What Lukashenko and Putin Have in Mind: An Interview with Pavel Latushko on the Threats to NATO and Ukraine

Belarus is becoming increasingly dependent on Russia, while Alexander Lukashenko’s regime faces economic challenges, sanctions pressure, and competition from China. At the same time, Minsk continues to support the Russian military machine, while hybrid threats are growing along the borders of EU countries – threats that may be part of a broader Kremlin strategy to destabilize Europe.

Pavel Latushko, deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, explained in an interview with Channel 24 why Lukashenko’s relationship with Putin is more of a “friendship of convenience,” how Belarusian companies are helping Russia wage war, and why Minsk’s economic outlook remains bleak. He also assessed the risks of hybrid operations against NATO countries, the role of the Belarusian army and security forces, and possible agreements between Lukashenko and Donald Trump's administration.

Lukashenko Welcomes Putin: What Lies Behind the “Friendship of Convenience”

Lukashenko, of course, congratulated Putin, joining Kim Jong-un’s favorite club – specifically from Turkmenistan. Trump didn’t call, but Lukashenko, of course, sent a telegram. And what do you think – does he actually wish Putin dead and want to take his place?

His situation is complicated because he’s very dependent on Putin. If Putin dies, political changes could occur in the Russian Federation, and that would also lead to a shift in policy in Belarus. But they’re essentially Siamese twins. If they’re separated, both will face problems.

For Lukashenko, of course, there will be far more problems if Putin dies first. Because the Russian factor is decisive for Belarus’s domestic policy. Lukashenko has built the country’s policy and economy around a single vector – it is tied primarily to support from the Kremlin.

If someone in the Kremlin wants to rethink this, it could go in two directions. Either that person will say, “Fine, I will no longer be a financial backer of the regime in Belarus,” and then we’ll have a chance to change the situation in the country. Or, conversely, someone might emerge who wants to replace Lukashenko with another Kremlin puppet. In other words, this poses additional risks for Lukashenko.

Pavel Latushko on Lukashenko’s regime and playing into Russia’s hands: watch the video

I don’t think there’s friendship there in the classical sense. It’s a friendship based on calculation. Everyone stands to gain something. For Putin, Belarus serves, unfortunately, as a reminder of certain remnants of the Russian Empire. The fact that Belarus is under the strong influence of the Russian Federation demonstrates that the Kremlin can still exert influence over others.

For Lukashenko, today’s Putin is a donor and sponsor who is saving him from economic collapse, particularly given his short-sighted and absurd economic policies and the impact of sanctions.

Belarusian Fuel for Russia: Will It Offset the Blows to Refineries?

Oil and gas analyst Boris Oronshtein reported that in September, Belarus supplied Russia with 205,000 metric tons of gasoline and 246,000 metric tons of diesel. To what extent can Belarusian supplies offset the effects of Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries?

As Russia loses its refining capacity, Belarus’s share of supplies to Russia should indeed grow. And as a result, the impact of these supplies also increases. But this is not of a global strategic nature.

Moreover, in September, Belarusian refineries began scheduled maintenance. This doesn’t mean that Lukashenko doesn’t want to sell gasoline. He even recently met with representatives of the Eurasian Economic Commission, and the head of government explained how Belarus is helping, for example, Kyrgyzstan with gasoline supplies.

He always uses the same line: “If we can help in any way, we will always help.” But his “help” means this: “Pay me, and I’ll help you.”

At the same time, the supply capacity of Belarusian refineries has decreased to some extent. We’re talking about a drop of approximately 10–13% compared to August. But this is temporary. If Ukraine continues to deliver effective long-range economic blows to Russian refineries, the share of Belarusian gasoline in the Russian Federation’s total consumption will increase once repairs at the refineries are completed.

How Belarus Supports the Russian War Machine

And how else can we cut off support for the Russian military machine through Belarusian enterprises? Which sectors are currently the most active – aside from diesel – specifically in the military sector?

It’s the repair of military equipment. Belarus has been engaged in this since 2022. It involves microchips supplied by enterprises within the “Integral” production association. This includes “BelOMO” and hundreds of other enterprises. The Belpol initiative once reported that about 500 Belarusian enterprises – both defense-related and general industrial – had shifted their focus to supporting the Russian Federation. Unfortunately, this is a fact we must acknowledge.

Today, Belarusian industry is in crisis. This crisis is caused by several factors. The first is the loss of export markets, primarily the European market, as well as problems with shipments to the African market, which cannot compensate for the losses incurred in the Ukrainian market.

We must not forget that Ukraine was Belarus’s second-largest export partner. In other words, Ukraine was the second-largest consumer of Belarusian exports, particularly in the machine-building sector, but Ukraine has completely eliminated this trade.

Therefore, to a certain extent, this is currently preventing the Belarusian industrial sector from collapsing completely. There is no growth – it’s zero percent. At first, there was a decline; now we’ve reached zero, but last month the decline began again compared, for example, to July, which was a month of growth.

Thesecond factor is competition from Chinese companies in the Russian market. The Chinese are more flexible, more mobile, have more money, and possess better technology. They are quicker to set up import-substitution enterprises. The Russian Federation has a special state program for import substitution, under which a certain portion of components must be produced within the Russian Federation.

For example, the Chinese are effectively building two plants similar to the Minsk Tractor Plant. And what will happen to the Minsk Tractor Plant then? It used to produce 100,000 tractors, then 60,000. Now it produces, roughly speaking, 10,000 plus 1,000 tractors, but for such a huge enterprise, this is unprofitable. It is completely in debt, up to its neck. These are enormous debts that the tractor plant cannot pay off.

Let’s look at BelAZ. KamAZ is already practically well on its way to starting production of BelAZ equivalents. If we look at “Belshina,” that is, tire production, the Chinese have also invested in that. Consequently, they will drive Belarusian companies out of the Russian market.

Even Lukashenko’s ambassador in Moscow has already been sounding the alarm: we’re being pushed out of the market; we’re in trouble. Lukashenko has no investments. His state-owned companies lack the financial resources to invest in setting up import-substituting production facilities within the Russian Federation and compete with Chinese manufacturers.

So, on the one hand, his best friend is Putin, but this same Putin is allowing Chinese companies to enter the industrial market. Lukashenko’s best friend is Xi, but Xi competes with Belarusian industry. Therefore, the prospects for Belarusian industry, I would say, are dismal.

Even if we imagine that the war ends tomorrow and Russia begins to cut spending on rearmament and weapons production, consumption of Belarusian goods will also decline. And where would Lukashenko turn then, if he remains under sanctions? So the economic situation is bleak and requires systemic changes. And most importantly – the lifting of sanctions. To lift them, policy must change.

Do you know what formula Lukashenko’s diplomats have come up with? This is what they say. When they meet, for example, in European capitals, in private, they’re told: You’re being asked to stop the repression in Belarus, release all political prisoners, and allow the free media, political parties, and nongovernmental organizations to operate.

And Lukashenko’s representatives respond: “We won’t do that, because if we do it inside Belarus, it will destabilize the situation in the country, and that could lead to a change in power. We don’t want a repeat of 2020.”

If we start from the premise that we won’t do anything within the country, then let’s talk about foreign policy. And in foreign policy, we’re interested in the economy. You’re interested in the economy, too. Let’s do business. And to do business – lift the sanctions.

In other words, this is a cunning formula: why should Europeans lift sanctions against Lukashenko when he hasn’t stopped the repression, hasn’t stopped supporting aggression against Ukraine, and continues his hybrid aggression?

A hybrid attack on the border with Latvia and a plan to destabilize the EU

Just yesterday, we saw what happened on the Belarusian-Latvian border: Twenty migrants and armed men threatened Latvian military personnel; unidentified masked individuals crossed the border, damaged a distribution panel, and stole cameras. What is this – little green men?

This is a premeditated special operation designed to destabilize the situation in one of the European Union’s member states – Latvia. I recently spoke with Latvian diplomats at NATO. They confirm that, of course, there may be a Russian connection behind this.

But let’s take a look: this has been happening since 2021. Why did it start at that exact time? During this period, if I’m not mistaken, there have been 48,000 attempts to illegally cross the border into Latvia to date, 140,000 into Poland, and 225,000 into Lithuania. In total, that’s no fewer than 213,000 attempts to illegally enter the European Union, organized by Lukashenko in collaboration with Putin.

There have been 12,000 attempts to enter Latvia this year. Poland managed to ensure that, under China’s influence and pressure, Lukashenko stopped further attacks on the Polish border. Poland has reinforced its border, investing one billion euros in two defense systems, making it very difficult to cross into its territory from Belarus.

Where did Lukashenko redirect the migrants? To Latvia. And we’ve already heard warnings from the intelligence agencies of many countries that various hybrid special operations would take place in the near future, particularly within the EU. And we’ve seen it happen.

They entered Latvian territory crossed the state border, and armed men in masks seized the cameras. In fact, it was an invasion, and they threatened Latvian border guards and military personnel with weapons.

This was planned back in 2021 with a very specific goal in mind. At that time, migrants were being sent en masse to Poland – remember Kuznica-Bruzgi, where there was a massive migrant surge – and then they began sending them to Lithuania. They were counting on Europe to open its borders, as it had during Merkel’s time, when she let in Syrian migrants and others.

At the same time, Putin agreed with Lukashenko that they would launch an invasion of Ukraine, and they understood that the invasion would result in a massive influx of refugees from Ukraine. A million people – millions. And then an explosive mix would have formed on EU territory: migrants from Belarus and Ukrainian refugees. That was their plan.

Lukashenko also had his own goal: revenge for the sanctions, for not being recognized – above all, for not being recognized as president. Now it’s being done for a different reason – to destabilize society, so that people grow tired of the war, tired of Russia, and so that politicians come to power who will say: Enough, we need to negotiate with Russia.

The Russian Federation’s strategic goal is to dismantle the European Union – to dismantle it by changing the ruling elites in specific countries. We see this in Germany, where I am now, as well as in France and many other countries.

What is happening in Europe right now? It is forced to spend enormous resources on defense. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Germany, France – all are spending huge amounts of money. And where does this money come from? From the general state budget. Consequently, fewer funds are allocated to social programs, and dissatisfaction is growing among the public.

Dissatisfaction is also growing toward the ruling elites. Today, the ruling elites support Ukraine. But they may gradually be replaced by those who will say: Enough is enough; come to an agreement with Russia; stop supporting Ukraine. This is the realization of the Kremlin’s strategic plan. The attacks on Latvia and Lithuania are minor elements, but they, too, are aimed at achieving this goal.

Russia is creating hybrid threats against NATO countries

Could pressure via Belarus be used to divert attention and forces away from Kaliningrad and the Suwalki Corridor? And what actions by Moscow and Minsk would allow us to say that a large-scale operation is already here?

Right now, we’re seeing targeted, multifaceted, and multi-level hybrid actions against the Baltic states and other European Union countries. In Poland, it was aerial activity: drones flew in, missiles were launched, and the air defense and air force systems were tested. Lithuania faced a migration crisis. Then tunnels appeared, and hot-air balloons were flown to block Lithuanian airports, preventing planes from landing. This caused serious economic damage.

Latvia – that’s ground operations right now, with 12,000 people entering en masse in groups that are already armed. They’re testing multi-level, multi-system actions. The goal may be the same, but the tools are different. And at some point, all of this could kick in at once. That’s when things will start to shake up. Some will advance on the ground, others in the air, and drones will fly in. These will not be large-scale operations, but they will be synchronized to occur at a single moment.

And then the question will arise: how will NATO react? And here the problem will arise again, because NATO will most likely not interpret this as aggression. It will be more talk, more spending on defense systems; once again, money will have to be taken from social programs, and once again, frustration and fear will grow in society.

This could happen, and I believe the CIA director, who also visited Riga, warned about this. He briefed the Latvian side on possible hybrid operations. The Prime Minister of Poland also spoke about this, noting that hybrid operations targeting the Baltic states will intensify in late fall and winter.

We must not forget about acts of sabotage deep within the European Union, such as fires at military-industrial complex facilities and arson attempts against commercial buildings. These are all diverse, multifaceted actions, but they share a single common goal – destabilization. And at some point, they may be carried out simultaneously.

Kaliningrad – there is a Russian military force stationed there, which is why Lithuania is concerned. It is establishing a defensive line because of the Suwalki Corridor – a 104-kilometer isthmus. Lithuania has already published plans for the evacuation of the population. One evacuation route will lead to Kaunas, and the other will go through the Suwalki Corridor in the event of an attack from Belarus or the Russian Federation.

That is why they need to hold this corridor. The Polish Armed Forces and Polish Defense Minister Krzysztof Kamiś have confirmed that Poland will come to the rescue to protect the Suwałki Corridor and prevent the Baltic states from being cut off from the main body of the European Union.

Russian-Belarusian Exercises: A Direct Threat or Merely Preparation

Last week, a Belarusian contingent participated in the Russian “Center 2026” exercises. Putin and Belousov observed the final stage of the CSTO exercises. What do these maneuvers reveal about the role of the Belarusian army today? And what should we understand about the purpose and results of these exercises?

The exercises, which took place on the territory of the Russian Federation, do not pose a direct threat. Forty-one countries are participating. Of course, when troops are trained under conditions simulating a real war taking place on European soil, this means an increase in the level of preparedness, particularly for those units of the armed forces involved in the aggression.

But overall, they do not pose a direct threat to Europe or Ukraine. As for the CSTO exercises, they are also largely routine in nature. There are two components – command-and-staff exercises, which, incidentally, are concluding today, and testing of radiochemical forces and radiochemical protection as an additional element.

Countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are participating, and they have no interest in taking part in any aggressive actions against either Ukraine or the European Union. And if they see any signs of preparations for such actions on the part of the Russian Federation or the Lukashenko regime, they will be the first to notify NATO or, within the framework of OSCE documents – the OSCE Vienna Document – regarding actions that could pose a threat to EU member states and Ukraine.

Therefore, attention should be paid to other exercises – for example, “Allied Resolve” in 2022. It was within the framework of the Union State that those exercises concluded, after which Russia launched a full-scale invasion from Belarusian territory. There is also “Alliance Shield” – which will also take place within the Belarus-Russia Union State in 2023. Incidentally, the next such exercise is planned for 2027 – these must be monitored closely.

There is also “West-2025.” All of this falls within the framework of the union agreements between Lukashenko and Putin, which include a joint regional military group, a joint air defense system, an air force, and joint command and coordination across all branches of the military. This is something we really need to watch very closely.

Internal Troops, OMON, and Preparations for Protests

In mid-October, Belarus will hold the “Unbreakable Brotherhood 2026” exercise. The Internal Troops and OMON will be involved. As I understand it, this is preparation for a scenario involving the suppression of protests, and such units are needed for a reason, aren’t they?

Both the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are currently training very intensively. The Ministry of Internal Affairs conducted the largest-scale exercises in Belarusian history on dispersing mass demonstrations. A surprise inspection of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Internal Troops was carried out.

As we’ve discussed, this is effectively an army. They’re armed to the teeth. Formally, their role is to maintain order in the country, but we understand that these are politically motivated actions. All of this is being prepared in anticipation that if people protest – for example, because war comes to Belarus in one way or another – whether coffins start arriving, shelling begins, or Lukashenko once again allows his territory to be used as a launchpad for strikes, which would inevitably lead to shelling of Belarusian territory – then they’ll be ready to act.

Right now, for example, counterterrorism exercises are taking place in Minsk. A counterterrorism conference was held, and it’s very interesting that the IRGC – Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – attended, training alongside the KGB, the Belarusian “Almaz,” and other special services to counter terrorist acts.

I’m very curious about something else: when Lukashenko is so actively developing cooperation with Iran, when Defense Minister Khrenin met with the deputy chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces a few weeks ago, when they’re supplying fuel to Iran, and when planes subject to U.S. sanctions are flying in from Iran – these transport planes, which are likely carrying not bread and rolls, but something related to weapons, ballistics, or drones. Lukashenko, by the way, recently visited a drone manufacturing facility.

What do the Americans think about this? We wrote to the Americans; I also wrote letters to the European Commission and to Ukraine – we shared this information so that everyone could see how Lukashenko is building relations with Iran. And here it’s interesting to see if there will be a double standard on the part of the White House administration.

Does Trump Need Lukashenko to Make Changes?

When you said that Lukashenko wants European sanctions to be eased – and that this would require changes to domestic and foreign policy – I thought: perhaps not everyone wants that. Joan Cole, Donald Trump – perhaps they don’t want Lukashenko to change his behavior. And after all, you can still trade potash with a dictator. Right?

Yes. And also, following up on the previous question, it’s worth noting that yesterday Lukashenko signed a very interesting decree. Under it, he changed the rules for forming regional executive committees and regional administrations – that is, regional governments.

Now these bodies will consist of about seven or eight people: a chairperson, three or four deputies, and an administrative director. And there are three more very interesting people in each region: the head of the regional KGB department, the head of the regional Ministry of Internal Affairs department, and the head of the regional State Control Committee department.

This is all part of the security apparatus. These are the people who possess weapons and real coercive power. Why is he doing this? After he appointed Pavlo Muraveyka as deputy head of the administration for military affairs, we are once again seeing the de facto emergence of regional military administrations.

Today, they are not military in nature; for example, representatives of the armed forces are not included in them. But in reality, these are military headquarters – military administrations – that will take control of the regions in the event of a crisis. And there, it is necessary to ensure coordinated interaction and the integration of the military apparatus with the civilian apparatus. This is a rather alarming decree signed by Lukashenko.

As for the potash trade – that ship has sailed. Economically, it doesn’t make sense; it brings Lukashenko no benefit whatsoever. That’s why the Americans are pressuring neighboring countries to open up transit routes for potash, primarily Lithuania and Klaipėda. Trump’s representatives have been to Riga, Vilnius, and Warsaw. They want to continue doing business with Lukashenko, believing that he is a tool that will allow them to make money.

Lukashenko is now proposing another project – “Grodnoazot” – a nitrogen fertilizer for which there is very high global demand. Here, he is proposing a trilateral U.S.-Russian-Belarusian project: the Americans invest, provide technology, and lift sanctions on “Grodnoazot”; the Russians, through “Gazprom,” provide gas; and Lukashenko gets a modernized plant.

And then, he says, the question will arise: let’s lift the sanctions on “Gazprom,” because gas is needed to produce these fertilizers. And if “Gazprom” is under sanctions, then the fertilizers must remain under sanctions as well. In other words, the business schemes here are very simple: just make money.

Just raking in the cash. And why did Lukashenko fly to Turkmenistan? Is he some great geopolitical strategist? Just to show that he’s flying somewhere?

Pavlo Latushko: It’s the anniversary summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States. I don’t know why this organization even still exists, but it’s a club of sorts. A club where some are dictators, and most are dictators. There are no democratic elections there. Well, maybe there are elements of democracy in Kyrgyzstan.

With all due respect, but if you look at Azerbaijan or Ukraine – there’s no democracy there in the classical sense. Take Tajikistan – no democracy; Turkmenistan – none; Belarus even less so; and Russia as well.

It’s a club of old leaders who’ve been in power for decades. They get together to drink, chat, complain, and show people: “Look, we’re friends here; we get along.” But what does this friendship bring to these countries economically? It brings absolutely no economic growth.

For Russia, however, these organizations – the CSTO, the CIS, and the Eurasian Economic Community – are beneficial because they serve the direct interests of the Russian Federation. It wants to maintain its sphere of influence, but that sphere is crumbling. Azerbaijan is drifting away, Armenia is drifting away, and Moldova drifted away long ago. Uzbekistan is quite economically independent and possesses significant energy resources. Who’s left? Kyrgyzstan and Belarus, which is completely under the Kremlin’s influence.