Russia Is Developing Its Own Version of Starlink: Berezovets Warns of a Threat to Ukraine and NATO

The Verkhovna Rada has endorsed the creation of a Space Force within the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is intended to expand the Ukrainian military’s capabilities in the use of satellite technology. Meanwhile, Russia is developing its own “Rassvet” system, which could enable the control of strike drones and pose new threats not only to Ukraine but also to NATO countries.

Taras Berezovets, an officer in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and political analyst, appeared on 24 Channel to explain why Ukraine needs a Space Force, how it can operate without its own spaceports, and why the Russian counterpart to Starlink is dangerous. He also discussed the Ukrainian army’s reliance on satellite communications, assessed the situation of Russian troops on the front lines, and commented on Donald Trump’s statements regarding Ukraine’s borders.

Why Does Ukraine Need a Space Force?

The Verkhovna Rada supported the creation of a Space Force with 245 votes as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. What will they do if Ukraine currently cannot even use its own airports, and what opportunities will this open up for our military?

Indeed, to someone unfamiliar with this field, the combination of Ukraine and space forces during a full-scale war may seem somewhat paradoxical. But I wouldn’t advise treating this initiative with irony or skepticism.

Ukraine has a rich history of space technology development. Just think of Sergei Korolev, who played a key role in creating the Soviet space program. For decades, Ukrainian engineers and designers have been among the leaders in this field.

Therefore, we possess the necessary intellectual and technological capabilities. And the current war only confirms how important it is to develop new military capabilities.

We have long since moved beyond the traditional concept of combat operations. This war is, first and foremost, a technological confrontation in which new methods of reconnaissance, command and control, and striking the enemy are constantly emerging.

In my opinion, we are already transitioning from seventh-generation warfare technologies to the next, eighth stage. And to a large extent, this development is taking place thanks to the experience of the Ukrainian Defense Forces.

Consider the creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces. In February 2024, Ukraine decided to form a separate branch of the armed forces that would specialize in the use of unmanned technologies.

At the time, this was a groundbreaking decision. Later, Russia began creating a similar military structure, drawing on Ukraine’s experience.

Today, we see that a significant portion of strikes on the battlefield are carried out precisely with the help of FPV drones, attack drones, and other robotic systems.

Therefore, the creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces was the right strategic decision. And I believe that the establishment of the Space Forces will be the next important step.

We were the first in the world to establish a separate branch of the Unmanned Systems Forces. Russia copied this decision about a year later. Now we are establishing the Space Forces, because modern warfare has long since moved beyond the land, air, and sea.

Russia has long had an Aerospace Force. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow inherited most of the relevant military and technological legacy and has actively utilized it.

However, the space component of modern warfare is not limited to launch vehicles or spaceflight. First and foremost, it involves satellites that provide reconnaissance, communications, navigation, and data transmission.

Without these technologies, it is difficult today to imagine the effective command and control of troops or the deployment of modern weapon systems.

At the same time, the adversary is also developing its own capabilities. Russia is attempting to deploy the “Rassvet” system, which it positions as an analogue to the American Starlink.

I believe this poses a serious threat to Ukraine and our allies. Accordingly, we need not only to use satellite technologies but also to develop capabilities to counter Russian space systems.

Looking ahead, one of the tasks of the new Space Forces could be to counter Russian satellites, particularly the “Rassvet” system and other constellations that Moscow will deploy in the future.

But to do this, we need to establish the appropriate structure, develop technologies, train specialists, and build cooperation with our partners.

How exactly will Ukraine’s Space Forces operate? Will we be able to control satellites while on Ukrainian territory, and how safe will such activities be?

Let’s start with the fact that states’ activities in space are governed by international law. There are international agreements adopted within the United Nations that define the rules for the use of outer space.

They impose certain restrictions on the use of weapons and military technologies in space.

But we see that Russia is trying to find ways to operate on the edge of these rules or circumvent them.

In particular, there have been instances where Russian reconnaissance satellites performed dangerous maneuvers near satellites that Finnish companies were using to support the Ukrainian Defense Forces.

I believe that Russia may be deliberately creating the risk of collisions without openly using missiles, lasers, or other weapons.

Let’s imagine a scenario: one satellite dangerously approaches another, a collision occurs, and our partner’s satellite is damaged or even rendered inoperable.

Moscow might claim that it was an accidental incident, a technical error, or a force majeure event. But such maneuvers, in my opinion, could be part of a deliberate hybrid operation.

Russia might say: “We didn’t attack; we didn’t use missiles or lasers. The satellites simply collided by accident, and one of them was destroyed.” But I believe that such actions can be carried out intentionally, and they are extremely dangerous.

Ukraine is already utilizing the reconnaissance capabilities of our allies’ satellites. We are receiving the information necessary to carry out military missions.

The next step is to expand our capabilities for directly controlling satellites that will operate in the interests of the Ukrainian military.

In the future, our partners will be able to launch the relevant spacecraft, and the Ukrainian military will control them through the newly established Space Forces.

It is not at all necessary to build a spaceport on Ukrainian territory for this purpose.

Currently, due to the war, we are unable to conduct such launches from our own territory. However, there are plenty of spaceports and the necessary infrastructure around the world.

Our partners, particularly France and the United Kingdom, can provide opportunities for launching spacecraft. Once in orbit, these spacecraft will be operated by the Ukrainian military.

In other words, we are not talking about the need to immediately create our own full-cycle rocket and space infrastructure, but rather about utilizing available technologies and partnership opportunities.

And this will allow Ukraine to develop the space component of its defense even under current conditions.

The Threat of Russia’s “Rassvet”

According to reports from the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Russia is already using the “Rassvet” network to control drones over Ukraine. This year, the Russians have launched 32 satellites into orbit, and the system potentially allows for the transmission of data from reconnaissance drones and the rerouting of strike UAVs during flight. How advanced is it, and how can Ukraine counter it?

First and foremost, it is important to understand that the “Rassvet” system is still in the testing phase.

We cannot yet objectively assess how successful this project will be or whether the Russians will be able to realize all the capabilities they claim.

However, it is already clear that it should not be underestimated.

If Russia is able to fully deploy the corresponding satellite constellation, it will significantly expand the capabilities of its military.

First and foremost, this involves gathering intelligence and transmitting data in real time.

This could allow the Russian military to monitor the situation over Ukrainian territory more effectively, as well as increase its surveillance capabilities over NATO countries.

Particularly dangerous is the potential use of satellite communications to control strike drones.

The Russians will be able not only to transmit information from reconnaissance drones but also to adjust the flight paths of attack drones directly during flight.

These are extremely important capabilities in modern warfare, as they allow for rapid responses to changing situations and the refinement of missions for unmanned systems.

But I see another potential application for such technologies.

Russia may attempt to carry out cyber operations against other countries’ space infrastructure.

Theoretically, this could involve interfering with satellite software, attempting to disrupt their operation, or even taking control of individual satellites.

If such an operation were successful, a satellite could cease to perform its tasks or sustain damage. This applies to both commercial and government space systems.

I am not claiming that “Rassvet” already possesses all these capabilities. However, I believe that it is precisely these threats that must be taken into account when assessing the development of Russia’s military space program.

It would be a huge mistake to underestimate the danger posed by the “Rassvet” system today. This is a threat not only to Ukraine but also to our allies, as Russia will attempt to use its new space capabilities against other nations.

At the same time, the project itself is not without its problems.

According to the information I have, over the past few months the Russians have lost contact with three satellites. They have effectively ceased to perform their tasks, which means a loss of the resources invested.

And this is despite the enormous funds that Russia is directing toward the program’s development.

Another problem is the Russian space industry’s technological dependence on foreign components.

I do not believe that Russia is currently capable of independently manufacturing all the components for such a complex satellite system using only its own technologies.

Therefore, it is quite likely that a significant portion of the equipment is of foreign origin.

First and foremost, these may be components manufactured in China, Malaysia, and other countries with advanced electronics industries.

I also do not rule out the possibility that Russian satellites may use technologies or components developed in G7 countries.

But to confirm this, we would need to examine the specific equipment. For now, we can only speak of the likelihood that such components are being used.

This raises another important question – the effectiveness of international sanctions.

Despite restrictions on the supply of dual-use technologies, Russia continues to develop its own military space programs.

Clearly, it is finding ways to purchase or obtain the necessary equipment. That is precisely why we need to strengthen control over technology supply chains.

Some people used to mock Russian space projects, assuming that Moscow would once again fail to create anything effective.

But I would not advise taking such a dismissive attitude toward an adversary.

Yes, “Rassvet” is still undergoing testing and has technical issues. However, Russia is investing significant resources in it, and in the future, this system could significantly alter its military capabilities.

An Alternative to Starlink

There have been reports that the Ukrainian Armed Forces may have begun using Israeli High Sky satellite terminals. At the same time, Donald Trump denies any involvement in possible restrictions on Starlink. Does Ukraine have a full-fledged alternative to this system, and is it possible to use multiple satellite networks simultaneously?

It must be acknowledged that, as of today, no system among Western nations can fully replace Starlink in terms of all its capabilities.

SpaceX has been developing this technology for many years, utilizing not only cutting-edge engineering solutions but also enormous financial resources.

Elon Musk was able to invest significant personal funds and attract additional investments, which enabled the company to create a large-scale satellite constellation.

Therefore, the emergence of individual alternative terminals does not yet mean that they are capable of providing all of Starlink’s functions to the same extent.

At the same time, reliance on a single system in a wartime environment is extremely dangerous.

Using Ukraine as an example, European partners have seen that access to critically important information and communications can be threatened without clear explanation.

That is precisely why representatives of the French government have begun discussing the need to create a European satellite communications system of their own.

European NATO and EU countries must develop the necessary infrastructure so that in the future they will not be dependent on the decisions of a single American company.

Everyone saw from the example of Ukraine that communications critical to the battlefield can be shut down without explanation. And no one will even attempt to explain what happened. That is precisely why Europe must create its own alternative to Starlink.

Regarding possible restrictions on the system’s operation in Ukraine, I believe that the relevant circumstances should be investigated by U.S. government agencies.

Questions about who exactly made the decision, whether representatives of the Pentagon or SpaceX were involved, and whether there were any violations of the law fall within the jurisdiction of the United States.

According to the information I have, members of the new Congress have already expressed their intention to establish a special investigative committee.

This commission could examine the actions of representatives of Elon Musk’s company and officials from the U.S. Department of Defense.

If it is determined that certain individuals knowingly made decisions that violated the law or contractual obligations, they must be held accountable in accordance with U.S. law.

But it is important to keep one more fact in mind.

The satellite communication services we are discussing are not simply a personal gift from Elon Musk to Ukraine.

The funding for these services comes, in particular, from a contract with the Polish government. In other words, these are services paid for by Polish taxpayers and received by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

This constitutes a commercial relationship that entails certain rights and obligations for the parties involved.

This is not a charitable act by Musk. The Polish government has entered into a contract and is paying for SpaceX services received by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Therefore, Poland has the right to demand fulfillment of contractual obligations and, if necessary, to impose penalties provided for in the contract.

I am convinced that the legal and commercial issues surrounding these contracts can be resolved through established procedures.

But for Europe, the main takeaway is the need to develop its own independent satellite communications capabilities.

And the resources for this are available.

France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other European countries have strong research institutions, engineers, technology companies, and access to space infrastructure.

Therefore, the problem lies not in a lack of specialists or technological potential, but in the need to make the necessary decisions and fund their implementation.

In my opinion, European countries should begin this work as soon as possible. After all, satellite communications have already become an integral part of modern military security.

Russian Offensive Stalls

According to observations by “Military,” the Russian Ministry of Defense has not reported the capture of any new settlements in Ukraine since October 28. Previously, Russian officials made such statements almost daily. Why have they stopped, and what does this say about the situation on the front lines?

The answer is quite simple: because the Russians are failing to capture new settlements.

Remember when Putin was asked about the sinking of the submarine “Kursk,” and he replied, “It sank”?

The current situation with Russian reports of military successes can be described in much the same way.

Previously, Russian propaganda repeatedly announced the capture of the very same towns and villages. At times, it seemed as though they had already managed to take a single village more times than there are days in a year.

This also applies to reports of combat operations in the areas around Druzhkivka, Kostiantynivka, Sloviansk, and other cities in the Donetsk region.

However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Russian army to demonstrate tangible results.

According to estimates by independent OSINT analysts, including the Institute for the Study of War, over the past two months Russia has lost more territory than it has been able to capture.

And this is an indicator worth considering when assessing the enemy’s capabilities.

The Russian war machine isn’t just stalling – it’s now beginning to lose ground. The Russians are not demonstrating the ability to conduct serious, successful offensive operations, even at the operational or tactical level.

I am in contact with commanders of Ukrainian units and can confirm that the situation on the front lines remains difficult.

We shouldn’t give the impression that Russia has lost all its military capabilities or no longer poses a threat.

But at the same time, we see a certain impasse in its offensive strategy.

The Russian command is not demonstrating any fundamentally new approaches that would allow it to achieve significant success on the battlefield.

The possibility of an offensive into strategic depth – which Russia had planned at the start of the full-scale invasion – is effectively off the table.

However, the enemy is struggling even to achieve smaller objectives in certain sectors of the front.

This does not mean that the Russians have stopped looking for solutions. They are constantly analyzing their own failures, trying to change tactics, and developing new technologies.

That is precisely why the Ukrainian army cannot stop evolving either.

We must maintain our advantage where we have already achieved significant results and constantly adapt to changes on the battlefield.

This is especially true for unmanned systems, reconnaissance, and the use of precision-guided weapons.

Furthermore, Russia is clearly pinning high hopes on a winter offensive campaign.

Historically, the Russian military command has often relied on harsh weather conditions as a factor that can influence the course of hostilities.

Now, the enemy may be hoping that winter will bring new opportunities for an offensive.

In particular, Russia is trying to increase pressure on Ukraine’s rear by striking energy facilities and other critical infrastructure.

I attribute these attacks not only to a desire to create problems for the civilian population, but also to attempts to disrupt the Ukrainian defense system ahead of possible new offensive operations.

Therefore, Russia’s current difficulties on the front lines should not lead to an underestimation of its future plans.

Hackers have released data from Russian state statistics showing that, as of August 28, more than 450,000 war-related deaths had been recorded. According to some projections, the death toll could reach 563,000–597,000 by the end of the year, although actual losses may be higher due to those missing in action. To what extent do these figures reflect the effectiveness of the Ukrainian military?

Statistics on Russian losses over the past few months are indeed extremely disheartening for the enemy.

And this is a direct result of the effective work of Ukrainian units, which are decimating the Russian army’s manpower.

The defense forces have significantly improved their capabilities in this area, primarily through the expanded use of unmanned systems.

For example, newly formed unmanned aerial vehicle battalions are now operating as part of the Territorial Defense Forces’ brigades.

Their mission is not only to deploy drones directly on the battlefield but also to accumulate and share practical experience among units.

We see that many Ukrainian brigades are demonstrating exceptionally high performance in the use of drones.

Moreover, this applies not only to the Territorial Defense Forces but also to other branches and types of the Armed Forces.

Drone operators are constantly refining their tactics, adapting their equipment to new conditions, and seeking ways to strike Russian targets more effectively.

That is precisely why I consider the creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces to be such an important decision.

Over the past two years, this field has developed to a level that allows Ukraine to claim a leading position in the world in terms of practical experience in the use of military drone technologies.

Today, Ukraine holds a leading position globally in many areas of unmanned systems application. And this is no longer just a source of pride, but a strategically important achievement for our security.

The experience we have gained is of great significance not only for Ukraine but also for its European partners.

I am convinced that without the Ukrainian military and its practical expertise, it will be extremely difficult for Europe to build an effective defense system in the future.

Our allies already understand just how valuable the experience of the Ukrainian military is.

This applies to the use of drones, intelligence, countering new weapons systems, and organizing defense in the context of a major war.

Therefore, once hostilities end, I expect many European countries to show increased interest in Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

Of course, there are political forces in Europe that oppose such a decision. These can include both far-right and far-left parties.

But ultimately, states are guided first and foremost by their own national interests.

And where the interests of Ukraine and its allies coincide, other political arguments may gradually lose their significance.

In my opinion, Ukraine’s military and technological expertise will become one of the most important factors for the future European security architecture.

Trump and Ukraine’s Borders

Donald Trump has stated that after the war ends, Ukraine may have a somewhat different shape. How do you assess these remarks by the U.S. president?

I saw these statements and specifically reviewed excerpts from Trump’s interview in the original.

I paid attention not only to his remarks about Ukraine’s borders but also to his other comments on the war, Iran, and Vladimir Putin.

I was particularly surprised by his explanation of the reasons behind the start of Russian aggression.

Trump suggested that Russia was allegedly insulted during negotiations, that its leadership was not treated with sufficient respect, and that this could have been one of the causes of the war.

As far as I understood, he was referring to the meeting between Zelenskyy and Putin in Paris.

But if we take such an argument seriously, we will find ourselves in an extremely dangerous situation.

It follows that any diplomatic disagreement or personal insult could be presented as a justification for military aggression.

And the next step, hypothetically speaking, could be Putin claiming that Zelenskyy looked at him the wrong way during negotiations and using that as a pretext for new threats.

It is clear that such logic cannot serve as the foundation for international relations.

That is why I find it difficult to comment on such remarks by the U.S. president at all.

There is an important rule in diplomacy: political leaders should not determine what the borders of other sovereign states should be.

This is an extremely sensitive issue that concerns international law, state sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Therefore, I see no point in analyzing in detail Trump’s personal assumptions about what Ukraine might look like after the war.

This is his own vision, which was evidently shaped by his understanding of the causes of the conflict and the advice of his inner circle.

But it does not change Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders.

We understand perfectly well that Ukraine’s borders will not change as a result. The fact that part of our territory has been occupied since 2014 does not mean that it has ceased to be Ukrainian.

Here, we must clearly distinguish between de facto control over territories and their status under international law.

Russia may temporarily control Ukrainian lands, but that does not mean they automatically become part of the Russian Federation.

Similarly, Ukrainians who lived in these territories before the occupation do not cease to be citizens of Ukraine simply because Russian troops have established control there.

The de facto occupation may continue. But de jure, Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders remain unchanged.

I am convinced that Ukraine cannot exist within any internationally recognized borders other than those of 1991.

And on this issue, it has the support of the majority of Ukrainian society and its European allies.

Therefore, any statements by foreign political leaders regarding a possible change to Ukraine’s borders cannot, in and of themselves, alter the legal status of our territories.

Berezovets on Ukraine’s Space Forces: Watch the video