Why Russia Is Targeting European Defense Officials and What Lies Behind the "Energy Truce": An Interview with David Sharp

Donald Trump’s statements regarding intelligence reports, a possible energy truce between Ukraine and Russia, and new threats from the Kremlin could have far more serious consequences than they appear at first glance. At the same time, the situation in the Middle East and the actions of Russian intelligence agencies pose additional risks to Ukraine and the West.

In an exclusive interview with Channel 24 , Israeli military analyst David Sharp explained just how critical U.S. support remains for Ukraine, why the Houthis are dangerous, and how Russia is increasing pressure on the European defense industry.

Strikes on Russian Oil Refineries and What Lies Behind Trump’s Blackmail

Donald Trump allegedly decided to blackmail us with intelligence data. According to the Financial Times, the U.S. president allegedly claims that it is Zelenskyy who does not want the war to end. But it is believed that if we were to stop, it would allow the Russian war machine to recover, since it is suffering from strikes on oil facilities. How important is it to continue, despite Trump’s blackmail?

Russia is certainly suffering. Russia is incurring losses as a result. Any loss means either less money for the war or a blow to the standard of living. It’s one or the other, really.

Of course, it’s possible to keep war spending at the same level, but then the standard of living suffers. Even Putin said that attacks on oil refineries – if I’m not mistaken – accounted for 1% of GDP. However, this is just a simple illustration.

In general, when strikes of this kind are carried out, of course, all aspects must be taken into account. It’s no secret that Ukraine’s partners – and Trump is no exception here – don’t particularly like Ukrainian strikes on targets related to Russia’s oil infrastructure.

And it is said that the Biden administration has expressed similar views. It’s no coincidence that for a long time, for example, Ukraine did not attack Russia’s tanker fleet in the Black Sea without any involvement of drones. Of course, Europe isn’t too fond of rising oil prices either.

There is an important element of political maneuvering here: on the one hand, it is important for Ukraine to inflict maximum damage on Russia; on the other hand, it must respond to Russia in some way – even if only partially – to the strikes that Russia, without hesitation, is carrying out against Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine must navigate between the various demands of its partners to prevent the situation from getting worse. It’s a very difficult situation when you’re dependent on someone else.

Moreover, partners may express these demands in a more blunt and public manner, as we’ve seen recently, or they may do so more subtly, but this problem has not gone away. And, unfortunately, it’s not always easy to find the optimal approach here. Sometimes steps that lead to success in one area can cause problems in others.

Unfortunately, that’s just how life is, and the task of a politician and strategist is to find the most effective balance for their own country.

Furthermore, it is important to understand that Russia has quite a few vulnerabilities. And in order to apply pressure to these vulnerabilities most effectively, a wide range of weapons and means of destruction is necessary.

If Ukraine had a truly broad spectrum of weapons, it would be easier for Ukraine to maneuver, whether or not it takes its partners’ wishes into account. It is always possible to disregard partners’ wishes, but it is important to understand that this may have consequences.

Accordingly, President Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian leadership must develop the most effective strategy possible – one that maximizes benefits for Ukraine – so that, on the one hand, they can inflict maximum damage on Russia, and, on the other hand, to do everything possible to ensure that relations with the United States are not harmed.

Because no matter how many complaints one makes against Trump, there are things on which Ukraine depends. And if those things disappear, it could negatively affect both the situation on the front lines and the ability to strike deep inside Russia. All in all, this is very complicated, it’s all unpleasant, and I can only hope that an optimal solution will be found here.

Could France, Estonia, or Europe compensate for the American volume and accuracy of intelligence?

Obviously not. But it depends on the specific circumstances. Intelligence comes in many different forms.

By the way, to strike an oil refinery, real-time intelligence is also used – and primarily not the kind needed to determine where the refinery is located. For example, where air defense systems are currently positioned.

It’s one thing for Ukrainians to know something, and quite another to actually execute it. If you can use intelligence to plot the correct route so that drones can bypass air defense systems, your chances of hitting that same oil refinery, for example, increase dramatically.

In general, European countries have certain capabilities, and they’re quite significant. But the Americans have greater capabilities. This applies to the launches of ballistic and cruise missiles. It applies to timely warnings. And it applies, in particular, to a vast amount of tactical data.

I don’t know exactly what the Ukrainians are currently receiving from the Americans or under what terms, but it’s believed they are receiving assistance. There were leaks at one point suggesting that during the Ukrainian offensive in 2023, it was literally possible to determine what was located on a neighboring hill and how to destroy it or, conversely, avoid the threat.

In addition, there are other points that should not be overlooked. The Americans are supplying aid to Ukraine based on decisions made back during the Biden administration. These weapons and ammunition are ordered from American or foreign manufacturers.

The Americans supply weapons in exchange for money. This is very significant. Therefore, even in the absence of goodwill, there could still be significant problems here.

Dependence is very, very bad. Especially when Trump doesn’t mince words. Israel has had to deal with this situation many times, even under other administrations, and even President Trump has periodically shown intolerance.

What can be done? That’s life. And we need to adapt to this reality as best we can, of course, while insisting on our own interests first and foremost.

And it’s best to do this behind the scenes, patiently, despite how painful the situation may be, explaining time and again what’s what and why. There’s no other way. This is a fight for our own national security.

Interview with David Sharp: Watch the video

Starlink and the Limits of What Is Permitted for Strikes Deep Inside Russia

It’s probably not worth holding out hope for the initiative we previously requested – to authorize the use of Starlink for strikes 200 kilometers deep into Russia – given that Musk is telling Trump that Ukraine needs a different president. Perhaps we should just forget about it?

First of all, this wasn’t really about Musk from the very beginning, and we should note that nearly five years have passed, and this authorization still hasn’t been granted. Although I’m sure this issue was raised almost from the very first months of the war.

Moreover, I believe that Elon Musk’s role here is secondary. Both Americans – in the previous administration and the current one – and not only Americans but also Europeans consider this move an escalation. In other words, they are evidently concerned that Russia, having suffered precision strikes, might go even further.

And precision strikes on Russian territory are exactly what Starlink – which operates hundreds of kilometers deep inside Russia – would deliver.

If Washington – that is, the U.S. president – were to decide, based on the collective advice of his inner circle, that this is what is needed, and were to propose it to Musk, I don’t think Musk would refuse. First and foremost, this is a political decision.

And, unfortunately, it is one of those political decisions that have not been made – or are being made with delay – in this case, not made throughout all the years of the war due to fears of escalation.

The Middle East: the Houthis, Saudi Arabia, and the Risk of Major Escalation

While Trump asks us not to strike Russian oil refineries, he himself is considering resuming strikes against Iran. Following the attack on the Riyadh airport, the U.S. president raised the possibility of new military action against Tehran. The coalition led by Saudi Arabia blamed the Yemeni Houthis for the attack and promised a harsh military response. Should we expect an escalation? Will Saudi Arabia act on its own, or will it coordinate with Trump after all? What might the outcome and scenario be here?

Specifically regarding this incident, he was referring to weighing the possibility of resuming strikes against the Houthis. However, such a possibility is always being considered with regard to Iran.

And it is generally believed that the chances of renewed hostilities against Iran will increase after the midterm elections, when the midterm election factor – regardless of the results – will no longer stand in Trump’s way. Then the chances will increase.

Especially since the situation with Iran is very interesting. Iran is under a real blockade – a physical blockade. Iran is unable to prevent oil from passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

In other words, they attack ships, but very ineffectively. The Americans are routing ships through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The total volume of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz – excluding Iranian oil – is practically the same as it was before the war.

Consequently, the situation – where Iran is under a blockade while everyone else seems to be living as if nothing had happened, albeit with certain restrictions – is absolutely unacceptable to Iran. And the Iranians will most likely snap and want to do something to change this situation.

“Snapping” – that means either strikes against Arab countries to turn the tables, or strikes against the Americans. Or the Americans will decide that their hands are already largely untied anyway, and since Iran shows no willingness to compromise on its nuclear program, they will take certain actions after the elections.

This specific case involving the Houthis and Saudi Arabia – in my view, the situation is very interesting and revealing. A strike by a medium-range ballistic missile – with a range of about 1,000 kilometers – hit the airport, causing enormous damage and resulting in a huge number of casualties and injuries.

The airport is a particularly important location for Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Saudi Arabia is striving to become an international hub for literally everything. They are attracting investment and pouring vast amounts of their own money into various projects. And the airport is one of their showcases.

Consequently, when a missile strikes the airport, it results in colossal media damage – in addition to the material and human toll, there is also media damage that highlights Saudi Arabia’s powerlessness against these boys in slippers. But in reality, it’s not that simple.

Many of them wear slippers, but that doesn’t stop them from knowing how to fight – and, in particular, how to launch ballistic missiles. And while many of them don’t make it into the frame, they’re well-equipped in terms of their uniforms and even more so in their combat skills and mastery of modern weaponry.

Houthis attacked a plane at Riyadh Airport / Reuters

Let me remind you that more than 10 years ago, they successfully deployed Iranian unmanned boats. They launch ballistic missiles at Israel from a distance of 2,000 kilometers. Their drones have even attacked Tel Aviv, approaching from the Mediterranean Sea and flying over the entire territory all the way to Egypt – not to mention the most critical Saudi targets.

And they know how to operate in the context of ground warfare in a unique territory like Yemen. Of course, they have very capable allies: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah.

They have periodically fired ballistic missiles at Riyadh and key targets in Saudi Arabia, but either the air defense systems were effective, or their aim wasn’t very precise. This case is illustrative For both the Middle East and international politics, as long as someone is firing at something but missing, it seems as though the situation is under control.

Or here, air defense shoots one down; there, it seems they missed; something fell in the desert – no big deal, life goes on as usual. And suddenly, one of those missiles finally hits exactly where those who launched it intended. And everything changes dramatically, because this has strategic consequences.

And the consequences are very severe – as I’ve already said, they’re visible, and they also damage one’s reputation. If that missile had struck a residential building somewhere in a residential area in Saudi Arabia with the same results, those results – despite the loss of the same number of lives – would have been less devastating, less problematic.

Today, the Saudis have suffered a very, very severe blow. This is a blow to the image of a country that is the largest oil producer and claims leadership in the Islamic world, specifically the Sunni world. They are trying to involve as many of their partners as possible in a potential operation against the Houthis, even though those partners are reluctant and don’t really want to go to war.

Because no one – not even the Saudis themselves – wants to get bogged down in a ground operation against the Houthis. And a ground operation alone isn’t enough, no matter how much you bomb them, since they’re thick-skinned and not particularly sensitive to casualties. Besides, they don’t have many high-value targets.

No matter how much you bomb them, you can only assist your proxies, who may advance more or less successfully, but you won’t be able to solve the Houthi problem. The Americans, however, are clearly under significant pressure from Mohammed bin Salman.

It is very important to the United States and to Trump personally. It is the most important economic partner and buyer of just about everything American, as well as a potential investor. And when the Saudis are in trouble, they look for anyone they can bring on board, particularly the Americans.

Trump was very reluctant to take any action against the Houthis, at least until the election. He understands perfectly well that bombing them is an option, but it won’t significantly change the situation. In other words, without a ground offensive – which no one is capable of carrying out today – the situation can only be slightly improved.

But when a missile hits the wrong target, the situation becomes urgent. And we see that the U.S. president’s tone has changed. And it may seem that in the near future, the Saudi prince will be more persuasive to him.

Incidentally, despite its very modern air force, this is a very telling example. Saudi Arabia has an excellent material base in terms of aircraft and other advanced weapons systems. Nevertheless, they are a striking example of the fact that it is not weapons, but people, who are the key factor.

If people haven’t learned how to use these weapons. If the system and its mechanisms haven’t been developed over many years, but rather if certain components were simply purchased for a lot of money, then the system and its mechanisms aren’t a system at all – they’re just something ineffective.

Consequently, the Saudis are unable to identify enemy targets at a high level from an intelligence standpoint; they are unable to operate effectively in real time; and they are unable to carry out a large number of combat sorties per day, which is what provides operational intensity.

And their Air Force – despite the fact that any country would likely dream of having such an Air Force in terms of its material capabilities – does not demonstrate high effectiveness.

And the Saudis’ task today – with the help of the Americans and other not particularly enthusiastic partners – is to improve the effectiveness of their air force: real-time strikes and more sorties.

What can I say? If Ukraine had the kind of material capabilities that the Saudis have assembled – I’m referring to the air force – and if we assume that the Ukrainians had mastered them at the highest level, the war with Russia would be unfolding according to a completely different scenario.

But, as we can see, this kind of tool works only partially for the Saudis – even against an enemy that, one might think, should be a source of laughter rather than respect. However, the Houthis should not be a source of laughter for anyone.

Will the energy truce between Ukraine and Russia work?

Donald Trump announced an energy truce between Ukraine and Russia. Do you believe there’s a chance this will actually happen?

There have been times when the most important events have unfolded right in the middle of a live broadcast. Once, Trump already announced an energy truce and something along those lines, but, as it turned out, he jumped the gun.

We’ll find out what this is all about in the coming minutes and hours. But it’s important to note this: whether Russia violates the agreement or not may depend solely on whether it’s in Russia’s interest to violate it or, conversely, whether it’s in Russia’s interest to abide by it.

The “carrots and sticks” approach toward Russia is very significant in the context of this agreement; Russia has a huge interest in adhering to the ceasefire. Conversely, if the sticks are weak or if Putin does not consider them significant enough, of course, they could violate the ceasefire at any moment. The “sticks” are, first and foremost, Ukraine’s firepower capabilities.

What Ukraine has already demonstrated – and what it may demonstrate in the near future – namely, strikes against Russia’s most critical targets – is pushing Russia toward concluding some form of ceasefire. There are likely some additional “carrots” from the United States as well.

If, overall, Ukraine is satisfied with a situation where – thanks to a combination of sticks and carrots – strikes on important Ukrainian targets are not carried out, that is a positive development. Without a doubt.

And we’ll have to wait for clarification on whether it actually happened, and to what extent this development – and this agreement – is currently hypothetical, and to what extent it satisfies the interests of the parties involved. If Russia has no interest in violating it – if this is a beneficial agreement for Russia, primarily for the sake of the security of its own facilities – then that will be the best incentive.

At the same time, if this drags on for a while – and then winter sets in – Russia might just stockpile missiles. Couldn’t there be more risks than benefits here?

Let’s keep our reasoning purely hypothetical for now; I don’t see any additional risks. The situation – and I’m speaking from a military standpoint – is dire. Russia could attack Ukrainian facilities at any moment.

It’s not as if Russia needs a break to become effective afterward. They can strike power plants and other targets here and now, every day.

Moreover, Russia still has a window of opportunity when it comes to jet-powered drones. And that window could narrow or close. I’m not sure about “close,” but it could very well narrow.

If Ukraine develops capabilities that frighten Russia, the chances of the agreement falling apart drop sharply. Ukraine, too, must build up its capabilities and improve them – whether during a pause, an agreement, a ceasefire, or in the midst of combat operations.

Only Ukraine’s own capabilities are the key factor in everything related to this kind of ceasefire. For a year and a half, there was no de facto ceasefire, although there were various tacit agreements between the parties from time to time. For example, the grain deal and so on, during which neither side struck the other’s facilities.

But note that the grain agreement worked not because Russia concluded it out of the goodness of its heart, but because they feared the consequences from Ukraine. In this case, the consequences from Ukraine were quite significant.

If they had been much more severe, I would have told you right away – and I’ve always said this – the chances that Russia would agree to a favorable energy truce would have risen sharply. And the chances that it would violate it would have fallen sharply.

Because the principle here is simple. If it hurts, you always weigh the situation. Is it worth the trouble? Is it worth striking the enemy if those strikes will be very, very painful for you?

We’ll see. We just have to wait for the outcome and the terms to see how things play out. But there’s been a lot of talk about an energy truce over the past few days.

We know that Ukraine wanted this. Putin pretended that for him, this was a secondary or even tertiary issue. As if causing harm to Ukraine were more important to him. It’s quite likely he was driving up the price, trying to extract additional concessions from the United States. So let’s see what ultimately happened.

Targeting executives is precisely part of the Russian state’s strategy. It’s entirely in line with their playbook.

The Kremlin’s Hunt for Top Executives of European Defense Companies

There are reports of a possible assassination attempt on Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, and the Financial Times reports that the Kremlin has declared a hunt for top executives of European defense companies. Just how high are the risks here, that they have begun to carry out the threats they’ve been making since spring? And what is the goal – to intimidate European partners both at the highest military and political levels and at the level of defense companies?

Politicians – especially those currently in office – and the leadership of private companies are fundamentally different things. Assassination attempts on politicians – the kind where one can link the security services to the plot according to the “rules of the game” – don’t seem to be taking place right now.

I see no point and no reason why Russia would take this step, particularly since it could end badly for its politicians. But with business executives, the circumstances are entirely different.

As for this conspiracy against Polish leaders, we’ll either hear more about it or it won’t be made public. There were some emails sent. Perhaps this is someone’s personal initiative or a scare tactic.

But unlike the attempts to assassinate current Polish politicians for no apparent reason, the assassination of executives is part of the Russian state’s strategy. It’s entirely within the rules of their game. They’ve carried out such attacks before. We know this.

And the goal here isn’t even simply to kill or injure a specific company executive or, perhaps, even a specific engineer – it’s about instilling fear. Russia’s goal is to force Western countries to change their stance on supporting Ukraine. And to that end, an atmosphere of fear is being created.

If you try to carry out actual assassination attempts – even rather clumsy ones – those are real actions. This isn’t just talk. And these actions make many people think twice, particularly certain Western politicians and, specifically, the executives of various companies.

Imagine a businessman or that very top executive who is living the good life, free from worries, working to expand his own operations – everything is going well for him – and suddenly he becomes a person who is a real target for hostile intelligence services. In other words, they have to take risks, fear for their lives, and literally change their circumstances.

And some of these people will ask themselves: “Why do I need this? Why should I go to all this trouble for Ukraine when it’s bringing me so many problems?”

This can have a certain effect. At least, that’s what the Russian intelligence services believe. We know of specific cases like this.

This interview has been condensed, corrected, and edited for better audience understanding.