, the Russians are forced to divert excess oil into buffer tanks.

First, tanks at ports are filled (as was the case in Ust-Luga and Azov), then barrels along pipelines at line-production control stations. By forcing the enemy to fill these tanks, the Defense Forces gain ideal, extremely vulnerable targets.

Interestingly, Ukrainian drones are attacking not only oil refineries but also the infrastructure through which Russia stores and exports petroleum products. In particular, following the attack on November 11 at the port of Ust-Luga, at least five tanks containing petroleum products with a total volume of 150,000 cubic meters were destroyed. Such strikes create additional problems for Russian oil exports.

Gas pumping stations have become a separate priority. Gas is much easier to ignite; it explodes more quickly and causes more extensive damage to infrastructure than oil. Svitan calls this strategy a very competent and professional approach to undermining the Russian economy.

Destroying fuel is only part of the strategy. The second stage is cutting off its supply routes. That is why regular attacks on the Crimean Bridgeand the land corridor continue.

The recent strike on the Crimean Bridge, which, according to preliminary data, caused the support arch to shift, is the result of routine, daily operations. Russian air defense around the bridge is extremely dense, with short-range systems such as the “Pantsir” concentrated there. However, constant pressure, the use of decoy drones to wear down the air defense, and the deployment of the latest weapons (possibly “BARS”-type drone missiles with a warhead of up to 100 kg) are paying off.

The main goal of these attacks is not necessarily the complete destruction of the bridge right now, but rather the permanent halting of traffic. Even minor damage forces the occupiers to block traffic, conduct inspections, and create traffic jams stretching for many kilometers. At the same time, the ferry crossing between the ports of Kavkaz and Kerch – where the Russians are attempting to reroute their logistics – is also being targeted.

The situation is similar along the land corridor. Over the past month and a half, the Defense Forces have struck six bridges on the highway from Rostov to Crimea. By maintaining fire control over an operational depth of up to 500 kilometers, the Ukrainian army is reducing the intensity of Russian troop movements and limiting their ability to conduct offensive operations in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson directions.

In addition to oil refining and logistics, another key target in the operational depth is Russian air bases and drone launch sites. Confirmed strikes on the airbase in Akhtubinsk (Astrakhan Oblast) and the drone launch site in Velikoye Tsymbulovo (Oryol Oblast) demonstrate the expanding geographic scope of Ukrainian attacks.

The enemy often sets up drone launch sites on the grounds of old Soviet agricultural airfields. It is difficult to destroy them completely, as the Russians disperse their equipment; however, massive strikes by Ukrainian attack UAVs make it possible to damage airfield infrastructure and shelters where Su-34-type aircraft may be located.

The biggest problem remains thethe plant in Alabuga, where “Shaheds” are manufactured. It is located 1,500 kilometers from the border and is protected by an extremely dense air defense system, similar to the one defending Moscow or the Crimean Bridge.

To effectively strike such remote and well-protected targets, Ukraine needs its own medium-range missiles, since its current systems cannot reach them, and it is extremely difficult for drones to penetrate such defenses.

According to Roman Svitan’s estimates, systematically paralyzing the Russian economy and military will require three to four years of sustained effort. A year and a half of this campaign has already passed. There is still roughly the same amount of time left for sustained strikes on the largest oil refineries – those with a capacity of one million – to reach the target of destroying two-thirds of their capacity. Once this goal is achieved, the Russian war machine will be physically unable to continue its advance.