"Trump Plays on Putin's Side": Ogryzko on the US Plan for Donbas and the Abu Dhabi Talks

After a nine-month hiatus, Ukraine, the United States, and Russia resumed talks in Abu Dhabi, but the Kremlin's position on ending the war remains unchanged. At the same time, the American side proposes discussing a new European security system and even a possible redrawing of the administrative borders of Ukrainian regions.

Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ogryzko explained on Channel 24 why he does not expect a breakthrough in the negotiations and what danger he sees in the initiatives of Donald Trump's team, which he believes play into Putin's hands. He also assessed the impact of Ukrainian strikes on the Russian economy, the prospects for military aid from the new US Congress, and the risks to Ukraine's European integration due to corruption scandals.

What the Kremlin wants from the negotiations

After a nine-month hiatus, talks between Ukraine, the United States, and Russia resumed in Abu Dhabi. Moscow sent an 11-person delegation led by Vladimir Medinsky, which also included representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the General Staff, and the FSB. Does this composition indicate a willingness to negotiate, or is Russia once again trying to stall for time?

The question is not who is part of the delegation. It can be formed from any people, someone can be called a member, expert or advisor. The outcome of the negotiations does not depend on this. The main thing is what directives these people received from their leadership: to seek agreements or simply to delay the process.

From what we see now, there are no signs of Putin's readiness for real compromises. There is no talk even of continuing some local truces, which could later become the basis for broader agreements. There are no concrete decisions on stopping attacks on Ukrainian energy or hostilities in the Black Sea. The only thing that is being talked about again is the possibility of prisoner exchanges, and this, of course, should be supported.

The main thing is not who is in the delegation, but what is written in the directives. What were these people ordered to do in the negotiations: stall for time or negotiate something? Right now, there are no signs of Putin's desire to make agreements.

However, there is one person in the Russian delegation whose presence deserves attention. This is Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. It was he who, in December 2021, was tasked with publicly voicing the Kremlin's demand to return NATO's military infrastructure to its 1997 borders.

Russia then effectively proposed to the Alliance countries to leave Central and Eastern Europe without the usual military protection. Moscow wanted to create a gray zone in which it could impose its own security rules on neighboring states. Ryabkov was one of the main public representatives of this idea, so his participation in the current negotiations may indicate an attempt to return to old Russian demands.

Now the Trump team is talking about a massive deal that supposedly provides a new vision for European security. But I don’t see how such talk can bring the war closer to an end while Russia continues to kill Ukrainians and destroy our infrastructure.

Trump talks about a great big deal that everyone will be thrilled about. I think he and Putin will be thrilled, but everyone else won't. Because we're being asked to talk about future security while the war continues.

The position of Ukraine and its European partners should be the opposite: first a cessation of hostilities, and only then substantive negotiations on further relations and security mechanisms. Otherwise, Russia will simply use the diplomatic process to continue the war and advance its ultimatums.

The Kremlin is bringing back old ultimatums

I agree with the idea that Trump and Putin are trying to decide the future of Europe without due consideration of the position of the Europeans themselves. But now it is not only them who will determine how Ukraine and other states of the continent will live. The political capabilities of the American president have significantly weakened after the elections to Congress.

Please note that in recent days I have not heard from Trump any demands for Ukraine to stop attacks on Russian oil refineries. Previously, he could publicly pressure his partners, but now his position no longer looks so strong. And this, in my opinion, is directly related to changes in American policy.

Instead, Putin continues to receive political support from Trump. Economically, Russia is largely dependent on Chinese aid, and on the international stage, its leadership is trying to take advantage of the position of the current American administration.

Sergey Lavrov's recent account of the negotiations at the end of 2021 was also very revealing. According to his version, the then US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken explained during a personal conversation that Washington could not guarantee that Ukraine would not join NATO. The maximum that could be discussed at that time was certain agreements on the deployment of short- and medium-range missiles.

Let's see what the Russian demands have led to. Finland and Sweden, which were not previously members of NATO, have joined the Alliance. Ukraine is developing its own long-range weapons, including drones that can already cover considerable distances. And now the Kremlin is again trying to present its ultimatums as the need to build a new security system.

We have a Russian foreign policy fiasco. And now they want to pull this dead cat, which has been dead for a long time, out again, put it on the table and say: look, what a wonderful cat. Let's try to revive it.

In my opinion, talk of returning to the security arrangements of 1997 does not correspond to current realities. Russia has changed the situation in Europe through its own actions, and now it wants to regain the opportunities it lost through aggression through diplomacy.

Strikes on refineries strengthen Ukraine

Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the successes of the Defense Forces at the front and strikes on the Russian rear are strengthening Ukraine's negotiating position. To what extent can such attacks force the Kremlin to change its position?

The answer is quite simple. There are already reports of new restrictions on the sale of gasoline in Russia: up to 30 liters for a car in the city and up to 50 liters on the highway. And I see this as one of the manifestations of the problems arising in the Russian fuel system.

Over the past seven or eight days, the Ukrainian military has demonstrated how significant the attacks on Russian infrastructure can be. If they continue at this rate, the Kremlin will have to devote more and more resources to restoring damaged enterprises. And disruptions in fuel production affect not only civilian transport, but also the supply of the army.

When there is no fuel to refuel not only a car, but also a truck that carries weapons to the occupied territories, this is already an argument for Putin why the war needs to be stopped.

Therefore, I agree with Zelensky: our military successes directly affect the negotiating possibilities. The Kremlin can ignore diplomatic appeals, but it is much more difficult for it to ignore the damage to the enterprises on which the functioning of the Russian economy and military logistics depend.

Some Ukrainians doubt that the Russian economy is really approaching a crisis. Even if businesses suffer losses, the Kremlin can continue to finance the war for a long time. What real consequences of our strikes can we already see?

They are becoming more and more visible. Look at the recent strike on the Kirishi oil refinery in the Leningrad region. Previously, an attack might have damaged one production line, after which the Russians would have tried to restore it for several weeks or months. Now, according to my observations, strikes can affect seven or eight production lines at once.

This is a completely different scale of damage. When a significant part of the production equipment fails, repairs can take months, and it is still unknown whether the enterprise will be fully restored to operation. I believe that the Ukrainian Defense Forces are gradually moving towards a much more effective impact on the most important objects of the Russian economy.

Previously, one production line would arrive, but today, seven or eight. If one could be restored in a few weeks or months, now the repair will take months. And there is also the question of whether it will be possible to restore everything at all.

Strikes on the enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex, in particular on the facilities in Votkinsk, are also important. Damage to such production facilities affects the Kremlin's ability to supply its army. And if problems arise simultaneously in oil refining, the military industry and the transport system, the consequences gradually accumulate.

The difficult economic situation is evidenced by Russian discussions themselves. I recently saw a meeting of the State Duma with the participation of the head of the Central Bank, Elvira Nabiullina, where economic problems were discussed. With the official inflation rate at 4.6%, the Russian authorities, according to the information I cited, are considering raising utility tariffs by at least 11%.

Add to this the recommendations to replace meat with legumes, which are presented to Russians as a complete alternative in terms of protein content. Such messages in themselves do not mean economic collapse, but they show how people's daily lives are changing.

Another telling moment is the news that Russia is selling part of its gold reserves. States usually try to accumulate such assets, rather than spend them. I attribute this to the Russian budget's need to find additional funds.

The Russian economy may not be growing as fast as we would like, but it is still heading towards a crisis. It is no coincidence that Russia has started selling gold, and on a large scale. And why? Because there is a hole in its pocket.

One successful strike should not be expected to instantly bring the Russian economy to a standstill. But systematic attacks on important enterprises create problems that the Kremlin has to solve while financing the war.

Where to direct Ukrainian ballistics

Ukrainians are asking when our ballistic missiles will be able to hit Moscow's energy facilities so that the Russians will feel the consequences of the same blackouts we are experiencing. Should we choose these targets now?

Here, first of all, it is necessary to take into account financial capabilities. Each missile has its own cost, and Ukraine has less money for the production and purchase of weapons than we would like. Therefore, it is necessary to determine priorities: for example, to hit an electrical substation in Moscow so that the power goes out there for a certain period of time, or to destroy the Russian S-400 complex or the launcher that the enemy uses to strike Ukraine.

I support the decision to focus primarily on destroying Russian weapons. After all, a damaged substation can create a spectacular picture, but if enemy missile systems remain intact, they will continue to attack Ukrainian cities.

While we are limited in finances, it is more correct to destroy the weapons that they want to destroy us with. Because if we just make a pretty picture on the screen and the Russian missiles remain, they will continue to hit us.

This approach is already affecting the enemy's actions. According to the information I provided, Russia has redeployed 47 strategic bombers to the Far East. I attribute this to an attempt to move the planes beyond the reach of Ukrainian weapons. And this indicates that the Russian command is already taking into account the possibility of Ukrainian attacks on remote military facilities.

The situation is similar with oil refining. Russia is trying to concentrate some of its infrastructure further east, but the main oil refining facilities are located in the European part of the country. There are significantly fewer enterprises beyond the Urals, and those that are operating also need repairs and maintenance.

Therefore, I believe that Ukraine should continue to focus its limited resources on those objects that directly support Russian aggression. When opportunities become more numerous, there will be room for a wider choice of targets. But for now, the main thing is to reduce the enemy's ability to strike and continue offensive operations.

Europe must be at the table

Before the talks in Abu Dhabi, the Ukrainian delegation met with representatives of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, NATO and the European Commission. Why is it so important for us to coordinate our position with our European partners if Russia insists on a trilateral format without Europe's participation?

If I were the Ukrainian delegation, I would ask this question very simply. If Abu Dhabi is going to discuss a new European security system, how can it be done without the Europeans themselves? Representatives of our partners are nearby, but they are not sitting at the main negotiating table. And this already creates a strange situation.

I would suggest inviting them directly to the negotiations. And until then, not to move on to a substantive discussion of European security. Such a position would be understandable, because the decisions will concern not only Ukraine, but also the states on whose territories Russia wants to change the military-political balance.

Jared Kushner's initiative to revive the NATO-Russia Council raises huge questions for me. But even assuming that such a format will indeed be discussed, the absence of European representatives seems unacceptable. You cannot determine the future of the continent by leaving its participants at the door.

How can we talk about European security without Europeans? They are sitting in the next room, and they are essentially told: wait, we will talk here, and then we will tell you everything. This is humiliating for Europe.

Perhaps the current format will be the first and last such case. In the future, Ukraine, together with its partners, must insist on the full participation of European states. I even see the negotiating configuration as two-on-two: Ukraine and Europe on the one hand, Russia and the United States on the other.

Why do I say this? Because I assess the actions of the current American administration as supporting the interests of the Kremlin. Trump's latest statements about a possible change in the configuration of Ukraine only strengthen my conviction.

Trump is playing on Putin's side. Trump is doing everything to make it easier for Putin. Trump wants Putin to win. That's it, period.

For Ukraine, this means the need to rely primarily on its own interests and the position of its European allies. We cannot agree to a negotiating structure in which the fate of our state and the security of Europe will be determined without their full participation.

US plan for Donbas

The Economist reports on an American proposal to change the administrative borders of Ukrainian regions so that Russia could declare the capture of all of Donbas, leaving the cities held by the Defense Forces under Kyiv's control. How do you assess such an idea from the point of view of international law and Ukrainian sovereignty?

It is difficult to talk about respect for international law here. If the American side were to proceed from the principle of restoring justice, it would first of all remind Russia that the captured Ukrainian territories are under illegal occupation. Even if Moscow has written them into its constitution, this does not change their international legal status.

Once this fact is recognized, it would be possible to discuss possible settlement mechanisms, including the issue of temporary international control or administration of the relevant territories. But instead, a proposal is emerging to redraw the administrative borders of Ukrainian regions so that Putin can present it as his own victory.

Under this plan, the part of Donetsk Oblast that Russia does not control could be formally assigned to other Ukrainian regions. The Kremlin would then be able to claim that it had accomplished its goal and captured Donbas, although the actual line of control could remain unchanged.

They propose changing the administrative borders so that Kramatorsk is no longer part of Donetsk Oblast. The approximately 11% that Russia did not seize should be declared parts of other oblasts. And then Putin will say: I promised you Donbas, here it is.

For me, this is an example of unacceptable support for the Kremlin's political interests. Instead of demanding that Russia comply with international law, they are proposing to change the Ukrainian administrative system in order to allow Putin to declare victory.

That is why I insist on strengthening Europe's role in the negotiation process. Under the current US administration, in my opinion, the positions of Washington and Moscow will remain too close, and Ukraine will have to take this into account over the next two years.

But the political situation in the United States may change after the end of Trump's presidency. We do not yet know who will come to power, but the results of the recent elections give reason to hope that the MAGA political movement will weaken.

Even if another Republican wins, American policy toward Ukraine may become more predictable. I do not rule out that then the balance of power in international negotiations will change, and Ukraine will receive much broader support.

The main question now is whether we can achieve a cessation of hostilities and get through this difficult political period without making concessions that would jeopardize Ukrainian statehood. And further possibilities for the return of the occupied territories will depend on how the situation changes in Ukraine, Russia, and among our partners.

What should the guarantees be?

The Ukrainian delegation names the cessation of hostilities, post-war security guarantees, economic recovery, and humanitarian issues as priorities. Can the American special representatives offer Ukraine truly credible guarantees?

So far, all we hear from Trump is promises of a wonderful, comprehensive agreement that supposedly will satisfy everyone. But there are no specifics about what exactly this agreement will entail. And for security issues, the details are the most important, because general political formulations are not able to protect the state from new aggression.

Even if the document states that Ukraine will receive guarantees similar to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, I do not consider this sufficient. The article provides for assistance to allies in the event of an attack, but does not specify the same mandatory military response for all states. Therefore, I fear a repetition of the situation that we have already experienced with the Budapest Memorandum.

In this document, Russia recognized the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, but later violated the commitments it had made. Therefore, new political promises, even formalized in an international document, do not in themselves guarantee security.

I don't want Ukraine to have Article 5-style guarantees. We have already been prescribed guarantees in the Budapest Memorandum. Security talks are great, but real guarantees are a completely different thing.

Ukraine's main guarantee should be its own army in the broadest sense. We cannot agree to quantitative or qualitative restrictions on the Armed Forces, to bans on certain types of weapons, or to other conditions that would tie our hands in the event of a future threat.

Ukraine must retain all capabilities for self-defense. If partners provide weapons and additional guarantees, this will be important support. But even without it, we must create a defense system that will not allow Russia to repeat aggression.

Our key guarantee is our own army. There can be no restrictions on its quantitative or qualitative characteristics, not even a word. We must reserve all the possibilities for defense. I repeat: all.

The Kremlin has repeatedly demonstrated that it can arbitrarily interpret previously signed documents. Therefore, Ukraine's future security must be based not only on the wording of international agreements, but also on the state's real military capabilities.

Rubio was pushed out of the negotiations

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiga, who has already met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, has been invited to the G7 meeting. What can this meeting bring to Ukraine and what role does Rubio play in current American politics?

I wouldn't want to be Marco Rubio right now. Donald Trump has built a system in which he has effectively handed over key foreign policy issues to Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. As a result, the Secretary of State, who is supposed to play a central role in diplomacy, has found himself sidelined from the most important negotiations.

Rubio is an experienced politician and tries to maintain an outward calm. He talks about coordinating actions and discussing international issues, but I assume that in reality this situation is very unpleasant for him. Especially when representatives of other states want to hear specific answers, and key decisions are made by people from the president's personal circle.

Andriy Sibiha is obviously interested not in general diplomatic phrases, but in practical issues of supporting Ukraine. However, Rubio may not have sufficient information about the content of the agreements being discussed by Trump's special representatives.

Trump has assigned key foreign policy topics to Witkoff and Kushner, effectively giving Rubio a place on the sidelines. And when Sibiga wants to talk about specific things, the Secretary of State may simply not have the answers.

At the same time, Rubio remains a professional diplomat who understands the limits of what is possible in international negotiations. Unlike him, Trump's special representatives can put forward initiatives that do not have sufficient practical basis. That is why I believe that Sibiga's meeting with the US Secretary of State should be used primarily to discuss the specific needs of Ukraine.

The most important issues are armaments, the funding already allocated that has not yet been converted into actual deliveries, and the possibility of receiving new military assistance. These are the topics that have practical significance, while talk of an abstract new security system remains mostly political declarations.

Can Andriy Sybiga use the meeting with Rubio to convey Ukraine's position to the American leadership? And can the Secretary of State himself begin to build a separate political career?

I do not exclude that Rubio is already thinking about his own political future. He has sufficient experience and understands that Trump's situation is gradually changing. But in the current administration, even a hint of independent popularity can cause discontent of the president.

I recall an episode during the election campaign when Rubio received a standing ovation and Trump jokingly said that he should probably be fired. I see in this reaction the president's unwillingness to accept that someone from his entourage might receive more attention.

So until January, Rubio, J.D. Vance, and other politicians in Trump's inner circle will likely tread carefully. They will wait until the new Congress is in office and the political pressure on the White House increases.

Only after that can the preconditions for more active distancing from the current president appear. But it is very important to choose the right moment. If someone starts their own political game too early, they risk losing ground before real opportunities open up.

New Congress and Aid to Ukraine

Democrats have won the US Congressional elections. How much will this change the situation with military aid to Ukraine, intelligence sharing, Starlink, and increased pressure on Russia?

I am convinced that the pressure on Russia will increase. In particular, Senator Richard Blumenthal, who worked on the sanctions initiatives with Lindsey Graham, will not allow Trump to continue his previous policy calmly. The American president will have to explain his decisions more and more often, in particular regarding Russian diesel fuel.

Trump is already trying to justify the relevant agreements, saying that he wanted to ease the situation on the world market. At the same time, according to the information I provided, not a single ton of fuel under this agreement has ever reached the United States. For me, this is another example of decisions that will raise questions in the new Congress.

Democrats can use budget negotiations to promote support for Ukraine. For example, if the Trump administration needs funds for a particular program, lawmakers can tie their approval to a decision to provide additional funding for Ukrainian defense.

If Trump says: I need money for such a program, the Democrats answer: okay, but we need 15 billion to help Ukraine. Here's the deal. You give me one thing, I give you another. In this sense, our chances increase many times over.

At the same time, Ukraine needs to prepare now for working with a renewed Congress. Among the newly elected legislators are people with whom we have not yet established close enough contacts. We need to explain to them the situation on the front, the consequences of Russian strikes, and the specific needs of the Defense Forces.

This work must span both parties and both houses of Congress. It is necessary to strengthen contacts with supporters of Ukraine, including through the Ukraine Caucus, and to seek new opportunities for bipartisan support.

It is the intensity of such diplomatic work that will largely determine how quickly new political opportunities will turn into real decisions regarding financial and military assistance.

The Kremlin sees Trump's weakness

Since the election, more and more American observers have criticized Trump's chaotic decisions and talked about his weakening positions. Does the Kremlin understand how much the situation in the White House has changed?

I think this is already obvious to many. The election results showed that a significant portion of Americans are dissatisfied with Trump's policies. Moreover, the negative attitude towards the president can affect even Republican candidates, who themselves have fairly moderate positions.

In my opinion, this trend will continue, and political pressure on the administration will gradually increase. But for Ukraine, it is more important now than simply watching Trump weaken, but to use the time until the new Congress begins its full-fledged work.

During these month and a half, we need to expand the circle of our supporters among American lawmakers as much as possible. We need to work with both Democrats and Republicans so that support for Ukraine does not depend solely on the personal position of the president.

This is especially important given that the Kremlin can continue to rely on divisions within the American political system. The broader support for Ukraine in Congress, the more difficult it will be to use such divisions against us.

The Carthage-2 case and the EU

The "Carthage-2" case involves possible connections between high-ranking officials and criminal structures, drug trafficking, and the production of counterfeit euros. How are such revelations perceived in Europe: as evidence of the work of Ukrainian anti-corruption agencies or as an argument against our accession to the EU?

Both. First of all, this is a shock for Ukrainian society, because it concerns suspicions of the fusion of criminal structures with representatives of the authorities. If such connections are indeed confirmed, this is no longer a problem of individual officials, but of the entire system of state administration.

According to the NABU representatives, to whom I refer, the current revelations may be only the tip of the iceberg. I do not exclude that further investigation materials will turn out to be even more resonant. Therefore, it is very important that the relevant proceedings do not stop at the stage of high-profile reports.

I am particularly concerned about situations where, after being detained, a person involved in a criminal case is released on bail quite quickly. Formally, this may comply with procedural law, but the question arises as to whether further investigation work is sufficiently ensured and whether there is a risk of influencing witnesses or evidence.

Some are detained, others are released. And then the question arises: is this really the result we all expect? Because the fusion of crime with power is actually what is called the mafia.

Ukraine's European partners may assess such cases differently. Our supporters will say that anti-corruption bodies are working and are able to expose violations even at high levels of power. And this is a truly important argument in favor of Ukrainian reforms.

But opponents of Ukraine's accession to the EU will have a different argument. They will emphasize that corruption risks remain extremely high, and that representatives of criminal structures, according to the investigation, may have had contacts in state bodies.

In my opinion, the response to this criticism should be very specific: investigations should end with legal court decisions, and proven crimes should be punished accordingly. Then Ukraine will be able to show that it is not only exposing corruption, but also really overcoming its consequences.

The argument for Europe would be that every case is brought to an end, and people who are proven guilty receive real punishment. Then we can say: yes, corruption exists, but we are fighting it.

Corruption exists in many countries, including European ones. But the main issue is the effectiveness of the law enforcement and judicial systems. If the results of the investigators' work are constantly leveled at subsequent stages, opponents of Ukrainian European integration will have more and more grounds for criticism.

Europe's law enforcement system and trust

Cross-border crime investigations raise questions about possible links between Ukrainian criminal structures and Russian networks of influence in Europe. Can international law enforcement agencies pay more attention to these links, and what would this mean for Ukraine?

I have doubts that this particular direction will become the main one in further international investigations. Russian organized crime has long penetrated various European countries, but the law enforcement systems there, in my opinion, work much more effectively than the Ukrainian one.

In the case of the Carthage-2 case, I am more concerned about the possible fusion of Ukrainian and Russian criminal structures. If law enforcement officials did indeed pass on information about international investigations to suspects, this jeopardizes not only individual operations, but also the trust of foreign partners.

Let's imagine a situation: Ukrainian law enforcement officers are invited to a meeting with European colleagues to discuss joint actions against criminal networks. And then information about these plans reaches the people they were going to check. Under such circumstances, the question arises as to how safe it is to exchange data with the relevant structures at all.

When our law enforcement officers are invited to meetings with high-ranking European representatives, and then the information is passed on to criminals and warned that they are already being sought, what kind of trust can there be in our law enforcement officers?

I am convinced that Ukraine needs profound changes in its law enforcement system. But I want to be understood correctly: we cannot equate all its employees. There are a huge number of people who risk their lives every day for the state, and there are those whose possible criminal actions discredit entire bodies.

Look at the work of the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which fight on the front and ensure the defense of Ukraine. Or at the activities of the SBU, in particular, Operation "Web" and other successful measures against Russian military infrastructure. It is worth noting the Special Operations Center "A" of the SBU, which demonstrates high results in the use of drones against the occupiers.

These people deserve enormous respect. But at the same time, possible crimes by other representatives of the law enforcement system cause reputational damage to the entire state. And this problem cannot be hidden behind the military merits of those who honestly do their job.

There are people before whom we should kneel and thank them for protecting Ukraine. And there are those who disgrace law enforcement agencies. And it is because of such people that the system needs to be changed.

A separate issue is the work of the prosecutor's office and the courts. I recently saw information about the average salaries of judges at approximately 350 thousand hryvnias. And when at the same time we hear about suspects in high-profile cases who are released on bail, society naturally asks whether the results of the judicial system correspond to its funding.

Of course, until there is a conviction, a person cannot be called a criminal. But the law enforcement system must also act in a way that ensures proper investigation and does not create conditions for evading responsibility.

For Ukraine, this is not only a question of internal justice, but also of future membership in the European Union. European partners must be confident that our law enforcement agencies are capable of reliably protecting common interests, and that our courts are capable of ensuring impartial justice.

Without real changes in this area, the path to the EU will remain difficult, even if Ukraine makes significant progress in other areas.

Ogryzko about the talks in Abu Dhabi: watch the video