Russia Has Found a Weak Spot in Ukraine's Energy Sector: Kryvolap on New Attack Tactics

Russia has begun using new "Geran-5" jet-powered drones against Ukraine, in which dozens of foreign-made electronic components have been found. At the same time, the occupiers are intensifying their attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, attempting to damage not only power generation facilities but also substations through which electricity is delivered to consumers.

Aviation expert Kostyantyn Kryvolap explained on 24 Channel how prepared Ukraine is to counter the new Russian drones and why protective structures do not always save energy facilities. He also discussed the expansion of Russian drone launch sites, the prospects for producing missiles for the Patriot system, and a special unit tasked with targeting enemy launchers.

Why Russia Depends on Western Components for Missiles and Drones

Russia has begun deploying new “Geran-5” jet-powered drones, which can already be compared to small cruise missiles. The Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) examined one of the samples: of the 93 electronic components, 52 were found to be American-made, while 10 each were Chinese and Swiss. How critical are these components to the Russian defense industry?

Without these components – especially high-speed chips – Russian missiles and drones will be unable to perform their missions properly. They may continue to fly, but they will face serious problems with accuracy, guidance, and orientation.

Without these components, the missiles will behave completely erratically. There will be no accuracy, no proper guidance or orientation system. They will be unable to effectively carry out their missions,
– explained Kryvolap.

Another issue is how to cut off the supply of necessary components. Sanctions are already limiting Russia’s capabilities, but general bans alone are not enough. We need to move toward detailed tracking of specific shipments, intermediary companies, and supply routes.

I recall the story of Andrei Belousov, who currently heads the Russian Ministry of Defense. Back in 2013–2014, when Moscow was preparing for aggressive actions against Ukraine, the question arose of how the Russian economy would function under international sanctions.

Belousov is considered one of the architects of a system designed to circumvent such restrictions. It involves the use of numerous intermediary companies through which equipment and components can be purchased without revealing the final recipient.

If one were to examine specific shipments of electronics for Russian weapons, it would most likely reveal not just one company, but an entire chain of intermediaries. However, modern intelligence capabilities make it possible to track international trade transactions.

This is especially true for the United States. U.S. intelligence agencies have far greater capabilities for analyzing financial and trade ties than might appear at first glance.

If cryptocurrencies are used in such transactions or if risks to the U.S. economy arise, U.S. financial intelligence may get involved. It has the necessary tools to uncover complex financial schemes.

The main issue is political will. If they want to, it will become clear who is supplying these components to Russia and how. U.S. intelligence has sufficient capabilities for this,
the expert emphasized.

At the same time, electronics manufacturers cannot automatically be blamed for the fact that their products are found in Russian weapons. A significant portion of these components are dual-use goods that are also used in the civilian industry.

For example, Texas Instruments may sell its products to ordinary commercial buyers without knowing that, after passing through several intermediaries, these parts will end up in Russian missiles.

Therefore, an effective response requires not only sanctions against manufacturers or individual companies but also the identification of the entire supply chain. Without this, Russia will retain the ability to obtain critically important electronics through third countries.

Jet-powered “Geran” drones threaten substations around Kyiv

The “Geran-4” and “Geran-5” jet drones are significantly faster than conventional “Shaheds,” making them harder to shoot down. Ukraine is already testing interceptor drones, but is this enough to defend against the new Russian weaponry?

We’ve now returned to a success rate where the effectiveness of shooting down such jet-powered drones is approximately 75–85%. This is a fairly good result, especially considering that we don’t yet have the necessary number of interceptor drones.

But even with this level of air defense effectiveness, the problem of the sheer number of attacks remains. The Russians are launching many drones, and some of them still manage to penetrate Ukrainian defenses.

These attacks have become particularly dangerous due to a shift in Russia’s energy strategy.

The enemy has already inflicted significant damage on Ukrainian power plants. However, on a national scale, there are still certain generation reserves that can compensate for some of the losses.

Instead, transmitting the generated electricity to consumers is becoming an increasingly serious problem.

Despite all the destruction, we still have substantial generation reserves. But electricity transmission has become the weak link. And the Russians have set out to deliberately destroy this very system,
– Kryvolap explained.

Around Kyiv, the enemy is attacking substations that operate at both the “Ukrenergo” and regional power company levels. The ability to transmit electricity from other regions to the capital and surrounding communities depends on them.

Therefore, even with sufficient electricity generation, damage to the grids can create serious problems with its supply.

The “Geran” jet drones complicate the situation due to their high speed. In particular, the Russians are using several variants of these drones, including the “Geran-5” and “Geran-5K” with swept-back wings.

They require a faster response from Ukrainian air defense forces. So far, we have had to actively deploy aircraft to counter these drones.

At the same time, an electronic warfare system has already been established and integrated over Kyiv, which can be described as a sort of electronic warfare dome. In my assessment, this makes it more difficult for the Russians to deploy drones directly over the capital.

However, protecting the city does not mean complete security for facilities located around it. It is precisely the substations outside the capital that remain crucial for the stable operation of the power grid.

We are constantly looking for ways to improve the effectiveness of intercepting jet-powered drones. The Russians, in turn, are refining their own weapons and trying to adapt them to Ukrainian countermeasures.

There is an ongoing technological battle. We are learning to shoot down their drones, while the Russians are trying to make these drones harder to take down. And this process never stops,
the expert noted.

A similar situation is unfolding on Russian territory. Ukrainian drones are increasingly attacking Russian thermal power plants and energy hubs, causing serious power outages in a number of regions.

Russia is also trying to strengthen its own air defenses to shoot down more Ukrainian drones. Therefore, both sides are forced to constantly adapt their technologies to the enemy’s new capabilities.

Concrete shelters cannot protect the entire power grid

Many power facilities in the Kyiv region – on which the capital’s electricity supply depends – have been damaged. Can concrete protective structures safeguard substations and other equipment from new attacks?

The effectiveness of such structures depends largely on their design. Initially, various engineering solutions – including concrete blocks – were used to protect transformers.

But if a structure is enclosed only on the sides and lacks adequate protection from above, the protective elements may fail to fulfill their purpose entirely during a drone strike.

A missile or drone attacks from above, so it is important not just to place concrete around the transformer, but to create a structure capable of withstanding such an attack.

The second problem is the number of facilities that are actually protected.

Reports have cited a figure of approximately 63% of protected equipment. But, in my estimation, the actual proportion of facilities with adequate protection is significantly lower.

Moreover, it is physically impossible to shield absolutely all equipment in the power grid.

First and foremost, large transformers were protected, since damage to them leads to large-scale fires and complex repair work.

Such devices are used to convert electricity from high voltage to lower voltage. Specifically, this refers to networks with voltages of 750, 350, 110, and 10 kilovolts.

Once a transformer is damaged, it must be repaired or replaced. And although there are some spare parts available, the Russians are striking so frequently that restoration work is not always completed before the next attack.

The resources for restoration are there, but time is in short supply. The Russians are striking so frequently that we simply cannot keep up with installing everything and fully restoring operations,
– Kryvolap explained.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that the enemy has begun targeting more than just the transformers themselves.

Other substation components are also being hit, including switching equipment, circuit breakers, and metal structures that ensure the entire system’s operation.

Some power facilities cover areas of several hectares. They house a large amount of equipment, which can also be damaged and require replacement.

According to information I’ve received from experts at Ukrenergo and regional power companies, repair crews are making tremendous efforts to restore the damaged grids. However, due to the intensity of the attacks, they are primarily facing a shortage of time.

Therefore, concrete structures remain an important element of protection, but they cannot completely eliminate the risks to the energy infrastructure. Some of the equipment will continue to be vulnerable to Russian strikes.

Russia wants to increase the number of drone launch sites to twenty

Russia is expanding the drone launch site in Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, from which it launches jet-powered drones against Ukraine. In September, an additional launch site was built there, even as the Ukrainian Defense Forces had already reported the destruction of similar infrastructure. How important are strikes against such targets?

When the Russians first began using “Shaheds” on a large scale, they had approximately eight main launch sites.

These sites were located in various directions – from northern Russia to its southern regions. In particular, they used Primorsko-Akhtarsk, as well as sites in occupied Crimea, including Gvardeyskoye and Cape Chauda.

However, over time, the Russian leadership decided to significantly increase the number of drones that could be deployed simultaneously against Ukraine.

In the middle of last year, they were considering the possibility of increasing production of jet-powered drones to approximately 3,000 and conventional piston-engine “Shaheds” to 2,500.

These are precisely the aircraft that carry combat payloads and are designed to strike targets.

I do not include “Gerberas,” “Parodies,” and other decoy drones in these figures. They perform other tasks: they can serve as reconnaissance drones, create interference, or divert the attention of air defense systems by acting as false targets.

The Russians’ existing infrastructure proved insufficient for launching a significantly larger number of strike drones.

They concluded that they need to build about 12 more drone launch sites to bring the total number of launch sites to 20. This will allow them to spread out the launches and ensure the scale of attacks they are planning,
– Kryvolap explained.

The Russians have set up one such site in Tsymbalove. The Ukrainian military has already dealt a serious blow to it.

Now the Russian side is expanding its infrastructure in Millerovo. In my opinion, this facility may also come under new Ukrainian attacks.

Interestingly, to launch jet-powered drones, the Russians use special launch rails comparable to catapults.

Last year, at an international exhibition – in Africa, if I’m not mistaken – they demonstrated an approximately 85-meter-long structure for launching the “Geran-4” and “Geran-5.”

At first, I didn’t understand why this system was being presented as such a significant technological achievement. Essentially, it’s a long launch rail mounted on the ground, and there’s nothing extraordinary about its design.

But it later became clear that what matters most to the Russians is the ability to conduct a large number of launches from a single site.

Using mobile launch systems or containers on such a large scale proved to be more difficult for them. That is why they opted for large, stationary launch rails.

If these facilities are not destroyed, the Russians will continue to increase the number of launch sites and related equipment.

I now seriously expect that a missile strike will be launched against the drone port in Millerovo and that this facility will sustain significant damage,
the expert speculated.

Destroying such sites is important primarily because of their role in enabling mass attacks. If Russia loses part of its launch infrastructure, it will have to restore the equipment and reorganize its launch operations.

What Will Help Ukraine Counter Ballistic Missiles More Effectively

Ukraine still relies heavily on PAC-3 missiles from the Patriot systems to intercept Russian ballistic missiles. What needs to be done to strengthen missile defense, and how important is it to destroy the launchers themselves?

We have relied on the Patriot systems and will continue to do so in the near future. We already have the necessary launch complexes, and the main task is to ensure they have a sufficient number of missiles.

This applies to both the PAC-3 and the PAC-2. If Ukraine obtains a license to manufacture at least some of these missiles, that would be a very significant achievement.

However, I do not think we will be able to produce the PAC-3 MSE on our own. There are significant technological limitations to this.

The main challenge lies in the missile’s homing system. According to my information, its development and production are tied to Boeing, and the program itself also involves Lockheed Martin and Raytheon.

This is high-tech equipment on which the missile’s ability to accurately hit a ballistic target largely depends. It is precisely these components that create a bottleneck in the production of the PAC-3 MSE.

Transferring the relevant technologies or licenses is no easy task. Therefore, even with the necessary production capacity, it would be extremely difficult to quickly organize a full production cycle for such missiles in Ukraine.

I consider the production of the PAC-2 GEM-T to be a more realistic option.

These missiles can also be used against ballistic targets, although their effectiveness in this role is lower than that of the specialized PAC-3 MSE.

The difference lies, in particular, in the engagement principle.

The PAC-3 MSE uses “hit-to-kill” technology, meaning a direct kinetic impact on the target. The interceptor must collide directly with the enemy missile and destroy it using the energy of the impact.

It is this technology that ensures high effectiveness against ballistic missiles. PAC-2 GEM-T missiles operate on a different principle and have a lower probability of intercepting such targets.

However, even expanding PAC-2 production would be an important step, as it would allow for the provision of additional munitions to Ukraine’s existing systems.

There is also a promising European initiative – the FREYJA project, on which a coalition of ten countries is working.

Its goal is to create a new anti-ballistic defense system for Europe. However, the coalition members have not yet made final decisions regarding the division of production, funding, and responsibility for individual components.

Technically, the capabilities for initial testing already exist.

The first interception tests could be conducted as early as December – perhaps not on Russian ballistic missiles, but on similar targets to test the technology. But the necessary political will for this is not yet in place,
– Kryvolap explained.

One option involves using the FP7X missile. It will differ from the base FP7 model by featuring a seeker head from Diehl Defence, a company known for developing the IRIS-T systems.

I consider this direction promising, but we shouldn’t expect quick results. Even after a political decision is made, it will take time to conduct tests, verify the compatibility of all components, and organize production.

However, there is a task that Ukraine can already carry out without waiting for new international programs: the destruction of Russian launchers used to carry out ballistic strikes.

Russian “Iskanders” are already becoming targets for a special unit

Recently, the Russians have significantly reduced the time their missile systems spend at launch positions.

Their crews quickly move into a designated area, launch missiles within a few minutes, and attempt to leave the site immediately.

Typically, this process takes about two to six minutes. This indicates that the enemy is aware of the danger of having its launchers detected and destroyed.

This applies to both the “Iskander” operational-tactical missile systems and the S-300 and S-400 systems, which the Russians are using to strike Ukrainian territory.

It is sometimes possible to distinguish between the use of these systems based on the nature of the attack and the number of explosions. Based on my observations, launches from the S-300 and S-400 often occur in bursts of four, whereas the “Iskander” systems typically employ a different firing pattern.

There is also a difference in the warheads. An “Iskander-M” missile can carry approximately 500 kilograms of explosive, whereas for the 48N6 family of anti-aircraft missiles, which are used with the S-300 and S-400, I estimate the figure to be around 200 kilograms.

These characteristics help analyze the nature of the strikes, although definitive conclusions require relevant data on a specific attack.

The Ukrainian military has already demonstrated the ability to destroy Russian missile systems before they can fire their weapons.

In particular, there were recent reports of two “Iskander” systems and one “Pantsir” system being destroyed. To me, this result shows just how important the development of Ukrainian weapons systems for combating enemy launchers is becoming.

I expect that the Defense Forces’ capabilities in this area will grow at an ever-faster pace.

“We have a special unit dedicated to destroying Iskander tactical missile systems and the launchers of the S-300 and S-400 systems,”
– Kryvolap said.

It is precisely because of its work and the actions of other Ukrainian units that I see the immediate prospects for a reduction in Russian ballistic attacks.

Of course, Ukraine will continue to need missiles for the Patriot system and to develop its own missile defense systems. But as long as the number of interceptors remains limited, it is extremely important to destroy the equipment that allows the Russians to carry out launches.

In my assessment, the Ukrainian military will gradually build up these capabilities. Recent results already show that the enemy is forced to change how it deploys its missile systems due to the threat of their destruction.

Kryvolap on attacks on the energy sector: watch the video