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15 October, 14:02
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Pause in Strikes on Russian Oil Refineries: Svitan Warns of Danger to the Front Lines

Roman Svitan explained why a pause in strikes on Russian oil refineries is dangerous, how Starlink restrictions affect drone operations, and what impact the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ counterattacks near Lyman and strikes on data centers are having.

Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries have become one way to disrupt the occupying forces’ fuel supply. However, there have been no new attacks on major refineries in recent days, although Russia continues to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

Roman Svitan, a reserve colonel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, flight instructor, and military expert, explained on Channel 24 why this lull could pose a threat to Ukraine. He also analyzed the limitations of Starlink, changes on key sectors of the front, and the capabilities of Ukrainian drones in combating Russian aviation.

On the night of October 14, explosions were again reported in the Rostov region, near the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery. At a nearby oil terminal, which had already been hit, new storage tanks caught fire. However, as Svitan noted, there have been no new attacks directly on major Russian oil refineries since October 10.

This lull raises questions, as Russian forces have not stopped attacking Ukrainian combined heat and power plants, gas infrastructure, and other energy facilities. At the same time, there have been no public reports of any agreements that would call for a halt to Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries.

They’ve stopped striking oil refineries, but the attacks on us continue just as before. In fact, there are even more of them now. Specifically, they’re targeting combined heat and power plants and gas transmission infrastructure – that is, energy facilities. No one here even raised the issue of halting strikes on Russian oil refineries. At least, there was no mention of it in the media,
– Svitan emphasized.

The military expert suggested that the reason for the pause might be the Ukrainian leadership’s desire to avoid a conflict with Donald Trump over his agreements regarding Russian diesel fuel. However, he does not know whether such an order exists or who might have issued it.

Among the possible motives of the U.S. president, he cited business interests linked to Russian oil companies. In particular, Svitan speculated about Trump’s potential interest in Lukoil’s assets, but acknowledged that he does not know the details of any possible negotiations or agreements.

The military expert sees the greatest danger in the fact that damaged Russian enterprises could gradually resume production. According to his rough estimate, there were more than 30 large oil refineries operating in Russia: about ten were put out of commission, another ten were undergoing repairs, and the rest continued to produce fuel.

Even a week without new strikes could allow some of the plants to make progress in restoring their capacity. Svitan doubts that Russia would direct the additional diesel primarily to the United States, which already has enough fuel of its own.

If we don’t strike for a week now, even the ten that are currently idle will begin repairs. And the ten that are currently under repair will resume production. Where will the diesel go? Do you think to the American market? There’s enough there; nobody needs it there. This diesel will go to the Russian army,
– explained the military expert.

Additional volumes of Canadian diesel – which Svitan estimated at approximately one million barrels per day – may also enter the U.S. market. Therefore, he links the resumption of Russian production primarily to the risk of improved fuel supplies for the occupying forces.

Because of this, the military expert has the most questions for the command responsible for conducting combat operations. He believes it is necessary to explain the reasons for halting attacks on large oil refineries, as he considers strikes on oil refining facilities to be one of the main mechanisms for weakening the Russian army.

Another problem has arisen due to reports of changes in the operation of the Starlink satellite internet service. Serhiy Beskrestnov, an advisor on unmanned systems, reported restrictions on certain SpaceX communication packages, while Serhiy Sternenko noted that terminals were disconnecting when drones were moving at high speeds.

Initially, the issue was reported at speeds of approximately 160 miles per hour, at which Ukrainian drones began to lose connection. Later, reports emerged of problems occurring even at speeds of 60–70 miles per hour. For unmanned systems that rely on Starlink during combat missions, such limitations could pose a serious obstacle.

Svitan noted that the Ukrainian military had been conducting operations even before the advent of SpaceX’s satellite internet. However, under current circumstances, certain missions – especially offensive ones – will have to be reassessed if their execution depends on a stable connection.

Right now, we just need to hold out for at least a few weeks. It’s very difficult, it’s very complicated, but it has to be done. Certain aspects, such as offensive operations involving Musk, simply need to be halted, knowing that they will fail,
– Svitan noted.

The expert links possible changes in cooperation with American technology companies to the upcoming U.S. congressional elections. He expects that after the election, the political situation may change, and U.S. lawmakers will have more opportunities to influence the Trump administration’s decisions.

In his view, Elon Musk is also forced to take the U.S. government’s position into account, since his companies’ operations depend on their relationships with government agencies. Therefore, Svitan does not rule out the resumption of full-fledged cooperation if the political balance in Washington shifts after the elections.

The issue of timely warnings about ballistic attacks remains just as pressing. Following the strikes on Kyiv, a debate arose regarding delays in air raid alerts, and Air Force spokesperson Yuriy Ignat explained that during one of the attacks there was no warning, whereas during the next one, a warning was issued.

Svitan noted that residents of cities near the front lines have long been living with limited time to react to missile threats. He compared the situation in Kyiv to the difficulties constantly faced by Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Kherson.

For five years now, we’ve been living under the same conditions in other cities – without Patriot systems, without real protection. Only Kyiv was protected. Now Kyiv is simply coming to the same level as Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Kherson. There’s nothing unusual about this, at least not in that sense. We just need to adapt to these circumstances,
– said the military expert.

At the same time, Svitan did not provide any evidence that the problems with the early warning system were caused by a deliberate restriction of U.S. intelligence data. He suggested that difficulties with information sharing may persist for some time until the political situation in the U.S. changes.

The military expert assigns an important role to Congress in the continued support of Ukraine. Mechanisms for influencing the administration during the adoption of the U.S. budget for the coming year could be particularly effective, as lawmakers will have the opportunity to raise issues of military and technological cooperation with Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces are continuing counteroffensive operations in northern Donetsk Oblast, where Russian commanders had previously hoped to threaten the encirclement of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk metropolitan area. Andriy Biletsky, commander of the Third Army Corps, and the analytical project DeepState reported changes to the front line, particularly in the Zelena Dolyna and Kolodyazi areas.

This involves nearly 100 square kilometers of territory where Ukrainian troops have made gains. Svitan praised the actions of the Third Army Corps, which is reducing the Russian salient north of Lyman and gradually realigning the line of contact.

Reducing the length of the front line allows Ukrainian troops to concentrate more forces on a shorter stretch of the defense line. This creates more favorable conditions for containing Russian attacks and preventing any further advances.

They’re straightening out the front line. They’re doing the right thing. First, cutting off such a salient reduces the width of the front line – probably by almost half. And if the front’s width decreases, the density of our troops increases, and in principle, there is a possibility of pushing the Russians back beyond Chornyi Zherebets,
– Svitan explained.

Further actions will depend on the balance of power and the terrain. The next natural line of defense after the Chornyi Zherebets is the Krasna River, but a hasty advance in that direction could create additional risks for Ukrainian units.

Although the Chornyi Zherebets is a small river, dams and lakes in certain areas complicate troop movements. Therefore, it is important not only to advance but also to select positions from which potential counterattacks by Russian reserves can be repelled.

Svitan considers the most prudent option at this stage to be securing a favorable line and preparing defensive positions. At the same time, he emphasized that this is his own assessment of the situation, based on the geography of the area rather than on information about the Ukrainian command’s plans.

The optimal option at this stage is to advance to Chornyi Zherebets, consolidate there, build fortifications, and meet the main offensive force of the Russian reserves from better positions. Most likely, that is exactly what will happen. “This is the logic of the process; it’s not insider information, but simply an attempt to read the battlefield,”
– the military expert emphasized.

The Russians are also facing difficulties in the Oskil sector. Ukrainian units, in particular “Charter,” are putting pressure on the occupiers, who are trying to hold their ground on the right bank of the river. For Russian forces, a retreat beyond the Oskil could mean a return to a more advantageous defensive line.

Svitan does not rule out that by the end of the year or the conclusion of the current military campaign, the Defense Forces will be able to hold the right bank of the Oskil and advance to the right bank of the Chornyi Zherebets. Such a development could deprive Russia of the opportunity to carry out its original plan to encircle Sloviansk and Kramatorsk in the near future.

This effectively nullifies the strategic prospect of encircling Sloviansk and Kramatorsk in the near future. This is what the “troika” has been working on. Why is this so important? On the one hand, these may seem like tactical moves, but they lead to serious strategic miscalculations by the Russian command,
– Svitan explained.

The Russian offensive plan depended to a large extent on the ability to cut off Sloviansk’s connection with Izium. The occupiers’ subsequent actions to the south and southwest of the urban area were based on this plan, but Ukrainian counterattacks are forcing the Russian command to revise its plans.

One possible option for the occupiers remains an offensive toward Sloviansk from the direction of Bakhmut and Kostiantynivka. However, the Ukrainian military already has prepared defensive positions in these areas, which could significantly complicate frontal attacks.

The situation near Dobropillia also remains critical, where Ukrainian forces are blocking Russian advances toward Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka. Between Dobropillya and Kostiantynivka, “Azov” units are operating; Svitan assessed their positioning as advantageous for defense and for containing the Russian offensive.

As a result, the occupiers may find themselves forced to advance between Ukrainian units, risking attacks from the flanks. The military expert compared this situation to the problems the Russians already faced near Svyatogorsk during their attempts to encircle Lyman.

Despite Ukrainian successes, the threat of further attacks remains. The Russian command, as Svitan predicts, will continue to use its available equipment and personnel, especially if fuel supplies to the occupying forces do not face new restrictions.

They will try to advance, they will suffer heavy casualties, and they will keep pressing forward. And even more so if we don’t strike at Russian oil infrastructure – they’ll have plenty of fuel. They’ll throw all the equipment they’ve brought out into battle – no one will hold it back. If there’s fuel, if there are people to man the armored vehicles, they’ll send them into battle,
– Svitan warned.

The Russians are also facing difficulties on the southern front. According to the expert’s assessment, Ukrainian units have significantly limited their ability to advance toward Pokrovske on the border of the Dnipropetrovsk region.

In the Zaporizhzhia region, areas near Huliaipole, Orikhiv, and Stepnogorsk remain dangerous. However, the considerable distance from the main Russian supply bases and the operation of Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles targeting logistics may hinder the occupiers’ advance.

Svitan sees the greatest threat in a possible direct strike on the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka metropolitan area from the south and southwest, particularly from the direction of Chasiv Yar, Kostiantynivka, Bakhmut, and Myrnohrad. In this direction, he estimates, the Russian command has concentrated over 100,000 troops.

The situation near Dobropillia may remain particularly tense in the near future. The Russians will attempt to weaken Ukrainian positions that pose a threat to their flank during a possible offensive on Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka.

The Russian army depends on fuel supplies, so Svitan considers strikes on oil refineries to be one of the most important ways to weaken the occupiers. At the same time, Ukrainian drones can also target other facilities that support the Russian economy and military infrastructure.

These include oil terminals, fuel transshipment facilities, and storage facilities. The military expert mentioned Novorossiysk, Primorsk, and the oil pipeline infrastructure in the Samara region, but emphasized that attacks on such facilities should not replace systematic strikes on oil refineries.

What oil refineries produce – aside from what is exported – also fuels the Russian army. The army runs on diesel and fuel. Fuel is the lifeblood of any army. No fuel – the army comes to a standstill. That is why it is important to prioritize oil refining first, followed by oil transshipment,
– Svitan explained.

Attacks on Russian data centers have become another important focus. In particular, there were reports of a strike on a facility linked to Sberbank in the Saratov region. Svitan believes that the centralization of digital systems makes Russia vulnerable to damage to large data centers.

Unlike Ukraine’s more decentralized digital infrastructure, Russian information systems, the expert suggests, rely heavily on a limited number of large computing complexes. Their operations may be linked to financial transactions, rail transport, the energy sector, and other critical industries.

They struck the data centers – great. That’s exactly what needed to be done. The Russians themselves showed us where to strike when they began attacking our data centers. It’s just that ours are dispersed; we don’t have the same problem as the Russians do. And when we started striking back at them, practically everything collapsed for them,
– said the military expert.

Svitan estimated that Russia has approximately five to seven large computing complexes where a significant portion of its digital information is concentrated. According to his assessment, some of these facilities have already been hit, but the exact extent of the damage and the consequences for the operation of related systems remain unknown.

In his view, problems in the financial sector could be particularly severe. Damage to the infrastructure that provides access to electronic banking data could temporarily complicate transactions and the operation of financial services.

At the same time, Svitan does not suggest shifting the focus away from attacks on oil refining in favor of digital infrastructure. He believes that attacks on data centers can complement the campaign to weaken Russia, but it is fuel production that directly affects the Russian military’s ability to conduct combat operations.

Ukrainian unmanned systems are increasingly being used not only against ground vehicles but also to engage aerial targets. During the conversation, they mentioned a successful attack by an FPV drone on a Russian helicopter, which required a high level of operator training.

Taking down a helicopter differs from attacking a ground target due to the unique characteristics of its flight. The rotation of the main rotor creates powerful air currents that can affect the movement of a small drone, so the operator must have a thorough understanding of their own equipment’s capabilities and the characteristics of the aerial target.

It’s definitely difficult. The helicopter itself stays airborne thanks to the movement of its rotor blades. The area they cover is quite large, making it practically impossible to get close. There are specific aerodynamic factors involved in the movement of the blades. It’s very difficult; it requires serious training. And we’ve just completed this mission,
– Svitan explained.

Specialized interceptor drones may be more promising for countering Russian helicopters. They differ from conventional FPV drones in their performance characteristics and can be more effective when operating against aerial targets.

At the same time, helicopters have different designs that affect their flight characteristics. Therefore, the use of unmanned systems against such targets requires appropriate training for operators.

For an interceptor drone, a helicopter is the best target. You just need to understand the mechanics, and every helicopter has its own unique characteristics. Coaxial helicopters have one design, while those with a tail boom have another. In other words, they have different mechanisms,
– noted the military expert.

Svitan believes that the capabilities of interceptor drones are not limited to air defense. He suggested that in the future, such systems could also be used to counter Russian aviation at greater distances, particularly through the use of unmanned platforms that would provide communication links.

To implement such technologies, stable transmission of control signals is necessary, so access to satellite internet remains a key issue. Svitan does not rule out that relevant developments are already underway, and that existing unmanned systems will eventually find new applications.

Svitan on the pause in strikes against Russian oil refineries: watch the video