"It was a big surprise for the Russians": An exclusive interview with the commander of the NOVA unit about Operation "Vivaldi" and the NRK

The commander of the NOVA 3 unit of the 3rd Assault Brigade of the 3rd Army Corps, with the call sign "Zhorik," spoke in an exclusive interview with Channel 24 about the unique experience of the large-scale deployment of ground-based robotic systems during Operation "Vivaldi."

The military officer explained how the robots provided reconnaissance, logistics, evacuation, and fire support, effectively replacing thousands of soldiers in the most dangerous areas. He also revealed details about the use of old Soviet armored personnel carriers (APCs) converted into remote-controlled ground kamikaze drones to breach enemy fortifications.

What would the soldiers not have been able to manage without?

Operation “Vivaldi” by the Third Army Corps against the Russians is ongoing. Many people are writing that this is the first time such a robotized war has been waged, during which strike and logistics NRKs were used on a massive scale and successfully for the first time. Please tell us exactly how you used the NRKs. What role did they play here? How many were used, as far as you can say?

NRKs (ground robotic systems) were used from the very beginning. The entire operation was planned by Andriy Biletsky, commander of the Third Army Corps. And, most likely, from the very beginning, we began using NRKs for reconnaissance, route reconnaissance, mining, and the like. For ambushes, for strike missions, and also for logistics – to support assault teams, logistics operations, and evacuations.

Today, it would be very difficult to carry out such an operation without NRKs. NRKs have replaced a great deal of manpower. During the operation, the NOVA unit transported over 240 metric tons of cargo to liberated territories alone and covered a distance of over 30,000 kilometers.

If we convert this to personnel, how much cargo could a single soldier carry to move that amount? No more than 20 kilograms, because he would have to march about 20 kilometers. So, if we take the figure of 240 metric tons and divide it by 20 kilograms, we get 12,000 trips. That’s if a single soldier were to do it.

Or we’d need to deploy 12,000 of our own soldiers. So there’s the figure NRKs allocated solely for logistics. And that’s not counting evacuations, reconnaissance, or losses of personnel, vehicles, or armored vehicles.

So, are NRKs much more effective than heavy drones capable of delivering cargo? Does that mean NRKs are the better option right now?

I’ve always said that you can only win as a team. In other words, there’s no such thing as “better” – whether it’s NRKs, UAVs, or electronic warfare. If we pull our infantry out of the front lines now, everything will fall apart. The NRKs will fall, the UAVs will fall, and all the other units will fall.

In other words, we can only win this war and defeat the enemy as a team. Every unit, every formation makes a significant contribution to achieving the result.

Full interview: watch the video

How was Operation “Vivaldi” prepared?

From what you can share, can you provide details on how you initially worked with the NRKs and how you first trained to use them? In other words, did they then move behind enemy lines, and did you use them as a means of logistics?

Let me put it this way: our unit has been working with NRK for over two years. We were among the first to put NRKs on a systematic footing and begin using them on a large scale. In other words, we’ve been using NRKs for a long time, so our crews are already trained, have combat experience, and are constantly on the job.

The first NRKs were launched behind enemy lines for reconnaissance. That is, not just from UAVs. From the air, we saw one thing; from the ground, we saw another. Later, we launched NRKs to reconnoiter routes. Everyone saw the armored vehicles rolling in, but before that, we had to check for mines.

Next, our NRK demining teams would go in. There, Wherever we found mines, we cleared them. We also cleared routes for our assault teams. Then the strike NRKs went in to carry out their missions, followed by the logistics support for the assault teams.

Once the guys had penetrated deep into enemy territory, they needed support. The NRK constantly supported them. And everyone understands: advancing requires logistical support. In other words, the NRK units were constantly in the rear, delivering ammunition, provisions, and everything else that was needed.

How many NRK units did you use in total?

There’s no exact figure, but a lot.

Are we talking about thousands?

No, not thousands. If someone had given us thousands of NRKs, that would have been incredibly powerful. Let’s just say, hundreds.

How did the assault NRKs perform? How many fighters could they have replaced in that scenario?

The commander of the strike NRKs can tell you more about that. However, yes, they made a major contribution to this operation. They did what no one else did. So it’s best to ask the commander to explain it to you.

Why did the strike come as a surprise to the Russians?

Andriy Biletsky said that the Russians “slept through” this strike. How did they fail to notice it? You mentioned that the NRK units penetrated deep into the enemy’s rear. Did the enemy not notice them, or did you operate in such a way that they didn’t see you? How did you manage to outmaneuver them?

To achieve this, we didn’t just involve a single unit, but the entire Third Army Corps and all allied units that participated in this operation – and continue to do so.

Of course, we carried out diversionary maneuvers, built up our equipment, movement of NRKs, and so on in other areas to minimize the enemy’s awareness. And this was kept as secret as possible so the enemy wouldn’t find out.

Everything was used for this purpose: from military equipment to small NRKs.

So was it more of a surprise for them? Unexpected?

Yes, it was a surprise. In fact, it was a major surprise. Everyone heard how many prisoners were taken. So it was very unexpected. The operation was meticulously planned, and the approach to it – and its execution – was top-notch.

During Operation “Vivaldi,” we managed to take a large number of Russians prisoner – which is very difficult, if not impossible. Just how difficult was it?

Our assault teams can tell you more about that – it’s their achievement; they’re the ones who took the Russians prisoner. Yes, it wasn’t without the help of UAV units, NRK units, electronic warfare units, and everyone else, but the main credit goes to our assault troops, our infantry, who went in and got the job done.

Take note! During the three phases of Operation “Vivaldi,” soldiers of the Third Army Corps captured more than 250 Russian servicemen. They reported that their commanders issued orders to “wipe them out” and sent assault teams on one-way attacks with no possibility of retreat.

What are Biletsky’s plans regarding the NRC?

We see that the enemy isn’t stopping yet and isn’t coming to the negotiating table. So, in your opinion, how do you see the NRK – and perhaps not just the NRK – developing in the future?

The NRK needs to scale up if we want to free up personnel and preserve our forces. We don’t have that many people. I said at the beginning how many fighters we would have had to deploy if it weren’t for the NRK – we would have needed over 12,000 fighters. Robots have replaced all of that.

A robot is just a piece of metal. Yes, it costs money, but it’s just a piece of metal. Tomorrow we can go out and get a new one. It’s very hard to get a soldier back if they’re wounded, and even harder if they’re lost. That’s why we just need to scale up the NRKs.

And, as Andriy Biletsky said, the plan is to replace 70% of our troops with robotic systems. That’s what we’re striving for. That’s what we’re building. We’re building a tiered logistics system and developing robotic fire support systems to free up personnel and replace them with robots.

If there’s an opportunity to deploy, for example, transformers, we’ll send transformers in. Of course, we can’t remove all the infantry – that won’t work. But if we manage to build a transformer somewhere, we’ll deploy it.

What other technologies could be even more helpful in combat? Take robotic turrets, for example – do they really help much during an offensive, or not?

Everything helps. New technologies – every innovation helps – because this is a new kind of war. Those robotic turrets, for example, made a major contribution to Operation “Vivaldi.”

They worked in conjunction with the NRK, so to speak?

They were deployed with the NRK – that is, the robotic turrets were part of the NRK.

And have the Russians also started using NRKs? Or are they still just sending in “cannon fodder”?

The Russians learn very quickly, and they also have NRKs; they’re also being used in our area of responsibility. More than one NRK has been destroyed in our area of responsibility.

They don’t have them on the same scale as we do yet, but given their capabilities and ability to scale up, I think we’ll soon see their robots in action as well. That’s why we have to stay one step ahead of them.

Which robots are more effective?

And which NRKs are more effective? Ukrainian or foreign ones? Do you use different types? We use a wide variety of NRKs.

We use a wide variety of UAVs. Whatever comes our way, we make it drive – even if it can’t drive.

What makes our domestically produced UAVs better, for example? They’re cheaper – at least when we’re buying them. If someone tells me, “Would you rather take one evacuation vehicle for 10 million or several for 500,000 each?” I’d take the ones for 500,000 each, because that gives me 20 chances to get out, not just one.

In other words, I believe that an NRK is a logistical, evacuation vehicle – it fulfills a single mission. Everything else is a bonus, because it could be destroyed on the very first mission; it might complete 100 missions there, but we have to plan for just one – for the worst-case scenario.

And not just, for example, through government procurement – can you receive such NRKs from volunteers, from Ukrainians who care? Do you accept such donations?

Of course, we do. We’re all for it. Anyone who’s willing to help us – we’re all for it.

What else, besides NRKs, was used to ensure the operation’s success?

To break through the enemy’s fortified defenses during the third phase of Operation “Vivaldi,” we used old Soviet armored personnel carriers, completely packed with explosives and converted into ground-based drones. I’d like some details here, too. Was this also a huge surprise for the occupiers? Who came up with this idea?

I’ve already said that Andriy Biletsky planned the entire operation. I can’t say for sure whether it was his idea or if someone else suggested it to him. However, he definitely approved it.

I can’t go into details here, but that’s what happened. The APCs were used. It destroyed the enemy’s fortified position, thereby contributing to the success of our troops’ advance.