"You Need to Be a Psychotherapist with Putin": Fesenko on the Negotiations in Abu Dhabi

Ukraine, the United States, and Russia are preparing for a new round of trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, but the Kremlin has not yet shown any willingness to back down from its demands. European leaders, including the President of Finland and the Prime Minister of Norway, are becoming increasingly involved in diplomatic efforts as they seek a new approach toward Moscow.

Political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko explained in an interview with 24 Channel why Europe’s involvement could change the negotiation process and what is lacking in U.S. mediation. He also discussed why special communication tactics are needed with Vladimir Putin, what could once again lead the negotiations into a dead end, and what challenges await Ukraine this coming winter.

A New Round of Talks in Abu Dhabi

Donald Tusk announced that on November 4, trilateral talks between Ukraine, the U.S., and Russia are scheduled to take place in Abu Dhabi. How will this round differ from previous ones, and what role will Finland and Norway play in its preparation?

I believe this is a very important step in the development of the negotiation process. It is much more substantive than previous attempts by Emmanuel Macron or, even earlier, Olaf Scholz to engage in dialogue with Putin. Back then, the focus was mainly on reestablishing contacts, whereas now we are seeing the continuation of concrete diplomatic efforts.

First, there were talks in Oslo, then Steve Witkoff’s meeting in St. Petersburg. Now a new trilateral round in Abu Dhabi is being discussed. And here, it is of fundamental importance for Ukraine and Europe that contacts with Putin not remain Witkoff’s monopoly.

The participation of Finnish President Alexander Stubb could significantly strengthen this process. He is an experienced diplomat who has a good understanding of both European politics and the Ukrainian position. Moreover, he is a politician who actively supports Ukraine.

But we shouldn’t expect a single phone call or meeting in Abu Dhabi to yield immediate results. Negotiations with Russia will be complex and protracted, especially since Putin currently shows no intention of ending the war.

What matters to us is that the negotiation process has not come to a complete halt and that European leaders who can defend Ukraine’s interests are gradually joining it.

Why Europe Does Not Have a Unified Position

Europe has reacted with mixed feelings to the contacts between Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre with the Kremlin. Were they acting independently, or did they coordinate their steps with their partners?

I do not consider these to be unilateral actions. The talks in Oslo took place about a week ago, and Finland and Norway were not the only countries represented there.

National security advisers from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany participated in them. According to some reports, which I cannot yet confirm, there were also representatives from Poland and Italy. In addition, there was talk of participation by representatives of the European Commission and NATO.

Witkoff was in contact with Zelenskyy, and after his trip to St. Petersburg, he met again with the Prime Minister of Norway, among others, and briefed him on the results of the talks.

As far as is known, the leaders of Finland and Norway also reported on their contacts with colleagues from the Nordic countries. At the same time, a certain disagreement arose with Denmark. Its prime minister was one of the first to sharply criticize this initiative. Perhaps, for some reason, there was a lack of proper coordination with her.

However, Donald Tusk confirmed that he had been informed, as had Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Therefore, I assume that the European Union leadership was also aware of these contacts. At least, no sharp criticism came from their side.

There is another factor to consider here. Within Europe, there is competition for the right to participate in negotiations with Russia. This is a perfectly natural situation for politicians, especially when it comes to such important decisions.

But the problem runs much deeper. For over a year now, European countries have been unable to definitively decide who exactly should represent them in the negotiation process.

I recall a telling discussion at the Munich Security Conference last February. At that time, Keith Kellogg, who represented the U.S. in negotiations regarding Ukraine and Russia, spoke at a Ukrainian event.

European leaders, including the Prime Minister of Denmark, asked why Europe wasn’t being included in the negotiations. Kellogg replied that a large number of participants would only complicate the process.

But in reality, the Europeans themselves were unable to agree on joint representation. To this day, this issue remains unresolved.

In practice, a group of the most active countries has emerged – the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. They are participating in consultations with Ukraine and the United States. Finland and Norway have now become more actively involved in this process.

If we wait until all European states agree on joint representation and then select negotiators, we could lose yet another year. Therefore, in my opinion, the initiative by Stubb and Støre is entirely justified.

And here it matters who exactly took the initiative. We’re talking about leaders who have consistently supported Ukraine and do not advocate for unilateral concessions to the Kremlin.

Until very recently, Moscow categorically denied the possibility of European participation in the negotiations. But now, Putin’s adviser Yuri Ushakov is already saying that European countries should also be included in the discussions.

This is a significant shift in the Russian side’s rhetoric. And it would be wrong not to take advantage of the opportunity to gradually consolidate the European presence at the negotiating table.

However, it is no less important to determine exactly how to conduct negotiations with Putin. Here, in my view, there is a fundamental difference between the approaches of Witkoff and Stubb.

Witkoff relies heavily on business logic, trying to adapt to the Russian leadership’s position and seek agreements through economic interests. But this approach does not guarantee a result.

Stubb combines diplomatic flexibility with a firm stance. He can listen to his counterpart, but at the same time does not abandon his own position. This is particularly important for negotiations with Putin.

I would even say that one needs to be something of a psychotherapist here as well. Putin has accumulated many anti-Ukrainian complexes and grievances toward the West. Moreover, this is not just about his attitude toward Zelenskyy, but toward Ukraine as a whole.

Currently, some of his grievances are directed primarily at Europe, whereas his attitude toward Trump is somewhat different. Therefore, the negotiator must strike the right tone.

Perhaps, at first, Putin should be given the opportunity to voice all his grievances, to repeat his statements about the so-called root causes of the war and his grievances against the West. Only then should the conversation be gradually steered toward specific issues on which agreements are actually possible.

I don’t know if this tactic will work, but it holds more promise than simply yielding to Russian demands. Even if we don’t achieve results immediately – but at least manage to begin a substantive discussion – that in itself will be a step forward.

At the same time, we need to understand that diplomatic contacts will not automatically stop Russian aggression. Negotiations may proceed in parallel with the escalation of the war, and Ukraine must be prepared for this.

I am still convinced that the absence of negotiations is worse than negotiations with an uncertain outcome. However, how they are organized is of the utmost importance.

Until this year, the U.S. primarily relied on shuttle diplomacy: it engaged separately with Russia and separately with Ukraine. This resulted in a “broken telephone” situation, where one side said one thing, but the message conveyed to the other side was slightly different.

This was particularly evident last March during attempts to agree on a partial ceasefire regarding energy facilities and the safety of shipping in the Black Sea.

At first, it seemed that agreements had been reached. But a few days later, it became clear that Ukraine and Russia had different interpretations of the list of facilities that were off-limits to attacks. As a result, the agreement did not take effect.

Similar problems arose during discussions of the U.S. peace plans. That is why the direct trilateral format, which was first used in January of this year in Abu Dhabi and then in February in Geneva, became an important step.

Here, all three parties are already sitting at the same table, able to discuss proposals directly and clarify their positions.

Last year, there were also direct contacts between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul. The Americans initially welcomed this format, but it quickly became clear that without active mediation and effective moderation, the negotiations would not work.

Even the delegations themselves need time to establish normal communication. And then concrete proposals are needed that can serve as the basis for compromise.

At the beginning of the year, the trilateral talks initially progressed quite actively. They even discussed practical mechanisms for a ceasefire, but in the end, everything stalled over the territorial issue.

The Russian side insisted on the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Donbas. This demand became the main obstacle to further progress.

There is now a risk that the same scenario will repeat itself. However, judging by some reports, in this new phase the parties may try to start not with territorial issues, but with security guarantees and post-war conditions.

This is a different tactic that, in theory, allows for avoiding an immediate confrontation over the Donbas. However, if Russia again insists on Ukraine’s neutral status, an equally complex problem will arise.

Therefore, much will depend on the people who will lead the negotiation process. If Stubb plays a significant role, I see some opportunities for constructive work. If everything once again depends primarily on Witkoff, my predictions are significantly more pessimistic.

Why the Kremlin Agreed to Talk with Europe

Why is Putin even agreeing to engage with European leaders who openly support Ukraine?

Because he understands the need for negotiations. Putin has already agreed to the negotiation process as a whole, and now the circle of participants is gradually changing.

Prior to Witkoff’s meeting with Putin, consultations took place in Oslo, where Europe was represented quite broadly. This included the President of Finland, the Prime Minister of Norway, and representatives of leading European nations, the European Union, and NATO.

This indicates that Europe is already becoming a participant in the negotiation process, albeit primarily through consultations for now. The Russian leadership is also beginning to acknowledge this.

There are a number of issues that cannot be resolved solely between Washington and Moscow. For example, the future of sanctions against Russia.

The European position, which Ukraine supports, is that a gradual lifting of sanctions is possible only after the war ends. Witkoff, on the other hand, in my opinion, is inclined to lift certain restrictions even before such agreements are reached.

The second issue is frozen Russian assets. The U.S. side has put forward ideas about returning a portion of these funds to Russia. For Ukraine, such an approach is fundamentally unacceptable.

However, a significant portion of Russian assets is under the control of European countries. Therefore, any agreements regarding these funds are impossible without their participation.

The third issue is Ukraine’s future membership in the European Union. The Americans view this as one of the possible elements of security guarantees. However, the decision on Ukraine’s accession will be made not by the U.S. or Russia, but by the EU member states.

Next is the broader issue of European security. Putin constantly raises objections to NATO’s military presence near Russian borders. At the same time, Europeans view Russian troops near the borders of EU countries and the Alliance as a threat.

These issues cannot be resolved without the participation of European countries. The same applies to the idea promoted by Witkoff – Russia’s return to the European energy market.

Russian gas and other energy resources can return only if the European countries themselves make the appropriate decisions. Washington cannot unilaterally determine their energy policy.

Therefore, the Kremlin has practical reasons to engage with the Europeans, regardless of its stance on their political positions.

Why Stubb and Støre, specifically? They are already involved in consultations with Witkoff, have contacts in Ukraine, and represent countries with experience in international mediation.

Moreover, Moscow likely considers them more suitable interlocutors than some representatives of the European Union leadership. For example, the Kremlin views Kaja Kallas extremely negatively.

There is also an intra-European factor. Despite her consistent support for Ukraine, Kallas has faced difficulties in her relations with a number of European politicians. This, too, affects the question of Europe’s representation in the negotiations.

Perhaps Moscow has decided to first establish contacts with leaders of countries that do not belong to Europe’s major political centers. For the Kremlin, this approach may seem less confrontational.

Furthermore, the Finnish and Norwegian diplomatic traditions have a long history of participation in international peace processes. One need only recall former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, who received the Nobel Peace Prize for his mediation efforts.

Therefore, contacts with these countries could serve as a kind of preparation for broader official negotiations involving Europe.

I don’t think Putin has suddenly changed his attitude toward Ukraine or European countries. But he recognizes that without them, he won’t be able to reach a number of desired agreements.

Why the negotiations might hit a dead end again

Reuters reports that Putin has not made any concessions and continues to demand the Donbas. If Russia’s position has not changed, won’t the new negotiations end in the same impasse?

If the parties once again focus exclusively on Donbas, the negotiations could indeed stall. But right now, they are trying to change tactics and shift their attention to other issues.

The idea is to first discuss security conditions and possible guarantees after the war ends. It remains unclear how successful this approach will be.

However, I see a much more serious problem right now than Putin’s territorial demands themselves. He has no intention, at least for now, of negotiating a genuine cessation of hostilities.

In my opinion, Putin is negotiating primarily for Trump’s sake. He understands that the U.S. president wants an agreement and is trying to keep the diplomatic process going without changing his own military strategy.

At the same time, Moscow has begun to acknowledge the need for negotiations with Europe. This is another avenue of its diplomatic efforts that the Kremlin can use to achieve its goals.

But at the same time, Russia will continue to apply military pressure. And by that, I mean not only the front lines, but above all attacks on Ukraine’s energy sector, industry, and economy.

In this way, Putin will attempt to weaken our ability to resist and create more challenging conditions for Ukraine ahead of future agreements.

Therefore, we should not expect a quick resolution. Peace negotiations in complex wars can last for years, and certain preconditions are necessary for real progress.

The most important of these is military parity. Both sides must come to the conclusion that they are unable to defeat one another militarily and that continuing the war will not yield the desired result.

On the ground, we are already close to a situation where neither side can achieve a decisive advantage. But in the air, the situation is different.

Due to a shortage of air defense systems, Ukraine faces serious difficulties in intercepting Russian ballistic missiles and jet-powered drones. Russia retains the ability to launch large-scale strikes against our cities and energy infrastructure.

And Putin, in my opinion, continues to believe that this will allow him to win the war. As long as he harbors such expectations, he will not be open to real compromises.

The second obstacle is the U.S. negotiation strategy. A business-like approach, a willingness to make separate economic deals with Russia, and the possibility of unilateral concessions create the risk of easing pressure on Moscow even before hostilities cease.

This is precisely where the participation of Europeans – who have different approaches to sanctions, security guarantees, and future relations with the Kremlin – could prove crucial.

Theoretically, the format of the negotiations could be expanded to include other countries, such as Turkey, India, or China. However, these are merely possible scenarios for now, not concrete agreements.

The main task now is to find a way to shift the dialogue with Putin from discussing his maximalist demands to substantive agreements. This requires the specific negotiating tactics I mentioned earlier.

Putin wants to negotiate with the West, especially with Trump. Otherwise, he would not have agreed to diplomatic contacts at all. Now he is showing a certain willingness to talk with the Europeans as well, and this opportunity must be seized.

At the same time, I do not expect substantive negotiations to actually begin in the coming weeks. In my opinion, this may not happen until spring or summer of next year.

For this to happen, Ukraine must survive the winter, and the situation on the front lines must convince the Russian leadership that there is no possibility of achieving military victory.

Political developments in Europe will also play a role. In particular, Putin may be waiting for the results of the French elections, hoping that political changes in France will weaken European solidarity in support of Ukraine.

This factor should not be underestimated, as Ukraine’s situation remains difficult not only militarily but also financially.

For next year, we need an additional 70 billion euros on top of the aid that our European partners have already allocated for 2026 and 2027.

We have not yet been able to secure the full amount. Discussions are currently underway regarding the possibility of raising at least 40–45 billion euros, but even these funds will have to come primarily from contributions by individual countries.

The European Union’s budget does not have sufficient funding to cover the entire need. Moreover, not all European countries will be willing to allocate additional funds to support the Ukrainian resistance.

Russia also faces economic challenges, but the current situation in the oil market and shifts in U.S. policy are creating opportunities for it to generate additional revenue.

This means that Ukraine will have to simultaneously address the challenges of defense, military funding, and securing international support. And all these factors will influence our negotiating position.

Therefore, I see no realistic alternative to continuing the diplomatic process. But negotiations do not mean that Ukraine must agree to all of Russia’s demands.

On the contrary, we must seek agreements that take our security interests into account and engage partners capable of strengthening Ukraine’s position.

That is precisely why I view the efforts of the President of Finland and the Prime Minister of Norway positively. Their involvement could help gradually shift the negotiation process, which until now has largely depended on the approaches of American mediators.

Fesenko on the Abu Dhabi talks, Europe’s role, and psychotherapy for Putin: watch the video