"These talks won't amount to anything": An exclusive interview with Dmytro Kuleba on the Kremlin's plans, pressure from external forces, and Ukraine's future
In an exclusive interview with 24 Channel, former Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba spoke about Russia’s true goals in the Abu Dhabi talks and problems with arms deliveries. Russia is categorically opposed to Ukraine’s EU membership, demanding that Ukraine renounce a common European security policy.
- 1What the talks in Abu Dhabi showed and why Russia is diverting the conversation from the ceasefire
- 2What "security architecture" is the Kremlin imposing on Europe?
- 3Why Russia is already effectively opposing Ukraine's membership in the EU
- 4Is there any point in negotiations if they want to agree on security guarantees with Moscow?
- 5The negotiating team, the Arakhamia factor and the absence of the Ukrainian ambassador to the US
- 6Putin's humanitarian "gestures", Starlink, Patriot and American pressure
- 7Ukraine's Internal Capability, Borshchahivka, "Carthage" and the Crisis of Confidence
The talks in Abu Dhabi could play into Russia's hands, as the Kremlin is trying to change the very logic of the dialogue with Ukraine. Instead of discussing a ceasefire, Moscow is promoting its own vision of Europe's future security architecture, effectively demanding to limit not only Ukraine's cooperation with NATO, but also its path to the European Union.
Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba spoke about this in an exclusive interview with Channel 24. He also explained how the blocking of Starlink and Starshield affects the situation on the front, why Ukraine is facing delays in the supply of Patriot missiles, what Bankova's negotiating tactics are, and what internal problems undermine public trust in the state.
What the talks in Abu Dhabi showed and why Russia is diverting the conversation from the ceasefire
Dmytro, I propose to start with the two-day trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi. Among the key issues for Ukraine were the unblocking of the Black Sea, an energy truce, and an exchange of prisoners. There is a positive result - the exchange will take place. As far as I understand, that's all for now. What are your main conclusions from these talks? What did you highlight for yourself based on previous experience?
It's great that the largest exchange is going to happen. It's always good when our prisoners return home, because in Russia they are kept in terrible conditions. We all know about it. But we have to understand that exchanges should happen regardless of the political process.
Russia has made them hostages of negotiations to demonstrate that there is progress. Therefore, the feelings are mixed.
On the one hand, it is good that our people are returning, but on the other hand, the Russians are actually trafficking in people, simulating constructiveness in negotiations.
There is also a negative aspect of the recent negotiations. Russia has completely removed the issue of a ceasefire from the agenda. After all, the entire process was originally conceived precisely to agree on this. Instead, the Russians have dragged the Americans into a conversation about guarantees and security architecture.
Now they have played another card and shown "great generosity" by saying that the Europeans can join the negotiations. Europe will decide in what format it will participate, and after that the philosophical discussion will begin again. The Russians will talk about a pan-European security architecture, in which their interests should be fully taken into account. And there will be no talk of a ceasefire again.
The fact that Russia, with the support of the American administration, managed to shift the negotiations to general issues instead of discussing a ceasefire is bad.
Of course, the question of Europe's future security is also important. After all, after the war we need to live somehow. But first we need to stop the war. And the Russians say: "No, we won't stop anything. Let's talk about how we will live after this." That's the problem.
Now all the media is discussing where Europe is and why its representatives are not at the negotiating table. Should we pay as much attention to this as they are doing now?
It's like they write on the Internet: "Don't you think our attention is being distracted from something important?" This is exactly the case. We are gradually being drawn into a lively discussion: will there be negotiations with Russia? Everyone is focusing on this issue. Now there are negotiations. And we are being asked a new question: will Europe be at them?
We are starting to discuss this again. This is how we are being distracted from the main thing - will there be a ceasefire? Unfortunately, this is the success of Russian diplomacy. But it would not have been possible if the American side had not actually played along with Russia.
When the Russians offer to talk about European security, the Americans might reply: no, let's first agree on at least a partial ceasefire – for example, in the energy sector, a cessation of air strikes or hostilities in the Black Sea.
Instead, they agree to discuss European security. Now we are in for another long and drawn-out discussion. It will not end well for one simple reason. Not because Europe is bad, but because Russia's demands effectively mean exposing Europe's entire eastern flank to Russian influence.
If we look at a map and draw a line to NATO's borders as of 1997, as the Russians demand, we will see that we are talking about a return to the division of Europe by the Iron Curtain into spheres of influence of the West and the Soviet Union. That is, to the order that emerged after World War II.
Putin thinks in precisely these categories. He is trying to restore the greatness of the Soviet Union, which it achieved under Stalin. This means a new division of Europe along security principles and the beginning of its fragmentation.
You say that Russia is distracting attention from the main thing - a ceasefire. At the same time, it does not agree to a cessation of hostilities on the front line. I noticed a change in the rhetoric of the Ukrainian authorities. At first, the president spoke about security guarantees, then a ceasefire and an end to the war. Now the sequence is different: first a ceasefire, then security guarantees and an end to the war. Why did the emphasis change?
Security guarantees for Ukraine have already been discussed. The intensive negotiation process that we observed from November 2025 to the end of February 2026 lasted actually three months. During this time, all possible security guarantees for Ukraine that could be put up for discussion were presented. Macron came out and declared that the security guarantees for Ukraine had been agreed upon.
President Zelensky understands that 99 percent of what could be discussed and recorded on paper has already been worked out. Therefore, this topic is effectively closed. When we are told: "Let's offer you something like NATO's Article 5," the question arises: what does "like Article 5" mean?
This is either NATO's fifth article or not. Such things don't work otherwise. Therefore, Zelensky understands that the issue of security guarantees has already been worked out and we need to move on to the next one - a ceasefire. How long can it be postponed? But the Russians again answer: "Wait, what about the European security architecture?"
Full conversation with Dmytro Kulebao: watch the video
What "security architecture" is the Kremlin imposing on Europe?
Representatives of the Russian delegation said that any truce should be discussed directly with Putin. Regarding the European security architecture: what exactly does the Kremlin put into the concept of the so-called new security architecture of Europe? What kind of order on the continent does Putin seek to achieve?
This is a very old Russian story, which began politically in 2007 with Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, in which he declared a crusade against the West. In 2008, Russia proposed a draft of a new international treaty on the architecture of European security.
And this initiative was stalled in diplomatic processes. Nothing came of it, because essentially the whole point of this agreement, there were a lot of words, but the essence was that we will do whatever we want, and you have to tolerate and accept it. If you are against it, we will consider it a threat to our national security and will act accordingly.
Then there was the war in Georgia, then the fourteenth year happened in Ukraine, then the twenty-second year happened. But on the eve of the twenty-second year, in November of the twenty-first, Russia summoned American representatives. A delegation flew in from Washington, and they were handed a paper that said even less than what they have just written.
That is, from the twenty-first demands to the West, what they need to do. For example, now their demands include provisions that Europe should stop considering Russia as a threat. They say: delete from all documents that you consider Russia a threat.
And from Ukraine, for example, they are now demanding that Ukraine remove the mention of Russia as an aggressor state from all documents, so that this term simply disappears. And that is why they are acting very consistently. It is a very long story.
This story is not aimed at solving the security of Europe, not at guaranteeing the security of Europe, but at creating space for Russia for further expansion. Because when they say: withdraw all NATO infrastructure from the countries of Central Europe... there is no requirement there for Finland to withdraw from NATO. But they demand that all NATO military infrastructure be rolled back to the ninety-seventh year. That is, from Central Europe, from Sweden and from Finland.
And what does this mean? It means that these countries will feel their vulnerability. Because today, for example, aircraft from western and southern NATO countries are participating in air patrols and intercepting Russian drones and missiles over the territory of the countries of the eastern flank.
Now, if this does not happen, these countries will remain naked, because not all of them have their own military resources. And what will this provoke? It will provoke these countries to call Moscow and say: well, what do you need, you tell me. That is, it will put them in a weak position. That is their goal.
This is if we look at this history so conservatively. And if we look at them, based on the experience of the last six years, we can say that these requirements have not been met at all. They are Russia's preparation for war with NATO countries in Europe.
Because Putin will come out and say: well, I asked. We have been asking for twenty years now, no one listens to us, we have been left with no choice. We are now forced to solve the issue ourselves. These are the two poles.
But what Russia demands from Europe is unfulfillable, because it will significantly weaken and expose Europe, and expose it to Russian influence. In principle, it is impossible to talk about the security architecture of Europe without Europe.
Why Russia is already effectively opposing Ukraine's membership in the EU
You said that the topic of security guarantees has already been worked out. I will quote the president's words about "security guarantees of the NATO Article Five type." What do you think this is about?
I understand that this is a familiar topic to everyone, Article Five of NATO. But I was confused by something else in these last negotiations. Before the last meeting, there was a narrative that the Russians do not object to Ukraine's membership in the European Union, but they object to Ukraine's membership in NATO. And that there are no questions about the EU.
It was always hard to believe, but now there is documentary evidence that the Russians see Ukraine's membership in the EU in their own Russian distorted way. What are they saying? They say: we are not against Ukraine being part of the EU's common market, that is, economic integration. But we are categorically against Ukraine joining the EU's common foreign and security policy.
And what does this demand of theirs mean? The fact is that the norm of the Treaty on the European Union on collective security is written better than Article Five of NATO. It's just that no one knows it. No one knows about it, because no one has talked about it.
We have been hammering NATO's Article Five into our heads for decades. NATO's Article Five states: if someone attacks Olya, Dmytro will do everything in his power to help Olya. I really hope for that. You can count on my Article Five.
And the treaty on the European Union says: if someone attacks Olya, Dmytro will join in and fight alongside her to repel the attack of this scoundrel.
And the Russians understand this. The Russians understand that the security of Europe and Ukraine in general is, first and foremost, the unity of Ukraine with Europe. And it is in the security sphere that they are trying to separate this, because they need a Ukraine and Central Europe that are naked in terms of security, which they consider to be their sphere of influence.
And so, when I look at all this, I understand that the Russians' position is actually hardening. They understand that there is no such thing as "Article 5 of NATO" and there will be none, and accordingly they need to act not against Article 5 of NATO, which is not in the future anyway, but against what is a real threat. And the real threat for them is the unity of Ukraine with Europe.
So it's a step stronger?
This is worse. We have the clarity today that Russia even objects to Ukraine's membership in the European Union.
And the negotiating framework, which said: well, let's theoretically consider refusing NATO membership, but at the same time we will hide under the umbrella of the European Union, wave our hand at Russia and say: "We left," - and this is unacceptable to them.
Which brings us to what we always say, that the Russians' goal is not to agree on how Ukraine will live as an independent European state. The Russians' goal is to bring Ukraine back under their control.
Is there any point in negotiations if they want to agree on security guarantees with Moscow?
The American negotiators, as the president said, asked the question for the first time: if you join NATO, are you ready to withdraw from Donbas? How do you like this idea? And isn't the president shifting responsibility onto the people if suddenly there is such an option?
The responsibility for the future of Ukraine lies with the Ukrainian people, part of which is a man named Volodymyr Zelensky, who holds the position of President of Ukraine. We all bear responsibility for the country.
And playing football, where the people say: "We are good, the president is bad," or the president says: "I am good, the people are bad" - this is not a working story. It is a working story from a political point of view, but it is a crime against the Ukrainian state.
And Zelensky, from the point of view of negotiations, his logic is this. Well, that's how I understand it, because in principle, this is how negotiations should work. In order not to be cornered, you always have to have a subject higher than you who must agree with your position.
If I were sitting in negotiations as a minister and someone said to me, "That's it, sign it," I would say, "Wait a second, I can't sign it. I need to go to Kyiv and report to the president. Our National Security and Defense Council will meet there. We have democratic procedures." And I avoid this pressure, I get out of this pressure, I buy time for my country to win something.
This is how it works in principle throughout the hierarchy. The minister does not go to negotiations immediately. First, the negotiations are conducted by ambassadors, and the ambassador says the same thing: "Excuse me, but I need to report to the minister and get instructions." This is a negotiation tactic.
And the president uses this tactic when they say to him: "So what, tell me, you're the president!" And he says: "Wait a second, this is a fundamental issue for our state. We need to ask the people's opinion." That's it, he got out of this pressure.
At the domestic level, I think the president is using this tool not to shift responsibility to the people, but to protect the agreement from being simply broken within the country.
The idea of a referendum on the peace agreement, relatively speaking, has only one meaning. It stops, or at least significantly limits, the space for Ukrainian politicians who are not currently in power to go to power, telling people how bad the agreement is. We will come, we will do better.
Therefore, it seems to me that in the first case it is a negotiation tactic. In the second case it is a strategy for how Ukraine will live with the agreement. But I am not sure that Ukrainian society will not be brought to such a state by the war that such a model will be categorically rejected.
I doubt it because, as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said, security guarantees for Ukraine must be agreed with the Russian side. That is, if the Russian side is against Ukraine joining NATO and, for example, against joining the EU, then this system will not work.
It won't happen. Yes, that's a good thing, you know, you can't worry about the results of these negotiations, because nothing will come of them.
I spoke to the Europeans last week, with one person there, and I said: "You are rushing into these negotiations, where our place is at the table. And I think you need to think three times whether you need this place at the table." Because again, behind the negotiation strategy there should be a player who remains untainted and retains his subjectivity in order to enter the process when everyone else is discrediting themselves.
And now the Europeans will come, they will sit down and what? We are sitting at the negotiating table.
The only reason why the current European elites are so eager to be at the negotiating table is because of their domestic politics. Because the opposition in France, in Germany, in Belgium, in Italy, they all demand: we demand that you participate in the negotiations.
And European leaders, deeply involved in the material and understanding that these negotiations, unfortunately, are leading nowhere, because Russia is simply not conducting them in good faith, are forced to go to them anyway in order to relieve this domestic political pressure.
But as far as I know, no key country in the European Union has any illusions that something rational, balanced can be agreed with Russia now.
The negotiating team, the Arakhamia factor and the absence of the Ukrainian ambassador to the US
How does all this affect communication, primarily with American representatives, when it comes to the case where the name of David Arakhamia is mentioned? Does it affect trust?
It's not that this administration of the United States of America is white, fluffy, and corruption issues are a red line for it. But I don't think that on the American side, there are people participating in the negotiations for whom the existence of any corruption risks is an obstacle to negotiations.
For them, a story about corruption is not a goal, but a tool. That is, when corruption is a goal for you and needs to be overcome, you take a principled position. You say: I cannot negotiate with a person who goes around under the covers.
And when it's a tool for you, when it's convenient for you, you sit with a person, regardless of how many criminal cases they have, and you talk and negotiate with them. And when you don't like this person, you have leverage against them.
Then you say: "No, wait, how can I negotiate anything with you if there are criminal proceedings against you." And so for them today I don't think this is an obstacle.
I see that on the American side, the negotiators are businessmen who were brought into diplomacy. And David, he is a businessman who came into politics. And their psychotypes, in principle, are the same.
Is this with Witkoff?
I think that the psychotype of David and Witkoff, they understand each other as much as possible.
We do not have an ambassador of Ukraine to the United States of America. In your opinion, why is this candidacy still open? And how negatively does this affect support for Ukraine?
An ambassador is needed in Washington, and in January 2027 he will be needed there more than ever. That is, when you have all American politics in the White House and you have direct channels of communication with the White House, you can still somehow compensate for the absence of an ambassador on site.
It's bad that there is no ambassador, but it's still a controlled, managed process. But when politics in America has again split into two centers, which are Congress and the White House, and in Congress, and in the House, and in the Senate, there are Democrats, and in the White House, there are Republicans, there is no way without an ambassador.
We really need an ambassador who won't leave Congress. You can maintain direct lines of contact from Kyiv to Washington through the White House, because there are two or three people there, and they can communicate with each other on both sides. But Congress is hundreds of people, and you can't physically reach them from Kyiv.
Secondly, a lot of new people have come in, and you just have to build relationships with them. And they won't meet with anyone from the embassy, they'll send them to their staffers. And talking to a senator, talking to a congressman is the ambassador's job.
And these people need to be indoctrinated, they need to be fed the Ukrainian agenda. And this is literally not just daily, but hourly work. And the third factor is that some key lawyers for Ukraine, for example, Jeanne Shaheen, that's all, she is not in Congress. That is, we need to form a new core of support for Ukraine in Congress. And for this, the figure of the ambassador is irreplaceable.
So potentially, if we consider a candidate, for example, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs could take this position?
Former, thank God, our former foreign ministers are in good health and are strong figures. Look, it doesn't matter who the former is. Maybe he won't be the former at all. Maybe he will be a star that will light up in the sky, without having any great career experience in diplomacy.
It's simply a matter of the president finding someone he's comfortable working with, someone who's comfortable working as part of the president's team, and who also has the strong professional and human qualities to make this work effective.
Because the embassy in Washington is, in the current reality, a volcano where you are in the process of erupting, and you are sitting right there in this crater, and you just need to manage to extinguish these waves that are rising into the air and manage this process.
So are there such people? One hundred percent such people exist. But it is simply necessary that the stars align, and time is running out. Because from January, Ukraine in Washington will find itself in a new reality that will determine the attitude towards Ukraine for years to come. And the work must be done.
Have you been offered?
Look, I'm not commenting on who offered what to whom. I believe that this and who responded to what – I believe that this is exclusively the prerogative of the president. These are personnel issues, this is an intimate matter of the president.
Who he talks to, what he says, what they answer him – that can only come from him. And for me to sit here and say: "No, I didn't offer" or say: "Yes, I did offer, but I refused" – well, that's all such arrogance and deceit.
The president says whatever he sees fit to say on this matter, and that is purely his parish. And mere mortals in the form of potential candidates for US ambassador must wait for the final decision, which he will make after receiving consent from one of them.
Putin's humanitarian "gestures", Starlink, Patriot and American pressure
After Abu Dhabi, Witkoff and Kushner flew to Putin. Let's highlight a rather tricky point that Putin proposed. This is a humanitarian mission from Konstantinovka based on the experience of Oleszyk. In your opinion, why did this proposal come up and for what purpose?
Yes, classic negotiation tactic. When you don't want to do something, you have to switch the other side to another issue.
As far as I understand, after or even in Oleshki, our Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets handed over a list of some settlements where this Oleshki experience can and should be repeated.
It is obvious that the Americans probably had this list, and they say: "Here is an offer." And he, Putin, does not want to do anything in these territories. He chooses where it is profitable for him to do it and where he will most likely receive a refusal.
And he says: "Kostyanivka. Then to the side, I have a better idea. Go do your job, I want Kostyantynivka." That's it, he switched his attention, and people where they really need help remain suffering.
And why do they need Kostyantynivka? It's very simple, because he needs to prove now what he hasn't been able to prove for many months: that Ukraine lost this city, that it fully controls it, and that Russia is moving towards achieving its next goals.
Look, Putin never thinks about people. Neither his own nor strangers. We all realize that Russia could have solved the crisis in Oleshki on its own.
But it took a whole hero's journey, a feat, how we heroically solved it all in the presence of cameras. And the same with Kostyantynivka. The same, in principle, with any point. But bring in a humanitarian worker, open the way for people. Say: "If you want to leave - leave."
They don't do that. They filter every such case through their own interests, where the interests of the people who are suffering mean nothing at all.
After visits to Putin, Ukrainian defenders again recorded limitations in the operation of the Starshield military satellite communication system. SpaceX tells us that these are technical failures. Are these technical failures?
Well, do you believe that SpaceX, which returns a rocket from space and grabs it with tongs with an accuracy of half a meter, is unable to solve a technical problem with the satellite communication system for five days?
The first time this happened and Americans were pointing fingers at each other, saying, "It's not us, it's not the White House, it's the Pentagon, it's not the Pentagon, it's SpaceX, it's not SpaceX, it's the Pentagon," they were playing it. We all pretended that this is how it happened. Well, okay, technical failures happen.
Everyone understood what had happened, but everyone helped the American partners and said: "Well, we're okay. There was a technical failure, we can repair it." And somehow Zelensky talked to Rubio. Rubio is not involved in SpaceX at all, but somehow it all worked.
But when it happens a second time, well, people will laugh if you just say it's a technical problem. No, it's not a technical problem, it's a lever used against Ukraine.
This is an extremely sad story, especially from the point of view of the fact that, in principle, any company should take care of its reputation. And a company that publicly declares or communicates that we have technical problems and outages with the Internet here, what kind of client will then place a bet on you if you regularly have technical problems?
And SpaceX is extremely careful about its reputation, it cares about it. And that's why they even go so far as to admit technical problems that they can't solve for five days, to the detriment of their commercial reputation.
Unfortunately, pressure is also being put on us regarding the transfer of Patriot interceptor missiles. What is happening with the missiles now? And how are the States using this against us?
At the same time, The State Department has signed off on the sale of Patriot systems to Ukraine , which will begin to reach us from there in 2030. But according to the news, it spread so much that Marco Rubio is a good guy, and Heygett is bad.
I don't know, I don't have any inside information about what's going on with Heygett's signature. But you don't need any inside information here, you just need to, you could even chat with some chat room for half an hour and it would show you all the numbers.
And you don't have to be a super-expert to understand one scary thing: even if they sign a contract with us, even if they give us a certain number of Patriot missiles, first, we will shoot them down very quickly. Second, we will be left without missiles again.
That is, we simply have to be aware that there is no systemic solution for ballistic war of such intensity as we have today. And we would like to get at least something. But we must understand that this is nothing more than at least something. And then everything will return to its normal course, because they simply do not have time to produce such a large number of missiles for the Patriot.
Are there any solutions from the series for Japan to share?
This is possible, but only in theory. But in practice, no one will share anything, because the military in all countries is not stupid, and they see how war has transformed, that ballistic war is becoming the norm.
And when this happens to you, the first thing you do is make sure you have enough of these missiles, because you don't know what security situation you'll find yourself in tomorrow.
We are considering expanding Starlink, Starshield to Russian territory deep inside the aggressor country in order to detect these launchers and destroy everything on the ground. Nobody does anything?
No. That's not going to work. I think everyone in the world is looking at one of the fundamental problems in defense right now. It's called the kill switch.
The problem is that America, when transferring its military technologies to other countries, leaves a kill switch. Today your F-35 is flying, and tomorrow someone in Washington presses a button, and your F-35 will not fly. The same with Patriot. Or with Starlink: today everything works for you, and tomorrow it doesn't work for you.
And now all countries are looking at these problems with Starshield in Ukraine and understand that tomorrow the same thing could happen to them. What is your reflex at such a moment? You look at what else is on the market that can be brought up to the level so that at least some alternative exists, some backup option.
Or what would it take to create this alternative? Could Europe launch a thousand satellites into orbit and create a full-fledged alternative to Starlink there? Well, it could. But it's all time, it's all discussions, it needs to be developed, decisions need to be made.
But now everyone will look for and develop alternatives. And that's good, because eventually they will appear on the market, they already exist, they are not as good and comprehensive as Starlink, but there are also satellite systems that allow, at least to a limited extent, to work in Russia without Starlink.
And then these systems will simply expand, because basically Musk is shooting himself in the foot, and the Pentagon is shooting itself in the foot, because with this behavior in Ukraine they are sending a clear signal to everyone that you can't really count on us. And everyone is starting to build their own alternatives.
Ukraine's Internal Capability, Borshchahivka, "Carthage" and the Crisis of Confidence
Let's talk about internal capacity. I suggest starting with the event at Petropavlivska Borshchagovka. What was it, in your opinion?
I was horrified at first. But when an hour after it appeared, I was sent a photo of this supposed doctor kneeling in front of the gate to this building, this story ceased to be of any interest to me, because everything is clear there, it's a show.
That is, she played her role. As you can imagine, it's just an emotional outburst. And then, when another picture appeared, where people gathered to free the men locked in the torture chamber, and then when these men got on the bus, those who were going to free them began to shake and break this bus.
It is obvious that their goal was not to save people, but simply to create the maximum image. And the third chord in this whole story is the leader of the Alternative for Germany party, Ms. Weidel, who instantly picks up the video from Borschagivka and spreads it through her social networks: "Look what is happening to dictator Zelensky."
Everything, the circle has closed. From the artist on Borshchahivka, who gets on her knees to shake up the situation, to the leader of the most anti-Ukrainian and most pro-Putin force in Germany. The circle has simply closed. Everything began and ended. That's why it was like this in Lviv, and now this has happened in Kyiv. Unfortunately, a brilliant operation, probably by the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation.
But nevertheless, Yuriy Butusov said that all this is a consequence of two global problems: the lack of systematic work in the field of mobilization regarding trust in the service and the lack of effective military justice.
I think the problem is basically that we have lost the momentum of building our national capacity. That is, in the twenty-second year, this outbreak of activity in society, in the government, in parliament, led to the country receiving a huge impetus.
And so new brigades were formed. That's how the arms market was created. It didn't just happen. Someone did something for this. And then we rode on this inertia and now we've reached a turning point.
Because if we turn conditionally to the left, the situation will become worse in everything: and in our ability to generate a technological breakthrough. I agree that for mobilization in the current reality, in the reality of such a long-term war, there is no good solution that will make everyone happy. But in order for a person to understand more and more and feel more protected, a lot can be done.
But we've lost that momentum to reinvent ourselves. And that's usually why if we turn left, we just keep getting bogged down in our problems. We have some point solutions, but no systemic solutions.
Or we need to turn right. To do this, we need to abandon all those models of relationships, mutual obligations that have formed in government and in the market, and in the security and defense sector in general from 2022 to 2026, and make a new quantum leap.
What should this manifest itself in? It should manifest itself in solving the very systemic problems that exist in the arms market, in how it functions. It should manifest itself in solving personnel problems in the law enforcement system.
Personnel decisions very often mean more to people than the bills introduced. And we need to clear the space again, as we did in 2022, when all the who, what, to whom, all of that was put aside and we went to defend the country.
Let's remember Operation Carthage here. NABU and SAPO exposed top officials of the SBU, the police, and the Prosecutor General's Office with bribes.
This is also the result of the stabilization of the system. That is, when everyone feels stable and protected, the feeling of fear that you are doing something wrong disappears.
But this is the root cause, and the consequence is that there is a gap between society and the state, which together make up the country. That is, people say: "Well, we can't trust you. You demand that we tolerate something, but you don't tolerate anything. Everything is fine with you there."
And when this internal unity is lost, from which capacity is actually born, capacity is born when everyone is united around one goal and everyone does their job, and society turns away from its elites. That's all, this is the perfect moment to seize the state. That's the trouble.
But the main demand of society is that all those involved in something like this should be punished and brought to justice. People don't see justice, people don't see punishment.
Look, our country was part of a big other country, the Soviet Union, and there was a very fast judicial process. There, a person was taken and even said that he was guilty, they held a trial in the presence, sometimes even in the presence of wide sections of the population, the activities of this trial were widely covered in the media, and then these people were shot.
Well, for example, they shot the Ukrainian elite in the context of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine case. They sent some people to camps there, they put them to death. But it all happened very quickly. And the people were having a blast, the people said: "Well, that's normal, they just gave everyone a slap in the face." And then it all ended with millions of innocent people being digested by the machine.
That's why I'm against playing along with those who demand that everyone be shot quickly, the death penalty. Because what are we building then? I'm not saying that a machine that starts grinding doesn't stop and eventually reaches those who demanded that such a machine work.
If you and I are building a normal European country, we must agree that judicial proceedings are long. We must also agree that a person behind bars is not the best image for justice.
There was a case about the head of the Supreme Court, who was caught in corruption, and he signed an agreement with the investigation. He pleaded guilty, returned some crazy money to the budget. And, as far as I remember, he was given a suspended sentence. Well, the goal was achieved. The person was cleaned out of the system, the person returned the stolen goods. Achieved.
Third, when they talk about bail. It's bad that they were released on bail. Well, you understand that if they don't get bail, then tomorrow they will file a case with the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights will say that bail is a normal tool, and the fact that they were deprived of such a right is a violation of human rights.
That's why I'm for things to happen. I'm for anti-corruption agencies to work. But let's not demand from them all that will ultimately harm our country.
I am also outraged by the scene with the applause at the exit from the pre-trial detention center. Honestly, I don’t understand how this is possible. Well, I understand, your colleague is there. Well, they took the colleague away, dragged him out. That’s it, let’s go. Well, arranging this ovation is not my thing either.
But you understand what is happening now among those who applauded there. They sit and think: how can we now take revenge on NABU? And they sit and think: yes, we know that they are like that now. Therefore, we have to think, how can we still hit them. And this spiral of war within the country is unwound.
This is bad. It's not that it's bad that a corrupt person goes to court for a long time to get a verdict. What's bad is that everyone starts fighting each other, and each of them believes that he is a patriot, that these are the traitors. And I am a patriot, I am a hero.
But we live in a country where, in principle, any person can be a hero here, and a bad person there, a good person here, and a traitor here. It bothers me that we are all eating each other up on an institutional level, on a human level, and destroying faith in our own country.
This interview has been shortened, corrected, and edited for better understanding by the audience.