"Russia Has a Vulnerable Spot": An Interview with Romanenko on the Burning Oil Refineries and the Destruction of the Crimean Bridge

In an exclusive interview with Channel 24, military expert, Lieutenant General, and founder of the “Let’s Protect Ukraine’s Skies” Foundation, Ihor Romanenko, spoke about new air threats, the modernization of Russian drones, attacks on oil refineries, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the prospects for destroying the Crimean Bridge.

According to him, Russia is developing new jet drones, which are essentially small cruise missiles with a range of up to 800 kilometers. The expert also assessed what is currently preventing individual successful interceptions from leading to widespread success.

What new weapons are the Russians developing for attacks?

The “Let’s Protect Ukraine’s Skies” Charitable Foundation is constantly holding fundraisers. Please tell us, what are you raising funds for this time? Is it again to help train our pilots, and more?

We’ve wrapped up our previous fundraiser, which went toward equipping mobile fire teams. After that, using a portable surface-to-air missile system, they shot down a very important heavy target – a “Shahed” drone. The goal is to increase the capabilities of the air defense systems we currently have.

We hope that several options – already more than six – will be scaled up, and about twenty different companies and organizations in our country are working on interceptor drones that, based on their specifications, can to destroy jet drones. This is very important and fundamental.

I would also like to emphasize here that jet-powered drones represent the second wave of aerial threats – complex and challenging targets that we must overcome. The first wave consisted of gasoline-powered drones, the earlier “Shaheds.” Ukraine succeeded in this and found a solution using interceptor drones with capabilities that would allow us to do so.

The second wave consists of jet-powered drones, and we must prepare now, proactively, to destroy the targets the Russians are developing. These are small cruise missiles with higher speeds, capable of operating at higher altitudes; they are inexpensive, in their view, and have a range of up to 800 kilometers.

But this is preliminary. And when it comes to integrating and implementing these systems, the actual performance may not quite match what they want. But we must already be working on this so as not to find ourselves in a situation like the one with the jet “Shahed” drones, which we now have to counter and catch up with.

Ihor Romanenko on Russia’s new jet-powered drones, strikes on oil refineries, and the destruction of the Crimean Bridge: watch the video

Why is the mass interception of aerial targets still difficult?

The issue now lies in the scale of the shoot-down operations themselves. We know that the turrets are already operational. You previously explained that an operator in a mobile fire group has only seconds to react, so automation helps significantly. Do these robotic turrets actually help? And what exactly is preventing us today from turning individual successful interceptions into widespread success? Funding? Technology?

All of the above. Definitely funding and the development work itself. That is, first of all, for development to take place, these projects need to be funded; and then, once there are several options that actually meet the performance criteria and are capable of destroying targets, and that they are relatively inexpensive compared to the targets – in this case, the “Shahed” drones.

A turret is a mount for an anti-aircraft machine gun or anti-aircraft cannon. My son serves in mobile fire teams. Unfortunately, they’re equipped with, for example, an American anti-aircraft machine gun, but they lack other essential equipment that would significantly increase its effectiveness. They need a thermal imager, they need night-vision capabilities – well, they need a lot of things.

But the equipment that’s been arriving over the past few days – this automated turret – has a range of about 800 meters. In other words, this is effectively the last line of defense – the final line of defense in terms of range – that meets the threat before the actual protection of the facility. But we need a range of at least a few kilometers to increase the likelihood that the facility we’re protecting will remain intact.

So, such developments are underway. We’re reporting that final testing is underway, with combat-style tests being conducted by up to six different companies. This process is nearing completion, and there’s already talk of successful operations – not only with these automated turrets, which are the latest development, but also with the previous models, where various configurations were tested over several days.

But this requires the completion of this process, codification, and adoption into service by our relevant units. And

for that to happen, we need to produce a large quantity to ensure effectiveness. And so, this challenging work still lies ahead. Unfortunately, I think it will take several months.

How is Russia defending its oil refineries, and why does it need aerostats?

The Russians are already resorting to tactics dating back almost to World War I – they’re launching aerostats to protect their oil refineries from Ukrainian drones. But why are they – a country with such advanced technology – resorting to such methods? And what can actually help them protect these refineries? These balloons? Or is it just to create a false sense of security?

This indicates an exploration of various options. These balloons aren’t a new idea. They’re used, for example, by Israel and some other countries to, say, elevate radar stations (the higher they are, the farther they can see).

“Line of sight” is a well-known concept, and so it allows for earlier target detection; then, at that altitude, information gathered by the relevant systems can be received and transmitted over long distances – whether to aircraft in the air or to other systems. This is a straightforward approach.

But the question is: how do you do it? That balloon they’re using has already experienced a technical malfunction and was falling, but it remained in the air because they anticipate that we’ll target it and are planning how to defend against that.

In other words, during tests of the balloon you’re referring to, it fell in a “wedge-shaped” pattern. They haven’t achieved results yet. They’re drawing conclusions, making improvements, and so on. So this is still a work in progress.

And the issue isn’t just about the balloon. We can see that they’re also improving their airstrike capabilities, as well as their intelligence-gathering and analysis capabilities. We should never treat the enemy as complete fools. That’s not our position.

We need to assess the situation realistically, study the characteristics, and prepare our personnel and our own capabilities to counter such enemy attack capabilities, and, conversely, to develop our own capabilities so that we can be effective both in striking enemy targets and in defending our air and missile defense systems. And all of this must be based on an objective assessment of the enemy’s capabilities and resources.

What is Russia’s most vulnerable target?

Today, the Moscow suburbs and Moscow itself came under drone attacks. There was an attack on the “Volodarskaya” station, which supplies the Moscow region with fuel, including aviation fuel. And all four airports in this hub suffered a collapse. But when the front lines begin to feel the fuel shortages, will they still restrict civilian consumption until the very end to preserve supplies for the army? And just how significant is the strike on the “Volodarskaya” fuel distribution station?

It’s significant. First, from a military standpoint, the key is that we need to increase the rate of losses in everything that produces, stores, and delivers fuel and lubricants to units and formations of the Russian army. So far, despite the fact that our strikes have reduced their capacity by up to 40% at various times – which is a very high figure – it fluctuates, rising and falling as they recover, and that’s important.

The impact on Russia’s war economy itself is also an economic factor, because not everything is going well there, and their supply, logistics, and everything else depends on the logistics that are being carried out.

And, as always – in the past, present, and looking ahead – the informational impact of these events and the moral and psychological pressure on ordinary citizens are of paramount importance.

It’s one thing to watch all this on TV, but it’s quite another when it all comes flying in, reaches a specific citizen – and even in the capital, in Moscow, they first have to find a gas station that has gasoline and allows them to buy it, and then wait in line. It’s a whole process.

And this is in Moscow and throughout the Moscow Region, where the four rings of air and missile defense are at their most effective.

In terms of effectiveness, the Crimean Bridge also has a very high level of protection. They’ve secured it from the air, on land, at sea, and underwater. For now, I think this bridge’s turn is still ahead of it. And this has a direct impact across such a broad spectrum on our current circumstances.

And I understand that our leadership, in particular, is responding to statements by Trump, who is shifting the blame for high diesel prices – and fuel prices in America in general – ahead of the congressional elections, on Ukraine in order to deflect the issue that this is primarily happening because of the war in Iran. And it’s not just the Strait of Hormuz there.

Despite all these efforts, we will, first of all, continue to strike precisely these targets. It’s also important to emphasize that we shouldn’t just target storage tanks – after all, those have already been destroyed, and there are backup tanks and others – but rather strike at the most vulnerable spot: the refinery’s processing facilities.

And if this is happening both in Moscow and in the Moscow region, it further underscores the importance and significance of such events.

Will the Crimean Bridge be destroyed?

You mentioned the Crimean Bridge, an illegal, superfluous structure on our land. October 8 marks the fourth anniversary of the first bombing. So maybe it’s time to take action against the bridges in Kyiv again? And give a “gift” to Putin, whose birthday is today?

I don’t disagree. I like your idea. Let’s join forces and convince our military and political leadership that, perhaps, The time has come. When we joke about this, it means we’re resilient in the face of these events.

And I must say, to make this happen, there needs to be a comprehensive, high-level interagency operation to eliminate him.

We’ve already discussed defense issues with you regarding all aspects of this bridge, and if we’re going to do this, it will require appropriate resources and the development of an interagency operation. This means within the framework of the Ukrainian Defense Forces. It involves the efforts of the Main Intelligence Directorate, the Security Service of Ukraine, and the National Guard. I won’t list them all, but everything that falls under the relevant capabilities of the Ukrainian Defense Forces must be mobilized, concentrated, and executed.

I think, one way or another, sooner or later, this will happen. Although, returning once again to the point you raised, perhaps this would be a very striking gift to this dictator – I almost said “man.” You see, it’s impossible to be so wrong, because this figure is a dark stain on the history of all humanity. And he will pay for everything he has done during this time.

Will anti-drone nets help protect the bridges in Kyiv?

Speaking of protecting bridges, photos have surfaced allegedly showing the Northern Bridge in Kyiv protected by anti-drone nets. And that’s sparked a flurry of debate. Some say: it’s like putting a bandage on a dead man. Unless, of course, they ever manage to stop FPV drones. Others say: it will protect everything. How do you assess this level of protection? Isn’t any protection better than none?

Unfortunately, this is a less-than-admirable trait among some of our citizens. And here we see examples of that kind of mockery. We remember how it was, by the way, with the nets – when the Russians started building them to protect their roads. We laughed, and then we started doing it ourselves.

Listen, I always check this with our military personnel who are directly carrying out missions on the front lines and wherever the fighting is taking place. And if you add a motorcycle, a buggy, or some old nag to the mix – or have to carry all that on your back for 10 to 20 kilometers until they get there – and it’s not just walking – it’s under enemy fire, with their drones and so on – whether it’s carried by a horse, a donkey, or an NRC. All of this needs to be verified.

I’m a proponent of taking a professional approach to this; the problem needs to be solved comprehensively, using both these nets and automated turrets. Fences are a passive measure – they don’t stop anything, but everything flies over them, and they’ll only trigger before the target is struck.

The issue is being studied because, for example, if the nets are made of metal, they place a load on these bridges. An objective, professional approach is important – one that actually makes a difference.

Let’s proceed step by step, but in a coordinated manner. We should begin by “intercepting,” for example, these “Shahed” drones at long range with our F-16s, which should be equipped with missiles – though we currently have a shortage of them, or even of ammunition.

And then everything else follows. This is an air defense system. It engages enemy aircraft using anti-aircraft missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems to the best of their capabilities, but ammunition is also needed for all of this. Then, man-portable surface-to-air missile systems can operate at the appropriate range, along with automated turrets and so on.

And if we set up and then incorporate passive air defense elements as well, this provides varied protection; moreover, to effectively manage all of this, we need to detect these systems – including these jet-powered drones. This requires radar stations and radio-technical stations that operate using audio and video.

In other words, if there are many of these capabilities, and they are deployed from a distance and across the entire area leading up to the target, then together they all function effectively. And the greater the potential of these components, the stronger the air defense coverage of a specific target – in our case, the bridge.

Could Russia resort to biological weapons?

Some say that Putin has acquired biological weapons and are citing all possible analysis, referring to epidemiology experts who have written that while Russia won’t succeed with a nuclear attack, it might with a biological one… Others say, “Come on, biological weapons? You can’t control them – if you use them against one side, they’ll infect the Russian occupation forces too.” Could Putin really use the plague as a biological weapon?

Unfortunately, they do have such a weapon. But regarding the incident itself, you see, this is a very serious matter. And the question is, what does this tell us? First, perhaps this is God’s punishment. They have a great many internal problems that need to be addressed, rather than waging war against our people and our country. This is a matter of principle.

Second, take a look at how Trump reacted – he spoke openly about Russia’s assistance. And here it’s worth noting that throughout his entire time in office, Trump never once condemned Putin, but only spoke of what a “strong” leader he is and so on.

To trust him… We’ve become pragmatic realists; we’ve gotten a lot from Trump (both Tomahawks and Patriot batteries). Let that be on the conscience of this politician, whose people will pass judgment on him as early as November and, I believe, will make their choice on many issues.

As for this situation, we need to be prepared. We see how COVID has affected the entire world and all these circumstances, and we must take everything seriously. Because Putin understands that halting hostilities could spell not only political death for him, with all the consequences that entails.

Even if the Russians are forced to engage in genuine negotiations to halt hostilities, he has plans in place; the Russians will continue to develop elements of hybrid warfare and hybrid actions against NATO and other countries.

And this, of course, poses a danger to us – both in the behavior of Putin and Trump and in how it affects the war and the global security situation in general.

What indicates the start of a covert mobilization in the aggressor country?

Robert Magyar Brovdi says that the volume of “200” and “300” cargo has increased by 40 percent. Is this covert mobilization actually underway?

Absolutely. Although it’s important to keep in mind that this certainly affects the Russian army’s capabilities, it’s also important to realize that this won’t stop Putin. And here it might be worth recalling 2023, when Valery Zaluzhny spoke about the misconception that the heavy losses – which were already occurring back then – could stop the leader of this imperial country. That wasn’t the case with Putin then, and it isn’t now.

Certainly, the casualties are high – they’ve already reached 42,000 in a single month. That’s a very high figure, in principle, but the country is large, there are still people there, and their economic and military potential is greater than ours.

And that is why our strategy for countering them is the rapid adoption of technologies – which we’ve been discussing with you today – using artificial intelligence and deploying our assets in the information domain – which enhances the effectiveness of our forces both in striking enemy targets and in defense, by building a more powerful air and missile defense system.