"You Can't Negotiate with Putin": Naki Outlined Three Conditions for Ending the War

The West continues to seek ways to reach an agreement with Vladimir Putin, offering diplomatic contacts, economic cooperation, and the easing of sanctions in exchange for an end to the war. However, the Russian dictator is not backing down from his demands, and new negotiations with European leaders are once again turning into discussions about history rather than concrete steps toward peace.

Russian opposition journalist and blogger Michael Naki, in an op-ed published by 24 Channel, explained why Putin perceives the West’s concessions as weakness and what actually drives his decisions. He also analyzed the mistakes in international policy since 2008 and identified three circumstances that could force the Kremlin to end the war against Ukraine.

New talks with Putin have once again failed to yield results

Western politicians have been trying for many years to find a way to engage with Putin. Some offer economic incentives, others rely on direct negotiations or increased pressure, but none of these approaches has yet forced the Russian dictator to abandon his aggression.

The latest attempt involved telephone conversations between Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gar Støre with the Kremlin on October 27. These were the first such conversations by leaders of European countries supporting Ukraine since French President Emmanuel Macron’s call in July 2025.

The initiative was coordinated with Kyiv on the eve of the planned resumption of negotiations in Abu Dhabi. European leaders sought to discuss possible steps toward ending hostilities, particularly halting Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of winter.

The conversation, originally planned to last less than half an hour, lasted about 90 minutes. However, according to the Financial Times, Putin devoted much of the time to his own reflections on Slavic history, while the issue of a ceasefire made virtually no progress.

Stubb and Støre received no signals from the Kremlin indicating a change in its position. The Norwegian prime minister later acknowledged that he did not expect concessions from Putin, although he considered it important to convey the position of European partners directly to him.

According to Naki, this latest failed diplomatic effort highlights a fundamental mistake that politicians have been repeating throughout the war.

“The belief that there is some kind of key to him that will allow everything to stop immediately persists among a wide variety of politicians on both sides of the ocean,”
Naki noted.

Other interlocutors have already observed similar behavior from the Russian dictator. In February 2024, American journalist Tucker Carlson traveled to Moscow for an interview, but in response to his first question, he received a lengthy lecture on Kievan Rus’ and medieval history.

In August 2025, in Alaska, Putin, according to the Financial Times, tried to convince Donald Trump of the historical unity between Ukrainians and Russians. He mentioned Rurik, Yaroslav the Wise, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky, while rejecting proposals for a ceasefire in exchange for easing sanctions.

Trump, according to the publication’s sources, raised his voice several times and eventually cut the meeting short and canceled the delegations’ scheduled working lunch. In October 2025, the U.S. president also canceled the previously announced summit in Budapest and imposed sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil.

Putin, however, continued to resort to pseudo-historical arguments. As early as this past October, he cited alleged genetic studies meant to confirm his claim that Ukrainians and Russians are one people, without specifying exactly which scientific studies he was referring to.

This topic preoccupies him far more than the ceasefire, sanctions, and trade agreements that people have been trying to get him interested in for years,
the journalist explained.

Naki believes that to understand the Kremlin’s next moves, one must consider not only its current negotiating demands but also how Putin himself perceives power, his own place in history, and relations with other states.

Fear and a desire for control shape Putin’s behavior

Naki links Putin’s attitude toward international negotiations to his personal experiences and worldview, which took shape long before he came to power. The journalist does not believe that the Russian dictator acts chaotically, as his behavior reveals a consistent desire to dominate those around him.

Even as a schoolboy, Putin was interested in the work of the Soviet secret services. He himself recounted how he approached the Leningrad branch of the KGB to find out how to become an intelligence officer, after which he decided to pursue a law degree.

Naki also drew attention to the stories the Russian leader has repeatedly told about his childhood. In particular, he spoke of a rat he had cornered that suddenly lunged at him, as well as a rule he allegedly learned on the streets of Leningrad: if a fight is inevitable, you must strike first.

According to the journalist, such memories reveal a great deal about how Putin tries to explain his own behavior and demonstrate strength.

His stories about the back alleys are the tales of a wronged man who wanted to be, if not respected, then at least feared,
– Naki argues.

His work in the KGB, in his assessment, reinforced the future president’s tendency to use people to achieve his own goals. Training for intelligence officers included recruitment, information gathering, and the ability to influence others’ behavior.

While stationed in Dresden, Putin worked with intelligence sources. Later, as Naki suggests, such methods became part of his political behavior.

Examples can be found in the Russian leader’s interactions with Western leaders. After his first meeting with Putin in 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush said he could sense Putin’s soul. Angela Merkel, on the other hand, later described Putin as a man who constantly anticipates threats and is ready to respond to them.

Another telling incident occurred when the Russian president brought his Labrador to a meeting with Merkel, even though he knew she was afraid of dogs. Naki views such episodes in conjunction with Putin’s habit of making his interlocutors wait and exploiting their personal weaknesses.

Ultimately, Putin has concentrated virtually all state power in his own hands. In 2020, he secured amendments to the Russian Constitution that allowed him to reset his presidential terms, even foregoing the previous model of a formal handover of the office to Dmitry Medvedev.

People in this scheme are merely tools for achieving his goals. He feels no responsibility toward them. And the goal remains the same – to command respect through fear, but no longer from people within the country, but from those beyond its borders,
– the journalist emphasized.

This understanding of power, according to Naki, also explains Putin’s gradual identification of himself with Russia. As early as 2014, Vyacheslav Volodin put forward the idea that the existence of the state is supposedly inextricably linked to its leader.

After eliminating domestic political rivals, persecuting the opposition, and suppressing protests, the Kremlin began to increasingly rely on force in its relations with neighboring countries.

The Kremlin perceived the West’s concessions as a sign of weakness

Early in his presidency, Putin showed significantly greater interest in cooperation with Western countries. In 2001, he addressed the German Bundestag, calling Russia a friendly European country, and also raised the issue of a possible rapprochement with NATO.

Former NATO Secretary General George Robertson recalled that Putin asked when Russia would be invited to join NATO. When it was explained to him that the standard accession procedure must be followed, the Russian leader rejected the idea of waiting on an equal footing with other nations.

Naki considers this episode revealing for understanding the subsequent shift in the Kremlin’s foreign policy. Putin sought cooperation but would not agree to a relationship in which Russia would have to abide by common rules.

He was willing to be friends only on the terms of a “special partner.” But he was not granted that special status. And on February 10, 2007, in Munich, Putin spoke out against a unipolar world and NATO expansion,
Naki explained.

After the Munich speech, Moscow began to voice its grievances regarding the international order more and more openly. However, according to the journalist’s assessment, this did not signify a fundamental shift in Putin’s worldview – what changed, first and foremost, were the methods he used to achieve his goals.

At the same time, Naki disagrees with the argument that the West provoked Russian aggression by refusing to maintain friendly relations with the Kremlin. On the contrary, he pointed to numerous examples of economic and political rapprochement.

One such example was Germany’s policy. After stepping down, former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder took on leadership roles in organizations linked to the Russian energy sector, notably at Rosneft. Angela Merkel also supported economic cooperation with Moscow, although she acted much more cautiously.

In April 2008, at the NATO summit in Bucharest, Germany and France opposed granting Ukraine and Georgia a Membership Action Plan. Four months later, Russia launched a war against Georgia.

Even after the occupation of Crimea, German governments continued to support the construction of “Nord Stream 2,” presenting it as a commercial project. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, Russian gas accounted for approximately 55% of Germany’s imports.

Despite these economic ties, Russia did not refrain from further aggression. Naki explains this by how Putin assessed the willingness of other states to accommodate him.

If they meet him halfway, he perceives this as weakness and demands more. If they do not – he sees it as a challenge,
the journalist noted.

The first major test of the limits of what was permissible following the shift in Kremlin rhetoric was the war against Georgia. According to Naki, the reaction of international partners to that war influenced the Russian leadership’s subsequent calculations.

After Georgia, Russia tested the West in Ukraine

In August 2008, the Russian army seized part of Georgia’s territory, and Moscow recognized the independence of the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, as early as November of that year, the European Union decided to resume negotiations with Russia on a new partnership agreement.

In March 2009, the U.S. administration also announced a “reset” in relations with Moscow. Naki believes that this reaction gave Putin grounds to expect that he could carry out new acts of force without facing consequences he found unacceptable.

Meanwhile, internal political tensions were mounting within Russia itself. During Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, the opposition gained somewhat greater opportunities for public activity, and public demand for a change in leadership grew stronger.

The protests following the parliamentary elections in December 2011 were particularly telling. After Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, the authorities intensified their persecution of the opposition and imposed new restrictions on civil society organizations, protests, and independent media.

According to Naki, the fear of losing control over the country also influenced the Kremlin’s subsequent foreign policy decisions.

In February 2014, after Viktor Yanukovych fled Ukraine, Putin convened the heads of the security agencies and ordered them to begin preparations for the annexation of Crimea. He later personally acknowledged the involvement of Russian military personnel in the operation, although Moscow had initially denied their presence.

At the same time, Russia launched a war in the Donbas. In the summer of 2014, the Ukrainian military managed to push back pro-Russian armed groups, after which, according to the Ukrainian side, Moscow deployed regular units of its army, particularly near Ilovaisk.

However, Ukraine’s military resistance was not the only factor that influenced the Kremlin’s decision. After the downing of the Malaysian Boeing over Donbas, the European Union agreed to impose sectoral sanctions against Russia’s oil, defense, and technology sectors.

In September 2014, the European Parliament also called for considering the possibility of disconnecting Russia from the SWIFT international financial messaging system. According to Naki, the prospect of such restrictions caused particular concern in Moscow.

The Russian Central Bank began urgently developing its own financial messaging system. And after the signing of the second Minsk agreements in February 2015, the intensity of hostilities in Donbas gradually decreased, although ceasefire violations continued.

Naki believes that the combination of Ukrainian resistance and the threat of serious financial losses forced Putin to reconsider the pace of his aggression. At the same time, Russia gained time to prepare for a potentially larger-scale confrontation.

Putin Was Preparing for Sanctions and a Major War

According to Naki, the events of 2014–2015 showed the Kremlin that Western countries were not ready for a direct military confrontation with Russia but could inflict significant economic damage on it. It was precisely these financial instruments that Moscow began to view as one of the main threats to its own plans.

By the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia had accumulated significant reserves. According to data cited by the journalist, these amounted to approximately $640 billion as of early 2022; however, after the attack on Ukraine, a significant portion of these funds was frozen.

Naki speculated that the Russian leadership sought to build up a financial reserve for a protracted war without fully revealing its plans to international partners.

At the same time, Putin’s public rhetoric was changing. He increasingly drew on his own interpretation of Russian history, explaining current policies through the lens of events from past centuries.

In July 2021, the Russian president published an article about the alleged historical unity of Ukrainians and Russians. After the full-scale invasion began, he compared himself to Peter I, speaking of the need to reclaim and consolidate territories.

According to Naki, during his isolation amid the pandemic, Putin may have become even more immersed in such notions, and his constant exposure to his own propaganda only reinforced his convictions.

“Putin told the propaganda machine what to say. It repeated it, and then he himself absorbed that propaganda and believed in it even more strongly,”
Naki explained.

On the eve of the invasion in February 2022, Putin was already openly denying the independence of the Ukrainian state, claiming that modern Ukraine had allegedly been created by Lenin.

However, the attempt to quickly seize Ukraine ended in failure. The Russian army was forced to retreat from the Kyiv region, and in the fall of 2022, it suffered defeats in the Kharkiv region and withdrew from Kherson.

Mobilization posed an additional challenge; following its announcement, hundreds of thousands of Russians left the country. And in June 2023, columns of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mercenaries marched toward Moscow, exposing the vulnerability of the Russian leadership itself.

Putin called the mutiny a “stab in the back” and compared the situation to the revolutionary events of 1917. Two months later, Prigozhin died in a plane crash in the Tver region along with Dmitry Utkin, commander of the Wagner Group.

For Naki, these events were crucial in explaining the Russian dictator’s subsequent behavior.

“The war brought him face-to-face with his only real fear – the loss of power,”
– the journalist emphasized.

It was precisely after the Russian army’s greatest setbacks that the Kremlin began signaling, through intermediaries, the possibility of a ceasefire. However, according to Naki’s assessment, such proposals may have been intended to buy time to replenish military resources.

Why Negotiations Aren’t Forcing Putin to Stop

In 2022–2023, Moscow periodically demonstrated a willingness to discuss a cessation of hostilities. In particular, during the negotiations in Istanbul, the Russian side proposed postponing discussions on the status of Crimea, but at the same time insisted on limiting Ukraine’s defensive capabilities.

Naki drew attention to provisions in Russian draft agreements that called for reducing the Ukrainian army to approximately 85,000 troops, restricting heavy weaponry, and including Russia itself in the security guarantees mechanism.

Under such an arrangement, Moscow could gain the ability to block international aid to Ukraine in the event of a new attack. Therefore, the journalist does not consider the proposed terms to be a basis for lasting peace.

Why am I telling you all this? To make one simple thing clear: you cannot reach an agreement with Putin,
– Naki stated.

In his view, the Russian leader does not consider the country’s economic well-being a sufficient reason to end the war. Even representatives of the Russian government’s financial sector are speaking more and more openly about the depletion of resources and the deteriorating economic situation.

In particular, in June 2025, Russian Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov warned of the risk of the economy sliding into a recession. Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina spoke of the depletion of some resources, while representatives of major banks spoke of the need for changes in the economic growth model.

However, these warnings did not alter the Kremlin’s military decisions. Naki attributes this to the fact that, for Putin, economic losses matter primarily when they begin to directly threaten his power or his ability to continue the aggression.

At the same time, diplomatic contacts with Moscow continue. The journalist noted the latest visit by U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff to Russia on October 21, during which the continuation of the negotiation process was discussed.

The Russian side also agreed to return to the trilateral format in Abu Dhabi. However, just a week later, according to Reuters, Putin made it clear to the leaders of Finland and Norway that he has not abandoned his intention to seize the entire Donbas.

Naki believes that the Kremlin’s willingness to discuss organizing new meetings should not be confused with a willingness to make mutual concessions. He considers the more important question to be under what circumstances continuing the war would become impossible or personally dangerous for the Russian dictator.

Military losses could derail the Kremlin’s plans

Naki identifies a change in the situation on the front lines as the first condition that could influence Putin’s decision. The Russian leader must realize that continuing hostilities does not bring him closer to his goals but, on the contrary, causes him to lose ground he has already gained.

The Donbas is of particular importance to the Kremlin right now. According to information cited by the journalist, Putin had planned to establish control over the entire region by the end of 2026.

However, according to Naki’s assessment, the Russian army’s actual rate of advance does not align with these plans. Ukrainian counterattacks in certain sectors of the front are forcing Russia to redeploy reserves and expend significant resources on repeated assaults.

“Until he realizes that every day without a ceasefire takes away from him what, in his eyes, makes him great, there will be no motivation to stop,”
the journalist explained.

Naki cited estimates indicating that from September 1 to October 16, the Russian army lost a total of approximately 122 square kilometers of territory across the entire front line. During this period, according to his data, Ukrainian counterattacks recaptured more territory than the Russians managed to seize.

He specifically mentioned the Ukrainian “Vivaldi” operation near Lyman. According to reports cited by the journalist, it thwarted Russian troops’ attempts to bypass the fortified areas of Donetsk Oblast from the north.

In particular, Andriy Biletsky, commander of the Third Army Corps, reported significant losses by the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division. Naki emphasized that these events complicated the Russian command’s plans for an offensive on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

At the same time, the Russian General Staff continues to report the capture of dozens of settlements, including making claims that have not been independently verified. The journalist suggested that exaggerated reports from the military leadership could be giving Putin a false impression of the actual situation.

That is why, in his view, the actual loss of territory and the lack of strategic breakthroughs may be of greater significance to the Kremlin than general reports of military casualties.

The Economy and Fear of Mobilization Are Limiting Putin

The second condition for ending the war is directly linked to Russia’s resources. Even if Putin is unwilling to abandon his goals, financial difficulties, military casualties, and a shortage of volunteers willing to go to the front could limit his ability to continue hostilities.

According to data cited by Naki, the Russian government has already increased its forecast for the 2026 federal budget deficit to 7.3 trillion rubles, up from the previously planned 3.8 trillion. In the coming years, Moscow also expects significant budget shortfalls, while military spending continues to rise.

Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure have been a separate factor. Damage to facilities involved in oil production, refining, and transportation complicates the financing of military needs and places additional pressure on the economy.

Naki also cited estimates indicating that the Russian army has been losing more than 40,000 soldiers – killed or wounded – each month in recent months. At the same time, the cost of contracts with military personnel has risen significantly compared to 2022.

“When you don’t have the money for war and don’t have people willing to die for you, you’ll have to stop even against your will,”
Naki noted.

However, the Kremlin has another way to replenish the army – a new large-scale mobilization. It is here, according to the journalist’s assessment, that a third factor comes into play, one that is holding the Russian dictator back: the threat of losing power.

Following the mobilization in the fall of 2022, hundreds of thousands of Russians left the country, and dissatisfaction with the war became more pronounced. Naki believes that Putin remembers these consequences and is wary of repeating a decision that could trigger widespread domestic unrest.

At the same time, without additional personnel and funding, the Russian command will not be able to sustain the current intensity of combat operations indefinitely.

Options that could remedy this are blocked precisely by fears of losing power. This is the way forward. The only way to end the war. There is no other,
the journalist emphasized.

According to Naki, these three factors are interrelated. The depletion of resources complicates the Russian offensive, the lack of success undermines Putin’s political plans, and attempts to compensate for losses through coercive measures could threaten the stability of his regime.

Russia’s actions could lead to a new war

Separately, Naki considered a scenario in which Western states would attempt to bring the war to an end at the cost of unilateral concessions by Ukraine. In his view, even a hypothetical capitulation by Kyiv would not mean that Putin would abandon further expansion.

In such a case, the Russian army would retain a significant number of combat-experienced troops, and the Kremlin would see its belief confirmed that military aggression can yield political and territorial gains.

The journalist speculates that Moldova, Georgia, the Baltic states, and other Central European countries could become the next targets of pressure.

Naki already sees certain signs that NATO’s readiness to respond to Russian actions is being tested. In particular, he recalled the incursion of Russian drones into Polish airspace on September 10, 2025, and the subsequent consultations among allies under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The journalist also drew attention to acts of sabotage and other provocations in European countries. In his view, Moscow is trying to determine how far it can go without provoking a strong collective response.

There are those who think that someday the monster will be sated if you feed it everyone else but yourself. That has never worked in history,
Naki emphasized.

He drew a parallel with the 1938 Munich Agreement, when Great Britain and France agreed to cede the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany in the hope of avoiding a major war.

However, within just a few months, Germany occupied the rest of the Czech lands, and in September 1939, it launched World War II by invading Poland.

Naki believes that Putin may view any potential territorial concessions by Ukraine as proof that his strategy is working. He considers a scenario particularly dangerous in which the aggressor gains time to rebuild its military capabilities, while Western nations once again postpone decisions to strengthen their defenses.

At the same time, Russia has already suffered enormous human losses. The journalist cited data from a joint tally by “Mediazona” and the BBC’s Russian Service, which identified the names of nearly 283,000 Russian servicemen killed, noting that the actual number of casualties could be significantly higher.

Ukrainian civilians and military personnel who have died as a result of Russian aggression are not included in these tallies. Naki emphasized that the duration of the war will also depend on how quickly Ukraine’s international partners are prepared to increase pressure on the Kremlin, rather than counting on new agreements without a change in Russia’s position.

Michael Naki: Watch the video