Russia Risks Losing the "Eyes" of Its Air Force: Sharp on the Strike on the A-50 Plant

Ukrainian strikes on Russian aircraft repair facilities could significantly weaken the enemy’s aviation and air defense capabilities. The A-50 long-range early warning aircraft remain particularly important for Russia; although only a few remain in service, they are crucial for detecting Ukrainian missiles and drones at long ranges.

Military analyst David Sharp explained on 24 Channel why the loss of even a single A-50 creates serious problems for Russian air defense and what prevents the enemy from protecting strategic targets. He also assessed the capabilities of the Ukrainian FP-7 ballistic missile and explained under what conditions strikes on bridges and railways could disrupt supplies to the Russian army.

Why Russia Needs the A-50

The General Staff reported a strike on a Russian aircraft repair plant where A-50, Il-76, and Il-78 aircraft are serviced. In March, one A-50 was already damaged at this facility. How important are these aircraft to Russia, and what impact could the damage to these repair facilities have?

Despite their technical obsolescence compared to modern Western counterparts, the A-50s remain an extremely important asset for the Russian military. Their value is further heightened by the fact that there are very few of these aircraft in service. A significant portion has already been damaged or shot down. We recall two instances of A-50s being destroyed, which were major successes for Ukrainian air defense, although the Russians claimed that in some cases the aircraft might have been hit by friendly fire.

The A-50 is a long-range early warning and control aircraft that functions as a flying radar. Unlike ground-based radar stations, it can move to areas where there is no or insufficient coverage. Furthermore, thanks to its high altitude, the curvature of the Earth significantly less limits its observation capabilities. It has a greater radar horizon and is capable of detecting low-flying targets that are more difficult for ground-based radars to spot.

For Russian fighter and bomber aviation, this aircraft effectively serves as their eyes. It can warn fighters in advance of the appearance of Ukrainian aircraft, allowing them to prepare for an attack or execute an evasive maneuver. Similarly, the A-50 provides information to bombers operating near the front lines so that, in case of danger, they can move away from the threat.

What is particularly important on a daily basis: as a flying radar that sees farther, lower, and into areas with blind spots, it is the most crucial tool for detecting Ukrainian cruise missiles and drones attacking Russia or the occupied territories.

This is of fundamental importance for Russia’s vast territory. The A-50 can monitor large areas and help coordinate the interception of aerial targets using fighter jets and helicopters. In particular, claims have surfaced in the Russian military blogosphere that these aircraft allegedly played a decisive role in intercepting certain Ukrainian “Flamingo” cruise missiles. We do not know if this was actually the case, but technically, such a scenario is entirely possible.

If a cruise missile passes through an area without adequate radar coverage, ground-based systems may not detect it. However, the appearance of the A-50 changes the situation, as the missile then enters its detection range. And this is precisely where the small number of these aircraft in the Russian military takes on special significance.

In general, the loss of any such aircraft – and there are only six to eight in service – is a huge success that literally breaks through the enemy’s defenses.

As for the repair facility itself, the A-50 is based on the Il-76 military transport aircraft. In fact, it is the same aircraft, but equipped with a special long-range detection radar. Therefore, a single plant can repair Il-76 transport aircraft, Il-78 refueling aircraft, and A-50s. Damage to facilities that support military transport aviation is, in itself, a beneficial outcome for Ukraine, but the ability to disrupt A-50 repairs makes such a facility a particularly important target.

Another facility involved in servicing these aircraft is located in Taganrog. This is the main plant that works on the A-50. If a Ukrainian strike succeeds in delaying the repair of even one such aircraft, the Russian military will temporarily lose part of its ability to detect airborne threats. If Russia did not have these aircraft at all, it would be much more difficult for it to organize air defense and support the operations of its own air force.

Weaknesses in Russian Air Defense

This aircraft repair plant was already attacked in March, and now it has been struck again. Why has Russia failed to provide reliable protection for such a vital facility?

The Russian side has virtually no facility with full-fledged protection. Even Moscow, which is guarded most meticulously, remains vulnerable. A striking example is the oil refinery in Kapotna, which has already come under Ukrainian attack. At the same time, it is important to understand that 100% air defense does not exist anywhere, not even in countries with the most advanced systems.

Russia faces additional problems of both an objective and subjective nature. These include technical shortcomings in detection systems and anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as the level of personnel training, which does not always meet high standards. Furthermore, the country’s vast territory makes it difficult to establish continuous radar coverage. When Ukrainian drones break through certain sections of the defense line, it is sometimes simply difficult for the Russians to intercept them until they get very close to the target.

Russia faces numerous challenges in organizing its air defense. These include technical issues, detection systems and anti-aircraft missile systems that are far from perfect, and the training of personnel, which does not always meet high standards. The country’s vast territory is another factor.

As a result, the Russian command is forced to prioritize its defenses. They try to provide better protection for the most critical targets, but it is impossible to simultaneously defend all factories, military facilities, airfields, warehouses, and energy infrastructure. Moreover, the enemy faces shortages of anti-aircraft missiles. Therefore, regarding some targets, the Russians may deliberately accept certain risks, believing that potential damage from a small number of drones carrying relatively small warheads would be acceptable.

This situation creates opportunities for Ukraine, but at the same time poses complex challenges for our command. Ukrainian weapons are also limited, so we must consider not only the importance of the target but also the ability to inflict sufficiently serious damage on it. If Ukraine had a wide arsenal of cruise and ballistic missiles with large warheads, it would be possible to attack the production facilities of the Russian military-industrial complex much more effectively.

When you have almost exclusively drones at your disposal, it is impractical to strike a target that is difficult to disable. One of the reasons why oil refineries are targeted with such high priority is their vulnerability.

Oil refineries contain complex technological equipment, and damage to it – even from relatively small weapons – can sometimes lead to significant production losses. In contrast, causing serious damage to some military facilities requires a significantly greater warhead yield. Therefore, Ukraine has to identify weaknesses in the Russian defense system and select targets whose destruction will yield the greatest results given its current capabilities.

Capabilities of the FP-7 Missile

Firebird co-owner Denis Shtilerman reported that the Ukrainian FP-7 ballistic missile has already been tested in combat conditions, but he currently considers its use economically unfeasible. The missile costs about $600,000 and can deliver a 200-kilogram warhead up to 300 kilometers. Are there really no suitable missions for it yet?

First and foremost, we must distinguish between the responsibilities of the manufacturer and those of the state. The company’s task is to produce missiles according to the order, while the state and military command decide which weapons to use and for what missions. Therefore, it is not up to the manufacturer to determine whether it is appropriate to use a specific munition. As for the cost, $600,000 is a fairly large sum, but the main question is to what extent the missile meets its stated specifications.

Specifically, the FP-7 is claimed to have an accuracy of approximately 14 meters. This means that half of the missiles should land within a circle with a radius of 14 meters from a specified point, and another 40% or more should land within a radius of up to 28 meters. If the actual performance matches these figures, the accuracy is quite good. And such a missile, in my opinion, will certainly find its use.

Ballistic missiles have several important advantages over drones, even if they have a similar warhead weight. First and foremost, they are much more difficult to intercept, since the enemy must have specialized missile defense systems in the vicinity of the targeted object. For Russia, given its vast territory, providing such protection is extremely difficult.

It is very difficult to shoot down a ballistic missile unless there are appropriate systems near the target. For Russia, this is a very difficult task. A single ballistic missile can easily reach a location that even 20 drones cannot reach.

The second advantage lies in speed. A drone can take several hours to reach its target, during which time the enemy is able to detect it, prepare for interception, or relocate critical equipment. A ballistic missile covers the same distance in a matter of minutes, making it particularly effective against targets that can change their location.

Consider the American ATACMS. They are more expensive but offer high precision and have their own specific applications. No one asks why use ATACMS when you can launch 15 drones instead of a single missile. Every type of weapon has its own niche, and the FP-7 can also be useful for certain military missions.

If you want to hit a target that’s on the move, you need a ballistic missile.

At the same time, the FP-7’s range limitations must be taken into account. Three hundred kilometers is sufficient to strike targets in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories and in Russia’s border regions. But it is not enough for strikes against targets deep in the Russian rear. When it comes to strategic deterrence, Ukraine needs missiles capable of reaching Moscow and even more distant regions.

The Effectiveness of Rail Warfare

In Russia’s Arkhangelsk Oblast, a railway bridge collapsed under a freight train, causing disruptions to service toward Komi and Vorkuta. Sabotage is among the theories being considered. How critical could such a loss be, and is “rail warfare” capable of systematically crippling Russian logistics?

I would suggest looking to historical experience. During World War II, the Soviet command repeatedly ordered partisans to intensify so-called “rail warfare” to hinder the movement of German troops and supplies. However, subsequent studies showed that the actual results of such operations were often much more modest than expected. The main reason was the ability to repair damaged railroad tracks relatively quickly.

If a standard section of track is destroyed, under certain conditions it can be repaired relatively quickly. While a specific train may be affected or traffic may be temporarily halted, this does not necessarily mean that the enemy’s railway system has suffered strategic damage. It is important to consider the duration of the disruptions and whether the enemy can use alternative routes.

It all comes down to how quickly the tracks can be restored: if restoration is fast and easy, the results aren’t particularly significant. You need to identify key and critical points. If you simply blow up something along the track, a train may be derailed, but that’s just localized damage.

Railroad bridges are certainly more vulnerable targets than ordinary sections of track. However, even in this case, it’s important to understand what consequences damaging a specific bridge will have. If the Russians can reroute trains along a different route – even if it adds an extra 200 kilometers to the journey – it will create difficulties but won’t necessarily halt transportation.

The significance of rail warfare depends primarily on its scale and duration. If we’re talking about isolated strikes, their impact may be limited to local losses and short-term delays. In contrast, a prolonged disruption of rail service can have a more significant impact on military logistics. But this requires the necessary resources and capabilities to maintain a sustained impact on the enemy’s transportation system.

Either you keep the railways under constant pressure, disrupting service for an extended period, or the damage is limited to isolated incidents.

One of the factors that can ensure such an impact is air superiority. It allows for keeping key transportation areas under constant threat of attack. If such capabilities are lacking, one must limit operations to isolated strikes. Ukraine has already carried out strikes against Russian trains, locomotives, and bridges, but it is important to distinguish between the success of a specific attack and the systematic disruption of the entire transportation network.

Medium-range, TV-controlled drones deserve special mention. They could become an effective tool for striking moving railway targets. However, there are limitations within Russian territory, particularly due to the lack of access to Starlink. This complicates the deployment of such systems and prevents their full potential from being realized.

Strikes on Bridges

There were recent reports of damage to a bridge on the highway between Rostov-on-Don and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. A video has surfaced showing what appears to be a strike by an FPV drone. To what extent does this affect Russian military logistics, and should the use of such drones be scaled up?

FPV drones have significant advantages: they are relatively inexpensive and can be effective against a variety of targets. However, I would not limit the development of Ukraine’s strike capabilities to just this type of weaponry. In my opinion, one of the most promising areas right now is scaling up the production of jet-powered drones and high-precision cruise missiles.

Slow, long-range drones are gradually facing increasingly serious countermeasures. Russian air defense has learned to intercept a significant portion of such targets, so Ukraine needs faster strike assets to increase the effectiveness of its attacks. One example is the Ukrainian “Ruta,” which, according to my information, has already entered mass production at a rate of approximately 300 units per month.

FPVs are fairly cheap and effective, but jet-powered drones, such as the “Ruta,” which has entered mass production at a rate of 300 units per month, are the most promising option. Slow-flying drones are becoming less effective weapons because air defense systems are largely capable of dealing with them.

Specifically, this refers to the high-precision “Ruta” Block 1 cruise missile with a claimed range of approximately 300 kilometers. It is much more difficult for Russian air defense systems to counter such high-speed vehicles than conventional slow-flying drones. This does not mean that FPV drones are losing their significance: they remain effective in their own sphere of application, but every type of weapon has its own advantages and limitations.

As for the bridge between Rostov-on-Don and the temporarily occupied territories, its damage certainly creates problems for Russian transport. This could lead to traffic jams, transportation delays, and the need to reroute. But this is not the only transportation crossing providing access in this direction. If the enemy can bypass the damaged section by using another road or bridge, supplies will not necessarily suffer critical losses.

The Russians will consume more fuel, lose a few hours, and may face additional difficulties in organizing traffic, but overall they will be able to continue their transport operations. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between an isolated, effective strike and a systematic weakening of the transportation network, where disruptions become so significant that they begin to affect the troops’ ability to receive necessary resources.

There is a difference between sustained pressure and isolated, painful strikes. If strikes do not form a chain and are not systematic in nature, their significance drops sharply and amounts to little more than a delay in delivery of a few hours.

It is precisely according to this principle that other strikes against Russian rail and road infrastructure should be assessed. The damage to a single bridge may be a success, but its real military value is determined by how significantly and for how long transportation links are disrupted. Without sustained pressure, the enemy is capable of adapting to the loss of a single facility and organizing supplies via alternative routes.

Sharp on the strike against the A-50 repair plant, Russia’s porous air defense, and the effectiveness of ballistic missiles: watch the video